I'm a property dualist. I don't think consciousness is something separate from the body. I think it is a property of everything, every particle, like mass and charge. You can't remove mass from matter, and you can't remove consciousness from matter.

Would you, for instance, accept that physicalism is unable to account for consciousness? — Tom Storm

I am very firmly in that camp.

This post has several of the usual quotes about it.

Consciousness is not physical. Although it is inextricably bound to the physical, and doesn't exist without a physical component (at least we are not aware of any consciousness without a physical component), it is not, itself, physical. It does not have any physical properties, like charge, mass, density, hardness. It does not have physical characteristics, like size, hardness, and weight. We cannot measure it's speed, direction, or any other characteristics of physical processes. It cannot be sensed with any of our senses, or our technology. It is not describable with mathematics.

Physical things - objects and/or processes - build physical things. There is no logic or evidence for the idea that physical things can build non-physical things. And there is no theory, not even a guess from those who assume physicalism must be the answer to consciousness, as to how it can happen.

It doesn't make sense for purely physical structures and processes to evolve for purely physical reasons, without consciousness being selected for, without anything directing the evolution in order to bring about consciousness, yet one day find themselves in a configuration from which consciousness emerges. That scenario is absolutely bizarre.

I think everything is just stuff. I think everything has a non-physical property. An experiential property. Which doesn't mean everything is thinking. But everything is experiencing.

Premise 2: Physical causes and effects, by themselves, have no meaning or “aboutness.” — Tom Storm

Actually, I disagree with this one, also. :grin: But, iirc, you disagree with my reason. I think DNA means something it is not. I think the codons mean amino acids, and the strings of codons mean proteins. And teams of molecules use that information to assemble the amino acids and proteins. Meaning without thinking or intelligence.

Which means I disagree with Premise 4.

But I like 3!

How would you change that premise to retain the thrust of the argument? — Tom Storm

I can't imagine. I think three of his four premises are wrong, so they cannot lead to his conclusion. I think he needs another argument entirely to come to that conclusion.

Premise 1: Naturalism explains everything in terms of physical causes and effects.
Premise 2: Physical causes and effects, by themselves, have no meaning or “aboutness.”
Premise 3: Human thoughts, beliefs, and concepts are intentional—they are about things and can be true or false.
Premise 4: Intentionality (aboutness, meaning, truth) cannot be reduced to or derived from purely physical processes.
Conclusion: Therefore, naturalism cannot fully explain intentionality; the intelligibility of thought points beyond purely naturalistic causes.

Premise 4 would be the most controversial one. It's actually this premise I want elaboration on. It’s interesting because, instead of obsessing over consciousness, this argument treats a single attribute as foundational to a rather complex argument. — Tom Storm

Premise 1 is the one I think is flawed. Natural and physical are not synonyms. Anything in this universe is natural. It can't be otherwise. If there is something non-physical in this universe, then it is natural, and can be part of the explanation of some things.

We are living, thinking expressions of the principles of the universe. I think it wouldn't make sense if an entity with whatever minimal degree of mental ability that tried to understand the principles of the universe from which it grew couldn't recognize them. We evolved to recognize patterns
— Patterner

I’m certainly aware that this is a commonly held view. I don’t know whether it’s correct. — Tom Storm

Which part do you question? That there are consistent principles at work in the universe? That our evolution took place within those principles, and we operate within them and they operate within us? That success for a living thing means continued life, and we would not continue to live if we didn't recognize the consistencies?

By that last one, I mean an archae would not survive if its archaellum (flagellum) didn't act consistently to the signals it receives, or it receives inconsistent signals. On another level, we would not survive if we did not react consistently to the visual stimulus of approaching cars, or the signals from our retinas regarding approaching cars was inconsistent.

I can't help you with Hart. But it's not just our experience of the world that suggests those patterns, it's everything about our physical construction. We are living, thinking expressions of the principles of the universe. I think it wouldn't make sense if an entity with whatever minimal degree of mental ability that tried to understand the principles of the universe from which it grew couldn't recognize them. We evolved to recognize patterns. If there is consistency, and we can't recognize it, we die. How could we develop a mathematical system in which 2+2=17?

