It's interesting to watch ↪Corvus and ↪NOS4A2 attempting to fit the actual Austin in to the account that is so prevalent here, that indirect realism is about sensory apparatus, the way in which our eyes and brain process vision, and so direct realism must also be about sensory apparatus. Corvus in particular is finding that what Austin actually says does not match the common account of what an indirect realist should say. The hard part for them is going to be addressing the arguments Austin actually presents, and not re-dressing them so that they fit a preconfigured critique.
(Austin) is not defending realism against antirealism, but rejecting the very distinction between these two.
— Banno — Banno

I was wanting to keep interacting from my own thoughts only on the topic, but perhaps I must read the Austin, and even Ayer too if the thread is about what Austin actually said in "Sense and Sensibilia", rather than what problems direct realists and indirect realist have in their accounts on perception.

Austin and Ayer were very last in my reading list, but they are brought to the current reading list due to this thread.  My reading on them will be very slow due to my other readings going in tandem with them.  

From my quick reading of Austin last night, I agree that @Banno was right in his point that Austin seems to think there is no significance in differentiating direct and indirect words in perception.  He emphasises linguistic usage must be centred from ordinary people's usage, not philosophers'  In that sense, words like "material stuff", "direct or indirect '' don't make sense, because no one really uses these terms in daily life unless one is a philosopher.

However, he seems to acknowledge the case when "indirect" perception makes sense such as seeing objects using telescopes, binoculars and spectacles, which I have been using as an example for the indirect perception process.

Indeed I feel, there is no much significance in delving into the differentiation of direct and indirect perception because from my point of view, all perceptions are somehow indirect from the minimal perspective that for any human  perception, it will happen via proper and relevant sense organs i.e. the eye sights in visual perceptions, and ears for acoustic perceptions, and nose in case of smelling.  No one would use their nose to see a tree in the field, and no one would use their eyes to smell wine. And without the relevant sense organs and their proper functions, that particular sense perception would be impaired, if not impossible.

But if we agree on the fact that these sense organs are not the final perception location in the process, then they have to be the medium passing the sensed contents into the final location i.e. the brain.  Therefore all perceptions are indirect. And we are not even talking about sense-datum at this point.

I am still trying to understand the direct realist's account on perception.  In what aspect perception is to be understood as direct and real? Are they saying that what they sense from the external objects directly arrives in their brain without any medium in between?  Are they saying that what they sense and perceive from the external world are the true existence of the beings and the world with no possibility of being uncertain or inaccurate?

This point might not be the main topic of this thread as @Banno pointed out, so it could be ignored if that is the way the thread will proceed.

I will be reading the part where Austin discusses on "Delusion and Illusion".
 

I don't think the bit I bolded is right. Indeed, Austin is at pains to make the point that our perceptions are sometimes direct, sometimes indirect, and that neither is always the case.And this is one of his arguments against the sense data view that all our perceptions are indirect.

Again, it now seems to me that you have missed a rather important part of the argument against sense data. — Banno

Austin's claim seems to be devoid of good evidence or reasoning apart from the fact that it is revealing some aspect of perception from the perspective of the linguistic usages at the time when Austin was alive. I don't think the claim is a strong argument to say that Sense-Data theory is untenable. The claim seems not even relevant in opposing Sense-data theory.

Times have moved on more than a half century since "Sense and Sensibilia", and you must be aware that linguistic usage of so-called "ordinary people" changes considerably along with time.

You still have not answered the question on whether Austin was a direct realist or not. You must also realise that language is not perception. They are related, but one is not the other, and vice versa.

Austin is certainly not making any such claim. Sometimes we see things that are real. It does not follow that everything we see is real. Sometimes we see things that are not real. It does not follow that everything we see is not real. So your "For the realists, there is no room to say anything more on the perception than a chair is chair" is a mischaracterisation. Nor is memory a simple process of storage. I suggest the brush you are using here is too broad. If for you "the realist's account on perception sounds too simple", you might consider that you have not represented their view accurately. — Banno

Wasn't Austin a direct realist? His argument was against sense-data theory in perception, claiming that when you perceive an external world object, you are perceiving it directly without any medium in between the perceiver and the object.

