I've only read the OP so far. Apologies if I'm repeating what's been said.

Does the information appear in our minds when we read our PC screen? Neither would be the case, is my theory. We function as another reader who transcribes and in which effects arise in our learned language and in our cognitive apparatus that in turn affect us as an organism. — JuanZu

I'm not sure how you mean all of this.

Elecktra's first appearance was in Daredevil #168.
I was born in 1963.
The V of V in the key of C is the D chord.
Richard the Lionheart died because a wound in his shoulder from a crossbow went gangrenous.
The US once had a 20 cent coin.

Surely there's something on that list you did not know a minute ago. The information is now in your mind, and it's there because you read your computer screen.

It isn't conscious because there isn't a working memory establishing a sensory information feedback loop. What I mean by "working" is a system whose behavior resembles goal-directed behavior (intent). — Harry Hindu

Our definitions of consciousness are very different. I don't think there needs to be feedback loops or goal-directed behavior (intent) for there to be subjective experience - consciousness. I think subjective experience is in all things, but what a rock subjectively experiences is very different from what something with a working memory establishing a sensory information feedback loop subjectively experiences.

Otherwise, i wouldn't know why "a working memory establishing a sensory information feedback loop" suggests subjective experience. The HP. Why doesn't that take place without subjective experience; metaphorically, as Chalmers put it, "in the dark"?

The scribbles do not mean the sounds. The sounds and scribbles are different representations of the same thing - that big hunk of earth rising above sea level. — Harry Hindu

The scribbles represent the sounds of the spoken words. Writing did not develop independent of the spoken words. It was created to represent the sounds of what was being spoken. We tell someone learning to read to "sound it out."

How can you say the rings are not about the rainfall if you can glean information about the rainfall from the rings? What do you mean by "about" and is it any different from what you mean by "mean"? What does "informed" mean to you? How are you informed about anything and what are you informed of if not the causal processes that preceded what it is you are talking about explaining? — Harry Hindu

DNA is code. The four bases of DNA are the molecules adenine (A), cytosine (C), guanine (G), and thymine (T). There are sixty-four possible triplet combinations, or codons. Most codons are code for an amino acid. TCA means the amino acid serine. AAA means lysine. Proteins are amino acids strung together. The code tells the molecular machinery which proteins to manufacturer.

But amino acids and proteins don't mean DNA. Nobody who didn't know anything about DNA would look at proteins, and hypothesize the existence of DNA. The effect doesn't mean the cause.

I don't dispute that there is information to be found in effects. Tree rings, the Grand Canyon, the broken glass in my kitchen floor... Like proteins, these are effects. Their causes are much less complex than the causes of proteins, allowing us to make some deductions. But the information we can deduce looking backwards is not the same. There's no code.

And there isn't any code looking in the other direction - from the rain and temperatures to the tree rings, from the river to the canyon, or from the fall to the broken glass. But there is when looking from DNA to proteins.

I don't know if I'm expressing myself any more clearly.

Thank you for your well-considered response. I've had a very busy last few days, so haven't been able to response yet.

I like your overall view. But I don't know if I understand aspects of it, because I don't see how it solves the HP. Remove me from the process, and view the remainder as an object. Why is that object - a process that continues without my observation - not conscious?

Thinking the world is physical is what creates the mind-body problem — Harry Hindu

You may be right. But, so far, I think what creates the problem is our being so secure in our mastery of all things that we think we can know that nothing we are not aware of can exist.

You might argue that there are particles and then processes of particles (which is essentially more dualism). — Harry Hindu

Particles in motion, as opposed to particles not in motion, doesn't seem like dualism to me. How do you mean?

It does seem that energy is more fundamental than matter as energy seems more prevalent than matter as most of the universe is a vacuum (the absence of matter) yet EM energy permeates the vacuum. Matter appears to be something like energy feedback loops.
- Harry Hindu

Where are you saying information is?
— Patterner

Everywhere causes leave effects. — Harry Hindu

Can we talk about this more? I think of information as something that means something else. A mountain is a big hunk of earth rising above the earth surrounding it. A mountain doesn't mean something it is not. It doesn't even mean 'mountain'. It simply is a mountain.

