I decided to get Chalmer's words himself.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?app=desktop&v=yHTiQrrUhUA — Philosophim

Thanks for this! I've seen several of his videos, but hadn't seen this one before.

As long as one does not conclude from this that consciousness exists as some essence apart from the physical reality we live in, its fine. — Philosophim

I can't watch it now. Pushing midnight. So I don't know exactly what he's says, although I've heard and read some of him. But no, that's not there idea. The idea is that, in addition to the physical properties of matter we're familiar with - mass, charge, spin, etc. - properties that we can measure and study with our physical sciences, there is a mental property. Not being physical, we cannot measure and study it with our physical sciences. It is no more removable from matter than mass is. Even though it is not physical, it is not "apart from the physical reality we live in."

Vitalism used to be a solution to a "hard problem" based on the assumption that... — jkop

That hard problem was solved. The HPoC has not been. And the fact that it turned out inorganic and organic compounds are not fundamentally different is not evidence that the same answer will apply to the HPoC.

Now I don't think we're anywhere near a synthesis of consciousness from unconscious compounds, but if seems fairly clear that consciousness is a biological phenomenon. — jkop

All we know is that we are not aware of any consciousness that exists apart from biological entities. We don't know what the connection is between the two things.

I'll leave it to you to read it, but it's a deep question. — Wayfarer

I have. Biosemiotics, beginning with that page in particular, was one of the first things I learned after coming to TPF.

But the interpretation of information is not a physical process, — Wayfarer

Not information created and interpreted by humans. And I know that's what you're talking about. But what about other kinds of information?

For many tiny critters, light hits an eyespot, which sends signals to flagella, which react according to that information.

DNA is a better example. The information encoded in it is the blueprint for amino acids and proteins. The interpretation of that information and the production of the amino acids/proteins is the same process.

Please don't take my disagreement as hostile. :) — Philosophim

It had not crossed my mind. No worries at all.

How would the thought "I am consciously aware" be possible without language? — Janus

I don't know if it is. It seems very difficulty to separate human thought from human language. However, animals have thoughts that don't seem connected with language. Danger. Safe. Food. Mate. Protect. We would have had at least as many before we developed language. (No way to know, but maybe our ability to have thoughts without language reached the point where it couldn't increase further. One day, something finally triggered in someone's head, and they started creating language.)

We reflect on experience and say things like "i saw something red". Perhaps it is that post hoc reflection that makes us think we are sometimes consciously aware. It is only the moments we recall that could make us believe that. Those moments are in the tiny minority. At least for me. — Janus

I did see something red. And I don't need post hoc reflection on such an experience. I can look at something red right now, and reflect on the experience as I'm having it.

Physical processes don't suggest conscious awareness, unless you mean behavior. The physical processes that don't suggest awareness don't suggest the absence of conscious awareness either. Nor do they suggest that awareness could not arise from physical processes.

You ask why subjective awareness at all. Presuming it is a real thing then why not? We have a subjective prejudice that physical stuff could not have subjective experience. Exactly what would be the argument supporting that conclusion? We have nothing to compare our situation with so it remains just an assumption based on intuitive feelings I think. — Janus

You are right about all that. But here's how I see it. I've used this analogy before.

If I saw a skyscraper made entirely of liquid H2O, I'd be awfully suspicious. To my knowledge, the properties of liquid H2O cannot explain a skyscraper. Do those properties suggest the absence/impossibility of skyscrapers? I suppose not. But I'm still thinking it's suspicious.

Of course, we should look into the properties of H2O. It seems to be the only thing we have to work with, after all. Maybe we just aren't aware of all its properties. Maybe we haven't yet thought of all the ways the properties we're aware of can be combined.

But we try and try, and can't find anything to explain it. We don't even have a theory for how it can be. We just keep assuming it must be nothing but liquid H2O, since we can't find anything else involved. So we assume if we gather enough water, we'll eventually see how it makes skyscrapers.

