As I have said before, with the dialogues we need to look not only at what is said but at what is done. — Fooloso4

Indeed. And I have kept that in mind when reading.
It is something I am alert to in real life, including being aware of my own actions and if I follow my own advice. Some things are easier said than done :wink:

Correct. And the crux of the matter is, are they the shoes (1) of a philosopher or (2) of an author of comedy? — Apollodorus

Playwrights were big celebrities back then. I don't know, probably best to just drop it, huh? There's more important stuff in the world. :grin:

Playwrights were big celebrities back then. I don't know, probably best to just drop it, huh? There's more important stuff in the world — frank

lol I think you might be right there. But maybe we should wait for the final verdict before we give up completely?

I didn't know about the Bacchants. — Amity

I should add, in case it is not obvious, that wine and fertility are about bodily pleasures. And yet, Socrates throughout the dialogue has railed against the pleasures of the body. Here too, the context is "being mastered by pleasure" and the "exchange pleasures for pleasures", but he refers to the rites of the Bacchants "Riddles" and "mysteries" indeed!

Socrates is quite clear it is not rites that purify:

Exchanged for one another without wisdom such virtue is only an illusory appearance of virtue; it is in fact fit for slaves, without soundness or truth, whereas, in truth, moderation and courage and justice are a purging away of all such things, and phronesis itself is a kind of cleansing or purification. (69c)

There is, however, one more piece of the puzzle:

There are indeed, as those concerned with the mysteries say, many who carry the thyrsus but the Bacchants are few. These latter are, in my opinion, no other than those who have practiced philosophy in the right way.(69d)

The thyrsus is the wand, but not all who carry the wand and participate in the rites understand them. They have, as it were, the props and go through the motions, but do not practice philosophy in the right way. And, if any confusion still remains, once again, practicing philosophy in the right way means,
"in truth, moderation and courage and justice".

practicing philosophy in the right way means,
"in truth, moderation and courage and justice". — Fooloso4

I think that was already obvious. But practising moderation and courage and justice must be considered in the context of Socrates' belief in rebirth, etc. as discussed at 72a - 72d.

Socrates now summarizes Cebes’ argument but makes a significant change without Cebes’ noticing. Did he forget his own argument? Cebes said that every soul wears out many bodies, but Socrates says:

... the soul in its very entering into a human body was the beginning of its destruction, like a disease (95d)

As if to emphasize this change, Socrates says:

I deliberately repeat it often, in order that no point may escape us, and that you may add or subtract something if you wish.

And Cebes said:

There is nothing that I want to add or subtract at the moment. That is what I say.(95d-e)

After Cebes says this:

Socrates paused for a long time, deep in thought. (95e)

Then says:

"This is no unimportant problem that you raise, Cebes, for it requires a thorough investigation of the cause of generation and destruction. I will, if you wish, give you an account of my experience in these matters. (96a)

One might think that what will follow is a discussion of natural science.

Listen then, and I will, Cebes, he said. When I was a young man I was wonderfully keen on that wisdom which they call natural science, for I thought it splendid to know the causes of everything, why it comes to be, why it perishes and why it is. (96a)

But he did not find the answers he sought.

One day I heard someone reading, as he said, from a book of Anaxagoras, and saying that it is Mind that directs and is the cause of everything. I was delighted with this cause and it seemed to me good, in a way, that Mind should be the cause of all. I thought that if this were so, the directing Mind would direct everything and arrange each thing in the way that was best. If then one wished to know the cause of each thing, why it comes to be or perishes or exists, one had to find what was the best way for it to be, or to be acted upon, or to act. On these premises then it befitted a man to investigate only, about this and other things, what is best. (97b-d)

Socrates accepted Mind as the cause, but instead of inquiring about what Mind is, or how it arranged things, he sought an explanation for why it is best that things be the way they are. He did not find such an explanation in Anaxagoras or anywhere else. He thus launched his “second sailing” to find the cause. (99d).