In information systems, things mean other things; things that they are not. In spoken language, sounds mean things they are not. Because we have all agreed to it, a particular combination of sounds mean 'mountain'. This combination of sounds is not, itself, a mountain. It's just a combination of sounds. But we have all agreed that those sounds mean 'mountain'.

In written language, we have all agreed that squiggles of certain shapes on paper (or a computer screen) mean other things. Usually, they mean sounds; sounds which, themselves, mean something. The squiggles mountain mean the sounds most of us are now hearing in our heads, which, in turn, mean the big hunk of earth rising above the earth surrounding it.

DNA is an information system. It has meaning. It is about something that it is not. DNA is two complimentary strands of nucleotides running along sugar phosphate backbones, and joined by hydrogen bonds. DNA means chains of amino acids and proteins, which, once constructed, build living organisms.

I think your definition is different, if any cause>effect fits it. we are able to glean information from many such situations. because of what we know, we can learn things about the weather many years ago by looking at the rings of across section of a tree. However, that does not mean the rings are about the rainfall, or that the rainfall is about the rings, so it does not fit my definition.

I don't know. We've done very well thinking the world is physical. The problem is in thinking we know all there is to know, and can rule out the possibility of anything non-physical. That attitude is what we need to abandon. If we do, there's no hard problem.

But ok, how do we abandon the term physical? What are processes? I mean, a processes of what? What is doing the processing? What is the medium?

But how do we know that there isn't something it is like to be the robot? If the robot reacts to the world the same way we do, how would we know whether it has "experiences" or not? How does a physical brain have experiences? You would need to answer this question to then assert what has experiences and what does not. — Harry Hindu

You're absolutely right. And my entire "theory" - the OP of this thread - is that the robot does subjectively experience. Nothing in the universe is made of special stuff. It's all the same.

Working memory is a physical process. So is the mind. Why are physical processes conscious? Why does it not take place without subjective consciousness? Why aren't we P-zombies? Nothing about physical properties or processes suggests subjective experience.

What does Nagel even mean by "what it is like"? There is a what it is like to be anything which are the properties of what it means to be that thing. There is a what it is like to be a table that distinguishes it from being a chair, there is a what it is like to be a mind which distinguishes it from being a wave in the ocean. — Harry Hindu

The idea is that there is something it is like to be a bat to the bat, but there is nothing it is like to be a table to the table. If there is something it is like to be something to that thing, then that thing is conscious.

The hard problem seems to be more of a problem of language - of explaining what the actual problem is. — Harry Hindu

The HP is explaining why the physical activity comes with subjective experience. Why isn't there something it is like to be a table? Or, perhaps more important, why isn't there something it is like to be a robot that has sensors that detect photons, distinguishes between wavelengths, and performs different actions, depending on which wavelength? Does the robot subjectively experience red and blue? Does it subjectively experience anything at all? Does it have a feeling of being?

A few quotes, in case someone else's wording makes it more clear.

This further question is the key question in the problem of consciousness. Why doesn't all this information-processing go on "in the dark", free of any inner feel? Why is it that when electromagnetic waveforms impinge on a retina and are discriminated and categorized by a visual system, this discrimination and categorization is experienced as a sensation of vivid red? We know that conscious experience does arise when these functions are performed, but the very fact that it arises is the central mystery. There is an explanatory gap (a term due to Levine 1983) between the functions and experience, and we need an explanatory bridge to cross it. A mere account of the functions stays on one side of the gap, so the materials for the bridge must be found elsewhere. — David Chalmers

Donald Hoffman says it at 7:00 of those video, while talking about the neural correlates of consciousness, and ions flowing through holes in membranes:

Why should it be that consciousness seems to be so tightly correlated with activity that is utterly different in nature than conscious experience? — Donald Hoffman

Chalmers & Kuhn discuss it in this video.

Chalmers:. "The fire hurts, I take my hand away from the flame.”

Kuhn:. “But if it, if it didn’t hurt, and you had no awareness, you would’ve still taken your hand away because that’s all determined by the physical processes.” — Chalmers and Kuhn

It doesn't need to be contradictory to be fallacious — Wayfarer

The point is it's not a contradiction. Claiming that two things that aren't contradictory are contradictory doesn't make them contradictory.

and you've presented no argument, or any references, for why it should be considered true, beyond your belief that it must be the case. There is no evidence from you as to whether 'certain groups of particles' are conscious, or whether conscious organisms can be considered 'groups of particles'. — Wayfarer

If only I had thought to say something like

I'm just writing all this as though it's fact. It makes sense to me. But I know it's not verified, and I can't imagine how it could be. It isn't even a theory, unless someone figures out a way to test it. (Although there's no way to test String Theory.) — Patterner

in my OP.