I think the case for consciousness is even more difficult to explain. At least H2O and skyscrapers both have physical properties, and no suggestion of non-physical properties. Even processes like flight, metabolism, and vision can be seen to come from purely physical foundations. Subjective experience cannot. The properties of matter that we know of, and have measured to an amazing degree, do not suggest subjective experience.

The argument for reductionism I hear most often is, just because we haven't figured it out with our sciences yet, doesn't mean we won't. My opinion is the fact that we haven't should not be considered evidence that we will. Nor is there evidence that the things we are aware of because of our sciences are the only things that exist. The different nature of subjective experience, on the other hand, suggests something different is involved.

The HPoC is why the unconscious responses are accompanied by the conscious awareness, rather than going on "in the dark." They can go on in the dark, as they do in the non-biological machines we've made that can perceive and differentiate different frequencies of the electromagnetic spectrum, and act in different ways in response to different frequencies. The physical processes that take place within us don't suggest conscious awareness. The physical properties of particles (mass, charge, spinn, etc.) don't suggest conscious awareness. So why the redness of red, or the sweetness of sugar? Why subjective experience at all?

How would those different frequencies be "perceived" if not in the form of different colours? — Janus

We have machines that can differentiate different frequencies. For them, it's binary code.
BLACK
00000000
00000000
00000000

RED
11111111
00000000
00000000

WHITE
11111111
11111111
11111111

BLUE
00000000
00000000
11111111

I don't know nearly enough of how our visual system works. My Behe quote stops with a current being transmitted down the optic nerve to the brain. I don't know what happens there. But nothing red or blue happens.

As you say, re: the rock's possible subjective experience, we simply assume not. So, possibly (but unlikely) the rock could be suppressing it's selfhood from expressing as behavior so as to keep its selfhood hidden from observers. — ucarr

Another (unlikely) possibility is the rock subjectively experiences, but has no capability of expressing any behaviors. Maybe it's exactly what we think it is, but conscious.

Ludwig said,
"The basis of rationality is the discovery of what brings success and what brings failure."
If you try to build your hut's support beams out of jellyfish, Shaka, when the walls fell. If you think rationally, you'll try something else. If you are a poor swimer, it would be irrational to try to swim home. You don't have to attempt to explain anything to anybody.

Most of our memories just come when we want them. "Trying to remember" is possible, though I don't find that I know exactly what I do when I'm trying or even succeeding. It just happens - or not. — Ludwig V

I wish I could remember the tv show I saw one time, lo these many years ago. Sadly, decades. One charter told another that she could remember much greater detail if she tried to walk through it slowly, step by step. That's why I do it the way I do. Only a few days, before any memories fade away. I start with a detail that I remember well. Then I move forward. As slowly as I can. When I do that, I remember little things you wouldn't normally. Glance over because someone coughed, and notice their blue shirt. You never know what you'll dredge up.

The basis of rationality is the discovery of what brings success and what brings failure. Then there's all the learning from those around us, including what counts as success/failure. — Ludwig V

But therr are irrational proper. I wonder how many different reasons there are for that. The baby's brain grows/is wired as those things are happening, because that's what the DNA designed it to do. What if it gets no interaction? Does the brain wire badly? Does a time come when it is too late for things to work out well, no matter what happens? And what about irrational people who got the interaction that works best in the vast majority of cases?

What is really weird is that I've noticed that sometimes I know that I've remembered before I've remembered the details. — Ludwig V

Sure. I don't have to sing Hey Jude to know I know all the words, or recite my children's birth dates and Social Security numbers to knows I know them.

Surely it is possible to remember a sequence of events without visualizing them? Actually, for me, it's not a choice. The sequence of events since I last had it occurs to me without pictures. — Ludwig V

I don't know. it never occurred to me to try. I just automatically start visualizing the events. I don't know how I would do it. Lol.
"Ok, after I paid, I put the card back in my wallet. When it was in my wallet, I put it in my back pocket. I grabbed my bags, a couple in each hand, and walked to the car. I opened the car door, put the bags in, took my wallet out and threw it on the passenger seat. I don't remember taking it off the seat when I took the groceries in. AH!! Maybe it fell between the seat and the door!"