I was trying to point out some problems with the direct realist's account that you can perceive external world objects directly, and sense-datum is not involved.

The contents you perceive definitely get stored in your mind, if not in memory where else could it be?

Another problem I used to think that naive realists and direct realists (not sure they are the same people, but sounds similar to me) have with their claims, is that what they perceive is the true account of the real world, which is problematic (from the argument of illusion). You cannot ground certainty of the external world solely on the basis of what you perceive due to the imperfect human sense organs, and possibility of illusion with perception due to the way the objects' nature and property are, or the fluxing environmental condition of the perception etc.

I agree with Russell's Representative Realism, because it says what we perceive is sense-data not the objects direct. In the case of sense-data, the whole process of perception process gets coherently explained and understood. Because it is sense-data, the data which could be accurate or inaccurate, can be stored and retrieved, it coheres with the whole human cognitive process and paradigms.

And still he wasn't denying the external world as illusion. The world out there exists even when we don't perceive it. But due to nature of the world, and our perceptual sense organs, what we perceive is sense-data, not the objects themselves.

Anyhow, this thread is a good opportunity to take out the old classics "Sense and Sensibilia" and "Foundations of Empirical Knowledge", read, think, refute (if need be), and learn. cheers.

I don't wish to dissuade you, indeed there is no alternative, as you must begin where your thoughts are now. The material we are considering takes some digestion, especially as much of it is contrary to what is usually taken as granted in these fora. But from what you have written here you have been following Austin's account well, which is far more than can be said for others. — Banno

Thanks mate. :)

And here it is not at all clear what it would mean to see something without using one's eyes, or any other sense organ. So it's not clear what the direct/indirect distinction is doing in this case. Austin doesn't directly address such an argument, because no one, least of all Ayer, was so gormless as to present it. — Banno

The fact that Ayer and Austin both deal with the issues regarding direct and indirect perception implies, that they must have taken the distinction not lightly. Especially if you notice Austin starts his first and second page of the book with general account of indirect perception, which he notes has been the classic view on the perception how it works.

Some folks deny the distinctions and some say they don't understand what direct perception means. It is because perhaps all perceptions are indirect in nature, and they cannot find any examples of direct perception.

I myself, cannot quite understand how perception works directly, but I do understand how it works indirectly, i.e. via sense organs and sense-data.

When one says perception is direct, i.e. it is between him and the objects or the world, I cannot quite get the point. Because the question was not who is perceiving the object, or the world, or who is responsible for the perception of the objects and the world, but the question was, how perception works.

It is like saying, how does a car work?, the person says, I drive the car. It is between me and the car, nothing in between. It is an answer which is from someone who totally misunderstood what the question was about.

You mention bringing eyes as a visual perceptual organ is absurd, simple and gormless. I feel it is not a reasonable or fair claim either.

Eyes were pointed out as a visual perceptual sense organ as a medium of visual perception, because without your eyes, you will not have visual perception. Simple as that. Of course everyone knows that eyes are the visual sense organ, but they seem to totally forget that eyes are the medium for transferring the image of the external objects into the brain, which makes the visual perception possible in the brain.

The working of eyes for visual perception could be quite complex. It wouldn't be something so simple and definitely not irrelevant with the visual perception topic, so saying it is not worth even mentioning such a simple thing in the discussion of how visual perception works sounds wrong and indeed addlepated.

Of course neither Austin nor Ayer mentions anything about the workings of eyes in visual perception in all of their books. That does not mean that they thought it would be gormless to talk about the sense organs in the theory of perception, but maybe they didn't know anything about how eyes worked in a neurological and biological way to perceive images and transfers into the brain.

So in those terms, there is nothing to understand. A so-called "direct realist" account of perception is the same as the standard account given by science. — Banno

Neurologists and Psychologists would say it would be addlepated for anyone talking about visual perception without going through ins and outs of the workings on the eyes, but Austin and Ayer had been doing it linguistically and logically, hence there are bound to be some muddles on the way. Still it is a useful exercise in semantics at least, and finding out what the actual issues are in the topic.

No. But they might say that when you look at a cup, what you are seeing is the cup, and not some philosophical innovation such as sense data or qualia. That you are not a homunculus sitting inside a head, looking at the a screen projecting images of cups.

