The internal voice (the Daimonion) that told Socrates no whenever he was about to do something wrong sounds far weirder than his method, which was probably more annoying than crazy. But maybe it's just a creative take on what we call the conscience (though one doesn't audibly hear it). — Nils Loc

When I first heard about Socrates' daimonion - an internal 'divine' voice - which guided him away from undertaking activities which might harm him, I wondered:

About whether it was intuition - that 'gut' feeling.
If he heard other voices which weren't discussed. Did he have auditory hallucinations - was he schizoid?
Why did he - or Plato - pay and draw attention to only that 'voice'.
What about the ones which would guide him to the good. The wise voice - perhaps based in passion for philosophy. As per the recent thread 'Plato's Phaedo', started by @Fooloso4
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/540733

In the center of the dialogue Phaedo said that they had been “healed” of their distress and readiness to abandon argument. (89a) In other words, Socrates saved them from misologic,about which he said "there is no greater evil than hating arguments". (89d)

There is one other mention of illness. In the beginning when we are told that Plato was ill. We are not told the nature of the illness that kept him away, but we know he recovered. Perhaps he too was cured of misologic. Rather than giving up on philosophy he went on to make the “greatest music”. Misologic is at the center of the problem, framed by Plato’s illness and the offer to Asclepius. And perhaps conquering the greatest evil is in the end a good reason to regard this as a comedy rather than a tragedy. — Fooloso4

Perhaps, Plato could be on the mad list ? What kind of an illness or great passion did he 'suffer' from ?

I read Socrates taking up music during his confinement as one way to keep alive when deprived of his preferred 'medium.' — Paine

Interesting. I didn't know of this 'music-playing' Socrates.
According to a quick search:

Socrates, as portrayed by Nietzsche, is a figure who is very different to Dionysus. During most of his life Socrates was the personification of a theoretical man (Nietzsche, 1967-1977, Vol. 1 p 98). He practiced neither music, nor poetry, nor did he have a high opinion of either. Only when he was in his death cell did he start to discover his musical side. Nietzsche attributes great importance to this observation (Nietzsche, 1967-1977, Vol. 1 p 92-96). From this brief description alone we can see that Nietzsche’s Socrates is very much influenced by Plato’s, for it was in Plato’s Phaedo that this story of Socrates was told Plato (Phaedo 60c-61d). However, it will soon be clear that Nietzsche’s Socrates is far from identical with Plato’s. Still it is much closer to Plato’s than it is to Xenophon’s or Aristophane’s Socrates who are the other major literary versions of Socrates.
[...]
Since Socrates never appreciated tragedy, i.e. music and poetry, during most of his life, and as he only went to the theatre when the plays of the logical poet Euripides were performed, it was strange that in his death cell Socrates suddenly devoted himself to music and poetry.

According to Nietzsche, then an important part of Socrates character, which he normally oppressed, was set free (Nietzsche, 1967-1977, Vol. 1 p 92-96). — Socrates - Minerva

I don't understand why it's thought that Socrates 'oppressed' this kind of mystical communication.
It doesn't fit in with how I imagined him to be...appreciative of all the senses. A higher awareness.
Listening to his daemonion. And so on. Wasn't music played in the Symposium?
Ah - do I remember the lyre players being dismissed? All the better to think?

Do you mean not subject to empirical validation, according to the standards of science?

The problem I have is that you're casting your net too wide when you denegrate anything that can be described as 'religious' in those terms. If you said 'fundamentalist' or 'dogmatic', then I might agree. — Wayfarer

Maybe fundamentalist and dogmatic are good descriptions if it summarizes the arguments as being ignorant of valid objections to them. I.e they dismiss reworking the argument based on valid criticism.

It doesn't need to be of empirical scientific validation, but at least logical and hold together without unsupported claims as foundational premises. Writing out poetics and fantasy within an argument is all good and well as long as they aren't functioning as being logical sources for the conclusion's validity.

I really dislike reading pure logic in philosophy, I like the writer to have some skills in painting their idea with some colors, it's just that the internal logic of the argument needs to have some consistency that isn't just within the mind of the writer (i.e biased to that internal belief).

And then there need to be a clarity in what an argument is doing. Is it asking questions, exploring a concept, or is it making a statement, a conclusion. I think many confuse a claim/conclusion with exploration and starts to make conclusions without actual support in the text (in an exploratory text) or make a poetic and exploratory text when they should bind together clear premises for a conclusion (making it muddy, looking at you Hegel!).

Then it is also vital what type of philosophy you are writing about. If we're doing moral philosophy, then the logic has to connect to human behavior and psychology, which can be messy and factual claims can be tricky with the whole ought/is problem. But if we are discussing philosophy that relate to facts about the world, such as physics and cosmology, then there's no point in making claims that have little to no roots in what has actually been scientifically measured and tested. Ignoring that is pure bias towards the beliefs of the writer.

So, we can go into pages of details in this epistemological overview of philosophy, but the guiding principles is that the more scientifically factual a claim, the more empirical it needs to be and the more phenomenological or focused on the human experience, the more exploratory it should be. But regardless of that, bias has a negative play. Even in the most exploratory writings there has to exist some internal logic that can be somewhat universalized and not just function within the beliefs and mind of the writer.

Suffice to say that the aims of the Buddhist teaching are conceived in terms of liberation from the ongoing cycle of death and rebirth (saṃsāra) and realisation of the state of Nirvāṇa. The account of the Buddha's awakening, based on the oral tradition, preserves the record of this as the Buddha is said to have realised it. The realisation of this state is something that subsequent generations of Buddhists are understood to have re-traced and re-capitulated (which is why, for example, the term 'Buddha' is not limited to one individual, but designates a class of being.)

Buddhist cultures have incorporated traditional cosmological models, which are clearly empirically unsupportable in light of current science. But then, the Dalai Lama has acknowledged that "If scientific analysis were conclusively to demonstrate certain claims in Buddhism to be false, then we must accept the findings of science and abandon those claims.” However he's also said “What science finds to be nonexistent we should all accept as nonexistent, but what science merely does not find is a completely different matter.” — Wayfarer

That type of anti-bias is in the realm of philosophy. It recognizes that empirical evidence demands a change to arguments and ideas, which is how philosophy should progress through history. The important part, however, is to distinguish a conclusion/claim of truth based on exploratory reasoning and one based on deductive logic. I'm objecting against making any conclusion or claim that only has exploratory writing underneath, since there are no actual premises in such arguments to support any actual claim.

The first part related to the cycle of death and rebirth is exploratory arguments that cannot conclude with actual claims of death and rebirth in the traditional sense of reincarnation. But they are exploratory in the way they link to ideas about cycles, in nature, in thinking, in history etc. Such ideas does not have truth-claims, but are observable explorations of holistic concepts about the life, death and the universe (and people like Schopenhauer took inspiration from). As long as we view them as exploratory, just like with Phaedo, they are profoundly important as concepts and frameworks of exploration. We could also stretch them to agnostic dialogues about actual reincarnation, but the important part is to be careful not to slip into making truth claims that functions on pure belief alone.

There are elements (I won't call them ideas) within religious culture that are indispensable to the human condition even acknowledging that whatever about them has been shown to be false by scientific methods ought to be revised or discarded. — Wayfarer

I agree, which is why I focus on philosophical claims either changing or are reworked based on new discoveries and understanding in science, or understanding concepts as explorations in thought that doesn't claim truths.

It's when religious truth claims and conclusions are made based purely on the belief biased to that religion that it stops being philosophy and becomes biased delusion. It's when the filter of religious bias or any bias exists as a closed door for further exploration, making someone stand their ground purely based on their belief, or that they become confused as to what is a truth claim and what is exploration in their reasoning.

