Yes, especially in the contrast with the "bodily" perceptions, διανοία is used.
As a matter of expression in Greek, the use of "δια" to nous and logos are not far away from the nouns and verbs by themselves.

So to say that ‘the real can only be discerned by thought’ doesn’t convey what depth of the ‘idea of the good’, — Wayfarer

Once again, according to the dialogue knowledge of the good can only be attained in death if at all.

'So isn't it in reasoning, if anywhere at all, that any of the things that are become manifest to it?' (65b)

Noesis is not reasoning. It is direct apprehension.

...the presumption is still that things are guided by intelligence, not by merely material causes. — Wayfarer

Right, but that is very different from what Apollodorus is claiming. I will have more to say about this section when I get there.

As a matter of expression in Greek, the use of "δια" to nous and logos are not far away from the nouns and verbs by themselves. — Valentinus

Right. The prefix "δια" here means by or through, thus dianoia (διανοία)/i] through thought and dialectic through speech.

I think it is a good practice when you come across something questionable to note it, postpone judgment, keep in mind the circumstances, and see how things develop. With the dialogues it is always important to look not only at what is said but at what is done. — Fooloso4

Understood.
I can postpone final judgement but not at the time of my reading and questioning.
I assess as I go...
This dialogue continues to intrigue and challenge me as I try to focus only on a particular section of text.

The Forms differ from the things of experience but they are not abstract concepts or objects of the mind. They are said to be "things themselves by themselves". This formulation is used with regard to the soul. What this means will be discussed. — Fooloso4

Thanks for clarification. Look forward to seeing what 'things themselves by themselves' actually means.

In that case the soul would not endure separate from the body. — Fooloso4

Correct.

But Beauty is not a concept. It's existence is independent of the mind. Things are beautiful to the extent they are images of Beauty itself — Fooloso4

OK. I still don't understand this...I will wait...

In the Symposium Socrates says that the love of wisdom is eros, desire. Philosophy then cannot be freedom from desire if it is motivated by desire. — Fooloso4

Indeed, I think the importance lies in the quantity and quality of desire.
Philosophy as a human enterprise can be as 'infected' by distractions or obsessions as much as the body. At death, desire is lost.
I guess, even if you believe in an afterlife...depending on what you think has been promised by 'being good' or temperate, it will have been satisfied.

I think the key word is 'nous' - a faculty rather more specific than is described by the general term 'thought'. — Wayfarer

Right now, I am only reading this particular English translation.
That there are more ways of interpreting and understanding I have no doubt.

Informative to read the responses by:
@Fooloso4 https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/535610
@Valentinus https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/535632
@Fooloso4 https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/535646

Bearing in mind the later arguments about the fate of the soul and of philosophers and ‘good men’, — Wayfarer

Yes, we will have to look a those arguments and whether they succeed or fail. This is why I ended my last reading this way:

And if these things are not true then rather than great hope there is a danger of a loss of hope. Knowledge of the just, the beautiful, and the good hang on the fate of the soul. — Fooloso4

At death, desire is lost. — Amity

The irony is that on the one hand the desire will be fulfilled, one will be able to see the truth unencumbered by the body. On the other, if philosophy is the desire for wisdom rather than its possession there would be no philosophizing in Hades.

So, I'm like, when are you going to realise what Fooloso4 is attempting to do here ? — Amity

I think that was a fuck-off. Fair enough.

I don't know what you mean by 'pure thought'. How do you understand it as it pertains to this section of the text ? — Amity

Ask Fooloso4.

I think that was a fuck-off. Fair enough. — frank

If I had meant to say, "Fuck off", I would have. You wouldn't have to think about it.
Your interpretation of my post as such, combined with an unwillingness to answer questions is telling. I'll end it here. For now.

That, it seems to me, would be a good reason to read it again — Fooloso4

I agree. That was behind my questions re @frank 's deep ( ? ingrained ) images and any changing worldview.