How would I know I did those things if I wasn't picturing the sequence of events in my head??

It is NOT that we don't understand that the brain causes subjective experiences. — Philosophim

Yes and No. Yes, we know that it happens in the brain. No, we do not know HOW. That's the HPoC.

And I'll note again, the only reason we cannot figure out how physical processes give rise to the subjective experiences of the mind is because we have no way of objectively knowing what it is to hold that subjective experience, because you must BE that being having that subjective experience. — Philosophim

I am the being having the subjective experience. That does not help me understand how it is achieved.

These things change various aspects of how the brain works, and, therefore, what we subjectively experience. They don't address how it is that we subjectively experience them at all. That's the HPoC.
— Patterner

No, that's the easy problem.
"For Chalmers, the easy problem is making progress in explaining cognitive functions and discovering how they arise from physical processes in the brain. The hard problem is accounting for why these functions are accompanied by conscious experience." — Philosophim

That quote explains it nicely. But you are misinterpreting it. Let me try this approach. This is from Darwin's Black Box, by Michael Behe. (Think what you want of his overall conclusions regarding a designer. But her knows the science.).

Here is a brief overview of the biochemistry of vision. When light first strikes the retina, a photon interacts with a molecule called 11-cis-retinal, which rearranges within picoseconds to trans-retinal. The change in the shape of retinal forces a change in the shape of the protein, rhodopsin, to which the retinal is tightly bound. The protein's metamorphosis alters its behavior, making it stick to another protein called transducin. Before bumping into activated rhodopsin, transducin had tightly bound a small molecule called GDP. But when transducin interacts with activated rhodopsin, the GDP falls off and a molecule called GTP binds to transducin. (GTP is closely related to, but critically different from, GDP.)

GTP-transducin-activated rhodopsin now binds to a protein called phosphodiesterase, located in the inner membrane of the cell. When attached to activated rhodopsin and its entourage, the phosphodiesterase acquires the ability to chemically cut a molecule called cGMP (a chemical relative of both GDP and GTP). Initially there are a lot of cGMP molecules in the cell, but the phosphodiesterase lowers its concentration, like a pulled plug lowers the water level in a bathtub.

Another membrane protein that binds cGMP is called an ion channel. It acts as a gateway that regulates the number of sodium ions in the cell. Normally the ion channel allows sodium ions to flow into the cell, while a separate protein actively pumps them out again. The dual action of the ion channel and pump keeps the level of sodium ions in the cell within a narrow range. When the amount of cGMP is reduced because of cleavage by the phosphodiesterase, the ion channel closes, causing the cellular concentration of positively charged sodium ions to be reduced. This causes an imbalance of charge across the cell membrane which, finally, causes a current to be transmitted down the optic nerve to the brain. The result, when interpreted by the brain, is vision. — Michael Behe

That is the Easy Problem. That is how we perceive a portion of the electromagnetic spectrum. There is TONS more detail in this, and we could go much further, mapping out how we can differentiated different frequencies within that portion of the spectrum. And how our perceptions are stored in the brain, and how that stored information can then be compared to future perceptions of that portion of the spectrum. And how we report on our perceptions.

All of that is the Easy Problem. Not "easy" as in "a piece of cake." But easy as in we understand how to go about it.

We do not know how to go about the HP. That's why it's named the Hard. Because we don't know. How is all of that subjectively experienced? People like Tse, Damasio, and Gazzaniga begin their books by saying we do not know. Koch just paid off his 25 year bet to Chalmers because we haven't figured it out. Physicist Brian Greene says there are no known properties of matter that even hint at such a thing. Why do I see red, rather than just perceive different frequencies, the way a robot with an electric eye might? Why do I feel pain, rather than just perceive damage to my body, the way a robot that's wrapped in a sensory web might? These things can, and do, take place without any subjective experience. How is the subjective experience accomplished in us?