At back of this debate are conceptions of reality. Does reality comprise physical objects determined by physical laws (that is, scientific materialism/physicalism)? Alternatives include various schools of idealism, dualism, panpsychism, and phenomenology - none of which are necessarily religious in nature. It is possible to argue the case without reference to religion, although rejection of physicalism might often suggest philosophical views that seem close to religion - too close for comfort, for a lot of people. — Wayfarer

In this I have to agree that the line I draw around the definition of philosophy and its purpose becomes more leaned towards certain schools than others. While I think all have exploratory functions and importance for the ability to reach depth in any subject, some schools of thought sometimes goes too far into "anything goes" and in my opinion that just blows up any ability to agree upon any definition of philosophy or for anyone to be able to reach any foundation of knowledge for existence itself. Arguments like the "brain in the vat", for example, while interesting, has become a go to claim that just dismisses the entire fields of neuroscience and psychology whenever someone tries to make philosophical claims based on that scientific foundation.

If there aren't any foundational agreements about how we approach reality (like accepting verified scientific results), then it simply becomes "anything goes". And of course knowing the difference between truth claims and exploration. We can explore ideas about the mind that are wildly speculative and perhaps even spiritual, as long as no one claims truths that have no foundation in verified science about the mind.

It is within confusing this difference between conclusions and exploration that I think most fail in philosophy. Both in writing and in reading.

Yes, this is exactly the issue, how are we to determine good biases from bad. You were talking as if all biases are bad, but now you appear to accept that some might be good. So, on what bases are we going to distinguish good biases from bad biases? — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I'm asking in a larger critical context. Because there's a faulty logic in claiming there to be good biases and bad biases when such claims are values that essentially requires a detachment from bias in the first place in order to reach a claim of what is good or bad.

Which means that the argument fails by its own logic and becomes circular reasoning. You claim there to be good and bad biases, but to reach those values you need to be unbiased and in doing so you are doing what I'm talking about, unbiased reasoning.

Bias is neutral, there are no good or bad values. In human reasoning and cognition it is merely a description of how the we gravitate towards something based on our emotions or paths of least resistance in our thought processes. Basically because it's part of how our minds work. Our minds seek patterns and summarize reality without rationality, much more than actually understanding a detailed and holistic view that is objective or detached from our cognition. To do that we need to apply a method that we follow and train ourselves to process what we learn and experience in a more careful way.

No, like I explained, biases are a natural and essential part of being human. Therefore it is impossible to be bias-free, and any attempt at "not having a pre-existing belief bias" would be a completely unrealistic attempt due to that impossibility. Such an attempt would just turn into a matter of gravitating toward keeping the biases which one is comfortable with, and eliminating the others, because it is impossible to not have any bias. Then we end up still having biases and no principles for distinguishing which biases we ought to have and ought not have. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, biases are natural, but they are not good or bad as you claim since such values are arbitrary. And if we are talking about knowledge biases, yes, everyone has biases and therefor it is the purpose of unbiased methods of reasoning to improve our ability to reach conclusions and truths that are objective or broad rather than the subjective truths of our stupid minds. Without methods like this we are simply just spitting out opinions that cannot be foundations for concepts that function in a broader context and society, they just become like any twitter thread: a long line of irrelevant noise biased towards each individual subject's beliefs.

I think you are mixing together praxis with bias. Philosophy focuses on unbiased reasoning in order to sometimes reach a praxis that we use in society. That doesn't mean "good bias" or "bad bias", it simply means that something like Kant's categorical imperatives are concepts that he argued for without biases to any beliefs and then we implement them as principles and praxis for how to figure out effective and functioning laws.

Your proposed "detachment from bias" is unrealistic, impossible for a human being to achieve, analogous to a mind separated from its body. It is not the human condition, nor is it a possible condition for a human being, so forget about it, and move along to something more realistic. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is not. It is, as I've been saying, a core tenet of philosophy.

Do you accept as true, the proposition that "perfect understanding" is impossible for human beings to obtain. If so, then you ought to recognize that your goal of being bias-free is not a reasonable goal for a human being. This conclusion necessitates a completely different approach to biases. Instead of attempting to reject all biases as fundamentally unwanted, we need to accept that it is impossible to reject all biases, therefore we need some principles by which we can decide which to reject. Do you see that these "principles" cannot themselves be biases, but more of a versatile, or universal method for assessing biases. — Metaphysician Undercover

The goal of philosophy is to reduce bias in reasoning and arguments. Without doing so, you are not doing philosophy, you are just telling loose opinions and that is not philosophy, that is just normal talk.

Explain what this universal method of assessing biases is, because so far you are just saying that we need to arrive at good and bad biases, but what exactly is the process you propose? How do we arrive at such conclusions? How do you reach them? If you say that we cannot do anything without bias, then how do we reach an understanding of what are good and bad biases? It's just circular.

This is not true. My demonstration that there are good biases came from your assumption that there are bad biases. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I'm saying that biases are neutral forms of gravitation towards certain things and in doing without knowledge of doing so, it breaks any ability to form objective or universal reasoning that functions as broader understanding or universal truths for the many. It's the process of arguing with bias that is bad, not that there are bad biases. That is a faulty understanding of what bias is as a natural phenomena in human cognition and how it relates to unbiased reasoning.

The rest of your reasoning then becomes faulty because you interpret bias wrong in the first place.

Bias is a natural and neutral manipulation of the ability to reason outside of your own beliefs. Without mitigating it through unbiased reasoning methods, you fail to universalize your arguments to function as broader truths or claims.

Furthermore, all that is required to further this process, is a definition of what constitutes "good". Once we have that, we can judge biases as to whether or not they are consistent with, or have that quality. "Good" would be defined in such a way as to be a principle, to serve as a method for judging biases, without itself being a bias. — Metaphysician Undercover

How do you arrive at good? You just claim us to arrive at that without explaining how we arrive at that? It's basically like saying, "once we have the concept of good acts, we can then form principles of morality that we can follow", and then argue about some ideals that still requires the "good" to be defined. You still don't seem to see that this argument is faulty, that it is a circular argument in which you describe a system that relies on axioms that needs to be argued for and proven absolute, before you propose how to use them. You are only describing how to use them... whenever we arrive at having such axioms.

All that is required is to have a process for judging biases which is separate from the biases, a process being an activity, whereas a bias is a static belief. The process therefore cannot itself be a bias. This is why science is based in a method, "method" signifying a process. — Metaphysician Undercover

So... you are basically describing philosophy and critical thinking for arriving to a place in which you can judge biases? So, basically what my definition of philosophy is and the entire point of philosophy? To be able to do unbiased reasoning.

I think you have entangled yourself further into this circular reasoning.

It appears like you have the idea here, when you talk about a "method". But it is not a matter of acting "against" biases, as you state. Nor is it a detachment from bias, as this is impossible. It is simply a way of acting which recognizes the reality of biases and the need to cope with them. To deny them, or pretend a detachment is self-deception. — Metaphysician Undercover

But, it is not, because the methods are common practice in philosophy. It's how we structure deduction, induction, analogies, metaphors etc. They're based on a systematic framework for thinking and arriving at conclusions that challenge our biases so that we can think past them.

The problem is that you believe that because of the natural state of biases in our cognition, we are unable to work past them through methods and instead need to surrender and incorporate bias into our methods.

You still need to use unbiased methods and critical thinking in order to arrive at a value system for what is good or bad biases. So the main objection becomes, why should we not use such unbiased methods as a primary method for everything we try to figure out, seen as they are neutral and more universalized and doesn't rely on reasoning that is manipulated by biases?

Let me take what you say here about the "soul" ad make an analogy. The concept of "soul" is a very difficult and complex subject in philosophy. It requires great study to understand the soul, Plato's "Phaedo" is a good start. But then there is Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, and many others. So when a learned philosopher makes a claim about "the soul as something actual", I would assume that this philosopher has some understanding about that matter. That philosopher probably even understands that Aristotle defines the soul as actual, and explains the logical reasoning why the soul must be defined as "actual". Therefore we cannot say that such a claim is "unsupported". — Metaphysician Undercover

Prove the soul's existence. That is the problem. How is any of what Phaedo describes supported other than through Ancient Greek's factual concepts of reality which were based on undeveloped methods of science? Concepts that are proven false with empirical evidence today.

That a learned philosopher's claim should be considered true because that philosopher has some arbitrary understanding of it, is basically appeal to authority.

