Thanks so much, I have more comments coming soon!

but his conclusions might imply it. — Snakes Alive

Great answers, want to get back to many comments when time permits.
But just, in relation to the above- I thought his conclusion was that we can (not by force) transcend will?

If Will is what brings dissatisfaction, will-lessness is what brings the salvation. The cognition comes from a sort of recognition of what is happening. The hard part is trying to get rid of that which essentially causes the very world to exist in its subject-object form, and thus the "illusion" of a the very world itself. Somehow getting to a state of "nothing" without "willing" it. This is why really achieving "Enlightenment" is so hard in Buddhism I wold presume. Same type of deal — schopenhauer1

will-lessness, yes, but not the wholesale abolition or destruction of will. So, it's like the will understands itself and loses interest in itself.
However, is it a result not of cognition, but of intuitive knowledge? And in Schopenhauer, we can tease these two out as being disparate?

Cognition? Or reason? — tim wood

how, specifically, do we differentiate the two?

It's weird in the sense that in my opinion, he overmined the idea of Platonic forms. He had it for each species, for each grade of object, for each individual human's character. I just don't buy it as a metaphysical claim, though I find it interesting. — schopenhauer1

The Platonic Ideas, for me, are the weakest, perhaps even most confused, aspect of his philosophy. e.g., it is not clear if they "belong to" world as will or as appearance.

Too bad it doesn't mean much if you don't agree with how moral worth is being dictated. — Sapientia

You make a valid point haha!

sure sounds good. we now seem to have a proof by exhaustion (x2) that covers:

1. The only kind of moral behaviour which has moral worth is compassionate behaviour.
2. the only incentive for behaviour of moral worth is compassion.

1. There are only three kinds of moral behaviour: egoistic, malicious, and compassionate.

2. The only kind of moral behaviour which has moral worth seeks to prevent harm to another and seeks another’s well-being, i.e. it is just and philanthropic.

3. Egoistic behaviour only has regard only for one's own well-being, and therefore cannot be philanthropic.

4. Malicious behaviour seeks to cause harm to another, and therefore cannot be just.

5. Therefore, neither egoistic behaviour nor malicious behaviour can have moral worth.

6. Compassionate behaviour seeks to prevent harm to another and seeks another’s well-being, i.e. it is just and philanthropic.

7. Therefore, the only kind of moral behaviour which has moral worth is compassionate behaviour. — Sapientia

And I would also add...

8. Therefore (in line with the fact that egoistic behaviour, malicious behaviour, and compassionate behaviour are fundamentally grounded in the incentives of egoism, malice, and compassion, respectively) the moral incentive must be compassion.

I think that Schopenhauer is wrong to rule out egoism in advance, due to his conception of behaviour that has moral worth, and I think that him doing so conveniently paths the way for his desired conclusion. But, if you accept his terms, then the rest does seem to follow, and it does seem to qualify as, or could be formulated as, a proof by exhaustion. — Sapientia

I still don't see how it could be formulated as a proof by exhaustion? (in premise/conclusion form) In light, of our definitions of egoism, malice, and compassion, this is the best I can do, yet it still seems a bit wonky.

1. the absence of all egoistic motivation is the criterion of an action of moral worth

2. moral conduct aims at the prevention or removal of another’s suffering,

3. Thus, moral conduct cannot be due to the incentives of egoism or malice but must be stimulated by compassion, the only incentive aiming at the prevention or removal of another’s suffering.

Also, You are quite right that he does rule out egoism in advance (Kant seems to, too), and I'm not convinced he's right to do this, too. It's essentially presupposed that conduct grounded in egoism has no moral worth whatsoever; no real argument.

proof by exhaustion as it isn't given in your argument that egoism, malice, and empathy are the only possible things that moral behaviour could be based on. — Michael

I understand this, good point. But if we accept, just for the sake of argument, that moral conduct can only be based on egoism, malice or empathy (compassion), does the argument qualify, or can be formulated, as proof by exhaustion?

about incentives, he pretty much only states the following

"the 3 fundamental incentives are:
compassion- the desire for another's well being; malice- the desire for another's suffering
egoism- the desire for one's own well being"
then he states: “In accordance with these incentives motives will operate on man and actions will ensue".

motives, for Schopenhauer, are just objects of external perception or thoughts that can either promises happiness or suffering for an individual. e.g. I see or think of an ice cream, the perception or thought of the ice cream promises happiness for me, and then stimulates the incentive of egoism (the desire for the well-being) in my character. The combination of the motive and the incentive causes my action of going to buy an ice cream.

I think at times he does use the terms "motive" and incentive" interchangeably.

The wording of the argument would need to changed to avoid circular reasoning. You couldn't have, "Moral behaviour cannot be based on egoism", as a premise, and, "Therefore, moral behaviour cannot be based on egoism", contained in the conclusion. — Sapientia

Thanks so much for your replies. I was told that this was definitely a proof by case by a chap well versed in logic, yet I'm racking my brains to see how this is so! I've attached a longer version from where this argument came from, if this helps. Can this be seen as a disjunctive elimination or proof by case? My brain is sore haha. Thanks again!

