I quoted this same passage in response to your question about what Socrates believes:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/569248

I think it likely that Pascal's wager is derived from this.

Nothingness is nothing to fear, but it's only one of the possibilities, no more certain than the alternative. — Wayfarer

Right, none of the possibilities are certain, but as far as Socrates is concerned, none are to be feared if one has led a just life. He thinks he lived a just life and so if death means rewards and punishments he is confident he will be rewarded rather than punished. Early on in this thread I tied that to what it might mean for philosophy to be preparation for death. Live in such a way that you will be rewarded rather than punished for what you did in life if, in fact, that is what happens in death.

I bolded the passages in order to dispel the notion that Socrates believes that the soul is immortal.

It is like Pascal's wager but there are differences.
Pascal presumed you had some days to live before the end so changing your relationship to it could kick in before one's death. The offer only being viable for a limited time.

Socrates doesn't have a lot of time left. He does not seem interested in making some last minute deals.

Socrates doesn't have a lot of time left. He does not seem interested in making some last minute deals. — Valentinus

I agree. It does not seem likely that any of these things are occurring to him for the first time. I think the whole thing is rhetorical. Persuading himself of anything is antithetical not only to a life spent in pursuit of truth, it is contrary to the advice given in the dialogue not to accept any argument about which one cannot be sure.

But Cebes and Simmias are not Socrates. They need something to believe. Socrates' attitude seems to me to be, wait and see. The final irony is that if death is nothing then he will not see.

For Socrates it is not a matter of belief but of trust, that is, not something to be taken as true, but of an attitude toward life, that he will not be harmed.

Although, as Apollodorus pointed out to me, 'the argument from harmony' is actually dismissed in the dialogue. — Wayfarer

Socrates' argument is that the soul is not like a harmony, it is more like the cause of the harmony.

Socrates’ argument does not depend on the pre-existence of soul. Even if the soul's pre-existence is not assumed, Simmias’ analogy still fails. — Apollodorus

That's right, Socrates' argument doesn't depend on the pre-existence of the soul, but he uses the proposed harmony analogy to demonstrate that the pre-existence of the soul is a necessary conclusion. That's why he proceeds at 95 to say that proving that the soul existed before we were born does not prove that it is immortal, (because he believes to have proven the soul's pre-existence) only that it has existed for a very long time. He says that entering the human body might be the beginning of its destruction, and it might perish with the death of the human body.

That is not Simmias' argument. Note the following: — Fooloso4

That's right, it's not Simmias' argument, it's Socrates' argument I am talking about. That is Socrates' way, to take another's argument, put it in his own words, and turn it around to produce the opposite conclusion as the one produced by the person who proposes the argument. This is how he demonstrates the faults in the arguments of others, and shows what the real conclusion ought to be.

That is not what Simmias' argument says. And according to Socrates' argument, the soul does not cause the body that is strung and held together by warm and cold and dry and wet and the like — Fooloso4

Yes, Socrates does argue this. The soul directs the parts, which creates a harmony. I gave you the quotes 94 c-e.

turn it around to produce the opposite conclusion — Metaphysician Undercover

In this case he did more than just turn it around. Simmias' argument did not include a separate soul. Socrates does not deal with Simmias' argument because the result would be that the soul does not endure.

Yes, Socrates does argue this. The soul directs the parts — Metaphysician Undercover

Directing the parts does not mean creating the parts. The soul does not cause the body.

In response to @Wayfarer and the conventional view of the arguments, I would like to briefly go through the arguments and show why they fail.

Before doing so we need to look at how Socrates defines death:

And that it is nothing but the separation of the soul from the body? And that being dead is this: the body's having come to be apart, separated from the soul, alone by Itself, and the soul's being apart, alone by itself, separated from the body? Death can't be anything else but that, can it?(64c)

Simmias agrees. But of course death can be something other than that! Death may simply be, as Socrates said in the Apology, annihilation. The question of the soul is the very thing that will be the focus of the discussion, but argument is made that at death the soul is alone by itself. It is simply accepted from the start as a given.

Cebes will soon raise an objection:

... what you say about the soul induces a lot of distrust in human beings. They fear that the soul, once she is free of the body, is no longer anywhere, and is destroyed and perishes on that very day when a human being dies; and that as soon as she’s free of the body and departs, then, scattered like breath or smoke, she goes fluttering off and is no longer anywhere. Of course, if she could be somewhere, herself by herself, collected together and freed from those evils you went through just now, there'd be a great hope - a beautiful hope - that what you say, Socrates, is true. (70a)

Cebes' hope is that what Socrates says is true. Socrates responds:

What you say is true, Cebes, but now what should we do? Or do you want us to tell a more thorough story about these things to see whether what we’re saying is likely or not? (70a-b)

Cebes' hope is based on the truth of what Socrates is saying, But Socrates lowers the standard from truth to what is likely.

The first argument is the Cycle of Opposites:

“ … do the souls of men exist in Hades when they have died, or do they not? Now there's an
ancient doctrine, which we've recalled, that they do exist in that world, entering it from this one, and that they re-enter this world and are born again from the dead; yet if this is so, if living people are born again from those who have died, surely our souls would have to exist in that world? Because they could hardly be born again, if they didn't exist; so it would be sufficient evidence for the truth of these claims, if it really became plain that living people are born from the dead and from nowhere else; but if that isn't so, some other argument would be needed.'”(70c-d)

But, of course, some other argument is needed. A reborn soul is one that has previously died. It exists in Hades as a dead soul. This is incompatible with the next argument, recollection. The other problem with the cycle of opposites argument is that obviously the living come from the living.

Recollection:

“ 'Well now, you know what happens to lovers, whenever they see a lyre or cloak or anything else their loves are accustomed to use: they recognize the lyre, and they get in their mind, don't they, the form of the boy whose lyre it is? And that is recollection. Likewise, someone seeing Simmias is often reminded of Cebes, and there'd surely be countless other such cases.'(73b-d)

His example of recollection surprisingly has nothing to do with life in Hades or a previous life. There seems to be no distinction here between recollection and being reminded of something. In the example given recollection is independent of stories of death. It is about what we are reminded of here and now.

Socrates shifts from things perceived to “the equal itself”.

Then we must previously have known the equal, before that time when we first, on seeing the equals, thought that all of them were striving to be like the equal but fell short of it. (75a)

It is through the combination of sense and thought that we perceive that things are equal. That this is either based on or leads to recollection of “the equal itself” is dubious. All that is necessary to see how implausible this is is to consider how we learned what it means for things to be equal.

“If those realities we are always talking about exist, the Beautiful and the Good and all that kind of reality, and we refer all the things we perceive to that reality, discovering that it existed before and is ours, and we compare these things with it, then, just as they exist, so our soul must exist before we are born” (76d-e).

But they are, as he says in the second sailing, hypotheses, not things recollected while dead.

Forms:

“ 'Now these things you could actually touch and see and sense with the other senses, couldn't you, whereas those that are constant you could lay hold of only by reasoning of the intellect; aren't such things, rather, invisible and not seen?'
'What you say is perfectly true.'
'Then would you like us to posit two forms of things that are - the Visible and the Unseen?'
'Let's posit them.'
'And the unseen is always constant, whereas the seen is never constant?'” (79a)

Obviously, not everything that is unseen is unchanging. More to the point, Socrates talks about such things as the corruption of the soul "polluted and impure" (81b) and the soul of a human being becoming the soul of an ass or some other animal or insect. (82a-b) So, the claim that the soul is unchanging is questionable at the least.