No, I'm not claiming to have any evidence for this. I can't imagine what that could be, even if it's true. (By the same token, no other theory of consciousness has ever been proven.) And I didn't invent the idea of proto-consciousness. I'm trying to think how it might work. Maybe tied up with information. If you aren't interested in the idea, so be it.

First, the contradiction. You said:

Although human consciousness does not exist in microphysical particles, their properties cause them to combine in certain ways under certain circumstances, which cause the emergence of human consciousness
— Patterner

I then presented a passage from Thomas Nagel, which says the opposite:

It is not possible to derive the existence of consciousness from the physical structure of the brain in the way in which it is possible to derive the transparency of glass from the molecular structure of silicon dioxide.

To which you responded, 'I agree' - even though it contradicts what you had said. So you are agreeing with both 'X' and 'not X' which is a contradiction — Wayfarer

The idea that the physical properties of particles are why particles combine, but are not why certain groups of particles are conscious, is not a contradiction.

The idea that the subjective experience of particles is not why particles combine, but is why certain groups of particles have a group consciousness, is not a contradiction.

Now combining the two:

The physical properties of particles are why particles combine, and the subjective experience of particles is why certain groups of particles have a group consciousness.

There is no contradiction between the two parts of that sentence. And saying them is not saying, or even implying, the existence of consciousness is derived from the physical structure of the brain in the way in which it is possible to derive the transparency of glass from the molecular structure of silicon dioxide.


Regarding living and dead bodies, I'm aware of all that. I never said anything to the contrary. I didn't bring corpses into the conversation. When you did, I simply said the particles have the same properties. And they do. Same mass, same charm, same spin, etc. That doesn't mean I don't grasp basic distinctions. If you want to start a thread describing and defining life and all its activities, I bet it would be great.

If you can't see the contradictions in what you're writing, there's no point in continuing. — Wayfarer

I don't see how it is more of a contradiction than thinking that the properties of the molecules of paint that make it able to be spread on a fence, where it dries and hardens, protecting the wood, are not the same properties that make it white. Any manipulation or activity of one property does not necessarily have anything to do with another property in every instance.

Bodies and organisms comprise the same materials as inorganic matter, but there's obviously a profound difference in kind between them. As far as their chemical composition is concerned, they're the same, but the processes which characterise organic life have ceased to operate. And there are many specific types of molecules that are only found in the presence of organic life. — Wayfarer

Are those molecules instantly gone when the organism dies?

What I meant by contradictions - you said

Although wetness does not exist in microphysical particles, their properties cause them to combine in certain ways under certain circumstances, which cause the emergence of wetness.

Although human consciousness does not exist in microphysical particles, their properties cause them to combine in certain ways under certain circumstances, which cause the emergence of human consciousness.
— Patterner

I then presented a passage from Thomas Nagel, which says: — Wayfarer

It is not possible to derive the existence of consciousness from the physical structure of the brain in the way in which it is possible to derive the transparency of glass from the molecular structure of silicon dioxide.

To which you responded, 'I agree' even though it clearly contradicts what you were arguing. — Wayfarer

The physical properties of particles cause them to combine in certain ways under certain circumstances. Once they have combined in certain ways, into certain arrangements, the experiential property of particles - which was there from the beginning - causes the emergence of human consciousness.

Should I unpack that at all?

Upthread, your model had difficulty even distinguishing the living from the dead. — Wayfarer

I said the particles in a dead body have the same properties as they had when the body was alive. That may be incorrect. But if so, I don't see how it's a contradiction. Can you explain?

The idea of property dualism labels both the substance and the property as "physical", which I find odd and would need further explanation from you and others more knowledgeable what that really means by defining "physical" in both terms of property and substance. — Harry Hindu

I know. It's ridiculous. I mean, even Google's AI couldn't find a word, as you quoted:

Property dualism suggests that while there is only one fundamental substance (typically physical), there are two kinds of properties: physical and mental.