The universe has order, regularities, patterns. If it did not, it would not exist. If protons sometimes stuck to each other when they were pressed close enough together, but not other times; or if opposite charges sometimes attracted each other, but not always; or if light sometimes traveled at c, but not always; or if 1+1 sometimes equaled 2 bit not always... What would such a reality look like?

But in this reality, things are consistent. And our brains - as well as everything else in the universe - came to be, and are founded, in those consistent principles. Why would our brains not recognize them?

I guess this is as tricky as anything else, eh? :grin:

I've never heard of this line of thinking, so I can't say further thought and discussion on it won't change my mind. But at the moment, my stance is no, there is no proposition outside of the thoughts of those entities who understand what is being discussed. If Props A and B can, or should, or will lead to C, it will only be in the thoughts of such entities. Write A and B, and all the rules and explanations of Propositions, in a book, and it will never lead to C until such an entity reads it and thinks the next step.

↪Patterner Perhaps someday we will. But, I don't disagree. I mean, how many "thoughts start in the Gut?" For lack of better wording... consciousness is merely the final plane of awareness. That said I believe will on will is the only causality. The inner will of energy being "the will to power." — DifferentiatingEgg

I can't say I fully understand what you mean, but I like the direction you're going. What is "will on will"? Are you saying only agents with will can cause anything?

The question of causation only enters, possibly, when a particular mind thinks Prop A and Prop B. — J

I don't follow. What else could it be other than thoughts? Certainly, if you write Props A and B in a book, and even if you also write everything about syllogisms, then close the book, Prop C isn't going to spontaneously appear in the book. But explain syllogisms to someone, then let them hear or read Props A and B, and...

In what way can a proposition be "merely" a proposition, and not a thought?

And clearly it's contingent: If I'm simply no good at elementary logic, thinking Props A and B will not cause me to think Prop C, no matter the entailment. — J

That's true. But Props A and B will cause some thought or other. Possibly "What the hell are they talking about? Who is Socrates?" That didn't spring into the person's thoughts for no reason.

Can you give me an example of the kind of proposition you have in mind?

I really don't know what you mean by entailment. I don't think there's any such thing as a "correct conclusion" where this topic is concerned. It's not a math problem. One thought causes another thought. Largely because of memories it triggers. It might also be influenced by other thoughts that are bouncing around in your mind at the same time, medical and environmental factors that are also in play at the time, and whatever other things. But A, B, and C would almost certainly not be thinking the consequent thoughts they have if I hadn't put Kant in their minds, and it is very likely they would be thinking their consequent thoughts after I put Kant in their minds, regardless of any factors other than memory.

Thanks for all that! I'll have to look up most of what you're saying to try to figure out what you're saying.

Or, if they are not causal in this sense, don't we need another explanation besides logical entailment? If I think "If A, then B; A" and then think "therefore B", has entailment produced this result? — J

Yes.

If I put the thought Kant in person A's head, their next thought is Critique of Pure Reason.
If I put Kant in B's head, their next thought is Monty Python.
If I put Kant in C's head, their next thought is West Wing.

None of the consequent thoughts, Critique of Pure Reason, Monty Python, or West Wing, would be thoughts of those respective people if Kant had not come first. All were caused by Kant. But there are obviously other factors, or all would have had the same consequent thought. Each person's consequent thought logically followed Kant, because each person has different memories associated with Kant.

That's how one thought causes another.

The final phenomena appears before our consciousness — DifferentiatingEgg

It seems to me figuring out what that means/how it works is the most important thing. And we all have different guesses.

Surely, a thought needs to be thought?
— Patterner

This again brings up the equivocation in what the word "thought" can represent -- either a proposition, or the mental/brain event whose content is that proposition. — J

Whatever the definition, a thought has to be thought. I wasn't sure if jkop was saying otherwise.