Is factually incorrect. Chalmer’s argument is directed at the inadequacy of physical accounts to accurately capture first-person experience, yours or anyone else’s.
— Wayfarer

Didn't you and I already address this on your first response to me? My point was that the heart of why this was is because we cannot know what its like to be another subjective individual. — Philosophim

You may have addressed it, but you are still using an inaccurate definition of the HPoC. As J pointed out early on:

The hard problem is, "Will we ever know what it is like to BE a conscious individual that isn't ourselves".
— Philosophim

Just for the record, that isn't the standard way of stating the problem, and it isn't David Chalmers' way (he coined the phrase). You can listen to Chalmers describe it here: He defines the problem as "how physical processes in the brain give rise to subjective experiences in the mind." When we solve this problem (I do believe it's when, not if) we may or may not know "what it's like" to be someone else. That's a separate, though perhaps related, issue. — J

Alright, then try to counter these points, because these points note that our autonomy is physical.

1. Drugs that affect mood and decisions. A person getting cured of schizophrenia by medication for example.

2. The removal of the brain or physical processes that result in life from the brain, and the inability of autonomy to persist.

3. Brain damage resulting in differing behaviors and consciousness. — Philosophim

These things change various aspects of how the brain works, and, therefore, what we subjectively experience. They don't address how it is that we subjectively experience them at all. That's the HPoC.

Cool. At least we got one thing settled. :rofl:

I'm thinking maybe the capacity to think rationally is hardwired in. But we must learn how it works.

That is indeed different from the situation I was thinking of; yours is a much longer-term problem. In that case, you are adopting the same approach as me, excepting that I don't visualize. — Ludwig V

How do you approach this without visualizing? I will picture in my mind my exact movements, to whatever degree I'm able to remember, like trying to watch a movie of the events.

The ground for my rational thinking or beliefs is the training and education that I got in my youth.
— Ludwig V
Sorry I don't see a logical link between the ground for your rational thinking or beliefs and the training and education in your youth. Could you elaborate further? — Corvus

Can you give any examples of what might constitute a ground for someone's rational thinking or beliefs?

When I'm at a cash desk, the range of possibilities is limited, so I just start checking them all. — Ludwig V

We maybe talking about different things. This sentence makes it sound as though you are physically checking the pockets. I'm talking about sometime later, possibly several days. (So, it might not be a wallet, since I would probably notice that was missing much sooner.) I can't physically check every possible place where something might have been left between the last time I know I had it and now. So I think back to that last time I had it, and start visualizing everything that I can from that point forward.

Is that what you're talking about?

FTR, Bach did not write any symphonies.

Very interesting. I wouldn't know if I put it in a pocket, or wherever, if I didn't visualize. I wouldn't even know how to approach the problem.

If I can't find my wallet, I think back to the last time I remember having it, then replay as much of what I've done since then, and hope to remember enough detail to "see" where I left it. I do that in images, not words.
— Patterner
I do the same thing, but in words, not images. — Ludwig V

That's fascinating. If the last time I'm sure I had my wallet was at the register in the grocery store, I'll picture taking my debit card out of the keypad, and try to see exactly what I did with it. Put it in my wallet? Then what? Did I put my wallet into my pocket? Jacket or pants? Did I put the wallet down and bag some groceries? Did I put my wallet into a bag that I was packing? Did the cashier say or do anything to distract me? If so, was it before I put my wallet into my pocket? On and on. But always picturing the scene. I'll usually close my eyes, so what's in front of me doesn't distract me.

No. They're usually in the neighborhood of $20/dozen.

Indeed. Darmok is one of the stupidest great episodes.