The reply to this will be that we understand from recent scientific developments that our brains actively construct a model of the cup. That's quite right. But it would be an error to think that what we see is this model - the homunculus again. Rather, constructing the model is our seeing the cup. — Banno

This is wrong. Because in neurological research, human perception can never see the exact "NOW". There is time lapse of your seeing the cup, and your brain processing the object as a cognition of a cup of about 0.05ms, which means you never see the cup direct. What you are seeing is a memory of the cup of 0.05ms past even if you may be telling yourself that is the live real perception you are having of the cup. It is a processed and stored image you were seeing.

As I see it, in Metaphysics, the Indirect Realism of Ayer is the more sensible approach. In Linguistic Idealism, the Direct Realism of Austin is the more sensible approach. As Austin is speaking from a position of Linguistic Idealism, Sense and Sensibilia should be read bearing this in mind. — RussellA

Good point. We will see what the reading and discussions will reveal in due course.

I had thought you had seen what Austin shows: that "direct" gets its use from "indirect". It seems that needs reinforcing. — Banno

My understanding was that "directly" was used to emphasise the fact that we don't perceive material things "directly", but perceive indirectly via sense-datum in Austin's book page 2. Austin gives out the classic general account of indirect perception, and says the issue is not trivial matter, and some people find it even "disturbing" on the account.

I was understanding that Austin dismisses the distinction between direct and indirect perception as not
meaningful, because he thinks perceptions are direct, although some perceptions are indirect such as when using binoculars or telescopes in visual perception.  I might have misunderstood the point. If so, please correct me, and confirm what is the case.

From my view, direct perception does not exist. All perception is indirect via sense data and sense-organ which carries the sensed information into the brain via sense organs.  Indirect or direct are just linguistic terms to mean that activities or motions are one to one link without any medium or stop off place between the subject and object, or there are ( in case of indirect processes).  Direct and indirect are not some essential properties of existence or entities as some folks seem to think.  We could easily have used "mediated" or "medium-less" instead of direct or indirect.

If I speak to you via phone, then I am speaking to you indirectly via phone.  If I speak to you face to face over a table, then I am speaking to you directly.  But we wouldn't even talk that way unless someone asked you "was your conversation direct or indirect i.e. via phone or video link?" No one would ask that type of questions in ordinary daily life of course. :)

Plane from London to Sydney is a direct flight, if it flies without stopping anywhere during flight, takes off from London and lands in Sydney then it is a direct flight.  If it stops in some other airports such as Dubai or Singapore, then it would be an indirect flight.

If asked how does smelling works, I would refer to the standard scientific account - I'm doing philosophy, so I don't know anything those scientists don't also know. But those accounts do not talk of direct and indirect smelling, except when they adopt a philosophical stance. — Banno

Scientists would definitely start with the sense organ Nose for their account of how smelling works. I am not sure if they would be interested in talking about direct or indirect smelling. I only gave my ideas on indirect smelling, because you asked for it. And that was just out of my impromptu reasoning on the indirect smelling case.

Smelling is different from visual perception, and it is more vague to think in terms of direct or indirect smelling.

But it tells you that smelling is definitely indirect perception because the object is the body, and what you are perceiving is the body scent. The body is a physical existence with mass and weight in space. The scent is a property emanated from the body with no physical properties at all. Your nose is inhaling the air mixed with the sense data of the body scent. If the perception was direct, then you couldn't smell it from the underwear on the floor, when you picked it up and sniffed it off, as the body was either in the shower or making breakfast in the kitchen.

Austin is at pains to make the point that our perceptions are sometimes direct, sometimes indirect, and that neither is always the case.And this is one of his arguments against the sense data view that all our perceptions are indirect.

Again, it now seems to me that you have missed a rather important part of the argument against sense data. — Banno

Ludwig V says that Austin might not have had any idea on Perception. In that case, I am wondering on what Philosophical ground Austin was opposing Sense-data theory apart from some ordinary people's linguistic uses of 1930-1950s in England.