I find that every time I read the dialogues I find something new and different. — Fooloso4

It is the same for me, with any book or film there is always something I missed first time round.

However, some may have fixed views on what the text means.
Responses can be ready-made. Re-heat in microwave for 3 minutes.

Did I misunderstand you when you said you "need to cut out".

Did I misunderstand you when you said you "need to cut out". — Fooloso4

Uh, carry on. :cool:

I find that every time I read the dialogues I find something new and different. — Fooloso4

That makes the whole discussion kind of pointless, doesn't it? What happens if following the closure of the discussion you decide to find "new and different things" in the texts?

I find that every time I read the dialogues I find something new and different.
— Fooloso4

That makes the whole discussion kind of pointless, doesn't it? What happens if following the closure of the discussion you decide to find "new and different things" in the texts? — Apollodorus

It does not make it pointless. It simply means that there is more there then I have seen. It is not a matter of "deciding" to find something new and different things. If they are there to be found I consider myself fortunate to have found them and revise my interpretation accordingly.

Socrates wraps up his defense by saying:

… maybe this alone is the right coin for virtue, the coin for which all things must be exchanged - thoughtfulness. Maybe this is the genuine coin for which and with which all things must be bought and sold; and maybe courage and moderation and justice and true virtue as a whole are only when accompanied by thoughtfulness, regardless of whether pleasures and terrors and all other such things are added or subtracted … and maybe moderation and justice and courage and thoughtfulness itself are nothing but a kind of purifier. (69 b-c)

Socrates demystifies “mystic rites”, “genuine hidden meaning”, “mysteries”, and “purification”. (69c-d) The practice of dying and being dead turns out to be the practice of a life of moderation and justice and courage.

Cebes breaks in:

Socrates, the rest seems to me to be beautifully put, but what you say about the soul induces a lot of distrust in human beings. They fear that the soul, once she is free of the body, is no longer anywhere, and is destroyed and perishes on that very day when a human being dies; and that as soon as she’s free of the body and departs, then, scattered like breath or smoke, she goes fluttering off and is no longer anywhere. Of course, if she could be somewhere, herself by herself, collected together and freed from those evils you went through just now, there'd be a great hope - a beautiful hope - that what you say, Socrates, is true. But this point that the soil is when the human being dies and holds onto both some power and thoughtfulness - probably stands in need of more than a little persuasive talk and assurance.(70a)

Cebes hopefulness amounts to saying that if what Socrates says, that the soul is somewhere herself by herself, is true then is true. Cebes states it in such a way that the latter follows as a conclusion from the former, but both state the same thing.

Socrates responds:

What you say is true, Cebes, but now what should we do? Or do you want us to tell a more thorough story about these things to see whether what we’re saying is likely or not?” (70a-b)

Socrates proposes telling a more thorough story in order to see if the stories he has told are likely or not. He shifts from Cebes ‘true’ to ‘likely’. He proposes to “investigate it in some such was as this”. (70c)

… do the souls of men exist in Hades when they have died, or do they not? Now there's an
ancient doctrine, which we've recalled, that they do exist in that world, entering it from this one, and that they re-enter this world and are born again from the dead; yet if this is so, if living people are born again from those who have died, surely our souls would have to exist in that world? Because they could hardly be born again, if they didn't exist; so it would be sufficient evidence for the truth of these claims, if it really became plain that living people are born from the dead and from nowhere else; but if that isn't so, some other argument would be needed.' (70c-d)

But, of course, some other argument is needed. The living come from the living. The argument that life comes from death requires a soul that does not come to be or die. Now perhaps a soul separate from the senses, a priori, might think that the living come from the dead, but our experience informs us that we are born of living parents.