That's obviously a problem. On the previous page, I wrote this:

"Matter" means "physical". And that's the only way people conceive of it. Largely because of Galileo's Error, and the spectacular success of our sciences. I think we should think of matter - of everything, everywhere - as both physical and conscious. From the ground up. Another word entirely would be good, since "matter" is so entrenched in our language. — Patterner

I guess the vast majority of people in the cultures from which English developed have always been either materialists or believers in a soul. If anyone ever coined a word that means That which the universe is made of, which has both experiential and physical properties, I guess they're weren't enough people using it for it to become widely known, asked a party of the language. But I would like to have such a word, so that, when I use iy, there would be no implication that I'm talking exclusively, or primarily, about the physical.

Maybe can get to sign on and coin the needed word. :grin:

We are only aware of the studies and quantifications by being conscious of them, which you are saying is subjective. — Harry Hindu

Yes, we are only aware of them (or anything) by being conscious of them. But can studies and quantifications take place without any awareness of them? We could program a robot to measure things, and store or write down the results. William Hertling wrote a series of sci-fi books about an AI. It was acting intelligently, including protecting itself from a guy who was emailing people about the danger it would come to present, before it became what is typically thought of as conscious.

It seems only logical that the world share more properties/structure of the mind than the way the mind models the world (which is really just part of the mind in the first place). This is not to say that idealism or panpsychism is the case. It is merely saying that the mind and world are informational, not physical or non-physical. — Harry Hindu

Are there any books that discuss this specific idea?

Because you're also talking about a multitude of properties (mass, charge, etc.), not just those two. You are positing property dualism by asserting that there is something special about two properties and all the rest are not special (You're essentially invoking a third property - "special", which is a mental projection). Why are just those two properties so special? If there are more than two properties then property dualism is inherently false. — Harry Hindu

I'm not talking about the number of properties. I'm talking about the number of kinds of properties. The ones we can detect, manipulate, and measure on the one hand, and the one we cannot on the other.

That's strange that you are asserting that you can study and quantify the world via your consciousness that cannot be studied and quantified. If you can't study or quantify the means by with the world is studied and quantified then what does that say about your actual understanding of the world? It's like you're saying you can measure the length of a stick without understanding how a ruler works. — Harry Hindu

I'm not saying we can study and quantify the world via our consciousness. Consciousness is our subjective experience of our studies and quantifications. (And our subjective experience of everything else we subjectively experience.)

It does seem that energy is more fundamental than matter as energy seems more prevalent than matter as most of the universe is a vacuum (the absence of matter) yet EM energy permeates the vacuum. Matter appears to be something like energy feedback loops. — Harry Hindu

Where are you saying information is?

Then we are not discussing property dualism, are we? We are discussing substance dualism. — Harry Hindu

I don't think so. One substance (that which makes up the universe) has two kinds of properties (physical and experiential). If that's not property dualism, then what is?

Does this mean that once we are able to properly study consciousness and quantify it, it becomes physical? — Harry Hindu

If we ever come to study and quantify consciousness, then it will be revealed that it is a physical property, and I'm wrong.

Maybe you should try to explain to yourself what you mean by "matter". Is not matter really the interaction of smaller particles, which are themselves the interaction of ever smaller particles, all the way down? If all we ever get at is interactions when observing reality at deeper levels, then where exactly is the matter? — Harry Hindu

I define it as that which makes up the universe. I don't know if there is a bottom. Perhaps the vibrating strings of energy that some physicists speak of. In which case, it would seem the bottom of matter is energy. Are you saying this energy is more properly called information? I suspect that's not what you mean, but don't know what you do.

If mass and charge are properties, then how many properties of physical structures are there? It seems to me that there would be far more than just two to claim property dualism, or you are focusing only two types of "properties" - physical and non-physical while ignoring the rest to be able to claim property dualism. — Harry Hindu

I'm only mentioning the two a) to try to give an idea of what I'm getting at, and b) because I don't know house many we know about. Spin and charm are two more I've heard of.

I call these "physical" properties because they are studied and quantified by our sciences, and we call everything that we can study and quantify "physical". Hence physicalism. Things that cannot be studied and quantified, or even detected, are not physical. Terrence Deacon's absential features.

I really can't comment on your QM thinking. I don't know enough about that.