(definitions
egoism is that which aims at increasing one's own happiness.
malice is that which aims at increasing another's pain.
compassion is that which aims at reducing another's pain)

Schopenhauer states "only insofar as an action has sprung from compassion does it have moral worth; and every action resulting for any other motives has none" Schopenhauer demonstrates that actions having moral worth are motivated solely by compassion (that is, the desire for another’s well-being) in an argument by elimination (proof by case or disjunctive elimination). Schopenhauer tries to explain behavior that has moral worth- just and philanthropic actions- by uncovering the motive for these types of actions. Since he thinks of just actions as actions where people restrain their conduct to keep from hurting others, and actions of philanthropy as actions in which people seek another’s well-being, he argues that neither egoism nor malice is a motive for these actions. He thinks that in both cases the ultimate end of a persons actions is to advance others’ well-being (either by refraining from hurting them or by alleviating their pain). Because the ultimate end of egoistic actions is an agent’s own well-being, and that of malicious actions is another’s misfortune, he concludes that neither egoism nor malice is the motive for actions possessing moral worth. Hence Schopenhauer concludes these actions must necessarily be motivated by compassion since he has eliminated two of his three fundamental incentives.

In other words, he has an proof by case argument in which neither egoism or malice can be the motive for moral conduct, which leaves compassion as their source.

Motives seem to be the individual instances that drive a person to do something, which may fit into the incentive of self-interest, malice, and compassion. — schopenhauer1

Yes, but then he has to refine his criterion of actions of moral worth, don't you think? It's not just a matter of the "absence of all egoistic motives"?

Sure. Motives are representations; objects of external perception or thoughts. We see an external object or have a thought and this object or thought either promises us well-being or woe (misfortune). (e.g. I see an ice cream or think of an ice cream and it this perception or thought causes me to get an ice cream). As representations, motives are within the principle of sufficient reason. Incentives, on the other hand, are expressions or states of the will. Specifically, they are desires. As states of the will, they are a part of one's intelligible character and are outside the principle of sufficient reason.

Motives stimulate incentives (in one's character), and the interaction between the two causes actions.

So when Schopenhauer says that the "absence of all egoistic motivation" is the criterion of an action of moral worth, it's not really the full picture. Because the motive interacts with an incentive to cause actions, as I said.
It should be like the "absence of all egoistic motives stimulating the incentive of egoism".

It's pretty weird right?!

Thought without language is most certainly possible. Artists, for example, think in terms in imagery, symbols. — Rich

but don't those images and symbols have words without which they cannot exist; without which they cannot be thought?

Yes, thanks, I do agree; and the meaning is very clear. I am just trying to reconstruct his argument in more rigorous terms. He actually is quite sloppy with his terminology at times... have you, for example, noticed his use of the terms "motive" and "incentive."? (in On the Basis of Morality) They are actually distinct concepts for him but he nevertheless uses them interchangeable which obscures his arguments.

No need to apologize, it's a great answer. Got me thinking. I'm going to try and get the original German to get clearer on this. But as it stands, like you stated, it just does not seem to be a technical sense of "presupposition". Technically, I think it's an error, so I am trying to reconstruct it in a more rigorous way. I'm off to find the German, and thanks again!

yep, see what you mean, something like, e.g.. my belief that the dodgers will win the final presupposes that I believe the dodgers exist. To be frank, I'm not entirely sure whether this is bona-fide presupposition. A "presupposition trigger", i thought, can't be a belief....I could be wrong!

Thanks. I agree, seems more like an entailment relationship...and, as such, Schopenhauer's use of "presupposes" entails a solecism!

As in "If another 'becomes the ultimate object of one's own will in the same way as oneself otherwise, then one [must] "suffer directly with the other, and feel the other's suffering just as one ordinarily feels only one's own and. likewise, one directly desires another's well-being in the same way as one otherwise desire only one's own".

Like this? Thanks

Why internal vs external? Don't you think that, for the most part, this way of describing our every day experience misleading. For example, when everything is going well with our jobs, our sports, our band, our transport, etc. there doesn't seem to be any experience of the internal or external.We are simply there, involved in a meaningful world with shared moods, feelings and understandings. And the better things are going and the more involved in the situation we become the less and less our experience is "subjective" and the less and less is there any internal/external experience. It is when we abstract from the situation and attempt to do philosophy, science, or try and overcome some impediment to our tasks, or become self-conscious for whatever reason, that the internal/external distinction (which is an ontological distinction) can then be derived. In my experience, the internal/external distinction is always derivative, derivative of a more basic shared, involved and public experience of our worlds. This latter experience is called being-in-the-world. — bloodninja

Sure, I think can see what you mean, and, if I am interpreting it correctly, I do agree to a very large extent. Fundamentally, for me, everything is essentially "internal", or a product of our our consciousness. One questions: how do you reconcile a notion of "public experience" and "being-in-the-world"; is this like a "pre-discusive" consciousness? pre-reflective?