Most important is the distinction between a Form and some thing of that Kind. Beauty is unchanging but beautiful things are not. The Form Soul may be unchanging but it does not follow that Socrates' soul is not.


Sophisticated Cause:

The final argument alters the hypothesis of Forms "safe but ignorant" (105b-c)

And if the non-hot were of necessity indestructible, then whenever anyone brought heat to snow, the snow would retreat safe and unthawed, for it could not be destroyed, nor again could it stand its ground and admit the heat?—What you say is true.” (106a)

But it is not true. The snow does not retreat, it melts. Cold itself may be indestructible but something that is cold is not. Socrates is deliberately conflating Form and thing. The same holds for all other things. It is not the Form Life that causes something to be alive, it is the soul that brings life with it that causes body to be alive. At the approach of Death the soul, being a thing rather than an indestructible Form, does not retreat. Like the snow it perishes.

The failure of the arguments does not mean that the soul is not immortal, it simply means that Socrates has not shown that it is. He says it is worth the risk of believing that it is, but if the philosopher seeks truth she does not settle for a belief. What the soul is and what its fate may be remains unknown.

Saying that the soul is like a harmony, or attunement, is to assume that there is such a thing as "the soul" which is being talked about. — Metaphysician Undercover

Right and this is what Simmias says:

... our soul is as it were, a blend and tuning of these very things, whenever, that is, they're blended with one another in a beautiful and measured way. (86c)

Simmias could have insisted that there is no such thing as the soul, — Metaphysician Undercover

He could have said that if he was denying that there is such a thing as a soul, but he does not deny it. The Pythagorean concept of the soul as presented in his argument is that it is not some separate thing. Cebes and Simmias are said to have "spent time with Philolaus.(61d) It is Philolaus who is the "somebody" who might give the account Simmias does. (85e-86a)

From the Wiki article Pythagoreanism:

The surviving texts of the Pythagorean philosopher Philolaus indicate that ... the soul was life and a harmony of physical elements. As such the soul passed away when certain arrangements of these elements ceased to exist.[53]

Therefore the thing which directs the parts is necessarily prior to the body — Metaphysician Undercover

According to Simmias' argument there is nothing prior to the body that directs its parts. The body is self-organizing.

... which would also be composed of an arrangement of parts, ad infinitum. — Metaphysician Undercover

Right, and that is the problem with your argument. Not only do you assume that all the parts together must be arranged, but for the same reason each of the parts individually must be arranged. If the soul arranges all of the parts together what arranges each of the individual parts? It can't be the soul because then the soul would be the cause of the body.

We cannot say that the fundamental parts are bodies because we do not understand what these parts are. — Metaphysician Undercover

The body here is thought of as consisting of the four elements:

And I fancy, Socrates, that it must have occurred to your own mind that we [Simmias, Echecrates, etc.] believe the soul to be something after this fashion; that our body is strung and held together by heat, cold, moisture, dryness, and the like, and the soul is a mixture and a harmony of these same elements (86b – c).

The elements and their properties were represented by a diagram with one square inscribed in the other, with the corners of the main one being the elements air, fire, earth, water, and the corners of the inscribed one being the properties hot, dry, cold, wet. When the properties are read diagonally across the inscribed square, they are “hot – cold” and “dry – wet”.

Four Classical Elements – Wikipedia

Being non-composite, the soul of course cannot be made of any elements. Therefore it cannot be a harmony of elements or parts. Therefore Simmias' analogy fails.

According to Simmias' argument there is nothing prior to the body that directs its parts. The body is self-organizing. — Fooloso4

These two ideas, that there is such a thing as the soul, and that each part of the body is itself a "self-organizing" entity, is what Socrates demonstrates are incompatible. If there is such a thing as "the soul", it is what directs the parts, to make a unity, a whole, the body, therefore the parts are not self-organizing.

Right, and that is the problem with your argument. Not only do you assume that all the parts together must be arranged, but for the same reason each of the parts individually must be arranged. If the soul arranges all of the parts together what arranges each of the individual parts? It can't be the soul because then the soul would be the cause of the body. — Fooloso4

Huh? This makes no sense. The argument leads to the conclusion that the soul must be prior to the body, then you conclude "It can't be the soul because then the soul would be the cause of the body." When the logic tells you that the soul must be the cause of the body, what premise tells you that the soul can't be the cause of the body, so you may conclude that the logic is flawed? When the logic gives you a conclusion which you do not like, due to some prejudice, that is not reason to reject the logic, it's reason to reject your prejudice.

These two ideas, that there is such a thing as the soul, and that each part of the body is itself a "self-organizing" entity, is what Socrates demonstrates are incompatible. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is what he argues against. He does this by changing the terms of the argument. His argument is based on a pre-existing soul, something that is not part of Simmias' argument.

The argument leads to the conclusion that the soul must be prior to the body — Metaphysician Undercover

Just the opposite. Immediately prior to Socrates' refutation, Simmias says that he has been persuaded that:

“… our soul is somewhere else earlier, before she is bound within the body.” (92a)

Socrates points out that the two premises are incompatible:

But it is necessary that you have different opinions as long as this thought of yours sticks around - that a tuning is a composite thing and a soul a sort of tuning composed of bodily elements tensed like strings. (92b).

He then asks:

“But see which of the two arguments you prefer - that learning is recollection or soul a tuning.”
(92c)

Simmias chooses recollection and a pre-existing soul. All of Socrates' arguments follow this premise.

When the logic tells you that the soul must be the cause of the body ... — Metaphysician Undercover

Nowhere does Socrates claim that the soul is the cause of the body. He says that the soul is the cause of life in the body. An arrangement of parts is not the cause of those parts that are arranged.

t is what he argues against. He does this by changing the terms of the argument. His argument is based on a pre-existing soul, something that is not part of Simmias' argument. — Fooloso4

No, Socrates argument is not based on a pre-existing soul, as I explained. First he demonstrates the faults of Simmias' position. Then he demonstrates that if there is such a thing as the soul, it must be pre-existing, as that which orders the parts to create the harmony. So the argument supports the notion of the pre-existing soul, with reference to the directing and ordering of the parts. Therefore the argument is based in the idea that a harmony requires the directing and ordering of parts, to cause the existence of the harmony, and concludes that what is commonly called "the soul" is what directs and orders the parts.

The conclusion is a pre-existing soul. It does not matter that the conclusion (a pre-existing soul) is presented first, as the thing to be proven. This does not make the argument based in the presumption of a pre-existing soul. What matters is the logical procedure. We can proceed from the premise of "harmony" to a need for something which directs and orders the parts, to the conclusion that the thing which directs and orders the parts (commonly called the soul) pre-exists the harmony. A pre-existing soul is not the base of the argument, but the conclusion.

We can proceed from the premise of "harmony" to a need for something which directs and orders the parts ... — Metaphysician Undercover

First, there is no need for something to order the parts. If you assume that the parts together need to be ordered, then each part would also need to be ordered because each part of the body has an order.

Second, in accord with Socrates' notion of Forms something is beautiful because of Beauty itself. Something is just because of the Just itself. Something is harmonious because of Harmony itself. Beauty itself is prior to some thing that is beautiful. The Just itself is prior to some thing being just. Harmony itself is prior to some thing being harmonious. In each case there is an arrangement of parts.