According to what you are saying, if Austin had any theory of perception of his own, it would have been called "sometimes direct, sometimes indirect, and that neither is always the case"-ism. It sounds too mouthful, and is empty in content.

Right. I don't think Austin is arguing with that, although it may seem that some posters in this thread are. He was taking issue with a theory of perception transmitted by Ayers, which says your knowledge of external entities is built up from smaller units of perception called "sense data." — frank

I am not sure if perception or indeed any mental events could be reduced to the brain from Epistemology and Metaphysical perspectives.  It cannot be denied that the brain is where all the mental events happen, but from that boundary we are entering the physiological and neurological land, which are the foreign territories.

There are lots of issues that can be talked about at the conceptual level on mental activities since ancient times, and that is what we have been doing, and I don't see much changes in the near future for that trend to change as far as speculative Philosophy is concerned, and I am happy with that.

For sense data theory of perception, I feel that it is more reasonable than any other theories of perception.  When I see an object in the world, many times I am not sure what it is at first, when they are some distance away.  All I get is the extension and colour of the object. 

The extension is in the space and time, but the colour is a property from my consciousness, so there is some synthesis going on in perception. At this stage of the perception the object is nothing more than data i.e. I know the shape, colour and the location of the object (i.e. on the grass of the garden). I can further go and look close into the object and try to find out what it is looking for more data on the object. 

But even if it was found out to be a tree leaf, if I keep asking questions on it, there are more facts I don't know about the leaf i.e. which tree did it fall from? Was it indeed from the trees in the garden? or Was it blown into the location?  How long was it there? So, I never get absolute full information about the leaf, and in that sense, it still remains as data.  Data is also, by definition, information that can be stored and retrieved for further manipulation, which is coherent with perceived data, because we remember, imagine and reason with the perceived data after the perception.

This is the case even when I pick up a cup with my hand and look into it. Of course it is a cup, but at asking where it is made. what it is made of, who made it, or which factory made it, what is the diameter?, the weight? ... etc. Of course some information will be available if I go and measure the diameter with the ruler, and weigh it on the scale, but many information still remains unanswered. It is a data. For some naive direct realist, it is a cup, and that's the end of story for them. For me, there is a lot more I don't know about the cup. It is a data needing more investigation if need be, and possible to find out more information on the data in due course. Because a cup is a cup, not just because it looks like a cup, but because it has the extensive properties (some are in the form of essential properties and some are informational properties) attached to it for being a cup.

Anyway, I feel in that sense, Austin's endeavour trying to criticise or deny Ayer's Sense Data theory had been in vain.  Asking how we talk about perception is interesting, but it wouldn't make our perception have more certainty in perceiving.

It would have been more meaningful if Austin came up with his own definition and theory of perception before criticising Ayer, but it doesn't appear to be the case.

I used to think every perception is indirect i.e. via sense-datum.  But Banno says that Austin claims there are perceptions which are not indirect.  So I presume he means that there are both direct and indirect perceptions depending on what they are.  I look forward to hearing what they are, and verify if it is a true claim, or not.

But take for instance, I am looking at an object on the grass in my back garden.  I am on the 2nd floor of my study room, and looking down at the grass through the window.  It is not that far away, about 30 ft distance.  The object looks grey and round in shape, and is unidentified at first. I was wondering what it could be, but cannot make out.

I was suspecting it would be either a leaf from the trees, or an empty plastic carton blown by the wind from the outside road, or it could even be the next door neighbour's cat droppings. I am not sure due to the fuzziness of the object and the distance.

I take out my old Pentax binoculars, and point to the object through the window, and focus for the object.  It is blurry and fuzzy at first, but soon it gets clearer, and appears as a super sharp image.  I can see the object now very well, and can tell it is a leaf possibly dropped from the trees in the garden.

The visual perception in this case was only possible via the aid of the binoculars.  For that, I would claim that the binocular was part of my sense organ.  The image was transferred to me via the lenses in the binoculars into my eyes and then into my brain somewhere in which was able to identify the image as a leaf, not an empty carton or the dreaded cat droppings.

In this case, if I say the whole perception was direct from the leaf on the grass to my cognition, I think I am not being fair or reasonable.  Even my eyes are not the recognitive judgemental place for the perception.  They were just a medium, which transferred the image in the binocular to my brain somewhere. 