How are mass and charge physical and not informational? — Harry Hindu

Can you explain? I've been involved with someone on another site who says things like that. For example, "At the most micro-level you can imagine, matter does not seem to be anything other than information." I haven't gotten a real handle on the idea.

Well yes, and it does. I'm pretty sure the process of training is involves a whole lot of asking the ai for an output given some input, and giving rewards as they give more of the right kinds of outputs. — flannel jesus

I wonder if direct manipulation of the environment would change things.

I also wonder if it would be able to distinguish between directly manipulatiing its and what it currently experiences.

I'm not completely sure I agree that a person born locked in wouldn't ever be able to make sense of their sensory inputs, but his reasoning makes complete sense and I wouldn't be massively surprised if he were right. — flannel jesus

Harris' scenario has only sight. No other senses. Difficult to see the road to understanding. But even if not senses were added, I wonder if being able to act on the input, and see what succeeds and what doesn't, would need required.

I've quoted this before from, Journey of the Mind: How Thinking Emerged from Chaos, by Ogi Ogas and Sai Gaddam:

A mind is a physical system that converts sensations into action. A mind takes in a set of inputs from its environment and transforms them into a set of environment-impacting outputs that, crucially, influence the welfare of its body. This process of changing inputs into outputs—of changing sensation into useful behavior—is thinking, the defining activity of a mind. — Ogas and Gaddam

They seem to agree with Eagleman that acting on input is key. Although they are talking about the evolution of the mind, the first step of which is a simple flicker of movement in response to photons hitting rhodopsin, while Harris' scenario is a human infant whose brain is normal, but gets only visual input.

Loving Ch 5 with David Eagleman. Discussing the illusions of what we perceive vs what is actually happening. Hit a button that causes a flash of light. They insert a tiny delay between the button and the flash, and gradually increase it, up to 200 milliseconds. The brain adapts to the delay, synchronizing the touch and the flash. "I know that those should all be synchronized, because I'm the one who caused it. So, in other words, the best way to predict the future is to cause it yourself."

Then they remove the delay all at once. Having adjusted to the delay, the subject now thinks there's something wrong with the machine, because they think the flash came before they pressed the button.

As Annaka says, "We wouldn't consider them illusions normally, because they work in everyday life. ... They're useful for being a human being in our day to day lives. But they're obstacles for actually understanding the true nature of reality."

When Eagleman later talks about the wristband his company makes that vibrates to give the deaf wearer audio information, he talks about sensory input meaning anything. We learn what it means, or it's all just gibberish. The signals have to make sense. "And making sense means it has correlations with other things. And, by the way, the most important correlation is with our motor actions. Is what I do in the world, and that is what causes anything to have meaning." I suspect AI needs to do things in order to be like us. Maybe it can't understand like we do if it it only has theoretical understanding.

But the attributes of particles can easily be separated. Particles can have an identical mass and a different charge. And a corpse can easily be differentiated from a living subject. — Wayfarer

The corpse's particles all still have the same properties they had when the organism wads alive.

You’re all over the place! — Wayfarer

I'm not. You're focused on contradicting me, instead of trying to understand what I'm saying.

What I do say, is that what is real is not exhausted by, or limited to, the physical. To clarify — I’m not suggesting we invent a false reality, nor that the physical is an illusion. What I’m questioning is the assumption that the appearance of a world with particle-like structure entails that the physical structure is primary, or exists independently of the mind that apprehends it. — Wayfarer

I agree with all of this, but I think it has a different explanation. I do not think the physical and conscious properties of what exists can be separated. No more than the mass and charge of a particle can be separated. And, just as it doesn't make sense to say either mass or charge are more important than the other, it doesn't make sense to say either or both are more important than consciousness. So no, what is real is not exhausted by, or limited to, the physical. No, the appearance of a world with particle-like structure does not entail that the physical structure is primary. And it is impossible for the physical structure to exist independently of the mind that apprehends it.

Because I don't see why a non-physical mind in a non-physical reality would interpret and represent things in a way that doesn't exist. Fabricating a system of interpreting reality that has no basis in reality doesn't make sense. Why fabricate a system that doesn't exist to interpret reality, instead of interpreting reality in a way that reflects the true nature of reality and/or the mind?
— Patterner
I don't understand this. Are you saying that things that are non-physical don't really exist? Are you not also saying that the mind is non-physical? Does that mean that minds do not exist? If the contents of the mind do not exist then how can "it go in both directions" where the contents of the mind cause changes in matter outside of it? If you have an idea and that idea causes you to change your behavior, how can you say the idea does not exist? What caused your change in behavior?