The question is, why did Socrates avoid his standard argument for Forms? It is an important question, one that we should not avoid.

Right, each part needs to be ordered, — Metaphysician Undercover

Socrates does not claim that the soul orders [each part of] the body [to be as it is]. [The soul does not cause the parts of the body. The soul does not take an undifferentiated mass and make fingers and hands and the other parts of the body]* The soul, according to his argument, brings life to the body.

*Bracketed statements are edits.

[His response to Simmias' argument is that you can't have it both ways. You can't have both the soul existing before the body and the soul being a harmony of the parts of the body.]

Do you think that the parts just happen to meet up, and decide amongst themselves, to join together in a unity? — Metaphysician Undercover

Your version of the clock makers argument is not found in the dialogue.

The problem is with the active/passive relation. — Metaphysician Undercover

The hypothesis is problematic. As he says:

I will not insist on the precise nature of the relationship, but that all beautiful things are beautiful by the Beautiful. (100e)

He does not, however, reject the Forms hypothesis, he affirms it. Beautiful things are beautiful by the Beautiful. It follows from the hypothesis that harmonious things are harmonious by the Harmonious.

The source, or cause of activity must come from the Idea, or Form, rather than from the particular thing — Metaphysician Undercover

Right. In this case the Form would be Harmony. Just as a beautiful body is beautiful by the Beautiful, the harmonious body is harmonious by the Harmonious.

1. Republic 531c is part of a criticism of Pythagoreans and musicians.

2. Simmias does not use the word harmonia in the sense of musical harmony but in the sense of “a joining together”:

… we believe the soul to be something after this fashion; that our body is strung and held together by heat, cold, moisture, dryness [i.e. the properties of the four elements], and the like, and the soul is a mixture and a harmony of these same elements, when they are well and properly mixed … Now what shall we say to this argument, if anyone claims that the soul, being a mixture of the elements of the body, is the first to perish in what is called death?” (86b, 86d)

Here is Simmias’ argument black on white:

“The soul, being a mixture of the elements of the body, is the first to perish in death”

Ergo harmonia = “mixture” or “joining together” in an orderly fashion = ordered arrangement = order.

Therefore the universal is Order.

The tuning is not the thing that is tuned. The tuning is the octave, 4th, and 5th, the ratios according to which the strings of a lyre are tuned. Analogously, the tuning of the parts of the body too is in accord with the proper ratios. Again, the tuning should not be confused with the body that is tuned. — Fooloso4

I already explained how this interpretation is faulty. "The tuning" is the act which tunes. It is not visible in the tuned instrument because it is prior to it, in time. But the act of tuning is logically implied by the existence of a tuned instrument. This is clearly what Socrates is talking about, because he describes how the soul is active in directing the parts. You continually ignore Socrates' reference to the activity of the soul, which is the way toward understanding that the soul is necessarily prior to the body. Appolodorus gets it:

Harmonia here does not mean a harmony in the sense of melodious sound, but the state of the lyre, brought about by a combination of things, that enables it to produce a certain sound: — Apollodorus

.

Absolutely correct.

I think that it is imperative not to make things up or insert things into the dialogue that are not there.

The fact is that Simmias’ argument is based on his comparison of soul with harmony or attunement (harmonia).

Comparison of soul with attunement means that if the soul is like the attunement, then the attunement is like the soul.

For the attunement to be comparable to the soul, it must have the same features F as the soul.

The soul according to Simmias has F1 viz., “being composite like the body” and F2 viz., “being a blend of the things in the body (86d) when these are held taut (92b)”.

Similarly, the attunement has F1 viz., “being a composite thing (syntheton pragma) (92b)” and F2 viz., “being a blend of the things in the lyre, body of the lyre, strings, and notes when these are tuned (86a, 92c).

Therefore, the “harmony” is simply the attunement or compound of its material constituents.

As observed by scholars and ancient authors, Greek harmonia comes from harmozo, “to fit together”. Therefore harmony or attunement here means “being in tune”, hermosthai. This is precisely why Simmias speaks of a “blend” or krasis (86d) and Socrates calls attunement “composite thing”.

Greek harmonia is closer to Greek krasis than to English “harmony”. Modern Greek for "wine" is krasi, literally "mixture" because wine already at the time of Socrates was mixed or tempered with water. And krasis is used here by Simmias himself to describe the soul and, by analogy, the attunement, hence a "mixture" or "blend".

The tuning is not the act of tuning, it is the ratio of frequencies according to which something is tuned. — Fooloso4

Do you not grasp the "ing" suffix on "tuning"? The ratio of frequencies, according to which something is tuned is the principle, or rules, applied in the act of tuning. But these principles do not magically apply themselves to the instrument, an agent is required. The agent is "the cause" in common usage. That is what you are consistently leaving out, the requirement of an agent, and this is what Socrates says is traditionally called "the soul", the thing which directs the individual elements, the agent.

The cause of the lyre being in tune is not the activity of tightened and slackens the strings. If I give you a lyre you cannot tune it unless you know the tuning, unless you know the ratio of frequencies. It is in accord with those ratios that the lyre is in tune. The cause of the lyre being in tune is Harmony. — Fooloso4

This is utter nonsense, and you should know better than to say such a thing Fooloso4. Clearly, "the cause" in common usage of this term, is the activity which results in the instrument being tuned, which is the tightening of the strings. Yes, knowing the principles (ratios), is a necessary condition for the agent which acts as the cause, but the ratios do not constitute the cause of the instrument being tuned, as "cause" is used in common language.

If we refer to Aristotelian terminology, and his effort to disambiguate the use of "cause", we'd see that the ratios would constitute the "formal cause". However, there is still a need for an "efficient cause", as the source of activity. Efficient cause is "cause" as we generally use it. We do not, in our common language use, refer to principles like ratios as causes. Would you see a circle drawn on a paper, and say that pi is the cause of existence of that circle? Or if you saw a right angle would you say that the Pythagorean theorem is the cause of existence of that right angle? Normally, we would say that the person who produced the figure, as the agent, is the cause of the figure's existence, and the principles are static tools which the person employs

Whether the body requires something else acting on it is never discussed. — Fooloso4

Yes, the requirement of something else acting on it is discussed, throughout 94, and I provided the quotes. The body requires something which rules over the parts, and this is the soul. Ruling over, directing the elements, and inflicting punishment on them, clearly constitutes "acting on".

If we refer to Aristotelian terminology, and his effort to disambiguate the use of "cause", we'd see that the ratios would constitute the "formal cause". However, there is still a need for an "efficient cause", as the source of activity. Efficient cause is "cause" as we generally use it. We do not, in our common language use, refer to principles like ratios as causes. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am not sure how the observation relates to your dispute with Fooloso4 but Aristotle did wrestle with distinguishing "cause" from essence in a use of language sort of way:

We should not ignore the fact that sometimes we are unaware of whether a name signifies the composite substance, or the actuality or shape, for example, whether "a house" signifies the composite, that is a covering made of bricks and stones laid in such-and-such a manner, or actuality or form, that is, a covering, whether a "line" signifies twoness in length or twoness, and whether an animal signifies a soul in a body or a soul; for it is the soul which is the substance of the actuality of a certain body. The name "an animal" may also be applied to both, not as having the same the same formula when asserted of both, but a being related to one thing. But, although these distinctions contribute something to another inquiry, they contribute nothing to the inquiry of sensible substances, for the essence belongs to the form or actuality
For a soul and the essence of the soul are the same, but the essence of "a man" is not the same as a man, unless the soul is called "a man" accordingly, in some cases, a thing and its essence are the same, in others this is not so. — Aristotle, Metaphysics, translated by Hippocrates G Apostle, Book Eta, Chapter3

he is not talking about some invisible act. The tuning of what is tuned is not the act of tuning, but rather the result. — Fooloso4

At 86 is how Simmias describes what you translate as "tuning". At 94 is where Socrates corrects Simmias,.with a more true description of "tuning", as an action consisting of the ordering or directing of the parts .