I am sure the final place where the perceptual judgement took place where I identified the object as a leaf was somewhere in my brain, and the categorical concepts which activated my judgement of the identification of the leaf as a leaf from the trees. My perception in this case was indirect in many folds for sure.

I still don't know what kind of leaf it is, or from which trees (birch, poplar or acer) in the garden. For that, I will need to go out to the garden and walk into the grass, and stand right above the object and have a close peek.

Hence, my perception was incomplete, although having identified what the object was ( a leaf), I am still not sure what it might be, therefore I have no complete access to the object in the world in epistemic sense even after having a concentrated perceptual operation with high quality visual aid. Of course I am not denying the existence of the object on the grass, or saying that it might be a figment of my imagination. What I am saying is that, I have perceived the object on the grass, and with the visual aid which assisted in clearing the blurriness of the image of the object, initial identification seems successful, however, the full knowledge of the nature of the object is still vague at this stage of perception.

Consequently perceptions cannot be direct, but must be resolutely indirect, because all perceputal activities take place via sense organs minimally, sense-datum mostly and many other peripheral factors. (I still keep open-minded admitting for the non-indirect perception case offered by Austin.)

So we don't seem to agree on the topic, but not all do, and that is pretty normal in all discussions.

Austin is simply investigating Ayer's creation of the distinction in dismantling the whole framework of direct/indirect as well as "perception". — Antony Nickles

I find Austin and Ayer's account of the topic interesting and useful.  But I still feel the classic account of indirect perception which has been around from the time of Plato is more reasonable, even if Austin tried to dismiss the distinction of direct and indirect perception altogether, and even if there are still many folks who claim that direct realists' view on perception is correct.

As said, brain and eyes are not the main topic in the thread, but were brought in to show that the perception process is not direct. 

I would leave it at that, and move on to the next chapter of the book. I did read up on the delusion and illusion part in Austin last night, and also read the part where he discusses difference in usage of the words "looks" "seems" and "appears".  It was more like English semantic chapter rather than Philosophy, but was very useful.  I agreed with him on every point in the chapter.

I am going to prepare for pointing out some of the logical problems noticed in Austin's analysis on Delusion and Illusion in his book.

Yes, good point actually. But then does Austin defines what perception is? His analysis on Delusion and Illusion is interesting.

I feel what Austin was forgetting was that perception is a subject process. Perception happens in one's mind which has no access by other minds. But he keeps stating problems on Ayer's account on Sense-data, Delusion and Illusion from 3rd point of view.

Something is only Delusion and Illusion when you know that why the perceived object is either delusion or illusion from 3rd party point of view. To the perceiver who doesn't know why the object appears as it does, but appears as it does, it is how an object appears in his mind, and that is the perception. What is described by 3rd party mind as delusion or illusion is not the perception, but explanation of why it is not real perception. In other words, to Austin the bent straw was an illusion, but someone who doesn't know why it appears as bent, the bent straw is a legitimate perception until he knows why it appears as bent, but straight when taken out from the water.

When one finds out, that what he was perceiving was an illusion or delusion, then he would know that it was an illusion, but before that it was a perception. Therefore perception is not just seeing something, identifying an object as something, and the end. But it goes on to further mental certification and judgement process of confirmation, correction and reconfirmation.

I suggest that Austin does not allow himself to be seduced by the cartesian sceptical argument into pursuing some perfectly assured certainty, which in the end destroys so much, but to notice that when things go wrong, there are ways of coping. Somewhat as, when you drive down a road, you have no assurance that the unexpected will not happen. But you are confident that you can deal with such incidents as and when they occur. That's particularly clear in his fourth point, that real is an adjuster word. — Ludwig V

When Austin keeps analysing the Delusion and Illusion case, he appears to be acknowledging the fact that perception has cases where it gives wrong perception rather than the real perception, which lacks certainty. Of course he is not talking about Cartesian certainty here.

I am not sure if Austin's extensive arguments on Delusion and Illusion were meaningful in his voracious attempt opposing Ayer's Sense-Datum concept. He could just have said that perceptions can lack certainty in certain cases.