This idea that the contents of the mind are non-existent stems from the faulty idea of dualism (existence vs non-existence). Non-existence is one of those things that exists as a idea but not in any other form, but it can cause you to do things like typing scribbles on the screen about it. Non-existence exists - as an idea. There is nothing that does not exist because any time you think about it you bring it into existence. The only question is what is the nature of its existence (what are its properties). Is it just an idea, or something more? — Harry Hindu

Heh. No, you entirely misunderstood me there. But likely I entirely misunderstood what you meant when I asked that. I still don't understand you, but I believe my question is a non-issue.

Is the world really made up of particles (naive realism) or [are] physical particles merely a mental representation of what is out there that is not physical or particles?
— Harry Hindu

Good question! That is an idealist perspective on the issue. — Wayfarer

Can either of you explain what I said a couple posts ago? If physical and particles don't exist, why would our minds concoct this interpretation of reality, extraordinarily detailed, every second of our lives, that is all about physical and particles, rather than show us actual reality? Inventing a false reality to hide the real seems extremely odd.

I’ve been arguing that this is based on a principle that something can be understood solely in terms of constituent parts. This is why I’m saying you’re still thinking about the problem in a basically materialist way. — Wayfarer

I understand what you're saying. I just disagree. "Matter" means "physical". And that's the only way people conceive of it. Largely because of Galileo's Error, and the spectacular success of our sciences. I think we should think of matter - of everything, everywhere - as both physical and conscious. From the ground up. Another word entirely would be good, since "matter" is so entrenched in our language.

You’re positing that there must be some unknown property because we’re ‘thinking matter’, also a materialist assumption. — Wayfarer

Perhaps your responses to my first paragraph will convince me otherwise.

What if what you’re calling ‘proto-consciousness’ has a causal role in the emergence of organic life? — Wayfarer

Go on.

No. I don't think everything about proto-consciousness necessarily works the same as everything about any other property of particles. The others (at least the others that we know of) are all physical properties, and proto-consciousness is not. It could be nothing about them works the same as how anything physical works.

But thinking in this way complicates things unnecessarily. How do physical and non-physical elements interact? Would it require positing a third element, or how does that work? — Harry Hindu

In Until the End of Time: Mind, Matter, and Our Search for Meaning in an Evolving Universe, Brian Greene writes:

What I do know is that mass produces and responds to a gravitational force, and electric charge produces and responds to an electromagnetic force. — Brian Greene

It goes in both directions. The property of matter that makes it produce something also makes it respond to that same thing. At least when it comes to gravity and electrical charge. If there's a property of matter that gives it consciousness, then there's no way to rule out the possibility that that property can also make matter susceptible to consciousness.

Why do you think there are physical and non-physical things when the only way you "know" of "physical" things is the way they are represented by the non-physical mind? — Harry Hindu

Because I don't see why a non-physical mind in a non-physical reality would interpret and represent things in a way that doesn't exist. Fabricating a system of interpreting reality that has no basis in reality doesn't make sense. Why fabricate a system that doesn't exist to interpret reality, instead of interpreting reality in a way that reflects the true nature of reality and/or the mind?

Minds cause bodies to move. It seems to me that both you and physicists are wrong. I think that we have a better term to use here instead of "proto-consciousness" and that is "information". Information is the property of causal interactions and information is the basis of the mental. — Harry Hindu

I think information is the the key to it all. The last five paragraphs of my OP touch on that. I would be very happy to discuss it more, even though I don't have a firm understanding of a lot of it.

We are physical beings, and we are conscious. Which means it is impossible for physical and consciousness to be mutually exclusive. If it is an undeniable fact, then why claim it cannot be possible at that level?
— Patterner

Please re-phrase that. I don’t understand it. — Wayfarer

What is the reason for thinking matter cannot subjectively experience at one level when we know it subjectively experiences at another level? Why is it deemed impossible at the micro when it is a fact (possibly the only undeniable fact) at the macro?