Great answers from everyone, thanks. At a logical level feelings and activities can't be identical. Of course this very much depends on how we define the two. When I say they can't be identical, I am assuming that we are thinking of an activity as some type of physical movement in "public". Feelings are internal and don't seem to necessarily entail physical "public" activity, although the converse seems to be true.

The only caveat here is that this doesn't mean phenomena are unreal, only that, in comparison with the will, their reality is derivative. — Thorongil

Yes, i know exactly what you mean. Even at one stage I think he says "empirical reality is perfectly real". It's just like the will is even more real. (you mention Platonic Ideas....for myself, he seems to be a bit confused about their ontological status at times)

I was thinking about this before, yet trying to put the argument into standard form is a tad tricky.
Thanks!

So you think this understanding of "illusory" "saves" him from the inconsistency I outlined above?:

1.Compassion requires one to accept empirical distinction. (compassion presupposes there to be two beings involved)

2. Compassion requires one to reject empirical distinction. (we are all "one" in the unitary will)

No, he recognizes that there is no metaphysical distinction. — Thorongil

Yes, which is the same to say that he recognizes there is fundamentally NO empirical distinction, that is:
the compassionate being recognizes he that all persons in the phenomenal world are expressions of the same UNITARY will qua thing-in-itself. Thus individuation- empirical distinction between persons- is recognized to be illusory.

Interesting, I'll muse on this!

Salvation is an action. — Noble Dust

so how can Salvation be an action, per se? "Will-less action" can only be a metaphoric expression

every action needs some effort of will. That's a predicate in the concept "action"

so some actions don't need an effort of will?

can salvation be a will-less action?

I see salvation as the supersession of compassion. — Noble Dust

what do you mean exactly? I salvation is compassion in overdrive? Sounds interesting

I'm interpreting or reconstructing Schopenhauer. Trying to make sense of him.
Now he says that compassion is the basis of ethics. Compassion requires stimulation or activity of will. If I help you, I move my body and desire to aid you.

But he also says the most most preferred ethical ideal is salvation which is achieved through denying the will. The ascetics who don't will, don't desire are most free from the suffering caused by desire. So we must switch off the will.

So I'm trying to see how compassion and salvation are compatible.

compassion requires stimulation of the will (to help another) but salvation requires cessation of the will. — jancanc

This is why some have said compassion and salvation are mutually antagonistic.

No, in salvation you deny the will to save yourself only. Like you deny your will to exist and thus are liberated from suffering. (according to Schopenhauer that is).

What this solution requires, I think, is a different understanding of "the will", as differentiated from the will-to-live:

I know Schop. uses “the will” and “the will-to-live” interchangeably, but we can understand them differently. “The will” is the blind striving entity that exists independently from human cognition; the will qua thing-in-itself . the “will-to-live” can be understood as the will qua thing-in-itself as it is manifested in all humans in the phenomenal world. Since the will-to-live is the will qua thing-in-itself as it is manifested in spatio-temporal objects, it can also be termed the “individual will”. The individual will is driven by the will qua thing-in-itself , and, by default, involves the affirmation of the will-to-live; that is to say, by default, it is egoistic.

Now I think there is no contradiction

Perhaps this can be solved thus: (I think you are intimating at this) In renunciation and compassion willing does continue, but willing-to-live ceases. Both renunciation and compassion require the denial of individual egoistic willing, but in both cases willing goes on. If one's body exists, it must will!

Also, all the ascetic saints Schopenhauer talks about in WWR are very compassionate beings, Jesus, Buddha, etc.

Didn't he also think that we are ultimately responsible for causing the suffering in the world? This is because we are the Kantian transcendentally ideal subjects, and thus we are the conditions of possibility (e.g. space, time, etc) for the one will to 'individuate' and feed upon itself. — bloodninja

Pretty much, yes. But more specifically because we "affirm the will-to-live", instead of trying to detach from this cosmic drive. The whole idea of denying the will-to-live is kind of dubious for me....it actually signifies an affirmation of the will (as contrary as that sounds)- we deny the will-to-live to escape suffering...but this denial require willing-- willing to deny the will!

please explain haha

The concept has no place in a post-metaphysical world — bloodninja

why not?.

I concede that we cant feel pain in their body. I'm a science man myself. But, if you think of ideals and call suffering one. When you encounter another's suffering, you would recognize the ideal, then the subtle ways this suffering is specific to this person, and feel that suffering of that specific kind, surely your body creates the sensation, but you didn't create that initial one of a kind formula of suffering.

These points are interesting, can you expand? I think you i interpret him to mean that by feeling another pain in another body....we experience a pain that originates in the other?

“in his person, — jancanc


We could not feel the pain without first becoming him, one could say. — Frank Barroso

you mean he is speaking metaphorically here?