Socrates now shifts from living things to beauty and ugly, just and unjust, larger and smaller. It should be noted that he mentions justice and beauty but not the good. According to the argument, doing good would result in doing bad. (70e)

In the Republic Socrates says that the Good: "provides the truth to the things known and gives the power to the one who knows". It is "the cause of the knowledge and truth". Further, "existence and being" are the result of the Good. (508e - 509b)

The argument from opposites concludes with the claim that this movement must be circular:

And similarly, my dear Cebes, if all things that partake in life were to die, but when they'd died, the dead remained in that form, and didn't come back to life, wouldn't it be quite inevitable that everything would ultimately be dead, and nothing would live? Because if the living things came to be from the other things, but the living things were to die, what could possibly prevent everything from being completely spent in being dead?' (72 b-d)

Perhaps Cebes is persuaded by this, but it assumes what is still to be proven, the continuation of the soul in death, and ignores the obvious fact of generation of life from the living.

'Yes, and besides, Socrates,' Cebes replied, 'there's also that argument you're always putting forward, that our learning is actually nothing but recollection; according to that too, if it's true, what we are now reminded of we must have learned at some former time. But that would be impossible, unless our souls existed somewhere before being born in this human form; so in this way too, it appears that the soul is something deathless.' (72e-73a)

Two points to be noted here. Socrates just went through this long argument from opposites, how life comes from death, but if the soul is deathless then it could not come to be or become again from its opposite.

Second, note the qualification: “if it is true”. Simmias does not share Cebes enthusiasm. He does not place his hope in the possibility that it might be true. He wants to be reminded of the demonstrations that it is true. There is a play here between recollection and remembering.

'One beautiful argument,' said Cebes, 'is that when people are questioned, and if the questions are well put, they state the truth about everything for themselves-and yet unless knowledge and a correct account were present within them, they'd be unable to do this; thus, if one takes them to diagrams or anything else of that sort, one has there the plainest evidence that this is so.' (73b)

He is referring to the demonstration in the Meno where a slave without any education is able to solve a complex geometric problem. Cebes mentions but seems to fail to recognize the importance of Socrates’ “well put” questions. Without them the slave would have never “recollected” the solution. The irony here should not go unnoticed. An overarching question of the dialogue is about teaching and learning. Socrates teaches him how to solve the problem and yet claims it was recollection. This is not the place to get into it, but the difference between Meno’s problem, teaching virtue to someone like Meno who is lacking in virtue and teaching someone geometry is very different. There is a sense in which virtue must already be in the soul if one is ever to be virtuous, but it is not evident that the same holds for mathematical knowledge.

Socrates breaks in:

'But if that doesn't convince you, Simmias, then see whether maybe you agree if you look at it this way. Apparently you doubt whether what is called "learning" is recollection?'

'I don't doubt it,' said Simmias; 'but I do need to undergo just what the argument is about, to be "reminded". Actually, from the way Cebes set about stating it, I do almost recall it and am nearly
convinced; but I'd like, none the less, to hear now how you set about stating it yourself.'

'I'll put it this way. We agree, I take it, that if anyone is to be reminded of a thing, he must have known that thing at some time previously.'

'Certainly.'

'Then do we also agree on this point: that whenever knowledge comes to be present in this sort of way, it is recollection?

He goes on to give an example of recollection:

'Well now, you know what happens to lovers, whenever they see a lyre or cloak or anything else their loves are accustomed to use: they recognize the lyre, and they get in their mind, don't they, the form of the boy whose lyre it is? And that is recollection. Likewise, someone seeing Simmias is often reminded of Cebes, and there'd surely be countless other such cases.'(73b-d)

There seems to be no distinction here between recollection and being reminded of something. In the example given recollection is independent of stories of death. Socrates now shifts from things perceived to “the equal itself”. (74a).

'But still, it is from those equals, different as they are from that equal, that you have thought of and got the knowledge of it?' (74c)

It is through the combination of sense and thought that we perceive that things are equal. That this is either based on or leads to recollection of “the equal itself” is questionable.