I feel that perception doesn't end there, but it activates the other mental activities in the mind such as reasoning, judgement and imagination for the assured certainty on the perceived content, as well as being stored in the memory for later retrieval in the mind for the other mental activities such as analytic, synthetic and creative uses, or the motivation for actions.

And when the perceivers doesn't believe the perceived content has certainty, they will keep on trying to verify on the validity of the perception until reasonable certainty is available to them.

If not, they will be concluded as mistaken identity or illusion, or else conclude or be opened minded the perceived object as unknown or mysterious perception. In case of Delusion, perhaps the perceiver will never find out or acknowledge, if what the perceiver was seeing was delusion.

I was not having a go at Austin. I was just responding to your question. (rememebr you asked me a question?)

I was wondering if rejecting all other points being raised with Austin's methodology and the points of his book, but keep on insisting to be recalcitrant for staying in the only one book of Austin, in that one book only, and regurgitating what he said repeatedly would be a good approach in understanding Austin. Because at the end of the day, it is a topic of Linguistic Philosophy as well as Perception.

Given this, there is no way that you will be able to understand Austin. You've just got the perception stuff far too embedded in your thinking. It's a bit sad that you have been so mislead, but them's the breaks. — Banno

Austin's writing is very clear, and his points are logical.  Anyone reading Austin will have no problem understanding him.  For some reason you seem to think, no one can understand Austin. 

Austin will show how Ayer has oversimplified, even misdiagnosed, the case for these abnormal instances, why we should reject 'sense-data' as a solution, and then that generalising to all perceptions is absurd — Banno

I feel that Ayer's sense data theory is more reasonable. If everything you perceive is real, and that is it, it sounds too simple, and it has no ground to explicate what happens after your perception with the perceived content.

When you look at the perceived content as sense data, you could say that the sense data is stored in your memory, which you could retrieve and manipulate i.e. imagine, analyse, remember, synthesise etc throughout time and time after the perception.

Perception is far more than just to say, what I see is "real", and that is it. The aftermath of perception is more complex, deep, rich and meaningful in human perception.

Without some sort of repository place for the perceived content i.e. sense data, everything ends abruptly, there is no more to be said.

For the realists, there is no room to say anything more on the perception than a chair is chair - that is real, which is too simple. How do they further explain on remembering, imagining, and intuiting, and analysing ...etc? A chair was a char. But you cannot know anything afterwards. Blank.

The distinction between direct and indirect is stated on page 2:

The general doctrine, generally stated, goes like this: we never see or otherwise perceive (or 'sense'), or anyhow we never directly perceive or sense, material objects (or material things), but only sense-data (or our own ideas, impressions, sensa, sense-perceptions, percepts, &c.). — Fooloso4

Thanks for your quote. :pray: The fact that Austin starts with direct and indirect perception in his book implies that he took the issue not lightly?  Just guessing.  

Anyway, pointing out eyes as a medium for visual perception is not such a nonsensical statement. It could be actually a legitimate scientific statement. If one reminds oneself that it is also part of the claim from phenomenologists such as Merlou-Ponty, who takes the physical body as a base of perception.

All neurologist and psychologists will never leave out eyes as a medium and sense organ for their account of visual perception. Berkeley has written a book on Visual Perception which exclusively explains how eyes work with the distant and close object for visual perception.

 Of course phenomenology would be off topic in this thread, so we won't go there deeper, but perception cannot be discussed without discussions of sense organs to some degree.

And if Austin were writing this, there would be a thread running through the text that shows how the very approach you have taken presumes wrongly that a complete answer can be given, an account of language in its entirety, as if the whole of language dwelt within itself. — Banno

First of all, I think you should learn to think and speak for yourself, not hiding behind Austin or whoever when expressing your points in Philosophy. But more importantly, I think you seem to be wrong again on that point. What is the point trying to create a well with just Austin's linguistic analysis on Ayer? Wouldn't the water in the well go stale soon with the prejudice and narrow mindedness rejecting all the relating issues, analysis and criticisms?

Should we not try to look wider? OK we cannot grasp the whole world or universe, let's presume, but should we not try to look at the issue at least from the perspective of Language in general? From my perspective, it would be more constructive to do so, otherwise you cannot comment on anything which is buried and hiding in the artificially dug-up wells.