This is the Socratic method, he allows participants to offer their own representations of what is referred to by a term; "beauty" in The Symposium; "just" in The Republic; etc., and he demonstrates how each one is deficient. Then he moves toward a more true representation.

You are refusing to accept Socrates' correction, that the true representation of "tuning" must include the act which directs the parts, causing them to be in tune. So you're still insisting that Simmias' representation is the true description of "tuning", despite the deficiency demonstrated by Socrates, and the obvious absence of agency, which is an essential aspect of "tuning".
.

There is in this theory no outside agent or principle acting: — Fooloso4

Yes, that's the whole point, in that theory, the one offered by Simmias, there is no outside agency. This description, offered by Simmias, requires no agency for "a tuning" to come into being. But Socrates demonstrates that Simmias' position is untenable, as has been thoroughly explained by Apollodorus. Then, Socrates offers a more realistic description of "tuning", a description which includes the agency which is obviously involved in any instance of tuning.

We are at an impasse.

We are at an impasse. — Fooloso4

It appears to me, like you refuse to accept that agency is an essential part of harmony, and that Socrates' description of harmony, as something produced by agency, is a much better description than Simmias' which neglects the role of agency.

There is a similar issue with modern physicalism and the physicalist's conception of emergence. Order, and organization, by the conception of emergence, is said to simply emerge from disorder. Of course this is contrary to empirical evidence, as it totally neglects the observed role of agency in the creation of orderly structures. I believe that this type of conception is promoted by atheists who approach this issue with a bias which encourages them to unreasonably reject the requirement of agency.

often in my past life the same dream had visited me, now in one guise, now in another, but always saying the same thing: "Socrates,'' it said, "make music and practise it." Now in earlier times I used to assume that the dream was urging and telling me to do exactly what I was doing: as people shout encouragement to runners, so the dream was telling me to do the very thing that I was doing, to make music, since philosophy is the greatest music. (61a)

And so it seems that Socrates, on the false premise that philosophy is the greatest music, went about to produce a philosophy completely devoid and stripped of music, totally amusical. But just to be on the safe side, he sloppily put together some words and fables from here and there, and got it over with. Ah, how amusing!

Doubt, or more precisely, knowledge of ignorance, is central to Socratic philosophy. Socrates was not plagued by doubt. On the contrary, he went to his death without fear, trusting that if there are rewards and punishment in Hades it is something he looks forward to. And if death is an endless, dreamless sleep he has no regrets about the life he lived.

For sure, doubt is central to Socratic philosophy. That the dialogues often end in aporia is no coincidence, not a bug but a feature, as we would say.
However, there are quite a lot of certainties.
And besides, Socrates own doubt is the case here, and not whether Socratic philosophy has elements of doubt.

I find that the painting of Socrates as a man devoid of doubt, with no fear of death, no regrets (presumably no guilt either) and looking forward to the afterlife (if any), very foreign to me, it actually reminds me of messianic figures, mystics, or madmen, but maybe they are all the same. Rather dogmatic, won't you think?

And besides, Socrates own doubt is the case here, and not whether Socratic philosophy has elements of doubt. — Pussycat

Unlike modern skepticism, Socratic skepticism is the condition that gives rise to and guides his inquiry. The Greek term skepsis means both doubt and inquiry.

I find that the painting of Socrates as a man devoid of doubt, with no fear of death, no regrets (presumably no guilt either) and looking forward to the afterlife (if any), very foreign to me — Pussycat

Some of his friends felt the same way.

Rather dogmatic, won't you think? — Pussycat

No. To the contrary skepsis informs his attitude to death. Philosophy as preparation for death is about what we do in life. We do not know what happens when we die. Our time here and now may be all we have. So how best to live it?

There are the accounts of Socrates' daimon giving him warnings. In Phaedo, the voice said he should set poetry to music. Plato shows him as withdrawn from others before going to the party in Symposium. Plato keeps pointing to these personal experiences but does not turn them into a single story. They seem to vary as much as the different myths that are used throughout his works. — Paine

I wonder if it makes much difference to talk of Socrates' daimon or daimonion. Perhaps he has both.
I can't recall where he explicitly talks of either. I do remember previous discussions.
From @Fooloso4's Phaedo thread - https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/10914/platos-phaedo/p1

Socrates is doing something he has never done before, writing. He explains it this way:

often in my past life the same dream had visited me, now in one guise, now in another, but always saying the same thing: "Socrates,'' it said, "make music and practise it." Now in earlier times I used to assume that the dream was urging and telling me to do exactly what I was doing: as people shout encouragement to runners, so the dream was telling me to do the very thing that I was doing, to make music, since philosophy is the greatest music. (61a)

He continues:

I reflected that a poet should, if he were really going to be a poet, make stories rather than arguments, and being no teller of tales myself, I therefore used some I had ready to hand …(61b)

Several things need to be noted. First, he calls philosophy the greatest music. Second, he claims that he is not a storyteller. But here he tells a story about a dream from his past life. That it is just a story will become clear.

Unlike Socrates, Plato did write and he is a very capable storyteller, capable of the greatest music. His dialogues are akin to the work of the poets’ plays. What we will hear are not simply arguments but stories. The question arises as to whether this is a comedy or tragedy. Phaedo says that he was not overcome by pity and that Socrates seemed happy (58e) Phaedo reports feeling an unusual blend of pleasure and pain. (59a). As we shall see, opposites will play an important part in Socrates’ stories. — Fooloso4

[emphasis added]

Plato shows him as withdrawn from others before going to the party in Symposium. — Paine

Yes. I remember reading this and wondering about his mental health. What with his daimonion and now this odd behaviour; his absence being described as a 'fit'.

I turned round, but Socrates was nowhere to be seen; and I had to explain that he had been with me a moment before, and that I came by his invitation to the supper.

You were quite right in coming, said Agathon; but where is he himself?

He was behind me just now, as I entered, he said, and I cannot think what has become of him.
Go and look for him, boy, said Agathon, and bring him in; and do you, Aristodemus, meanwhile take the place by Eryximachus.

The servant then assisted him to wash, and he lay down, and presently another servant came in and reported that our friend Socrates had retired into the portico of the neighbouring house. 'There he is fixed,' said he, 'and when I call to him he will not stir.'

How strange, said Agathon; then you must call him again, and keep calling him.

Let him alone, said my informant; he has a way of stopping anywhere and losing himself without any reason. I believe that he will soon appear; do not therefore disturb him.
Well, if you think so, I will leave him, said Agathon. And then, turning to the servants, he added, 'Let us have supper without waiting for him. Serve up whatever you please, for there is no one to give you orders; hitherto I have never left you to yourselves. But on this occasion imagine that you are our hosts, and that I and the company are your guests; treat us well, and then we shall commend you.'