After this, he said, when I had wearied of looking into beings, I thought that I must be careful to avoid the experience of those who watch an eclipse of the sun, for some of them ruin their eyes unless they watch its reflection in water or some such material. A similar thought crossed my mind, and I feared that my soul would be altogether blinded if I looked at things with my eyes and tried to grasp them with each of my senses. So I thought I must take refuge in discussions and investigate the truth of beings by means of accounts [logoi] … On each occasion I put down as hypothesis whatever account I judge to be mightiest; and whatever seems to me to be consonant with this, I put down as being true, both about cause and about all the rest, while what isn’t, I put down as not true. (99d-100a)

Those familiar with the Republic will recall the story of the ascent from the cave where it was necessary to first look at images of things (beings) before being able to look at things themselves, and then finally looking at images of the sun before looking at the sun itself.

With his “second sailing” Socrates looks to what seems best in a double sense. First, he wants to understand how it is best that things are arranged by Mind as they are, and second, having failed to understand things as they are, that is, to attain truth and knowledge, he seeks what seems to be the best argument.

I am going to try to show you the kind of cause with which I have concerned myself. I turn back to those oft-mentioned things and proceed from them. I assume the existence of a Beautiful, itself by itself, of a Good and a Great and all the rest. If you grant me these and agree that they
exist, I hope to show you the cause as a result, and to find the soul to be immortal.
Take it that I grant you this, said Cebes, and hasten to your conclusion. (100b-c)

Cebes does not really seem interested in the forms and agrees without question in order to get to the point that concerns him, the immortality of the soul.

Consider then, he said, whether you share my opinion as to what follows, for I think that, if there is anything beautiful besides the Beautiful itself, it is beautiful for no other reason than that it shares in that Beautiful, and I say so with everything. Do you agree to this sort of cause?—I do.

I no longer understand or recognize those other sophisticated causes, and if someone tells me that a thing is beautiful because it has a bright color or shape or any such thing, I ignore these other reasons—for all these confuse me—but I simply, naively and perhaps foolishly cling to this, that nothing else makes it beautiful other than the presence of, or the sharing in, or however you may describe its relationship to that Beautiful we mentioned, for I will not insist on the precise nature of the relationship, but that all beautiful things are beautiful by the Beautiful. That, I think, is the safest answer I can give myself or anyone else. (100c-e)

Socrates does not attempt to describe the precise relationship of beautiful things to Beauty itself. One would think it important to do so if it is to be accepted as philosophically sound. He settles instead for the “safest answer”. The image of sailing brings to mind, or rather, as we may recall, a “recollection” of the image of the raft sailing through life in the midst of danger.

It seems to me, Socrates, as perhaps you do too, that in these matters certain knowledge is either impossible or very hard to come by in this life; but that even so, not to test what is said about them in every possible way, without leaving off till one has examined them exhaustively from every aspect, shows a very feeble spirit; on these questions one must achieve one of two things: either learn or find out how things are; or, if that's impossible, he must sail through life in the midst of danger, seizing on the best and the least refutable of human accounts, at any rate, and letting himself be carried upon it as on a raft - unless, that is, he could journey more safely and less dangerously on a more stable carrier, some divine account. (85c-d)

According to Simmias' image, if we cannot gain knowledge, the raft will be out of our control and tossed about, unless there is a more stable carrier, some divine account. Is Socrates’ safe account just such an account? What is the cost of passage?

Socrates “assumes” the existence of the Beautiful itself and a Good itself, and so on. He does not try to prove them and does not say how they actually relate to things.

Recollect also the following: Socrates said he persuades himself that what he says seems to be true, (91a) which is very different from attempting to say what seems to be true. Is he trying to persuade himself that the forms seem to be true? Has he been successful? However we may answer this, one thing should be obvious: if the myth of recollection was true, none of this would be necessary. He would have simply recollected what he knew from being dead, the existence of Beauty itself, Justice Itself, the Good itself, and all the rest.