"Soul" can be used as metaphor, we can use it as exploratory concepts, just like reincarnation, the cycle of life and death can be discussed as frameworks of broader subjects. But if you are to arrive at a supported claim of an actual existence of a soul, you definitely need to have deductive logic and even more so actual empirical evidence since this is a claim about reality. As I've described, these things change throughout history, but we are at a time in history where science is an empirical field of such accuracy that the demand on philosophy when making conclusions like "the human soul is real" requires a lot more than an "appeal to authority".

Today, Phaedo is not even close to a sound argument. The entire dialogue relies on false assumptions about physics and the universe. It relies on that time's understanding of reality, but that today is nothing more than pure belief.

The problem is that people today take the historical relevance of Phaedo as evidence for it being true in its conclusions. It is through what I describe as the confusion people have today on how to approach much of old and ancient philosophy as exploratory rather than deductive. The claims that are made have faulty logic when updating them today, so they should only be used as exploratory concepts used for metaphorical exploration of the idea about a soul.

A good example of this is Ghost in the Shell, in which the soul is called a ghost and through that the philosophical concept handles the digitalization of the self as a separate entity from the original body. You can use Phaedo when exploring these ideas, but the conclusions it propose are not factual or supported as deductive claims about the soul.

But you could call that a bias if you like. Then however, when a learned physicist refers to a photon as something actual, we should assume that the definitions produced from observations of the photoelectric effect which incline the physicists to speak of a photon as an actual thing, constitute a bias in the very same way. — Metaphysician Undercover

A photon is a real thing. It is measurable as both a wave and a particle in experiments like the wave function collapse in the double slit experiment. We also have inventions and technology that utilizes photons as well as all electronics that use things like electrons. It is not a bias to "believe a photon to be a real thing", it is an empirical truth that would otherwise make the computer you write on to be running on pure belief, which I doubt.

. I'm saying that 'the mind' is a publicly tradable concept.
— jjAmEs — Wayfarer

Sure. — Wayfarer

I'm thinking you still don't see what I mean by that. There's a certain overlap in our positions, which is something like: Concepts are important. They exist. Perceptions are concept rich, but just stupid sensations. We need language/thinking even to absurdly deny the existence of language and thinking. We need linguistic conventions for denying the centrality of such conventions.

In dualism, ‘mind’ is contrasted with ‘body’, but at different times, different aspects of the mind have been the centre of attention. In the classical and mediaeval periods, it was the intellect that was thought to be most obviously resistant to a materialistic account: from Descartes on, the main stumbling block to materialist monism was supposed to be ‘consciousness’, of which phenomenal consciousness or sensation came to be considered as the paradigm instance.

The classical emphasis originates in Plato's Phaedo. Plato believed that the true substances are not physical bodies, which are ephemeral, but the eternal Forms of which bodies are imperfect copies. These Forms not only make the world possible, they also make it intelligible, because they perform the role of universals, or what Frege called ‘concepts'. It is their connection with intelligibility that is relevant to the philosophy of mind. Because Forms are the grounds of intelligibility, they are what the intellect must grasp in the process of understanding. In Phaedo Plato presents a variety of arguments for the immortality of the soul, but the one that is relevant for our purposes is that the intellect is immaterial because Forms are immaterial and intellect must have an affinity with the Forms it apprehends (78b4–84b8). This affinity is so strong that the soul strives to leave the body in which it is imprisoned and to dwell in the realm of Forms. — link

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dualism/#MinBodHisDua

What Freud, Saussure and Durkheim seem to have recognized is that social sciences could make little progress until society was considered a reality in itself: a set of institutions or systems which are more than the contingent manifestations of the spirit or the sum of individual activities. It is as though they had asked: “what makes individual experience possible? what enables men to perceive not just physical objects but objects with a meaning? what enables them to communicate and act meaningfully?” And the answer which they postulated was social institutions which, though formed by human activities, are the conditions of experience. To understand individual experience one must study the social norms which make it possible. — Culler

The notion of value... shows us that it is a great mistake to consider a sign as nothing more than the combination of a certain sound and a certain concept. To think of a sign as nothing more would be to isolate it from the system to which it belongs. It would be to suppose that a start could be made with individual signs, and a system constructed by putting them together. On the contrary, the system as a united whole is the starting point, from which it becomes possible, by a process of analysis, to identify its constituent elements. — Saussure

The arbitrariness principle can be applied not only to the sign, but to the whole sign-system. The fundamental arbitrariness of language is apparent from the observation that each language involves different distinctions between one signifier and another (e.g. 'tree' and 'free') and between one signified and another (e.g. 'tree' and 'bush'). The signified is clearly arbitrary if reality is perceived as a seamless continuum (which is how Saussure sees the initially undifferentiated realms of both thought and sound): where, for example, does a 'corner' end? Commonsense suggests that the existence of things in the world preceded our apparently simple application of 'labels' to them (a 'nomenclaturist' notion which Saussure rejected and to which we will return in due course). Saussure noted that 'if words had the job of representing concepts fixed in advance, one would be able to find exact equivalents for them as between one language and another. But this is not the case' (Saussure 1983, 114-115; Saussure 1974, 116). Reality is divided up into arbitrary categories by every language and the conceptual world with which each of us is familiar could have been divided up very differently. Indeed, no two languages categorize reality in the same way. As John Passmore puts it, 'Languages differ by differentiating differently' (cited in Sturrock 1986, 17). Linguistic categories are not simply a consequence of some predefined structure in the world. There are no 'natural' concepts or categories which are simply 'reflected' in language. Language plays a crucial role in 'constructing reality'. — Chandler on Saussure

https://www.cs.princeton.edu/~chazelle/courses/BIB/semio2.htm


What I make of this is that we are trained as children to employ a system of signs in the context of a social life which is largely non-linguistic. This system of signs is also a taken-for-granted lens on the world. It makes philosophy and science possible. It is their 'ground.' And yet philosophy and science seek out the ground of this ground (metaphysical or physical substratum). The Mobius strip comes to mind.

Derrida's concept of iterability is attempt to make sense of the realm of the ideal, the realm of Forms. What is this human passion to dwell in the realm of the forms? To escape time, decay, vulnerability, confusion... I share this passion. We want to add to the Book, live in the Book.

I just completed a long essay in several parts on Plato's Phaedo. Read it and get back to me if you want to discuss Plato.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/10914/platos-phaedo/p1

Do you know other examples about mythopoeic? — javi2541997

Plato's Phaedo. A detailed discussion:here

Plato's Timaeus. Discussed in far less detail here

... the Aristotelian concept of essence (which Thomas inherits) ... — Relativist

The term essence (essentia) was a Latin invention used to translate Aristotle's Greek ousia. Cicero is credited with inventing the term, from the Latin esse, to be. It means "what it is to be". To complicate matters, ousia is often translated as 'substance', a term whose meaning is not co-extensive with ousia. Ousia refers to some particular being, Socrates or Plato.

The guiding question of Aristotle's Metaphysics is the question of 'being qua being", that is, what it is for something to be the thing that it is. What is it, for example, that distinguishes man from other beings. And, what it is distinguishes Socrates from other men. The puzzle is laid out in Plato's Phaedo. Each attempted solution proves to be problematic.

Those who desire answers and assurances will take part to be the whole. In the Phaedo in the double sense of the soul not as a part but as the whole and the stories and not the arguments as the whole. In re Aristotle's Metaphysics, the problem of prime movers is taken to be not the problem but the answer.

The character of Socrates as depicted by Plato is not always consistent with the historical personage of Socrates. — Merkwurdichliebe

Right, I am referring here to Plato's depiction of Socrates, "made young and beautiful" (Second Letter). The Socrates depicted in the other two main sources, Xenophon and Aristophanes, is not historical either. But we should keep in mind Aristotle's claim that poetry is more philosophical than history.

He knew nothing. He was not a skeptic, he was absolutely ignorant. — Merkwurdichliebe

I agree he was a skeptic, although not in the modern sense of skepticism. True to his reputation for irony, he claims to know that he does not know, which is not the same as absolute ignorance.