After this, supper was served, but still no Socrates; and during the meal Agathon several times expressed a wish to send for him, but Aristodemus objected; and at last when the feast was about half over—for the fit, as usual, was not of long duration—Socrates entered. Agathon, who was reclining alone at the end of the table, begged that he would take the place next to him; that 'I may touch you,' he said, 'and have the benefit of that wise thought which came into your mind in the portico, and is now in your possession; for I am certain that you would not have come away until you had found what you sought.' — Gutenberg - Plato's Symposium

[emphasis added]

Plato keeps pointing to these personal experiences but does not turn them into a single story. They seem to vary as much as the different myths that are used throughout his works. — Paine

Yes. The variations seem to suit the different contexts, audience and subject matter. The Symposium is one of my favourites. Party Perspectives on Love.

Five fingers does not make one finger, it makes something different, one hand. So by your analogy a multitude of intelligences would not make One Supreme Intelligence, it would make something different. — Metaphysician Undercover

Fingers are part of the hand (or extensions of the palm). The multitude of individual intelligences are part of the Supreme Intelligence or extensions of it just as fingers are of the hand. The analogy may be less than perfect but I think it does give an idea of what is meant.

Well, if "seeing oneself in the other" is metaphorical for something which involves only one, that would be very very strange. — Metaphysician Undercover

In his dialogues, Plato uses the imagery of reflection multiple times to point either to the individual self or to the Universal Self/Ultimate Truth.

For example, in the Phaedo, he compares looking for truth in theories and arguments about things, to studying the image of the Sun reflected in water “or something of the kind” (Phaedo 99e). The phrase “something of the kind” is Plato’s way of alerting the reader to the fact that this is not an exact comparison, analogy, or account.

The metaphor refers to one seer or cognizing subject. Hence the illustration of the mirror. What Plato is saying is that the philosopher must look at himself, i.e., at his own intelligent soul, using his own intelligence as a mirror. This is the path to self-knowledge as well as the path to knowing the Ultimate.

And if this, "seeing oneself in the other", is, as you said, the source of all knowledge, then knowledge cannot be derived from One, it requires more than one. — Metaphysician Undercover

That which “sees itself in the other” and "is the source of all knowledge", is Ultimate Reality which reflects itself in itself. The “Other” and resulting “Many” here is conceptual. When Ultimate Reality which is Pure Intelligence reflects itself in itself it recognizes the “Other”. i.e., its own reflection as itself, not as some other reality different from itself.

In the world of Being, the Creative Intelligence that contains the Forms, for example, is cognitively identical with the Forms and is aware of this identity. The sense of real difference only arises in the world of Becoming, where things are not perceived as different manifestations of one cognizing intelligence but as separate and independent of one another and of the cognizing subject.

But the point I was making was that as Plato does not present his philosophy in a very systematic manner, it is essential to systematize our understanding of it starting from a few basic principles.
In the first place, we need to familiarize ourselves with the wider cultural, religious, and philosophical background behind the Platonic project.

As shown by Lloyd Gerson, Plato and his followers operate within the framework of “Ur-Platonism”, a general philosophical position that combines antimaterialism, antimechanism, antinominalism, antirelativism, and antiskepticism.

Though it emerged before Plato, Ur-Platonism was given shape by Plato and was further developed by later Platonists, especially Plotinus, in line with the blueprint sketched by Plato.

Platonism does not offer a decisive answer to all the problems raised either by itself or by its opponents. However, it does offer a theoretical framework within which philosophical inquiry and practice can be conducted along the lines suggested by Plato in his dialogues.

If we follow the pattern established by Plato and developed by later Platonists, we can avoid most of the misunderstandings or misinterpretations that have arisen especially in more recent times.

The relation between the Good and the Beautiful is a case in point, showing how two apparently distinct things can be ultimately one.

In Ancient Greek, the word “beautiful” (kalos) was already often used not just in the sense of “aesthetically pleasing” but also of “good” in the sense of “useful”. Plato himself states that the divine is Beauty, Wisdom, and Goodness and that by these qualities the wings of the soul are nourished and grow, enabling it to ascend to higher planes (Phaedrus 246e).

This is exactly the meaning of the “Ladder of Love” described in the Symposium. Though the ascent starts as a quest for Beauty itself, what the philosopher ultimately attains is the Good which is Ultimate Truth:

Do but consider, that there only will it befall him, as he sees the Beautiful through that which makes it visible, to breed not illusions but true examples of virtue, since his contact is not with illusion but with Truth. So when he has begotten a true virtue and has reared it up he is destined to win the friendship of Heaven; he, above all men, is immortal (Symp. 212a)

Now, if “beautiful” were to mean “aesthetically pleasing” and nothing else, then “seeing the Beautiful” would be the final goal. But this is obviously not the case. Having seen the Beautiful, i.e., the Good, the philosopher must now “beget virtue”, i.e., good. Only then will he or she become loved by the Gods.

Beauty here is treated as an expression of Good. This practical value of Beauty and its identity with Good is consistent not only with Ancient Greek Weltanschauung but also, and above all, with Platonic philosophy.

Having come into contact with Beauty which is also Good and Truth, the philosopher becomes “pregnant in the soul” with things that are beautiful, good, and true, and “gives birth” or produces them.

Thus birth itself has a dual meaning. The philosopher is born to a new world of beauty, goodness, and truth, and in turn, gives birth to things that are beautiful, good, and true.

Socrates himself must somehow be in contact with Truth, Goodness, and Beauty, because he acts as a midwife to those whose minds are “pregnant with fine ideas” (Theaetetus 150b ff.) and (according to Alcibiades) begets beautiful speeches about virtue.

It follows that, as Diotima says, love of Beauty is really love of Good (Symp. 206a): We love Beauty because it is in some sense Good. Love of Beauty is the desire not only to behold Beauty, but to hold it for ever and to manifest it in everything we do in every way we can. The Gods do not judge man by what he sees but by his actions.

Plato clearly equates Beauty with Good and with Truth. Hence the quest for Beauty, Goodness, and Truth and their practical application become central to Platonic philosophy. The philosopher who has attained this triple goal becomes “beloved of the Gods” (theophiles) and “immortal” (athanatos).

The question of Plato’s causality is another problem that can prove intractable if we ignore the wider Platonic framework.

As discussed, Aristotle says that Plato recognizes two causes only: formal and material. The formal one is represented by the One and the material one represented by the “Great and the Small” a.k.a. “the Dyad” (which despite its name is a single principle of materiality).

But this is not supported by the dialogues where there is an efficient cause as well as a final cause. The Forms seem to be efficient causes in the Phaedo, but in later dialogues the efficient cause is Soul, Nous, or Creator-God (Laws 896a). Indeed, it stands to reason that the efficient cause of the Universe is the Creative Intelligence that contains the Forms, rather than the Forms themselves. And the Good is the final cause.

So, Plato has at least four causes. In fact, Proclus identifies six causes: three primary (efficient, paradigmatic, final) and three accessory (material, formal, instrumental) and believes that a detailed analysis would yield as many as 96 (a number with cosmological connotations).

However, all causes are closely interconnected and ultimately one. As Proclus himself puts it:

But let it be the case that multiplicity has its ordering centred on the monad and diversity centred on the simple and multiformity centred on what has a single form and diversity centred on what is common [to all], so that a chain that is truly golden rules over all things and all things are ordered as they ought to be (On the Timaeus 2.262.20).