Socrates ends with a very odd bit of advice:

Then would you not avoid saying that when one is added to one it is the addition and when it is divided it is the division that is the cause of two? And you would loudly exclaim that you do not know how else each thing can come to be except by sharing in the particular reality in which it shares, and in these cases you do not know of any other cause of becoming two except by sharing in Twoness, and that the things that are to be two must share in this, as that which is to be one must share in Oneness, and you would dismiss these additions and divisions and other such subtleties, and leave them to those wiser than yourself to answer. But you, afraid, as they say, of your own shadow and your inexperience, would cling to the safety of your own hypothesis and give that answer. If someone then attacked your hypothesis itself, you would ignore him and would not answer until you had examined whether the consequences that follow from it agree with one another or contradict one another. (101c-d)

When one is added to one it is not the addition of one to one that makes two but it is two by sharing in Twoness. Socrates tells him that he should “loudly exclaim” this. Yelling has seemed to take the place of persuasion by reason.

And when you must give an account of your hypothesis itself you will proceed in the same way: you will assume another hypothesis, the one which seems to you best of the higher ones until you come to something acceptable, but you will not jumble the two as the debaters do by discussing both the beginning and what emerges out of it, if you wish to discover any truth … but if you are a philosopher I think you will do as I say.”
What you say is very true, said Simmias and Cebes together. (101d-102a)

Compare this to the description of dialectic the Republic:


"Well, then, go on to understand that by the other segment of the intelligible I mean that which argument itself grasps with the power of dialectic, making the hypotheses not beginnings but really hypotheses—that is, steppingstones and springboards—in order to reach what is free from hypothesis at the beginning of the whole. When it has grasped this, argument now depends on that which depends on this beginning and in such fashion goes back down again to an end; making no use of anything sensed in any way, but using forms themselves, going through forms to forms, it ends in forms too." (511b)

In the Republic hypothesis is used to get free of hypothesis, back to the beginning of the whole. Here, however, Cebes and Simmias are told to go from hypothesis to hypothesis, but they do not free themselves from hypothesis. They are told not to discuss the beginning, but, of course, they can’t because they have not arrived at the beginning. They have not arrived at the forms. At best they have arrived at what seems to them best. The philosopher, if Cebes and Simmias are philosophers, does not have knowledge of the whole either through dialectic or recollection.

if the myth of recollection was true, none of this would be necessary. He would have simply recollected what he knew from being dead, the existence of Beauty itself, Justice Itself, the Good itself, and all the rest. — Fooloso4

I think you are missing some important points, e.g.:

1. Full recollection of past knowledge is not automatic. it needs training by means of philosophy, etc. and may require more than one lifetime to develop fully.

2. What you recollect in this life depends on what you knew in your past life or lives. If you were not a fully enlightened soul in your past life then you wouldn't have experienced Beauty Itself, Justice Itself, the Good Itself, and all the rest, and you couldn't recollect all that in this life.

I should add, in case it is not obvious, that wine and fertility are about bodily pleasures. And yet, Socrates throughout the dialogue has railed against the pleasures of the body. Here too, the context is "being mastered by pleasure" and the "exchange pleasures for pleasures", but he refers to the rites of the Bacchants "Riddles" and "mysteries" indeed! — Fooloso4

Thanks for further explanation.
Sometimes things need spelling out, even if they might seem obvious to others.

Even when things seem more clear or obvious as we discuss the dialogue, repetition does no harm.
Indeed, I think there are instances of such in the text. To reinforce or to replay the arguments all the better for analysis and assessment of any conclusions.
This helps to consolidate any short term 'Aha, got it!' or 'OK...but not quite there yet' into the long term memory. All the better for later recall. No rebirth required.

Memory recall or retrieval is remembering the information or events that were previously encoded and stored in the brain. Retrieval is the third step in the processing of memory, with first being the encoding of memory and second, being the storage of the memory. Retrieval of the encoded and stored memory is very important because otherwise there is no point in storing information.

I repeat the themes in my posts because it helps keep them in mind as I go.
For example: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/538325

Those familiar with the Republic will recall the story of the ascent from the cave where it was necessary to first look at images of things (beings) before being able to look at things themselves, and then finally looking at images of the sun before looking at the sun itself. — Fooloso4

Yes. I recall that, even if I am not overly familiar with it. Thanks for the memory :cool:
I had thought of it fleetingly in the previous discussion re chains and release. Freedom from the painful fetters - the pain gradually being eased as Socrates rubs his legs. It is a process.
Just like the pain and pleasure of reading a difficult text...

So, people learn through repetition; the repetition builds paths in our brain. Once people have been down the same path a few times, they find the place quicker next time round.