And through his method, he discovered these men did not know what they believed themselves to know. — Merkwurdichliebe

Someone who knows nothing would not possess the skill needed to reveal the ignorance of others or to persuade the likes of Plato and Xenophon to learn from him. Plato's Socrates acknowledges the craftsmen's knowledge of their crafts. He also refers to the physician's knowledge, the ship captain's knowledge, and others who possess some form of knowledge. The problem is, being knowledgeable about one thing they wrongly believe they are knowledgeable about all others. Xenophon's Socrates also recognizes those who possess some form of knowledge.

But he never assented to a knowledge of the forms, that was a Platonic fabrication. — Merkwurdichliebe

The point of the passages I cited from the Republic is that he does not assent to knowledge of the Forms. It is not a Platonic fabrication, but an assumption the less than careful reader is led to. It should also be pointed out that in the Theaetetus, the dialogue devoted to the question of knowledge, there is no mention of the Forms.

In fact, "The Republic" is entirely Platonic, not Socratic. — Merkwurdichliebe

At one time, a great deal of effort was exerted attempting to distinguish Plato from Socrates. There are probably a few around who still try to identify the historical Socrates, but we simply do not have the evidence to do so. The problem is compounded by the fact that Plato never speaks in his own name in the dialogues. In the Seventh Letter he states:

But thus much I can certainly declare concerning all these writers, or prospective writers, who claim to know the subjects which I seriously study, whether as hearers of mine or of other teachers, or from their own discoveries; it is impossible, in my judgement at least, that these men should understand anything about this subject. There does not exist, nor will there ever exist, any treatise of mine dealing therewith. For it does not at all admit of verbal expression like other studies (341c)

Socrates came to reject the notion that "man is the measure of all things". — Merkwurdichliebe

We do not know this. If we look at Plato's dialogues, however, and after all the discussion is about Plato, things are not as simple as they may appear to be on the surface. If we do not have knowledge of the truth and must rely on opinion, then man is the measure. This does not mean that whatever man says is true but rather that in the absence of the truth as the measure we are left with what Socrates calls in Plato's Phaedo his "second sailing", that is, his reliance on speech. This is skeptical in a double sense. The Greek term 'skepsis' means both to inquire and to doubt. His reliance on speech is not an acceptance of whatever is said, but an inquiry or examination of it. It is sometimes referred to as zetetic skepticism. It is the method of dialectic.

Attunement is how Horan translates it. It is how Sedley and Long translate it. It is how Brann translates it. It is how many others translate it as well. The Greek term is ἁρμονία (harmonia) and is transliterated as harmony. — Fooloso4

The particular word used is not relevant. What is relevant is how Plato describes what is being talked about. We have the passage from Simmias which I quoted, "a harmony is something invisible, without body, in the attuned lyre, whereas the lyre itself and its strings are physical, bodily, composite, earthy and akin to what is mortal". Replace the word translated as "harmony" with "attunement" if you will, but that does not change the description presented.

Then we have Socrates' description at 92c, "...the lyre and the strings and the notes, though still unharmonized, exist; the harmony is composed last of all, and is the first to be destroyed." Go ahead, replace "harmony" with "attunement". This does not change the thrust of the argument because the context provides the meaning.

The tuning of a lyre exists apart from and prior to any particular lyre. — Fooloso4

This is nonsense. Yes, it is true that the principles by which a lyre is tuned exists apart from any particular lyre. But "the tuning of a lyre" is the tuning of a lyre, and that means that a particular lyre is being tuned. This is your sophistry. When Plato talks about a particular lyre, a bodily composite of elements, wood, pegs, and strings, which is tuned to produce a "harmony" or "attunement", you claim that he is talking about the general principles by which a lyre is tuned.

The context clearly indicates that you are wrong in your interpretation. First, in Simmias' statement, the harmony or attunement is something which exists "in the attuned lyre", it is not a separate principle by which the lyre is tuned. Then in the context of Socrates' statement, "the harmony is composed last of all". Obviously this "harmony" or "attunement" is not the principles by which the lyre is tuned, because that would be prior to the attunement, and not "last of all".

These statements in Plato's Phaedo are very explicit, and completely contrary to your interpretation above.

The myth of recollection is fraught with problems. If we start with the premise that knowledge is recollection then there would never be a time when knowledge was learned. But it cannot be recollected if it had not at some time first been learned. — Fooloso4

Yes "recollection" is fraught with problems, as it leads to eternal objects of knowledge, commonly known as "Platonism". But the problem of preexisting knowledge, knowledge which preexists the individual, which shows up within the individual, as instinctual know-how, and the capacity to learn, which the theory of recollection was designed to resolve, still exists if we deny the theory of recollection.

To improve does not mean to bring into existence. One cannot improve something that does not exist. — Fooloso4

Put this into context though. To improve would be to bring harmony from dissonance. This very clearly indicates bringing harmony into existence.

Your final statement, "One cannot improve something that does not exist" represents the exact point of Plato's argument. To improve an evil person is not to bring harmony to dissonance, because that would imply that the evil person, being dissonant, does not even have a soul. Being dissonant means the harmony does not exist, and therefore neither would the soul.

But that is not the case in reality, the evil person does have a soul, and so do all sorts of other living things. Therefore improving on the attributes or properties of the soul, may be described as bringing harmony to something dissonant, but the soul cannot be the harmony because it exists even when there is dissonance, prior to the harmony.

Right, it is not the soul which is tuned. The soul is the attunement, the arrangement and tension of the parts of the body, not what is tuned. — Fooloso4

Now you are being ambiguous with your use of "attunement". Each body, or musical instrument, has parts and an arrangement which are particular to that body or instrument. You've said already that the "attunement" in your peculiar interpretation exists prior to the instrument, as the set of principles by which the instrument might be tuned. Now, you cannot turn around and say that the attunement is "the arrangement and tension of the parts of the body", and pretend to be consistent. That arrangement and tension is particular to the individual body, and is therefore posterior to the existence of the body.

When the instrument is in tune the strings are in harmony to each other. — Fooloso4

Again, you are playing your equivocation.

The more harmonized the soul the less its dissonance. A soul that is in poor health, a soul with a great deal of dissonance, is still a soul. — Fooloso4

You are not getting the point. The soul is harmony, attunement. That is the theory. It cannot be more or less harmonized, or in any way dissonant or else it would not be a soul. That is the precept of the theory, the soul is harmony. Therefore, by the precept of the theory a soul cannot have "a great deal of dissonance", because this is contrary to harmony, and by the theory the soul is harmony. The proposed "great deal of dissonance" would indicate a supposed soul with a great deal of non-soul, but that is contradictory.

A soul that is well attuned, a soul that is in harmony and balance, rules well. One that is in discord does not. Harmonized means that there is not one element of the attunement that rules. — Fooloso4

If the soul is a harmony, or attunement, then every soul, necessarily, is well tuned, by definition. By this theory, "the soul is a harmony", there can be no such thing as a discordant soul. That would be contradiction.

The attunement is the condition of the instrument. Your being in good or bad health is not something distinct from you, but you are not the condition you are in. — Fooloso4

Again, you are equivocating with "attunement". By what you said at the beginning of the post, "The tuning of a lyre exists apart from and prior to any particular lyre", the attunement is not "the condition of the instrument". It is something separate from any particular instrument, as the principles by which an instrument might be tuned.

Your equivocation allows you to blatantly contradict yourself. First, the attunement is apart from and prior to any particular instrument, and now it is "not something distinct", it is "the condition of the instrument".

Where does it say that the spirited part is the medium between body and soul? — Fooloso4

Read "The Republic" please.