This is why Platonic tradition refers to Ultimate Reality (or first principle and cause of all) as “the Good” or “the One”. Identifying Ultimate Reality with the Ultimate Good and the Irreducible One is consistent with Plato’s commitment to the reduction of fundamental principles of explanation to the absolute minimum. Insisting that they are not identical, tends to unnecessarily raise problems that are difficult to resolve. Hence even Proclus (who often likes to make complicated analyses of everything) uses the Homeric golden chain as a symbol of the hierarchy of reality ultimately depending on one Supreme Cause.

In any case, it is clear from Socrates’ statements in the dialogues that sciences like mathematics are not to be studied for their own sake but for a higher purpose. The same applies to logic and to philosophy itself.

The Platonic project is not about becoming lost in endless discussions about details. It is about elevating human knowledge and experience to the highest possible plane.

What is particularly interesting about Plato in this regard is the fact that his dialogues can be read or interpreted on more than one level.

For example, we know that seeing occupies a central place in the Ancient Greek worldview where it is closely connected with knowledge.

Aristotle begins his Metaphysics with the following statement:

All men naturally desire knowledge. An indication of this is our esteem for the senses; for apart from their use we esteem them for their own sake, and most of all the sense of sight. Not only with a view to action, but even when no action is contemplated, we prefer sight, generally speaking, to all the other senses. The reason of this is that of all the senses sight best helps us to know things, and reveals many distinctions (Meta. 1.980a)

Plato’s Forms are literally, “things seen”. Not seen by sense-perceptions, imagination or thought, but by pure intelligence. And since according to Plato Creative Intelligence generates the Universe by means of Matter and Form, it may be said without exaggeration that Creative Intelligence “sees” or projects the Universe into existence.

Another important faculty is the faculty of hearing, i.e., of perceiving sound. Plato calls the primary elements of matter (fire, earth, water, air) that make up the material world, “stoicheia”. “Stoicheia” also means elements of knowledge in general, as well as units of speech (including the letters of the alphabet), in particular.

Speech is a form of sound and sound is the product of motion. Plato tells us that the Primordial Matter of the Receptacle has a certain motion like a kind of “shaking” (seismos) or vibration comparable to that produced by a winnowing basket or sieve that makes particles separate or coalesce according to certain patterns (Tim. 52e).

Since for Plato, motion is always associated with soul or spirit, i.e., intelligence, this subtle, inner vibration of Primordial Matter must be caused by the Divine Consciousness itself.

In other words, though motionless, the Universal Consciousness produces an imperceptible vibration and sound that crystalizes into the fundamental elements that form the objects first of intellection and then of sense-perception, that together make up the Universe: the Universe is a manifestation of sound which in turn is a manifestation of the imperceptible inner vibration of the living Divine Intelligence.

However, these are concepts that take human intelligence to the limit of thought, to a point beyond which there is no thought and no language.

This is why Plato refuses to be dragged into details. In the Timaeus he explicitly leaves the first principle of all out of the discussion. Having described the primary elements of matter, he says:

But the principles (archai) which are still higher than these are known only to God and the man who is dear to God (Tim. 53d)

For the same reason, later Platonists like Plotinus refer to the Ultimate as “above being” (hyperousios) and “ineffable” which can mean “forbidden to be spoken”, as in the secrets of mystery rites (Phaedo 62b) or “inexpressible” (Soph. 238c).

At this point, some may be inclined to dismiss Platonism as “mysticism” or whatever. However, if we think about it, there is no reason why we should expect the human mind which deals with limited, measurable, and expressible things, to grasp something that is ultimately unmeasurable, at least by normal standards.

So, Plato’s dialogues are not treatises of pure or formal logic. They are literary pointers to higher truths that the reader must discover for himself and using his own intelligence.

"The good" is the final cause in Aristotle, and is prior to all the other causes. That you relate "the One" to formal cause is further evidence that the One is distinct from the Good. The good is the final cause. — Metaphysician Undercover

"Final cause" simply means the purpose for which something is caused.

The same thing can logically function as efficient cause, material cause, formal cause, and final cause.

Like the Good, the One provides essence to the Forms, but is itself above essence.

Since intelligence is dependent on intelligible objects, and the intelligibility of intelligible objects, we ought to conclude that in Plato's metaphysics, intelligence and knowledge are secondary to the good. — Metaphysician Undercover

Sure. Intelligence may be dependent on intelligible objects in ordinary experience. But this is not the case with regard to the One or the Good. The One or the Good may perfectly well be a form of "objectless" intelligence.

For example:

1. Pure objectless Awareness.
2. Consciousness or Self-Awareness.
3. Intelligence or Awareness of intelligible objects perceived as part of itself.
4. Intelligence or Awareness of intelligible objects perceived as other than itself.

If we think of the ultimate first principle as pure objectless awareness, that at the time of creation becomes first consciousness or self-awareness, i.e. awareness having itself for object, and then intelligence, i.e. awareness containing and organizing intelligible objects, e.g. Forms, then we can see that there is a big difference between Divine Intelligence (levels 1, 2, 3) and human intelligence (level 4).

I think the easiest way to understand Plato and Platonism is to look at Creation as a diversification or “multiplification” of what is absolutely one.

Therefore, to discover the absolutely one or “the One itself” we must apply a reverse process of simplification or reduction of multiplicity to its first causal principle.

Dialectics is the only process of inquiry that advances in this manner, doing away with hypotheses, up to the first principle (arche) itself in order to find confirmation there (Rep. 533c).

The literal meaning of arche is “beginning” or “origin”. To obtain true knowledge of anything, the philosopher must rise above assumptions or hypotheses to the first principle itself. In relation to knowledge, the philosopher must rise to its very origin or source.

Hence we are told that the Good is the source of all knowledge:

This reality, then, that gives their truth to the objects of knowledge and the power of knowing to the knower, you must say is the Form of the Good (Rep. 508e).

The objects of knowledge not only receive from the presence of the Good their being known, but their very existence and essence is derived to them from it (Rep. 509b).

Here we have all the elements of knowledge (and of reality):

Object of knowledge.
Knowledge of the object.
Means of knowledge.
Knowing subject.

(Human) knowledge itself consists of (a) sensory data and (b) reasoned thinking that uses the principles of Sameness, Identity, and Difference, to organize the sensory data in a way that makes the world intelligible.

These principles enable us to classify everything according to certain essential and immutable universal properties called Forms.

The various classes of Forms are known by the Form of Knowledge (to Eidos tes Epistemes) itself (Parm. 134b).

But (as we are told in the Parmenides) we do not possess the Form of Knowledge.
Therefore, the Form of the Good and Beauty and the others that we conceive as Forms themselves are unknown to us, even though our knowledge depends on them.
And if anything partakes of Knowledge itself, there is no one more likely than God to possess this most accurate knowledge.
[This is consistent with the Timaeus where God is the Divine Creative Intelligence that contains the Forms and creates the universe using the Forms as a model.]
But if God has Knowledge itself, he will not have knowledge of human things if there is no relation between the world of Forms and the human world.
Therefore he who hears such assertions is confused in his mind and argues that the Forms do not exist, and even if they do exist cannot by any possibility be known by man; and he thinks that what he says is reasonable, and he is amazingly hard to convince.
Only a man of very great natural gifts will be able to understand that everything has a class and absolute essence, and only a still more wonderful man can find out all these facts and teach anyone else to analyze them properly and understand them.
On the other hand, if anyone, with his mind fixed on all these objections and others like them, denies the existence of Forms, and does not assume a Form under which each individual thing is classed, he will be quite at a loss, since he denies that the Form of each thing is always the same, and in this way he will utterly destroy the power of carrying on discussion or dialectic.
To train ourselves completely to see the truth perfectly, we must consider not only what happens if a particular hypothesis is true, but also what happens if it is not true.
For example, we should inquire into the consequences to the One and the Many on the supposition that the One or the Many exist or not.