That is why I am struggling and others might find it all too obvious and have a quicker pace.

The thyrsus is the wand, but not all who carry the wand and participate in the rites understand them. They have, as it were, the props and go through the motions, but do not practice philosophy in the right way. And, if any confusion still remains, once again, practicing philosophy in the right way means,
"in truth, moderation and courage and justice". — Fooloso4

Understood. But got a long way to go...thanks for being a guide along the way :sparkle:
Even if you are not an Absolutely Perfect Sage :wink:

That is why I am struggling and others might find it all too obvious and have a quicker pace. — Amity

The problem may be that others are only too quick to proclaim what is all too obvious and not pace themselves slowly enough to attend to the details that can turn the obvious into something quite different.

So, people learn through repetition; the repetition builds paths in our brain. Once people have been down the same path a few times, they find the place quicker next time round. — Amity

Consider the following from my last post. Socrates says:

I deliberately repeat it often, in order that no point may escape us, and that you may add or subtract something if you wish.(95d)/quote]

As I pointed out:

Socrates now summarizes Cebes’ argument but makes a significant change without Cebes’ noticing. Did he forget his own argument? Cebes said that every soul wears out many bodies, but Socrates says:

... the soul in its very entering into a human body was the beginning of its destruction, like a disease (95d) — Fooloso4

Also consider what Socrates says about incantations. Sometimes we come to believe something is true just through repetition.

There's no comedy or tragedy because it's not a drama. There's no story arc. — frank

"Drama" in the sense of "play". Obviously, not a conventional one. But it does contain elements of tragedy and comedy and has a spiritual message to convey. So, maybe something like the mystery plays of antiquity only more complex and sophisticated?

The degree to which tidbits might be buried in what looks like offhand comments is very different issue to that of the dialogue's status as a play.

Of course. Have you read any books about Meister Eckhart? — frank

Yes, I have. I think Eckhart's teachings come very close to the mysticism within the Platonic tradition.

You said:

There's no comedy or tragedy because it's not a drama. — frank

In response I quoted Rosen making specific points as to the dialogues being dramas:

in Neo-Platonist times, interpreters of the dialogues took the dramatic form very seriously.

there was a tradition of taking seriously the dramatic form of the dialogue. It began in Germany in the 18th century with people like Schleiermacher. And that tradition extends through the 19th century, and you see it in scholars like Friedländer and in philosophical interpreters like Gadamer.

within the last ten years, even the analysts have began talking about the dramatic form of the dialogue

within the last ten years, even the analysts have began talking about the dramatic form of the dialogue — Fooloso4

That's what I'm saying, "drama" or play with a moral and spiritual content.

It is something that I have been attempting to show — Fooloso4

Yes. I have been attempting to understand and slowly getting there.
I think most careful readers and followers of this discussion can see and appreciate your approach to this.

It is significant that those who have opposed my interpretation have not said anything about the details of what Socrates says in the dialogue about myths. Instead they point elsewhere. — Fooloso4

Yes. It is unfortunate.
However, interesting questions have been raised and I have learned more than I would have if I had just stuck to the text.
I am trying to do both. Not easy.
Hopefully this will lead to a better understanding :sparkle:

It is significant that those who have opposed my interpretation have not said anything about the details of what Socrates says in the dialogue about myths. Instead they point elsewhere. — Fooloso4

Have you thought of just drawing out the significant ideas instead of providing your interpretation?

In the Republic hypothesis is used to get free of hypothesis, back to the beginning of the whole. Here, however, Cebes and Simmias are told to go from hypothesis to hypothesis, but they do not free themselves from hypothesis. They are told not to discuss the beginning, but, of course, they can’t because they have not arrived at the beginning. They have not arrived at the forms. At best they have arrived at what seems to them best. The philosopher, if Cebes and Simmias are philosophers, does not have knowledge of the whole either through dialectic or recollection. — Fooloso4

Lies to children are simplified versions of the truth, containing intentional lies that cover deeper, more detailed or complex issues in order to explain the overall picture.

Wittgenstein's ladder is different int hat it is necessary to climb the ladder in order to then dispose of it.