I encountered someone once who told me that he thought in images. Specifically, when he was packing a suitcase, he would lay out everything he was taking and visualize how they could be placed in the suitcase. When he had a satisfactory visualization, he would pack the suitcase. He said it worked. I was sceptical, but had no ground for arguing with him. I think it is possible. There's been some empirical work on this in psychology, and it seems that some people say they never think in images, but many say they do, at least sometimes. — Ludwig V

That makes sense. For certain things/in certain situations, like packing a suitcase, i would think thinking in words would be a hindrance.

If I can't find my wallet, I think back to the last time I remember having it, then replay as much of what I've done since then, and hope to remember enough detail to "see" where I left it. I do that in images, not words.

I was thinking there are people who claim they never think in words. If there are such people, I would like to know how they have conversations.

But if every such threat is evil, then the world is filled with evil, and has been since before humans came on the scene.
— Patterner
That seems to imply that some threats are good - or maybe neutral. But surely such threats would be a promise, if good, and neither here not there if neutral. — Ludwig V

I don't think a wolf bringing down prey is more evil than an avalanche burying the same victim. I think there needs to be malicious internet for evil to be present. And that means humans.

Non-physical, to me, means non existent. — Mark Nyquist

My main point is that the hard problem really is a secondary problem. The question of physically contained non-physicals is primary to understanding consciousness. — Mark Nyquist

I don't understand. Are non-physicals physically contained? Or are they non-existent?

Non-physical, to me, means non-physical. I wouldn't see how the fact that there are physical things rules out the possibility that there are non-physical things.

And examining the context we see full input and output capabilities, connections with the biological organism, location in space and time, that is fully consistent with what consciousness is. — Mark Nyquist

But that does not explain consciousness. Why is the full input and output capabilities, connections with the biological organism, location in space and time, accompanied by subjective experience? Why does it not all take place 'in the dark'?

And yes, We create the very concept of evil. That's my point.
— Patterner
So do we create the concept of a threat? Or a llama?

We show that we have understood a concept by the way we behave. Our linguistic behaviour is the quickest and most accurate (but not absolutely accurate) way of showing what understanding we have, but our non-linguistic behaviour does also show that understanding. There can be ambiguity in both llinghistic and non-linguistic behaviour. But many of them (maybe all) can, in principle, be cleared up on further investigation.
Whether "threat" or "bad" or "evil" is the best way of describing the llamas' behaviour is simply not clear from the information we have. Any of them would be a reasonable explanation for what we know. We would need a good deal more information to clarify that.
You seem to be wanting to get inside the heads of the llamas. We don't need to get inside the head of anyone, animal or not. That's just as well, because it's not possible to get inside anyone's head. — Ludwig V

A wolf is a threat to a llama, no question about it. But if every such threat is evil, then the world is filled with evil, and has been since before humans came on the scene.

Is that right? Has the world been filled with evil since before humans came on the scene?

Some people say that they think in images. That would be independent of language. — Ludwig V

I very much wish I knew one of these people, so I could talk with them and ask many questions.

When you stand at a scenic lookout, are you really describing the vista to yourself in sentences - or do your eyes and mind take it in and transcribe it later - maybe only a few seconds later? Do you look at a painting or hear a concerto in words? — Vera Mont

I love this!!

often enough, we try to transcribe the experience into words. it is never successful. But, surely, there is some kind of thinking involved in the experience itself. And particularly with the painting and concerto, since very specific thinking is involved during the creation.

We're special because we have all these extra capabilities that raise us above the other animals, but when we dig ourselves into trouble, it's because the special capabilities are unequal to the animal instincts. I'm saying neither the animal instincts nor yet our helplessness to control them, are responsible for our messes. We do control them. We make laws, practice monogamy, have celibate monastic orders, teetotalers and anorexic teenaged girls. Instincts don't lead to genocide. It's the extra special faculties, the facility for narrative, that creates the evil that we do - and the very concept of evil. — Vera Mont

I think our special capabilities allow us to ignore the animal instincts. Obviously, that's not always a good idea. As you say, genocide. Otoh, they allow us to do some amazing things. It's difficult to say the amazing outweighs the genocide, but we're stuck with both edges of the sword.