The conclusion, as we saw, is that “If the One is not, nothing is” (Parm. 166b).

In other words:

Intelligible Forms must exist in order for the Material World to be intelligible to us.
There must be a relation between the Forms and the Material World.
The relation between Forms and material objects is one in which the latter participate in the former.

Similarly, the Forms participate in the One and the Dyad.
The Dyad participates in the One.
The One is the ultimate first principle of all.

Otherwise said:

The One generates the Dyad.
The One and the Dyad generate the Forms.
The One, the Dyad, and the Forms generate Creative Intelligence.
The One as Creative Intelligence generates the Material Universe consisting of Soul and Matter.

Soul derives from the One, Matter derives from the Dyad or Receptacle, a form of Primordial Matter that the Creative Intelligence, using the Forms as patterns, forms first into the four primary elements, fire, water, earth and air, and then forms these into the objects of the universe from heavenly bodies to a lump of earth.

The One itself and all its products being a form of Intelligence, the Material World consists of various forms of intelligence from the World Soul down to the souls of intelligent living beings to inanimate things.

It follows that Intelligence is the only reality. Or, Reality is intelligence. And because it is one, it is called “the One” (to Hen). Because it is good, it is called “the Good”, etc.

So, we can see that the theory in its fundamental principles is not unsound. What remains to be addressed is whether any of this can actually be known to us. Plato in this regard clearly states that the Form of the Good which is the source of all knowledge can be known:

This reality, then, that gives their truth to the objects of knowledge and the power of knowing to the knower, you must say is the Form of the Good, and you must consider it as being the cause of knowledge and truth, and an object of knowledge (Rep. 508e1-4).

When Plato says that truth is “unknown” or “unknowable” to us, he does not mean this in an absolute sense. If he did mean it in an absolute sense, then philosophy as inquiry into truth would be futile. Therefore, what Plato obviously means is that truth cannot be known by ordinary means such as sense-perception.

As Socrates (Plato) puts it in the Phaedo:

If we are ever to know anything absolutely, we must be free from the body and must behold the actual realities with the eye of the soul alone” (Phaedo 66d–e).

When the soul inquires alone by itself, it departs into the realm of the pure, the everlasting, the immortal and the changeless, and being akin to these it dwells always with them whenever it is by itself and is not hindered, and it has rest from its wanderings and remains always the same and unchanging with the changeless, since it is in communion therewith. And this state of the soul is called wisdom (phronesis) (Phaedo 79d).

Detaching itself mentally and emotionally from the material world, physical body, sense-perceptions, and thoughts associated with these, the soul’s (or man’s) pure intelligence (nous) uses dialectic, recollection, and contemplation to obtain a direct experience of reality.

And because reality itself is intelligence, it stands to reason that intelligence can know reality. In fact, human intelligence already knows this subconsciously or intuitively. All it needs to do is to bring this latent intuition to the fore so that it becomes an actual experience.

To take an illustration from physics, matter is said to consist of components that are not only increasingly smaller and therefore “immaterial”, but that also behave in an ordered and “purposeful” manner that resembles a rudimentary form of intelligence.

If we break cognition down into its primary components, we obtain a similar result leading to intelligence, consciousness, or awareness itself. This is the objective of Platonic philosophy.

In his dialogues, Plato uses the imagery of reflection multiple times to point either to the individual self or to the Universal Self/Ultimate Truth.

For example, in the Phaedo, he compares looking for truth in theories and arguments about things, to studying the image of the Sun reflected in water “or something of the kind” (Phaedo 99e). The phrase “something of the kind” is Plato’s way of alerting the reader to the fact that this is not an exact comparison, analogy, or account.

The metaphor refers to one seer or cognizing subject. Hence the illustration of the mirror. What Plato is saying is that the philosopher must look at himself, i.e., at his own intelligent soul, using his own intelligence as a mirror. This is the path to self-knowledge as well as the path to knowing the Ultimate. — Apollodorus

I look at the reflection metaphor as something more specific, something more scientific. We see in the mirror image, an inversion, right is shifted to the left. So looking at a reflection does not give us a true representation, but it is so close to being true that it fools us. So while you say "The phrase “something of the kind” is Plato’s way of alerting the reader to the fact that this is not an exact comparison, analogy, or account", I look at Plato as saying the reflection itself is not a true representation. So much of Plato's work involves informing us of ways to distinguish reflections from reality, so that we can be aware of the inversion which occurs in reflection, and not accept it as a true representation. That a reflection contains an inversion, and is therefore not a true representation is a key point.

That which “sees itself in the other” and "is the source of all knowledge", is Ultimate Reality which reflects itself in itself. The “Other” and resulting “Many” here is conceptual. When Ultimate Reality which is Pure Intelligence reflects itself in itself it recognizes the “Other”. i.e., its own reflection as itself, not as some other reality different from itself. — Apollodorus

Based on what I said above, I think that this is incorrect, especially the last sentence. "When Ultimate Reality which is Pure Intelligence reflects itself in itself it recognizes the “Other”. i.e., its own reflection as itself, not as some other reality different from itself. " There is no such thing as "reflects itself in itself". A reflection is always external to the thing reflected, so there is already an Other implied by "reflection", the thing which reflects. Otherwise there is no reflection. And, I believe this is critical to understanding Plato, because this Other is the cause of the deficiency and misunderstanding in knowledge. If we ignore the Other, then we think we have pure, true knowledge, ignoring the role of the Other, and the inversion of the reflection, thereby deceiving ourselves.

So your statement is really self-deception, which can be apprehended as self-deception when analyzed and seen as self-contradicting. The Intelligence which sees itself in the reflection must see the reflection as Other, to see the true reality, because the true reality is that the reflection is Other than itself, as it is an inversion. It's contradictory to say that the reflection of a self is itself. And if we fall for that self-deception, to think that the reflection of oneself is oneself, and not recognize that it is Other than oneself, this is self-deception.

Even when we look inward, what we call "introspection", or reflecting on one's own existence, it is imperative that we recognize a division between the outer self, and the inner self. This is why we have a dualism. To deny this division, and make the thing reflecting the very same thing as the thing reflected on, is to wrongly dissolve dualism, and fall for the illusion that the reflection is the true reality.

In the world of Being, the Creative Intelligence that contains the Forms, for example, is cognitively identical with the Forms and is aware of this identity. The sense of real difference only arises in the world of Becoming, where things are not perceived as different manifestations of one cognizing intelligence but as separate and independent of one another and of the cognizing subject. — Apollodorus

This is simply an unsupported speculative proposition concerning the nature of the "Creative Intelligence". As I I explained already, and exemplified with your finger/hand analogy, we have no reason to believe the Creator is an "Intelligence", just like we have no reason to believe that the unity of five fingers is a "Finger": A hand is something completely different from a finger, therefore we ought to also believe that the Creator is something completely different from an intelligence.