What I claim is that the attunement is not apart from the body, not that it is a part of the body. It is not some part in addition to the parts. — Fooloso4

Hmm, the final part of the post directly contradicts the beginning of your post. This is due to the equivocation I pointed to. Do you proof read? That could help you to avoid embarrassment. Look, this is the top of your post:

The tuning of a lyre exists apart from and prior to any particular lyre. The tuning, the harmony, is an arrangement of frequencies that exists even when a particular lyre is not in tune — Fooloso4

By your new statement "the attunement is not apart from the body", do you agree with what Plato has Socrates say, that the attunement is posterior to, as dependent on the body? It is last to be produced, and first lost at corruption of the body And do you agree that an attunement is not random, but according to some principles which constitute "harmony". So if the soul is supposed to be a harmony, or attunement, the tensions of the bodily elements must exist in this specific way in order for that body to be endowed with "a soul"? That is the position which Plato is arguing against. And I suggest it is much the same as modern physicalism

The thread on thread quality ran out of puff just as the content reached one of its periodic lows.

Let's put the issue this way: Most threads are poor quality. But a very few - maybe one in fifty - are worthwhile. And one in a few hundred is excellent.

In the last few weeks only Plato's Phaedo reached a reasonable standard.

It might be interesting to flip the usual question. So here's a follow on for you:

What have been the most worthwhile threads on the forums?

Link to them, with a reason.

At the risk of making this thread useful:

No result in a search for “Plato's Phaedo” — praxis

Some books says that Plato thinks that we are all born with the Forms from the past life. We never learn new things. The knowledge is all in the mind and forms already with us, and we just retrieve them. — Corvus

Correct. This is Plato's Theory of Recollection (anamnesis) according to which souls having lived before and having experienced the Forms, have latent knowledge of them, which knowledge can be retrieved through recollection.

Plato introduces this in the Meno and Phaedo:

“What you think,” he [Socrates] asked, “about the argument in which we said that learning is recollection and that, since this is so, our soul must necessarily have been somewhere before it was imprisoned in the body?”
“I,” said Cebes, “was wonderfully convinced by it at the time and I still believe it more firmly than any other argument.”
“And I too,” said Simmias, “feel just as he does, and I should be much surprised if I should ever think differently on this point (91e-92a)”

Are you being sarcastic or is that what you really believe. If that is what you believe we have read different books. — Athena

Well, if you have any evidence that Jesus and St Paul spread Christianity by force of arms, feel free to post it here. :smile:

Anyway, as I said, the issue is very complex, and I don’t think you will be able to fix all the loose ends, to be quite honest. You would need a team of scholars and experts to sort out the historical and cultural background in the first place, let alone anything else ....

IMO the concept of “European Dark Ages” does not really stand to objective scrutiny. The teaching of philosophy in the eastern part of the Roman Empire was carried on without interruption from Plato and Aristotle to the modern era.

Where did the Arabs get Plato and Aristotle from? From the Greeks! Who translated Plato and Aristotle into Arabic for them? The Eastern Christians!

Meantime, the West was overrun by Germanic tribes: the Ostrogoths in Italy, the Franks in France, the Vandals and Visigoths in Spain, etc. Latin and Greek were no longer widely used, and traveling was more difficult. The Western Empire disintegrated into separate kingdoms.

In 797 AD, Irene of Athens became Empress of the Eastern Roman Empire.

Pope Leo III did not like the idea of a female emperor, declared the throne vacant, and in 800 decided to crown Charlemagne, King of the Franks, as Emperor of the Western Roman Empire. The Greeks who saw themselves as the rightful heirs of the Roman Empire protested and this developed into hostile relations between East and West. The conflict led to the East-West Schism of 1054 and the Western sacking of the Eastern capital Constantinople in 1204.

So, I think it can be seen that the West lost its Greek and Roman cultural heritage NOT because of the Church but because the Romans lost control of their Empire to Germanic barbarians. And the West began to translate Aristotle from Arabic into Latin, not because his works were not available in the Greek East, but because knowledge of Greek had been mostly lost in the West and because of the animosity between West and East.

Moreover, this happened at a time when philosophy had begun to be suppressed in the Islamic world. After that, the Abbasid Caliphate was taken over by Turks and Mongols (1258) and that was the end of the “Golden Age of Islam”.

The Italian scholar Petrarch who lived in the 1300’s and is widely regarded as the “Father of the Renaissance”, was in fact opposed to the Averroists who only knew Aristotle from Arabic commentaries translated into Latin. He started collecting manuscripts of the works of Classical authors and he was inspired by the Abbott Barlaam of Calabria who had lived most of his life in Greece (as head of the Monastery of St Gregory).

Petrarch had read Augustine and Cicero (a manuscript of whom he had inherited from his father) as well as Plato's Phaedo and Timaeus that were available in Latin translation and received a Greek copy of Homer from the Greek scholar Gen. Nicholas Sygerus. Petrarch’s friend Boccaccio was another prominent promoter of Greek language and literature. Whilst commissioning the translation of Euripides and Aristotle from Greek into Latin, they introduced the idea of studying the Classics in the original Greek. Their follower Coluccio Salutati continued their work and in 1395 founded a chair of Greek at the University of Florence for the Greek scholar Manuel Chrysoloras. Other scholars and philosophers from Greece followed in the next decades.

Petrarch | Encyclopedia

Apparently, Petrarch coined the phrase “Dark Ages” and this was later used by Protestants to attack Catholics and blame them for the “Dark Ages”, etc.

However, 1) Petrarch was referring to the western part of the Roman Empire (the Latin West), 2) as Petrarch (and everyone else) was obviously aware, the Eastern Roman Empire (the Greek East) was still extant (until it was conquered by the Muslim Turks in 1453), and 3) the concept of “European Dark Ages” is out of date and is no longer recognized by most scholars.

There are many other misconceptions about the “Dark Ages” and the same goes for the “Islamic Golden Age” that, incidentally, was coined in the 1800’s as an expression of Western Orientalism.

So, it seems that some are working with outdated concepts from a bygone era and wrong historical data.

See also:

Medieval Monasticism as Preserver of Western Civilization

Hmm. I wonder if this is more about Plato than Socrates? — Banno

I'm not sure that you mean by "this". For me, what is most interesting is the difference between two representations of the same event. Assuming that neither side is lying, but that both are selecting, we might expect to get a more balanced view of what actually happened.

This strikes me as cowardly. Elsewhere he talks about Socrates courage. — Fooloso4

This takes us to the heart of the euthanasia issue. I'm with Marcus Aurelius in his Meditations. I hope I will have the courage to recognize when my time is up; I would welcome the opportunity to choose to make a dignified exit. There is something cowardly about clinging desperately on to the last shreds of life, though I admit that from another perspective all we can ever do is postpone death. But this may only be the result of my life experience.

Given that Socrates was actually in good health, you may be right. But what were the real likely outcomes of the trial?

Socrates gives something of an answer in the Crito, but frames it in the context of his violation of his (implicit) contract with the Laws. But I think it was unrealistic to think that this accusation and this trial could possibly be the end of the matter. The trial was the result of a long persecution, as Socrates tells us in the Apology; that would not have ended. Exile would not have resolved the issue, especially when he started practising his philosophy in the place he was exiled from or even when his reputation followed him. (He talks about having to constantly move on from one city to another.)
Socrates frames his questioning process as a collaborative exploration in which each participant helps the other(s). But it is not difficult to see that they might see the process as entirely combative and even dishonest (for goodness sake, we all know what piety or courage is, even if we can't define it!). That's the heart of the problem.

With regard to the scene in Plato's Phaedo, it may be that Socrates no longer wanted her present simply because she had become distraught. — Fooloso4

Perhaps. I think it is more complicated than that. Plato wants to present an inspiring scene (or version of the scene). The philosopher meets his end with calm and courage. Xanthippe disrupts that, but, in the presentation, reminds us that this is the scene of a disaster. By being escorted away, she is prevented from disrupting the project. Whether we see that as a rather brutal exclusion of his wife or a protection of Socrates is another matter.

It may be that her reputation for being difficult is due entirely to Xenophon. — Fooloso4

Yes. It seems to me that there is a great deal to be said for Xanthippe's bad temper. He irritated everyone else, why would he not irritate his wife? All that time spent in futile debate with strangers, when he could be earning a living. For Xanthippe, that would not have been a marginal issue. How did Socrates pay the bills? Though if there were two women in his life (Myrto), perhaps her issue with him was simpler than that. We'll never really know.