Is what we have read so fr a lie-to-children or Wittgenstein's ladder? Is Socrates engaged in pedagogy, or is this a necessary logical step in the argument?

The approach taken by Fooloso4 is analytical — Amity

Based on the divisions in the article you cite my approach would be "Straussian":

Historically important modes of interpretation, like the Neoplatonic, and their modern counterparts—“unitarian,” “developmentalist,” analytical, esoteric, and Straussian

By contrast Leo Strauss and his followers specifically start from the multiplicity of the dialogues and the characters, situations, and conversations in them. At least in its original form, “Straussianism” is probably—at least in principle—the most sensitive of all approaches to the Platonic corpus (other than the most exclusively literary) to its dramatic aspects. Its methodology is hard to summarize but can perhaps fairly be said to consist in trying to see how the choice of characters, their setting, and their interactions affect the apparent outcomes of the argument.

From an earlier post:

There has been an important reappraisal in the way the dialogues are read. Influential figures are Jacob Klein and Leo Strauss, and his students including Alan Bloom, Stanley Rosen, Thomas Pangle, and Seth Benardete, and their students, including Charles Griswold, Rhonna Burger, David Roochnik, Laurence Lampert , and many others. — Fooloso4

These are the people I read and whom I have learned the most from.

An important statement from Strauss's student Stanley Rosen:

For Strauss, there were three levels of the text: the surface; the intermediate depth, which I think he did think is worked out; and the third and deepest level, which is a whole series of open or finally unresolvable problems. Strauss tended to emphasize the first and the second. I wouldn’t say he didn’t mention the third, whereas I concentrate on the third. — Fooloso4

Between this and Rowe's criticism it is clear how far apart those who look at the dialogue as a whole with attention to parts are from those who say:

Have you thought of just drawing out the significant ideas instead of providing your interpretation? — frank

Between this and Rowe's criticism it is clear how far apart those who look at the dialogue as a whole with attention to parts are from those who say:

Have you thought of just drawing out the significant ideas instead of providing your interpretation?
— frank — Fooloso4

Indeed. As if what counts as drawing out a significant idea is separate from someone's interpretation :brow:

And to be clear, Socrates is talking about myths and those involved in the cults of mystical rites. Some here are advocating that we pay attention to them but ignore what Socrates says about them. If they are to be looked at, it should be from this perspective if looking at them is intended to shed light on the dialogue — Fooloso4

You keep saying "to be clear", but it isn't at all clear what you are on about.

Nobody says we should ignore what Socrates says about myths. But then nor should we ignore the other things he says regarding soul, immortality, and rebirth.

Either the dialogues are intended to stimulate thought or they are not. If they are, we can't ignore the fact that myths may have some truth in them and just dismiss them out of hand. The dialogues merely demand that we don't accept tradition unthinkingly, not that we become nihilists, atheists or communists.

Are you joking or just ignoring what has been said? — Fooloso4

You're not able to sum up your view?

@Apollodorus
So we have one vote for "can't give a summation"

How would you package your view?

"What has been said" by whom? Are you taking us for a ride or something? — Apollodorus

In case there are some here who are seeing this and might be confused, read the quoted statements above by Rowe and Rosen. The desire for a neat little "package" tied with a pretty bow is antithetical to an educated reading of the dialogues.

Is what we have read so fr a lie-to-children or Wittgenstein's ladder? Is Socrates engaged in pedagogy, or is this a necessary logical step in the argument? — Banno

The dialogue of Cratylus approaches your question from a particular point of view. Cratylus claims names are natural entities while Socrates argues that they are assigned values. The argument is not rancorous. Cratylus won't be climbing the ladder with Socrates. Pedagogy is dispensed sparingly.

I think that perhaps two in "a half and another half are two" do not refer to some form of Twoness of the number two but to two as individuals, each being "a half"? — magritte

Thanks for your contribution. I am not sure I understand you. But based on what I think you are getting at.

It is the unit, the one, that makes counting intelligible. In one sense a half and a half is two, but in another it is one.