So you simply ignore the separation I described above, which is an essential part of "intelligence", (dividing the reflecting self, in the case of introspection, from the thing being reflected on), to say that the Creative Intelligence is identical with the Forms. But if the Creator was truly an intelligence, we'd have to respect this separation which is an essential feature of "intelligence". It is respect for this separation which creates the need for Plato's tripartite soul, and the Trinity of Christianity. The separation between the two aspects of a dualism requires a third thing which maintains the division. I believe this situation is touched on in the Parmenides.

The reality of Becoming impresses itself onto any intelligence in a way which cannot be ignored. This results in a division between the "beings" which we know, and are intelligible to us, always being contingent as the result of a becoming, and the "Being" which is assumed as prior to contingent being. This division cannot be ignored in any introspection (self reflection) as it separates the introspecting self as the activity of a contingent being, from the Being of the so-called "Creative Intelligence" (which I argue is not properly called an intelligence).

If we follow the pattern established by Plato and developed by later Platonists, we can avoid most of the misunderstandings or misinterpretations that have arisen especially in more recent times.

The relation between the Good and the Beautiful is a case in point, showing how two apparently distinct things can be ultimately one. — Apollodorus

This idea, that the Good and the Beautiful are one, is itself a misunderstanding.

It follows that, as Diotima says, love of Beauty is really love of Good (Symp. 206a): We love Beauty because it is in some sense Good. Love of Beauty is the desire not only to behold Beauty, but to hold it for ever and to manifest it in everything we do in every way we can. The Gods do not judge man by what he sees but by his actions.

Plato clearly equates Beauty with Good and with Truth — Apollodorus

This is a misrepresentation of what is presented by Plato at Symposium 206. Notice, at 206a, that the object of Love is the good. This is what Diotima gets Socrates to agree with. People love the good, and they want the good to be theirs forever. There is no mention of Beauty here. Then Diotima proceeds to discuss Beauty. Beauty is described as being consistent with the gods, harmony with all that is godlike.

So we have Aristotle's distinction here between apparent good (the good which a person loves and wants to keep forever), and what is called by A as the real good, harmony with all that is godlike, what Diotima calls "Beauty". What Plato has set up therefore, is the division between "the good", what people desireor love, and "the beautiful", what is godlike.

Now we proceed to the end of 206, where Diotima states "You see, Socrates' , she said, 'what Love wants is not beauty, as you think it is'."

So the point made by Plato at 206 is actually the opposite as to what you propose. Diotima is actually establishing a separation between the good, and Beauty, and proposing that the good is what is desired and wanted by people, "loved", and this may be very inconsistent with what is beautiful, i.e. what is godlike, Beauty.

I suspect that is a no parking zone. — Fooloso4

The temptation to Straussianize, Maimonidize, or Farabize Plato is understandable. But I think it must be resisted. I believe that Plato should be read on his own terms.

The One is Infinite or Unlimited. We may ask, Infinite or Unlimited what? Being, Life, Intelligence (Einai, Zoe, Nous). How can limited human intelligence grasp what has no limit?

Well, Plato tells us how. The only way of doing it is by letting go of whatever is limiting our intelligence, that is, concerns with limited and limiting things such as the body and other material objects and thoughts about them; by lifting our gaze upward; and by opening our heart, the eye of our soul, to the Light of the One, that it may flood, pervade, and take over our whole being and lift us from darkness to its infinite, ever-present, all-illumining, and life-bestowing radiance.

The mind as a whole must be turned away from the world of change until its eye can bear to look straight at reality, and at the brightest of all realities which is what we call the Good (Rep. 518c)

In other words, the Intelligence Plato is talking about, is no abstract concept! It is a live, living force, it is Life itself. Try saying “dead intelligence”. It doesn’t make sense! Intelligence IS Life and Life IS Intelligence. And because it is Life itself, not "my life", "your life", or “our life” but Life in its absolute, irresistible, brutal, and devastating totality that sweeps all individualism away, we cannot control or manipulate it, try to do so, or even think of trying.

Plato uses the dialogues to convey a unified metaphysical framework that is hierarchical and that leads from complexity to simplicity, culminating in the absolutely simple first principle of the One which is autoexplicable and unhypothetical, but also ineffable and unfathomable.

Being Goodness, the One also serves as the guiding principle in Plato’s ethics. So, the philosopher can start living an ethical life straight away, without waiting for a vision of the One that, at the end of the day, may or may not come.

However, Platonism is “the Upward Way”, the process of ascent to ever-higher levels of being and experiencing. Whilst we are living a righteous life, or as righteous as possible, Plato gives us something even higher to aspire to. He explains how the One creates multiplicity by first imposing limit on the unlimited, i.e., on itself, and then forming it into ideal building blocks that are harmoniously arranged to provide the ordered structure of the Cosmos.

This is all that can be said (for now) about the One because the One, as already stated, is beyond the grasp of the human mind. However, though beyond our grasp, the One is knowable to us. This is very important to understand and to always remember. Remembrance (anamnesis) in Platonism is absolutely essential. And there is One thing that must be remembered at all times, even when we are asleep.

The same applies to the Forms. Though normally beyond our grasp, they can be known. Indeed, the Forms are the very essence of cognition, they stand at the threshold of the Unmanifest to the Manifest, at the apex of the “Intelligible Triad”. And for Plato (as for Ancient Greeks in general) cognition is “seeing”. When we see something we see a “form” or “shape”. Hence “Form”, eidos, which means “that which is seen”, i.e., the form or shape of an object of sight, something that is “seen”, “grasped”, “understood”, or “known”.

To begin with, we can think about Forms. There is nothing wrong with that. And I am not talking about wild speculation or fantasizing. I am talking about cool, rational, methodical thinking along the lines suggested by the dialogues. Thinking about the Forms opens us up to the experience of them. The Forms lead us to the Good and knowledge of the Good leads to knowledge of the Forms.

Socrates says that the philosopher, i.e. the lover of wisdom or seeker after knowledge, can hit upon reality only by hunting down that reality alone by itself and unalloyed (Phaedo 66a).

The Forms are like the tracks of an animal we are hunting. Though we may have heard of it, we do not know the animal. All we see at first are clues that something has passed by through the forest: we notice changes in the behavior of other animals, we see broken twigs and leaves, trodden grass, etc. We may even hear some unfamiliar sounds in the distance, all pointing in the same direction.

Suddenly, we see prints left in the soil and something inexplicable happens within us. Our heart skips a beat, our hair stands on end, and deep down we know that we are on the right track. From that moment, we can no longer let go. As Socrates says, the philosophical quest “takes possession of our soul” (Phaedo 82d). We must follow the clues day and night. Eventually, though, after days, weeks, months or years, we see the animal itself and how it makes those prints. This enables us to fully understand the clues that led us to the quarry.

In his dialogues, Plato provides a description of the One, tells us what the tracks are that lead to the One, and gives us many other clues by means of myths, analogies, and logical arguments. I think we can hardly ask for more!

But the most important clue that Plato (or anyone else can give us) is the need of self-knowledge. Lack of self-knowledge means that we don’t know who or what we are. And this can only mean that we are not who or what we think we are! We must be something else.

As Plotinus says, to know ourselves we must know our Source: the human mind is a microcosm of the Cosmic Mind, the Supreme Intelligence and Ultimate Reality, and what we are hunting or looking for – or at least part of it – is already and always present within us. This is why we will never find it by looking for it in distant places, and even less by denying its existence.