I think the relation between thoughts is logical, not causal. The necessity of a conclusion that follows from a set of premises is a brute fact that does not need to be thought or caused. — jkop

Surely, a thought needs to be thought?

Indeed, a coordinate system is an abstraction and thus can have its origin placed anywhere. My only nit on your post is the 13.5 BLY. Why that? Certainly somebody could place an origin a trillion LY from here without running into problems. Our particular typical assignment of 'here' does not concern any part of the universe that has not dependence on human notice. — noAxioms

True enough. I just went with the known universe.

I mean, there can be multiple heres and nows, but still the fact is that I'm only seeing one of them, and how come it's this one if they are all here and now, shouldn't I be seeing them all? — bizso09

No. Because, while you are here, experiencing this coordinate zero, other coordinate zeros are everywhere, in all directions, up to about 13.5 BLY from you. How could you experience the coordinate zero that Arcturus experiences?

argue that in the world, the You is an absolute global unique fact. It's coordinate zero so to speak. There are no multiple coordinate zeros, unless there are multiple disjoint worlds, at which point one of the worlds would become the true coordinate zero again. — bizso09

The are multiple coordinate zeros in regards to cosmology. I don't see all of this as a contradiction. I just see it as us not understanding things as well as as we could, and hopefully will. It's not how we think of things. Yet it's true.

No, it's not a fifth person. It is merely a reference point, or pointer, i.e. a window of first person perspective. It is not a physical being, soul or spirit, but merely just an additional fact of the world. The physical beings are the four people listed in the puzzle, along with their respective experiences. — bizso09

Ah. I also misunderstood.

Well, for sure, the world is not self-contradictory.

I think the assumption that "you" has a referent separate from Bob or Alice is the problem.

EITHER there's some spirit soul thing, a ghost going around to these bodies inhabiting them, in which case there's no paradox because there is a real difference

OR there are not these spirits and souls, and then there's no "you" that isn't synonymous with Bob, or synonymous with Alice, and there's no paradox. — flannel jesus

If I have a soul that goes into another body, then it's still me. No?

If I do not have a soul, then there is nothing to go into another body.

No contradiction either way.

I think a 'you' already implies a particular biological being so that you cannot just transport a non-physical kind of essence of a 'you' that stays the same to another body. — ChatteringMonkey

Yes. There is no "This is what it's like for me to be Alice" and "This is what it's like for me to be Bob".

Specifically the book Zen Mind Beginner's Mind. This is a Sōtō Zen text which stresses the 'ordinary mind' practice. Ordinary mind teachings suggest that enlightenment is not a distant, supernatural state to be achieved in a future life, but is found in the natural, unconditioned state of one’s own mind during everyday activities. — Wayfarer

"If you continue this simple practice every day, you will obtain some wonderful power. Before you attain it, it is something wonderful, but after you attain it, it is nothing special."

Where is the quote about before you attain enlightenment, you put on your robe and eat your rice. But after you obtain enlightenment, you put on your robe and eat your rice.

Edit:. I might be thinking the same book.
"To have some deep feeling about Buddhism is not the point; we just do what we should do, like eating supper and going to bed. This is Buddhism."

But at the same time, this "ordinary" mind is not the habitual, reactive mind filled with habitual tendencies, judgment and grasping, but rather a state of "no-doing" or wu wei. — Wayfarer

Yet nothing is left undone.

The idea would be more that energy is fundamentally intelligent, directed. — Janus

Can you say anything else about this? Any idea how energy is intelligent? (I agree that it is not the same as consciousness.) What is the intelligence directed towards, and how is the intelligence accomplished?

This is what I think I understand: the mind is not a detached observer, and the body is not merely a machine. They exist together, intertwined within a single field of lived experience. From this perspective, the traditional problem of interaction or dualism might be said to dissolve. Phenomenology does not assume that mind and body are two independent entities that must somehow be connected. Instead, it understands them as co-emerging, inseparable aspects of the way we inhabit and experience the world. Yet it seems to me we can ask whether this really addresses the heart of the mind–body problem, or simply reframes it in a more elegant way, substituting abstract categories like “lived experience” for concrete questions about causality, consciousness, and physical reality that first give rise to the apparent problem. — Tom Storm

Indeed. certainly, mind and body are one, and inseparable. But, for those interested in such things, we still need an explanation.