But with regard to twoness:

And you would loudly exclaim that you do not know how else each thing can come to be except by sharing in the particular reality in which it shares, and in these cases you do not know of any other cause of becoming two except by sharing in Twoness, and that the things that are to be two must share in this, as that which is to be one must share in Oneness ... (101c-d)

Note the similarity to the quote from 73e.

He is not claiming that Twoness is a thing known. It is an hypothesis.

From my discussion of recollection at 73 :

'But if that doesn't convince you, Simmias, then see whether maybe you agree if you look at it this way. Apparently you doubt whether what is called "learning" is recollection?'

'I don't doubt it,' said Simmias; 'but I do need to undergo just what the argument is about, to be "reminded". Actually, from the way Cebes set about stating it, I do almost recall it and am nearly convinced; but I'd like, none the less, to hear now how you set about stating it yourself.'

'I'll put it this way. We agree, I take it, that if anyone is to be reminded of a thing, he must have known that thing at some time previously.'

'Certainly.'

'Then do we also agree on this point: that whenever knowledge comes to be present in this sort of way, it is recollection?

He goes on to give an example of recollection:

'Well now, you know what happens to lovers, whenever they see a lyre or cloak or anything else their loves are accustomed to use: they recognize the lyre, and they get in their mind, don't they, the form of the boy whose lyre it is? And that is recollection. Likewise, someone seeing Simmias is often reminded of Cebes, and there'd surely be countless other such cases.'(73b-d)

There seems to be no distinction here between recollection and being reminded of something.

The Theaetetus, so often taken as an argument for knowledge as justified true belief, ends with no such conclusion. We are left with the same doubt here; not a lack of progress, but the absence of closure. The task left to those present is to continue the discussion.

It was this that caught my eye in your comments on reincarnation, and that had me encouraging you to produce this thread. I find an uncertain Socrates far more agreeable than a dogmatic Socrates.

Thank you for your efforts. I trust the thread was worth your while, perhaps in terms of ordering your understanding, perhaps in terms of addressing the various comments here.

Thanks again. It's amusing to see the putative Father of Philosophy engaging in anti-philosophy.

I learned a lot. — Valentinus

I am glad to hear that.

I can't help thinking about the issue of 'suicide' which we quickly passed over — Amity

The issue arises because of Socrates' choice to stay in Athens and drink the poison rather than flee. To some this seems like suicide, but it is questionable whether not doing everything you can to save your life amounts to suicide. In the Crito Socrates gives his reasons for his decision to stay.

At the end he does not simply calmly drink the poison, he:

downed it with great readiness and relish.

I don't think this is an indication of suicide but rather his eagerness to find out what happens next, if anything. And, of course, if death is nothingness then he won't find out.


There is also another issue: if being dead is so much better than the prison of life why not escape. Socrates appeals to the gods and our being their servants, but I do not know if there is a better argument to be found in the dialogue.

I will still keep on...and hope this thread does too... — Amity

I am thinking of following up with something more diagrammatic, an overview.

No sensible man would insist that these things are as I have described them, but I think it is fitting for a man to risk the belief—for the risk is a noble one—that this, or something like this, is true about our souls and their dwelling places … (114d) — Fooloso4

I think you are using the wrong translation.

Socrates says:
“… when death attacks the human being, the mortal part of him dies, it seems, whereas the immortal part departs intact and undestroyed, and is gone, having retreated from death […] And so, more surely than anything, Cebes, soul is immortal and imperishable, and all our souls really will exist in Hades” 106e -107a

Cebes replies :
“For my part, Socrates, I’ve nothing else to say against this, nor can I doubt the arguments in any way”. 107a

Simmias agrees, but still has some doubts:
“… I’m compelled still to keep some doubt in my mind about what has been said” 107b

Socrates has the final word:
“As it is, however, since the soul is evidently immortal, it could have no means of safety or of escaping evils, other than becoming both as good and as wise as possible”

Concerning the myth he tells of Hades, Socrates says:
“… since the soul turns out to be immortal, I think that for someone who believes this to be so it is both fitting and worth the risk – for fair is the risk – to insist that either what I have said or something like it is true concerning our souls and their dwelling places” 114d

For some strange reason you keep leaving out "However, since the soul turns out to be immortal".

Conclusion: Socrates does not doubt the immortality of the soul or its journey to Hades.