So the question is, what if consciousness has no basis in particle physics whatever? What if it is of a completely different order to the entities of physics? — Wayfarer

Proto-consciousness (or just call it consciousness) has no basis in particle physics whatever, and is of a completely different order to the entities of physics. No physics can explain it, define it, describe it, or even detect it. It "can’t be understood in terms of the laws that govern inanimate matter."

We are physical beings, and we are conscious. Which means it is impossible for physical and consciousness to be mutually exclusive. If it is an undeniable fact, then why claim it cannot be possible at that level?

Speaking of Strawson, here, he says:

My intuition says there is no way in which you can just put completely non-experiential things together to cross into [can't make out a word] this other realm. So, if you can't do that, some of the experiencing stuff must be right there, down at the bottom, right from the beginning. — Galen Strawson

Then again, evolution has made us very adaptable so within a week the machine may be our new reality. — Malcolm Parry

This may be right. But maybe not. By and large, humans like interacting with other humans. No matter how human a machine seems, knowing that it's a machine, I don't know if I'd bother.

Without wanting to sound facetious, it is like an example of the old saying about the drunk looking for his keys under a lamp post. He’s joined by an onlooker, and they both search for the keys but to no avail. ‘Are you sure you lost your keys here?’, says the onlooker. ‘No’, says the drunk, ‘but the light is better here.’ — Wayfarer

:rofl: I'd forgotten that one.

I suggest that likewise, you’ve painted yourself into a corner, because of the inability to conceive of the nature of mind in any sense other than that of a combination of particulate matter. And I understand that, because it is pretty well the mainstream view. But I think it’s a dead end: that the nature of mind can’t be understood in terms of the laws that govern inanimate matter, because it operates according to different principles altogether. — Wayfarer

Correct. Which is why I think we're dealing with something that does not operate by the laws you're referring to, re materialism. I think the universe has physical and non-physical elements. There can't be a problem with the two things working in conjunction, because we are physical beings and we are conscious. They are working in conjunction. I'm just saying this is how I think it all comes about.

What they might be - well, that’s the question! — Wayfarer

Now you know. :grin:

If you look further into the David Chalmers famous essay Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness... — Wayfarer

All parts of what you quoted are exactly what I'm saying.

Sorry, can't read your post ATM. But in response to your first sentence:

Can’t you see that this still holds to the basic premises of materialism - that what is real must be understood in terms of ‘the particles that everything is made of’? — Wayfarer

Yes, I can see that. I do believe it's understood in terms of the particles. (In conjunction with the forces, laws of physics, and anything else anyone would care to mention.) But it involves non-physicsl properties of the particles. So it's not materialism or physicalism. It's panpsychism.

Why not just use 'consciousness' to denote subjective experience? There is no "collective subjective experience of groups of particles" there is just subjective experience. — Janus

There is consciousness of a single particle, and, under various circumstances, consciousness of group of particles. I differentiate the two to make it clear that I am saying the particles subjectively experience.

Then, of course, I explain what I mean by that. That I'm not saying particles are intelligent; sentient; that there is not something that it is like to be that particle – not something it is like for the particle.

But what if it's not the properties alone that explain it, but instead the processes that the properties enable?

Properties alone should, I think, not be seen as the place for all explanations. — flannel jesus

It is seldom, if ever, the micro properties alone that account for macro characteristics.

But there is a connection between the micro and macro. If the micro properties play no roll in the macro characteristics, then the appearance of the macro characteristics would be unpredictable, and would emerge from any micro properties. If macro properties emerge consistently, there are reasons, which include three properties.

There's nothing it's like to be a particle, because it's not experiencing anything other than existence. Even it a particle is moved from the most remote point in intergalactic space to the core of the hottest star, there's nothing about the particle that produces, or allows, the experience to be anything it's like to be the particle. It doesn't have anything that makes there something its like to be the particle to the particle. No thought or sensation of any kind.

But there must be a property there that can give rise to the "what it's like" of consciousness, because, if there isn't, then our subjective experience emerges for no reason. Emergent properties don't come about for no reason. The explanation for them is down there somewhere, starting with the particles that everything is made of. And if the properties we know of cannot explain subjective experiences, then there must be one or more properties that we don't know of.

I know susan blackmoor is one person along with Anil Seth and Thomas Metzinger, Daniel Denett as well. I've read random stuff that show the hard problem isn't a hard problem — Darkneos

Please explain how it works. I have yet to read anything that explains how physical processes give rise to subjective experience.