On this view it would be energy which would be understood to be fundamental and consciousness (or mind, instinct or intelligence) would be included as being an ineliminable aspect of energy insofar as it behaves in a lawlike manner and constitutes the structures and processes we call "things" in an intelligent and intelligible manner. Any quality I can think of seems to be unintelligible if thought of as lacking energy. — Janus

I'm not sure what the idea is here. If consciousness is an aspect of the energy, what other aspects does this energy have? What does it do? Do you mean the energy is electromagnetism, and consciousness is an aspect of that? Or some other form of energy?

But once consciousness is treated as a property alongside physical properties, it immediately raises the question: why do certain physical configurations instantiate this additional property at all — Joshs

All physical configurations, or at least all particles, instantiate the property. Here's my position...

This property is what gives everything the ability to subjectively experience. Subjective experience, however, does not mean thinking, awareness, self awareness, emotion, and various other things that are generally labeled as "human consciousness". What we are conscious of is not what consciousness is. self-awareness is not consciousness. Self-awareness is our subjective experience of information processing and feedback loops. Emotions aren't consciousness. Emotions are our subjective experience of things likeneurotransmitters. Memory isn't consciousness. Memory is our subjective experience of stored information being referenced.

The subjective experience of a particle is very different from, and I would say very much less than, the subjective experience of people. Particles do not have any information processing, neurotransmitters or other chemicals, information storage, etc. They do not have sensory apparatus to give them input from the outside world or from within. There is, in fact, no within for a particle. So it's consciousness is of very little. Simple existence.

We still have a world described completely in third-person terms, to which experiential properties are added as something extra. — Joshs

Not "added as something extra." No more than mass is added as something extra to charge. All properties are there all the time, all doing what they do. The fact there we describe the world in third-person terms in order to understand certain things, and use them to our advantage, is not there world's fault. It is what it is. We might want to think of it, and our place in it, differently.

For Husserl and Heidegger, the mistake lies in taking “the physical world” as something already fully constituted as neutral, objective, and affectless, and then asking how consciousness gets added to it. That picture is a theoretical abstraction derived from scientific practice, not a description of the world as it is originally given. The world is first encountered as meaningful, relevant, and affectively structured. Neutral objectivity is a derivative achievement, produced by bracketing relevance, concern, and involvement, not the metaphysical ground floor. — Joshs

That all sounds good to me!

Property dualism remains wedded to the hard problem of it accepts a conception of the physical as fully intelligible without reference to the qualitative intelligibility dimension of experience. — Joshs

How can anything be intelligible without an intelligencer experiencing it?

The question “Why is there something it is like?” remains unavoidable. — Joshs

The answer is, because it is a property of the universe.


It seems to me that you insist it all must be viewed in a certain way. I disagree. I think it is all one; the universe experiencing itself all the time. Each part experiencing according its nature.

Hi. Sorry, I'm crazy busy at work, and can't even read all that you wrote, much less respond to it. But I wanted to just say this...

On the surface your account sounds as if you are rejecting the inner/outer split, but property dualism usually preserves and stabilizes the hard problem rather than dissolving it. — Joshs

If the hard problem is how physical things and processes can build/create non-physical consciousness, then those doors not preserve the hp. Consciousness does not arise from the physical. It's there with the physical all along.