So there, against my better judgement, is a beginning of what might be said about just your first point. As Anthony says, the whole picture and every word in it is either confused or wrong. — Banno

Here, one cannot fail to notice the impression that the whole motivation seems to prove the opposing interlocutors views are either confused or wrong, rather than trying to see the issue from a fair, reasonable and constructive point of view. 

It might be best to simply follow along, as the book is attached to my post here. — Antony Nickles

I was just responding to the other members queries on the points. You got to give out your points as clearly as possible, if you had one, when asked, don't you? :)

Thanks for the link, but I have nice hardback copies of both Austin (1962) and Ayer's (1940) books. I was reading both of them today. Must admit Austin's writing style is super clear, and utterly logical.

Austin's point here is that "direct" and "indirect" are a pair, linked by their opposition. Each derives it's meaning from the other, like "north" and "south", "up" and "down", "hot" and "cold". If you say that all perceptions are indirect, and imply that no perception is, or could be, direct, you deprive "direct" of any "meaning" and hence render "indirect" meaningless as well.

I don't accept that my eye is an intermediary, getting in the way of my perception. It would be simplistic to say that indirect perception is perception aided by something that is not (part of) me, but it is a start, and at least rules out the idea that my eye, which enables me to perceive at all, is somehow an intermediary in a process which could not happen without it. — Ludwig V

Indirect and direct are just words, which are adjectives to describe the noun, how it works. Perceptions are not by definition or essence linked to Direct or Indirect.

Ayer and Austin could have picked up other words to describe perception, but they are the words they used to describe perception.

The terms direct and indirect only get attached to perception when one is asked "how perception works". Because obviously there are objects and the perceiver in this issue, and the point we are discussing to describe the perception process is, by looking at all entities in the chain and their involvements in perception. We are not asking who is perceiving the tree in the garden, and what perception is made of, but how perception works.

To say eyes are one of the mediums of visual perception is to point out that perceptions are indirect. It had been mentioned particularly, because it is the most obvious and unmistakable example of the medium in visual perception by anyone, due to the fact that some folks in this thread seem to have problems in understanding why perceptions are indirect.

I am also trying to understand that, because unless I do understand that, I don't understand what "indirect" means. — Ludwig V

You can't understand what direct perception doesn't follow therefore indirect perception is not valid. It just proves perceptions are not direct, but they are indirect.

But if you ask how a rainbow is made, the rainbow will not be part of the explanation. The sunlight, and the raindrops involved are not the rainbow, but the rainbow is not an entity distinct from them either. This should not be surprising. If the analysandum is part of the analysis, you have a circularity. So looking to find a process or event that is the perception inside one's head is a mistake. — Ludwig V

Again, we are not asking what perception is made of, but how perception works.
When you are asked how a car works, could you explain the workings of cars without going into the explanations on how the engine, steering and gear works?

Austin is explaining how looking, seeing, etc. work. If science wants to study what happens to the brain when these things are going on, then that is just a different interest, but these practices are not discrete functions or processes of the brain (though the brain does do other stuff). — Antony Nickles

It is not a different interest. It was just part of the explanation why perceptions are indirect. Austin's first page of the book is about direct and indirect perceptions.

It now seems to me that you have not understood what Austin is doing. I suggest a re-read. — Banno

Austin's English and writing style is very clear, so there is little possibility for misunderstanding what he was saying.  And all the points we have been discussing in the threads are also clear.  I have given out my arguments against yours.  You just need to give out yours.

I guess you would like the following quote from Austin: — javi2541997

Yes, I think when Austin goes on explaining about the usage of word "Real", even he was aware that our perception was not 100% immune from infallibility. There could be cases of illusion, hallucination, delusion, and confronting with the bogus objects which look like certain objects, but found out to be bogus, lookalikes, mistaken identities etc. Hence the contents of perception require further judgements of its "authenticity" to have assurance as legitimate knowledge. The word "Real" is a qualifier to mean that what was perceived is fit for authentic knowledge of our perception among the other uses of the word.