'Then we must previously have known the equal, before that time when we first, on seeing the equals, thought that all of them were striving to be like the equal but fell short of it. (75a)

All that is necessary to see how implausible this is is to consider how we learned what it means for things to be equal. But Socrates’ concern is not simply with the equal:

Because our present argument concerns the beautiful itself, and the good itself, and just and holy, no less than the equal; in fact, as I say, it concerns everything on which we set this seal, "what it is", in the questions we ask and in the answers we give. (75d)

Can the earlier argument for opposites be reconciled with “the beautiful itself”, “the good itself”, and “the just itself”? What each is itself does not allow for its opposite.

As Socrates wraps up this argument we should not overlook a difficulty that is introduced but only developed later:

Just as sure as these beings are, so also our soul is (76e)

The problem is that “the beautiful itself”, “the good itself”, and “the just itself” are each one and distinct from things we call beautiful, good, and just. If the soul is in the same way they are then “the soul itself” exists, and my soul and your soul are like the things that are beautiful, good, and just, things that admit of their opposite. Things that come to be and pass away.

Indeed, Apollodorus comments on the proceedings are unhelpful and unwelcome.

There is a sense in which virtue must already be in the soul if one is ever to be virtuous, but it is not evident that the same holds for mathematical knowledge. — Fooloso4

An interesting wedge...

I have long found the discussion of recollection unconvincing; but this shows how it might have seemed plausible to our Greek companions.

He's not going to stop. We'll have to ask fdrake to help.

We could try appealing to his better nature...
@Apollodorus?

Your objections having been duly noted, please allow the thread to continue without obtrusive interjection.

I've already stated a few times I'm not stopping anyone and I don't care. If you're saying I'm not allowed to respond to posts on this thread, that's fine. Keep your thread. I don't need it.

The problem is that “the beautiful itself”, “the good itself”, and “the just itself” are each one and distinct from things we call beautiful, good, and just. If the soul is in the same way they are then “the soul itself” exists, and my soul and your soul are like the things that are beautiful, good, and just, things that admit of their opposite. Things that come to be and pass away. — Fooloso4

Gotta love a cliffhanger...

I'm not stopping anyone — Apollodorus

Yeah, you are. I'd like a clear run at the dialogue; your interjections detract from that for me. It seems I am not the only one who thinks so. By all means, start another thread, or wait until we complete the reading; but this is a thread specifically set up to work through the text under @Fooloso4's tutelage.

Let it be.

I don't care — Apollodorus

Obviously disingenuous, since you continue to post.

I find it odd that Cebes seems convinced by the argument at (72 b-d).

I am not surprised to see this in Apollodorus, having observed a habit of first forming a conclusion and then looking for the arguments that might support it. — Banno

The same occurred to me but decided not to give him something else to turn into an extended rant about Marxism and liberals.

My inclination is to say that learning the use of words such as "equal" is exactly learning the concept of equality. — Banno

Not arguing with you here, just asking, if you were to teach a child the use of of "equal", how would you do that?

Would you show them two equal sized objects? Something like that? Hope that they get it and are able to abstract from what you show them?

Endpoint being: inquiry may involve examples. An example is not a reification of anything.

Then we could talk about Meno's Paradox, when Fooloso4 is ready.

Understood. Standing down.

"The same" rather than "equal"... the process would be one of drawing attention to what is the same - both are red; despite their being quite different shapes. Both are heavy, despite being made of very different things. So the process is not recollection, but recognising and copying a pattern in the use of a word.

Wayfarer already answered that. It isn't my fault that you don't read other people's posts. — Apollodorus

Actually I read it. And I responded. It is your fault for not reading other people's posts.

The Republic 509D-513E — Apollodorus

This does not support your claim of a Cosmic Mind

This does not support your claim of a Cosmic Mind — Fooloso4

Oooo I can't resist...

If one assumes a cosmic mind, anything might count as evidence for it.

Gotta love a cliffhanger... — Banno

I would throw in some sex but Socrates already said the philosopher has not interest. Although, as I mentioned, at seventy years old he had a young son.

The same" rather than "equal"... the process would be one of drawing attention to what is the same - — Banno

I thought you were teaching them "equal"