And yes, We create the very concept of evil. That's my point.

I've often heard that language shapes our thinking, and is literally responsible for aspects of how our brains become wired. If that is so, then there must be thinking humans do that no other species does, and our brains must become wired in ways no others species' brains are. No?
— Patterner
Very good. But then the brains of bats and dolphins must be wired differently from ours, because they have specialized abilities that we do not - and just as their specialized abilities have evolved from ancestors that did not have those abilities, so our specialized skills must have evolved from ancestors that did not speak human languages. But again, in both cases, we would expect to find precursors or simple beginnings in those ancestors and we cannot exclude similar skills that have developed differently in other creatures. — Ludwig V

I don't understand what you mean by "we cannot exclude similar skills that have developed differently in other creatures." What would be an example?

Could be. Is it possible that human language couldn't exist if we were not capable of abstract thought?
— Patterner

I'm more inclined to argue that abstract thought couldn't exist if we were not capable of language. The truth most likely is that the two developed together. — Ludwig V

Yeah, I imagine they fed off of each other. But it's interesting to think of someone who had no language thinking abstract thoughts.

They may not conceive of 'evil' in human monster terms, but they do classify entire other species as 'bad'. — Vera Mont

No, certainly not 'evil.' But I think even 'bad' is a stretch. I wouldn't think we are safe with anything more than 'threat' and 'not threat.'

They make excellent guards for sheep, I've heard and will spit and kick at predators. But they can become accustomed to dogs in a domestic setting. — Vera Mont

I don't see how this, or anything else, makes them evil. I also don't know how we know what llamas believe about them.

Deservedly so! My mind's eye was looking at a square, but my fingers only got half the message. :sad: — Vera Mont

"half the message" is an excellent response! :grin:

It's all very strange to think about, eh? Could someone telepathically share their experience with me without also sharing all of their memories that make the particular experience what it is? Would the feeling of nostalgia automatically come with all relevant memories, since they must be actively remembered to some degree for them to feel it? Or would I get just the feeling, and not know what it's about?

Llamas believe all wolves are evil?

The angles of triangles add up to 360 degrees? (Just bustin' on your for this one. :grin: )

The hard problem is, "Will we ever know what it is like to BE a conscious individual that isn't ourselves".
— Philosophim

Just for the record, that isn't the standard way of stating the problem, and it isn't David Chalmers' way (he coined the phrase). You can listen to Chalmers describe it here: He defines the problem as "how physical processes in the brain give rise to subjective experiences in the mind." When we solve this problem (I do believe it's when, not if) we may or may not know "what it's like" to be someone else. That's a separate, though perhaps related, issue. — J

:up:

An interesting dilemma follows from the idea of "experiencing what X [someone else] experiences." — J

Rather, an interesting dilemma would follow from the idea of "experiencing what X [someone else] experiences," if it was possible to experience what X experiences. I don't suspect that will ever be possible, regardless off what the solution to the Hard Problem turns out to be.

It seems to me that abstract thought, thought about generalities may be impossible without langauge. — Janus

Could be. Is it possible that human language couldn't exist if we were not capable of abstract thought?

Self-reflection seems to me to depend on human language so I'm willing to let that go. — Ludwig V

I've often heard that language shapes our thinking, and is literally responsible for aspects of how our brains become wired. If that is so, then there must be thinking humans do that no other species does, and our brains must become wired in ways no others species' brains are. No?

So what we call reflective self-awareness which some would say elevates us above the other animals I would say is not anything different in any phenomenologically immediate sense than simple awareness of or sense of difference between self and other, but merely the post hoc narrative about our self-awareness which language enables us to tell. — Janus

Is there anything we think that no other species thinks? Or do we think nothing that is uniquely human, but we're the only ones who have the language to express it all?

Thanks. I should look into him. I know his philosophies were a huge basis of Julian May's Galactic Milieu series, which is an incredible scifi/fantasy series about humanity gaining psionic abilities.