Don't get me wrong. Plato succeeded in creating a story which has turned out to be the founding myth of philosophy. It was the first philosophical text I ever read, and still works well with beginning students. It's just that it would not be philosophical to refrain from exploring what a less sympathetic stance would look like.

OK but you didn't address my question:
This made me think of our 'Plato's Phaedo' discussion.

The repetition and singing as incantation; myths and magic.

Why the difference between the lines, even if it seems they are saying the same thing? — Amity

The purpose of the incantations in the Phaedo is to charm away the fear of death. The saint is praising his god.

What I noticed here was the change from God to god. — Amity

I take this to be about the difference between God as universal and the god who is his god. But I don't know that the saint sees them as different. It may be an expression of closeness, of unity.

Where does he claim the telos as the source of or navigator to truth — Gary M Washburn

As I understand it, for Plato, telos isn't the source of truth, "being" is the source of truth.

Plato in Phaedo argues that while materials that compose a body are necessary for its acting in a certain way, they cannot be sufficient. Telos is the inherent purpose of a person or thing, in that the telos of warfare is victory and the telos of business is the creation of wealth. What is sufficent is found within the Form itself, in that the Forms themselves are the source of the telos.

For Plato, truth is the way the world is. Truth depends on what "is" in the world, and is not defined in terms of any correspondence between statements and reality. Statements may be true in virtue of the world being a certain way, in that "Theaetetus is sitting is true if and only if the form sitting has being in the case of Theaetetus". These forms in the world are only shadows of the Forms, which we can recognize by using our mind and reason.

IE, by looking at forms in the world, which are the truths in the world, by using our mind and reason we can sense the Forms themselves. It is the Forms themselves that incorporate their own purpose, their own telos.

The abstract perfection of language — Gary M Washburn

George Orwell 1946 Politics and the English Language - "Political language... is designed to make lies sound truthful and murder respectable, and to give an appearance of solidity to pure wind. "

So what I didn't make clear is that this is all me. — frank

That had crossed my mind, but with your mention of Plato, Meno, Phaedo, and anamnesis I took it that you were discussing the dialogue.

So from my point of view, you're continually trying to teach me my own argument and nitpicking at the edges. — frank

That was not my intention. My remarks were all made with regard to the attempt to understand Plato's Meno. Perhaps in my eagerness to discuss Plato I missed what you were doing. My apologies.

As I read him, Plato is a relativist. Only not the kind of relativist that Schindler attacks. The argument is simple. Knowledge of ignorance means that moral absolutes are beyond our grasp. In their absence Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle must settle for what on the basis of argument seems true and best to them. In the absence of knowledge we cannot say that absolutes do not exist, but we can recognize that we are not in possession of the them. We remain in the realm of opinion.

The problem of misologic is raised at the center or heart of Plato's Phaedo. Simply put, Socrates wants to provide his friends with arguments to support belief in the immortality of the soul. The arguments fail to accomplish this. Those whose trust in reasoned argument is excessive and unreasonable are shattered. They may become haters of argument because it has failed them.

The cure involves, as the action of the dialogue shows, a shift from logos to mythos. Socrates turns from the problem of sound arguments to the soundness of those who make and judge arguments. Socrates human wisdom, his knowledge of his ignorance, is more than just knowing that he is ignorant. It is knowing how to think and live in ignorance.

So the assumption that her audience would assume that she was talking about marriage as popularly conceived in the mid-20th century is not unreasonable. — Ludwig V

Perhaps, but: 1) We are not that audience. We could read it as a quaint period piece, but if we are to evaluate it on its philosophical merits we might ask if it stands the test of time. 2) If her intention was to persuade young men to marry it is revisionist history. When she says:

People leading a normal domestic life would not, I believe, have fallen into this sort of mistake.

someone in the mid-20th century hearing this and taking "a normal domestic life" to be the married life of the mid-20th century would be misled and might conclude that if they do not marry they are not normal.

But how does that show that Plato and Descartes, in their different ways, did not both regard the human soul as radically distinct from physical objects? — Ludwig V

This is the claim I was responding to:

Philosophers did not want the human soul to be mixed up in the world of objects, as it must be to make knowledge possible.

As I read it she is claiming a concern to avoid contamination by the world of objects.

You seem to be suggesting that this is an alternative explanation for someone having difficulty with interpersonal relations. — Ludwig V

No. There are various reasons why someone does not marry. It was in response to Midgley's sweeping claims about immaturity and forming attachments.

It seems likely to me that we would not find a strong correlation between marital status and specific philosophical doctrines, but we need at least to consider the possibility, don't we? — Ludwig V

That is something I would judge from the fruits it bears. It would have to go further than just marital status, however. A happy or unhappy marriage, for example, might have to be taken into consideration. See the reference to what Socrates said in Xenophon's Symposium in a previous post.

My course is similar. Mankind at large is what I wish to deal and associate with; and so I have got her, well assured that if I can endure her, I shall have no difficulty in my relations with all the rest of human kind.

His course in marrying Xanthippe is similar to that of a horse-trainer breaking a willful horse. It is not marriage he wished to deal and associate with, but mankind at large. We see from Plato's Phaedo that he had no affection toward her. He did, however, on Plato's telling have some concern for the welfare of his children. I don't know if there is a correlation with his teachings, but it does seem that he preferred to hang out in the marketplace rather than at home with her.

@Wallows
I've seen that video too, and I agree, it is fascinating stuff. But I don't think its as threatening or even as beneficial, as people think. I think most "advances" in technology result in both unseen pros and unseen consequences.

Well, I would like to learn more about mathematics. It's something that is irresistibly beautiful and edifying.

I want to learn Latin. And biology. And ecology. And formal logic (better). And physics eventually. And then I want to own a yacht, and sail for awhile, and read every book I can find. My point is, I agree, there are lots of things I want to do but I think doing things, even new and exciting things, is only one facet of life, or at least, what makes life worth living and enjoyable and fulfilling.

No we should certainly not. I personally think the human species should go extinct sooner rather than later. All things considered.
— Grre

Uhh, and why is that? Are you perchance a misanthrope?

Because I am an irritating presumptuous autistic person here is the definition of misanthropy from Wikipedia;

"The pre-Socratic philosopher Heraclitus was by various accounts a misanthrope and a loner who had little patience for human society.[6][7] In a fragment, the philosopher complained that "people [were] forever without understanding" of what was, in his view, the nature of reality.
In Western philosophy, misanthropy has been connected to isolation from human society. In Plato's Phaedo, Socrates describes a misanthrope in relation to his fellow man: "Misanthropy develops when without art one puts complete trust in somebody thinking the man absolutely true and sound and reliable and then a little later discovers him to be bad and unreliable ... and when it happens to someone often ... he ends up ... hating everyone."[8] Misanthropy, then, is presented as a potential result of thwarted expectations or even excessively naïve optimism, since Plato argues that "art" would have allowed the potential misanthrope to recognize that the majority of men are to be found in between good and evil.[9] Aristotle follows a more ontological route: the misanthrope, as an essentially solitary man, is not a man at all: he must be a beast or a god, a view reflected in the Renaissance view of misanthropy as a "beast-like state".[10]"

While I have recently been hurt, and hurt quite badly, I don't claim to hate "everyone" out of some misplaced fear and distrust. I am biased, but more so, I feel detached. This detachment helps me see more clearly that individual lives don't matter in the slightest, and that species en masse don't matter beyond, perchance, their rarity and eliteness (life itself, is miraculous, statistically speaking), and that is that. Extinction then doesn't really matter. Except right now. To us. So, then, all is left is, what matters to you? Therefore, you are speaking from inevitable bias and waylaid by subjective experience-if nothing matters beyond your own life and experiences, then there isn't a lot of quantifiable meaning to our lives is there? And the life and experiences don't mean that much, so inevitably we cling to them. Hence extinction seems to us, quite bad, all in all, when considering our current lives.