No. I think most folk here understand Austin. You are an exception. — Banno

I never claimed I understand Austin in full.

In defense of Corvus, he says he has on order Catalina González Quintero's — Fooloso4

I am not sure if there is any point to trying defend anything against someone who didn't understand what self-contradiction statements are, but claim to understand performance contradiction. I was under impression that he was going to go through all the arguments that I went through with Banno AGAIN with the whole load of self-contradicting questions, and was wondering what the point was.

I do not know this work or what he will get from it. Perhaps after reading it he will modify his claims or give us reason to rethink some of our own. In any case, even if we disagree with what he will say or Catalina González Quintero says, it demonstrates an attempt to become better informed about such things. — Fooloso4

I am not sure either. But I thought it would be interesting to read somebody whom I have never come across as Kant commentary scholars before. I was presuming maybe there might some new interesting insight in the book. Will be able to tell more once I finish the book. Who knows.

I am not claiming that I am an academic sceptic. Most of my ideas comes from my own reasoning and little amount of casual readings on the textbook and commentaries.

These are not easy issues to work through. One thing that might help is remembering that sight is not the only sense, and that an account of how we perceive must wok as well for touch and smell as for vision.

So are you sure you understand how it works to touch something indirectly? To smell the coffee, indirectly?

I certainly don't. — Banno

Sure. Touching someone indirectly is possible. Think of a dermatology doctor wearing thin surgical rubber gloves, and performing skin examination of a patient. His specially manufactured surgical gloves are made so thin, almost transparent and super sentient to the doctor's hands so he can feel the parts of the skin being touched just like with skin to skin, but there is a barrier between his hands and the patient's skin being touched and examined.

Indirect smelling? Well as Austin said, there are various types of smelling too. Forget coffees.
Think of your partner's underwear. You used to smell the body scent from the body directly, but you can smell the body scent from the underwear when it was taken off and left on the bedroom floor on one lazy Sunday morning. You are smelling the body scent indirectly via the underwear.

There's a homunculus lurking here. — Banno

The research paper about the topic was in a Psychology and Neurology article. I remember reading it.

Quick search brings up Computational Theory of Perception.

If Austin was not a direct realist, then it would disappoint me. Because then it implies that he didn't even have his own belief in perceptual theory, but was just after attacking Sense-data theory on the basis of shallow linguistic perspective.

Ok. — Banno

Yeah, feel free. No pressure. Although I had some criticisms on the methodology and the subject itself, I also must admit that I have learnt a lot during the readings of "Sense and Sensibilia".

The question has a presupposition, which is in question. So it can't be answered. It's comparable to the traditional "Have you stopped beating your wife?" In this case, whether I answer yes or no, I commit to accepting that direct realism is a coherent possibility. — Ludwig V

Your statement is based on a fallacy of false dichotomy. Surely there are more perceptual theories than just the two. The question didn't presuppose anything. It could be the case that Austin had no idea on perception theories at all coming from a linguistic background.

I'm afraid I have a mild form of aphantasia. You can speak for yourself, but not for me. — Ludwig V

I tend to see mental images all the time, when I am remembering or imagining, even when I think of something, I can see images of the object I am thinking of.  

Even when I do gardening, before even starting the work, I would first imagine how it should look after the work, and commence the work as the images seen in my mind, and try to match the reality to the image, and it works better.

Maybe some people cannot see mental images as you said. Do your reasoning, thinking and linguistics  overrides the mental images that you try to see? I am not sure. I cannot imagine it. I am not sure what should be a normativity in this regard.

But I was wondering, Austin and Ayer, talk about perceptions in terms of delusions, illusions, hallucinations, and just ordinary visual perceptions, and they all occur in the realm of so called perception.  But why don't they include mental images we see during our remembering, imagining, thinking, and intuiting? That was my question.  

Perception will not bear the epistemological weight philosophers put on its shoulders. it needs help. — Banno

OK, that's fair enough. :)   But Austin shouldn't be afraid, or shy away from facing the contemporary criticisms and analyses on the points laid out in his works, if they are to be confirmed as having good grounds to stand on as a legitimate constructive philosophical methodology which must be a non-dogmatic and non nitpicking linguistic-quibble.