But this makes it sound as though there is more than one real world; that physics effectively captures the reality of an aspect of it (the physical) and we need another explanation alongside of it for something like consciousness. This is dualism, a reification of the hard problem. If instead we claim that the phrase ‘physical world’ is not describing a world that is real in the sense of being real independent of our conscious interaction with it, then we are doing phenomenology. This dissolves the dualism of the hard problem by showing there to be a single underlying process of experiencing accounting for the historical decision to bifurcate the world into concepts like ‘physically real’ and ‘real in other ways’. — Joshs

I claim that the phrase ‘physical world’ is not describing a world that is real in the sense of being real independent of our conscious interaction with it. I believe our consciousness and the physical world cannot be separated. That's what property dualism means. We can't remove the experiential property from particles any more than we can remove mass or charge from them. The bifurcation doesn't exist. But we ignore some properties at times. We don't concern ourselves with charge or consciousness when we calculate the path of a baseball after it leaves the bat. If we want to know why the ball bounces off the bat, we'll have to talk about the negative charge of the election shells. We don't talk about mass or charge when we discuss consciousness.

The idea that everything is physical does not entail that everything can be explained in terms of physics. The apprehension of the meaning of a poem might be a neural, that is physical, process, but the meaning apprehended cannot be explained in terms of physics. — Janus

I've been arguing this very thing for the few years I've been here.

Even the activities of cells cannot be understood without introducing the idea of signs (biosemiotics). — Janus

Ah. Yeah. How is it that codons mean amino acids, and strings of codons mean proteins. Sure, everything about them and the whole process of protein synthesis is physics. But that doesn't solve the mystery.

Biology cannot adequately be explained in terms of physics. — Janus

How do you mean? Any particular aspects of biology?

The internal combustion engine is well understood. The understanding of its workings were not the kind of thing I had in mind when I spoke of scientific theories. — Janus

You said "certainty is never obtained in the hard sciences." I would think that includes everything involved in the internal combustion engine. And it's true. Just because gravity works the way it does, and has every moment we are aware of, doesn't mean we have scientific proof that it will work that way tomorrow.

I think it is undeniably true that most of human life cannot be explained in terms of physics. On the other hand physics certainly seems to be the basis of chemistry and chemistry the basis of life and life the basis of consciousness, and even if this is so it still doesn't follow that emergent systems can necessarily be understood comprehensively in terms of the systems they emerge from. Try understanding poetry, art or music in terms of physics, or even biology, and see how far you get. — Janus

That's because those things, and most of human life, only exist because of consciousness. What emergent system that doesn't involve consciousness can't be explained in terms of physics?

The irony is that certainty is never obtained in the hard sciences. No scientific theory can ever be proven to be true. While many people fail to understand this fact, it may be that many, or even most, scientists do not fail to understand it. — Janus

Sure. But we don't say, "Well, we can't prove the combustion engine works the way we think it does for the reasons we think it does, so there's no point in making any. After all, what reason do we have to think the next one we make will work?

On the other hand it is possible, although it can never be proven, that the former exist only because of the latter. — Janus

We certainly are not aware of the existence of the former without the latter.

What the 'explanatory gap' and 'hard problem' arguments are aimed at, is precisely that claim. That everything is reducible to or explainable in terms of the physical. That is the point at issue! — Wayfarer

They make clear that everything is not reducible to or explainable in terms of the physical.

“We want to know not only that such-and-such is the case, but also why it is the case. If nature is one large, lawful, orderly system, as the materialist (or the naturalist) insists, then it should be possible to explain the occurrence of any part of that system in terms of basic principles that govern nature as a whole.” — Levine

Of course. The problem is assuming the things we know from our physical sciences are a complete list of the basic principles that govern nature.

Of course it is. That's the entire topic of this conversation. How does consciousness come about?

Well, here is a link to the Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scale DASS-42 test to see how you're feeling — Questioner

Ah. Self-reporting. I thought you meant some kind of measuring device.

You've never heard of megahurts? — wonderer1

Is that something that hurts an awful lot? Like "I'm gonna put you in a world of pain!" :grin:

Assuming you mean megahertz, yes, I've heard of it. I was not listing every unit of measurement. I was only giving a few examples.


Edit: Or did you mean emotions are measured in megahertz?

Are you suggesting there are not ways to determine how a person feels? — Questioner

Any time someone says they measured something, they give the measurement in units. 83 decibels. 25 cm. 100 mps. -30 inHg. That kind of thing. I would like to hear about the measurements of emotion, from any one of the "whole battery of tests."