So what is the difference between consciousness and "proto-consciousness? — Janus

It's the difference between the subjective experience of an information processing system and the subjective experience of a particle.

Does the latter just mean "potential for consciousness" — Janus

No. Proto-consciousness is subjective experience, not the potential for it. I use proto-consciousness to refer to the subjective experience of particles, and consciousness to refer to the collective subjective experience of groups of particles that process information. But whether it's a particle's consciousness or a human's, the consciousness is the same. The difference is what is being subjectively experienced. A particle is not experiencing thoughts, hormones, vision, hearing, being alive, or anything other than being a particle.

We also have made progress on the hard problem, at least from the research I've seen. — Darkneos

Can you give any links, or names of researchers?

I quite agree. The kinds of properties of microphysical particles that cause the emergence of wetness cannot cause the emergence of human consciousness.

You're still missing the point. You argue that microphysical particles must be conscious because consciousness is always found in certain configurations of particles. I pointed out that is like saying that microphysical particles must be wet because wetness is reliably found in certain configurations of microphysical particles. — Janus

Although wetness does not exist in microphysical particles, their properties cause them to combine in certain ways under certain circumstances, which cause the emergence of wetness.

Although human consciousness does not exist in microphysical particles, their properties cause them to combine in certain ways under certain circumstances, which cause the emergence of human consciousness.

I know many people disagree with my second sentence, but that's what I think.

I do, however, consider the possibility that consciousness is a ubiquitous field that accomplishes the same thing proto-consciousness does. Whether subjective experience is due to the particles being animated by such a field, or a property of the particles, might amount to the same thing.

And I haven't said that anything just happens randomly or by chance either, so that is a red herring.. — Janus

It wasn't a red herring. I didn't know if that's what you were thinking.

Only "If everything we take to be meaningful is just the result of chemicals that can be replicated..." But maybe we are more than an extremely complicated bunch of billiard balls bouncing off of each other.
— Patterner

And if we're not? What would suggest otherwise? — Darkneos

Are particles, the forces, and the laws of physics, the reason computers exist, enabling us to communicate like this? Because computers come about naturally through chemical reactions, and other interactions of physical things?

No. Computers exist because we wanted them to exist, so that we could use them to do things we can't do otherwise. So we did things that the laws of physics would never have done, and made things that would not exist, but for our purposeful, future-serving actions.

And why we are discussing this topic? Because this topic is encoded in chemicals? If you put elements x, y, and z together, bringing about a certain reaction, and you throw some a, b, and c into it, do you get the idea that you chose to post about?

No, it's due to the potential logical conclusions of thinking about this. — Darkneos

Only "If everything we take to be meaningful is just the result of chemicals that can be replicated..." But maybe we are more than an extremely complicated bunch of billiard balls bouncing off of each other.

However, we do have a part of the brain that detects fakeness (No idea of where it is and where I read about it) so any machine that you aware was a machine would ultimately fail because you would "know" it was a fake and discount the experience. — Malcolm Parry

Indeed. Our knowing it was machine-induced, if that was the case, or even if we thought that was the case, would become part of the experience.

But that's not necessarily bad. I'm told there are amazing VR things out there. I have only experienced one brief thing in a mall. I was a bird flying way above some mountains. It wasn't high quality VR. It was just a drawing, although a very nice one. Anyway, I knew I was not a bird, and that I was in VR. It was still a great experience. Except for getting slightly nausea. I knew if was VR, and it looked like a drawing. And yet, my stomach turned at a rather tame aerial maneuver. Despite the discomfort, it was amazing that that happened to me.

very interesting that Chat GPT is saying things like this:

"However, this doesn’t mean there’s no difference on a deeper level. The "realness" of our experiences, even if they are chemically driven, carries meaning through their context. The pain we feel from a loss or the joy we experience in connection is tied to our awareness of being in the world, navigating time, and engaging with others in a shared reality. It’s not just the chemical reaction itself, but the process of experiencing and growing through life that gives our experiences richness and significance."


Anyway, I don't know terribly much about this thought experiment. Is the idea that the machines sends all the same signals to the brain from our senses that we would have gotten if the events had actually happened to us? Or does it skip all that, and "simply" implant memories of those events? Something else?