I think, that if people had an extra 50 years to live longer, then the entire world would dramatically be changed for the better.

I agree. "Intelligence" develops it's capacities with experience and time and change. Old age does allow for wisdom, or at least, some degree of a wealth of experiences which are raw data of what is otherwise, an inaccessible reality.

I'm not sure serenity, contentment or happiness is at all compatible with whatever Nietzsche was advocating with such phrases as "Will to Power" and "The Overman." — Nils Loc

I don't know. Nietzsche's writings are beyond me. However, I suppose happiness like beauty can be in the eye of the beholder ? Interpretations of his works will no doubt included a mix of the subjective and objective.

It would've never occurred to me to call contemporary statue tippers iconoclasts but it fits with the original spirit of the term quite well. — Nils Loc

Yes, it does seem more like mob rule but somebody, somewhere has to set the ball in motion.
Is # tag activism better than philosophy as a way to raise, debate and change socio-political issues ?

They [Hashtags ] can be seen as a way to help or start a revolution by increasing the number of supporters from across the world who have not been in contact with the issue.[7] It allows people to discuss and comment around one hashtag. Hashtag activism is a way to expand the usage of communication and make it democratic in a way that everyone has a way to express their opinions.[7] Especially it provides an important platform for historically disenfranchised populations, enabling them to communicate, mobilize and advocate on topics less visible in mainstream media. — Hashtag activism

If one could imagine an alternative history where Socrates gave up his work (the public practice of Elenchus) to remain alive, would he remain the so called "father of Western philosophy". It's kind of a great mythic/legendary opening to the movement of Western philosophy — Nils Loc

I don't suppose I am alone in having imagined it. Nothing quite like a bit of (relatively) easy martyrdom.
At least Plato and Aristotle, the other 'fathers of Western philosophy', didn't meet such a fate.

There is a point beyond which philosophy, if it is not to lose face, must turn into something else: performance. It has to pass a test in a foreign land, a territory that’s not its own. For the ultimate testing of our philosophy takes place not in the sphere of strictly rational procedures (writing, teaching, lecturing), but elsewhere: in the fierce confrontation with death of the animal that we are.
— Costica Bradatan, NYT Opinionator: Philosophy as the Art of Dying

Philosophy as an Art of Dying by Costica Bradatan — Nils Loc

'Performance' - 'In the fierce confrontation of the animal we are'.
I like that. But my interpretation could be way out. And the link didn't work.

Philosophy where action or movement is both part and outcome of the critical thinking process.
But that is still a 'rational procedure' is it not ?
Being aware that our natural instincts underlie any rationality or superficial semblance of civilisation.
We can't kill them off - only manage to a certain extent.

It reminds me of the recent reading of 'Plato's Phaedo'.

'...Other people may well be unaware that all who actually engage in philosophy aright are practising nothing other than dying and being dead (64a)'

What are we to make of this startling and puzzling claim? — Fooloso4

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/534860

Philosophy:
'...It has to pass a test in a foreign land, a territory that’s not its own...' - Bradatan.

That reminded me of different cultures and the previous discussion re 'iconoclasts' and the tearing down of statues. A 'killing' if you like, perhaps more emotionally based - a violence against past or current culture and beliefs.
Perhaps another term could be 'iconoblasts' ?
I will never forget the blasting of the ancient Buddha sculptures by the Taliban in Afghanistan, 2001.

Humans being human ? The good, the bad and the ugly. Mad, bad and dangerous...?
Just like philosophy.

This is relevant to the ongoing nature of this thread, the content of which is suffering, as per:

But what I'm saying is that some of your formulations (e.g. "On a personal level, piety is being good to one's own self, the inner divine intelligence", "In philosophical (Platonic) life, piety is practicing philosophy whose aim is to "become as godlike as possible" = "serving one's own God", i.e., one's own self") sound more like narcissistic self-aggrandizement — baker

It is unfortunate but I think you have a point. Anyone following this thread closely will have noted a pattern of behaviour showing signs of a narcissistic personality disorder. Unfortunately, @Fooloso4 has been the main target. Anyone else showing support has been likewise treated with disdain. There is a tendency to belittle people so as to validate own sense of superiority. There are plenty of posts both here and on the other thread 'Plato's Phaedo' which, if they haven't been deleted by mods, provide evidence.
A consistent disregard of others' wishes and feelings combined with a need to control - not addressing the careful responses given with patience. And so on...
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Here:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/555886

I showed my son this thread and he laughed at how your challengers don't actually respond to your comments as given. That is what is funny. — Valentinus

It actually isn't funny at all. But if your son can see it...then he is more astute than some. Well done.

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Leads to utter nonsense, meaningless language use, equivocation fallacies, and inevitable self-contradiction and/or outright incoherence.
— creativesoul

In other words, it leads to typical troll behavior. — Olivier5

Yes. And still it goes on. With bells and whistles attached.

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From: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/555379

Unfortunately, the misrepresentations and lies continue. Such blatant dishonesty:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/555262
I will leave it stand. As an example.

My concern is that it will not stop - not particularly from the point of view of being a 'target' - but that any further threads concerning Plato's Dialogues will suffer the same fate.
I prefer now to read and consider any Dialogue in peace.
Hope that others continue in good spirit... — Amity

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Mods. This needs to be addressed. Please reconsider the previous complaints and issues raised.

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The math. forms are indeed not part of the physical world. But neither in an unaccessible metaphysical realm. — Prishon

Plato is a very complex writer and it is important to read him carefully and on his own terms. But I think that a first step in the right direction would be to bear in mind that the Forms are not the same as ideal objects.

An ideal object, e.g., an ideal triangle, is something that I form in my mind. But my ideal triangle is not the same as your ideal triangle; it is multiple as it exists in many minds; it is subject to time as it is not permanently fixed in the mind, etc.

In contrast, the Form of Triangle is one, unchanging, and eternal. It is beyond space and time and cannot be expressed in language.

The other peculiarity of the Forms is that they are at once (1) present in particulars through their properties and, therefore, immanent and (2) other than each and all particulars and, therefore, transcendent to them.

Acquainting ourselves with the concept of ideal objects is a necessary step toward understanding the Forms. But, eventually, we must go beyond the level of ideal objects in order to “attain to the knowledge of reality” as Socrates puts it in the Phaedo (66a).

You hunt something down by following its tracks until you see it. The tracks of the Forms are the universals, the things whose properties can be perceived in particulars .... — Apollodorus

The universals and particulars ring a bell. Yes, it was in the Introduction to Metaphysics book. I can remember vaguely.

I will read up it again, and the Phaedo too. The Form was always very tricky part in Plato.
Thanks for the info.

No matter where I looked, the platonic forms were not found. Now I am guessing, they could be my intuition or pure reason. — Corvus

The Forms are hypothetical. In the Phaedo Socrates says:

... I feared that my soul would be altogether blinded if I looked at things with my eyes and tried to grasp them with each of my senses. So I thought I must take refuge in discussions and investigate the truth of beings by means of accounts [logoi] … On each occasion I put down as hypothesis whatever account I judge to be mightiest; and whatever seems to me to be consonant with this, I put down as being true, both about cause and about all the rest, while what isn’t, I put down as not true.” (99d-100a)

The Forms are an attempt to make sense of the world. In the Republic Socrates will tell a tale of the philosopher who escapes the cave and ascends to the sight of the Forms. But Socrates also indicates that he has had no such experience. Here too the Forms are hypothetical not things known. In the Republic we also find the promise of dialectic being able to move beyond hypothesis by the use of hypothesis. But nowhere in any of Plato's dialogues does he identify anyone, either an historical individual or a fictional character, whose journey ends in knowledge of the Forms. The journey always ends in aporia.

I'm talking about the afterlife or the fate of the soul. — Moses

Yes, I know. The problem is, what is the real meaning of the afterlife according to the gospels? Things are not as clear as you might think. In Matthew the kingdom of heaven on earth. Some believed in bodily resurrection, while others believed in the resurrection of the soul, and still others did not make this division, it was the person that was resurrected.

Sure, but what does that mean? The Ancient Greeks apparently had no issues killing disabled babies or sending off boys to be "mentored" by older men. — Moses

Plato was not the Ancient Greeks. In the Republic we find his most sustained discussion of justice. I will not go into it here. I will only point out that at the center of the dialogue devoted to the question of what justice is Socrates talks about the turning of the soul to truth illuminated by the Good.

In Plato's Phaedo we find the dualism of body and soul and the afterlife of the soul that became enormously influential for Christian ideas of the afterlife.

Moses — Moses

Let's look at what happened when Moses brought down the second set of tablets:

Moses saw that the people were running wild and that Aaron had let them get out of control and so become a laughingstock to their enemies.So he stood at the entrance to the camp and said, "Whoever is for the LORD, come to me." And all the Levites rallied to him.Then he said to them, "This is what the LORD, the God of Israel, says: 'Each man strap a sword to his side. Go back and forth through the camp from one end to the other, each killing his brother and friend and neighbor.'" The Levites did as Moses commanded, and that day about three thousand of the people died.Then Moses said, "You have been set apart to the LORD today, for you were against your own sons and brothers, and he has blessed you this day." (Exodus 32:25-29)

Otherwise, by your account, Socrates actively sort out her company. Xanthippe may have been making the point that Socrates would have no further opportunity to educate his friends after the hemlock, perhaps in an attempt to have him make an effort to save himself. — Banno

It may be that her reputation for being difficult is due entirely to Xenophon. I don't know why he might do this. With regard to the scene in Plato's Phaedo, it may be that Socrates no longer wanted her present simply because she had become distraught. We do not know how long she had been there before this or what their private conversation was like. The comment: "you know her" (60a) might be taken in different ways. This is the only mention of her in Plato's dialogues.

Just keeping things philosophical. — javra

Perhaps you are right. Quantum physics always seem to shroud everything in a fog, anyway.

That's not what I said, is it? — javra

I may well have misunderstood you.

You and I are selves, and selves do stand out ... this to the consciousness embedded in each which, as consciousness, does not. One does not see "consciousness" in the mirror but only one's own physiological self. — javra

I find myself floundering here. There is a regrettable tendency to think of anyone's self - including one's own - as if it were an object of some sort. If it is, it is remarkably elusive for something that is omni-present in one's life and experience. What's worse, is that one tends to find oneself positing more than one - a physiological self, as opposed to various others; none of these can possibly be one's true self - whatever that means. In addition, while I can supply some sort of (metaphorical) meaning to "stand out" as a description of what existent objects do, I can't grasp a meaning clear enough to be sure that I'm making the right sense of what you are saying. I am confused by the fact that if something "stands out" in my experience, I find that it does so against a background, which also exists.

I might question whether the word was ever "perfectly useful," but other than that, you've said it well. — J

Perhaps. "perfectly" was really a rhetorical flourish, meant to underline that there are uses of "real" and of "reality" that are not problematic in the way that this peculiar, specifically philosophical, use, is.

We could, for instance, create "Peirce-marks" to indicate when the word is being used as Peirce defined it. — J

Well, yes, "P-real" could become a (real) word. There would be a swarm of other, similar, words. It would be interesting to see which of them would survive for, say, ten years. Definitions can only work if there is a consensus about how the term is to be used. But there is no such consensus in philosophy about "exists", so there is no sound basis for evaluating any definition. I'm also deeply suspicious of any definition that sets out to define a single word. (Dictionaries nowadays recognize the relationships of a given word to others.)

Curious if you disagree with this: In commonsense language, then, Superman, the comic-book character, exists (in our culture) but is not real. — javra

I think that's right. But it's perhaps worth adding that he is a real comic-book character, just not a real person. As a cautious generalization, I would say that the problem with "real" is that things are often real under one description and unreal under another. "Exists" seems to be binary (unless you are Meinong).

This sort of speculative physics makes for poor threads. — Banno

I agree with you. But see below.

Speculative physicists don't seem to think so (sc. that speculation is a waste of time).. — frank

That may be because they are working in a context that gives some traction to discussion and argument. On the other hand, it may be that that kind of response is not really appropriate. The speculation may be fun or exciting or something. Truth is, perhaps, only relevant when the speculation gets tied down into a
critical framework. It may or may not be true that Kekule came up with the carbon ring after he had a dream, which then gave him the idea of the benzene ring, which sent him into the laboratory. But it illustrates the point. No-one is concluding that dreams are a reliable source of scientific hypotheses.
The transition may involve a high casualty rate and a good deal of fruitless discussion. Is it worth it? I don't know.

There's no hypothetical future where humans have mastered time travel (and beyond?) that any matter currently in existence can be somehow "placed" or otherwise "end up" at such a point? Why is that? (It's honestly fascinating to ponder, is all) — Outlander

I can see your point. But I think it is important to recognize that the fascination is not the same thing as truth. If you don't, you'll find yourself believing in dragons and world conspiracies. "What if.." can be great fun. But it doesn't always play into truth and falsity. (Who cares that Superman is impossible? We all understand the context and can enjoy the stories, but let's not get carried away into political philosophy.)

That is the sense in which I hold they (sc. abstract objects) are real (in the noumenal or intelligible sense) but not existent (in the phenomenal, spatiotemporal sense. — Wayfarer

Well, they are not phenomenal or spatiotemporal objects. But why does that mean they don't exist? Or, why do you restrict existence to such objects?

This capacity (sc. to grasp abstract objects) is anticipated by a discussion in Plato’s Phaedo called ‘The Argument from Equality’. In it, Socrates argues that in order to judge the equal length of two like objects — two sticks, say, or two rocks — we must already have ‘the idea of equals’ present in our minds, otherwise we wouldn’t know how to go about comparing them; we must already have ‘the idea of equals’. And this idea must be innate, he says. It can’t be acquired by mere experience, but must have been present at birth. — Wayfarer

Yes, but Plato is wrong to think that the idea of equality must be innate. We learn how to measure things and so when things are the same length or weight - and even when there are two sticks or rocks. True, we are born with the capacity to learn, but that's not the same thing.

The simplest answer to the OP is we don’t know what else there is. There might be all sorts of weird and wonderful stuff, that we can’t see. We just can’t see it.
This can then be elaborated by saying we know that there is a lot we don’t know about the world we find ourselves in. So we know that we don’t know things about things that we can see. Therefore we are not in a position to say, or know anything about what we can’t see. So we can’t say what else isn’t there, just like we can’t give a full account of what we know is there. — Punshhh

Yes. That seems straightforward and right to me. It also seems to me that the difficulties arise only when we insist on trying to drag "reality" and "existence" and a metaphorical use of "beyond" into it.

There's no better place to start than the Apology of Socrates. Then try the short dialogues about the death of Socrates (especially Euthyphro and Crito -- Phaedo is not so simple).

After this, I would recommend the Symposion (though you should probably reread the Symposion after reading some other dialogues, it will broaden your view of it).

Only after this I would suggest the Republic -- and preferrably with a good instructor, good videos, a good guide, or something of that sort. The Republic is hard, and many world-famous thinkers (hey, Popper) have no clue about it even after reading it and writing books about it.

My two cents :).

Perhaps you think that there cannot be causation between different kinds of object, and thus if our brain events cause our mental events this would be evidence that brain and mental events must be events involving the same kind of object. — Bartricks

Probably the best analysis of the nature of the soul, ever written, is found in Plato's Phaedo. The idea that the brain is the cause of the mind, is very similar to the harmony theory. The material parts exist in a way which creates a harmony, and the harmony is the soul. But this theory is demonstrated as deficient because it cannot account for the reason why the parts exist in such a way as to be in harmony rather than dissonant.

So the theory needs to be inverted such that each material part, in itself, as an organized existent, is a harmony, and the cause of that harmony is something immaterial. This is what Aristotle takes as his starting point in "On the Soul". A living being is an organized material body. The cause of the organization, which manifests as the material body, is the soul. We can conclude therefore, that the soul, being prior to the material body as cause of it, is immaterial.