If people want the material and psychological benefits of cooperation in their society, they should (instrumental ought): — Mark S

What if they don't care about the benefits of cooperation but believe instead in the benefits of might is right and getting what they can through power and brutality? Is there any way your model can arrive at a justification for its initial axiom/s?

In other words how do you justify cooperation to those who aren't interested?

The challenge will be with what authority do we derive those moral principles? Just identifying the concept that underpin norms won’t appeal to those who believe that a moral fact must have a guarantor - a god, a Platonic realm or from some mechanism of higher consciousness.

I bid (call my own and thereby take possession) of Alpha Centauri, the Milky Way and the Great or Dapper Dipper. — god must be atheist

Cool. Can you give me a couple of stars - I need a hobby?

As long as either rule evokes a sense of empathy, where you are to place yourself in the shoes of the other and ask whether what you're about to do is what they want done to them, then you're within the Golden Rule. — Hanover

Precisely. That's how I understand it. It is not intended to be read in concrete terms, eg., 'I like X therefore everyone must get X.' It's more, 'I like respectful treatment (which acknowledges my preferences), therefore others should receive the same respectful treatment.' Which may be why the negative formulation - Hillel the Elder -“That which is hateful unto you, do not do to your neighbour' might be easier to convey. I think some call this formulation the Silver Rule.

Right. But ethics is a much broader subject than cultural moral norms which advocate parts of cooperation strategies. What goals ought we have for our cooperation? How ought we live, apart from living cooperatively with other people? — Mark S

As I said - that's where the contest of ideas comes in. Which is already in place and morality (in the West) is an active part of public discourse and subject to incremental tweaks, mods, and set backs over time. As a secularist, I might argue for preventing suffering as the primary goal. No doubt others have their goals, from pleasing gods to rule utilitarianism. Which to choose? All we can do is argue a case based on our convictions.

Cultural moral norms are arguably heuristics (usually reliable but fallible rules of thumb) for subcomponents of strategies that solve cooperation problems. — Mark S

I've always thought along these lines. Moral norms are traffic lights that help guide the flow of human behaviour. Humans can't help but build systems to follow - is morality more than a code of conduct tied to a value system? For me morality seems to be an open conversation and contest of ideas conducted between groups holding a multiplicity of values and beliefs. The best ideas don't always win.

What is your explanation for existence? Why it occurred, what purpose or meaning it may or may not have? — Benj96

Don't have one. I think ascribing purpose or meaning, reflects the general human propensity for sense making rather than whatever 'truth' might be. These questions are not useful to me personally, although I am aware of various theories/postulations. Not being an expert in any relevant academic field, my views, along those of most people, are inconsequential.

What are your ethical, epistemological or personal views related to existence? — Benj96

I am not partial to systems or theories. I prefer to do things. Theory and talk are cheap. Generally I hold that suffering is bad and often we can take practical action to prevent suffering (poverty, persecution, illness). Just about every problem on earth seems to be one of resource allocation.

I've held views similar to this, with various refinements, for most of my life. I review them fairly often.

Lord Acton's quote is:

Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely. Great men are almost always bad men, even when they exercise influence and not authority. There is no worse heresy than that the office sanctifies the holder of it.

I think it's safe to say that in some instances (especially politics) the fear of losing power is a powerful aphrodisiac for fraud and violence. I think Acton's one of those quotes for which it isn't hard to find facts to match the sentiment; it's serviceable and versatile even when used out of context. But Acton was thinking about popes and kings not the Dean of English at some college, or the CEO of Disney. The broader question of how people use and abuse leadership always provokes strong feelings. I don't think it is necessarily the case that powerful people abuse their power, but it happens often enough. The broader question of what is a great man remains unanswered - do we ask Nietzsche or Gandhi?

As to power being an incentive for nobility - I can see how this might be the case. Can we think of some good examples? Are they like Wittgenstein turning his back on the influence of his family and giving away his considerable fortune? Or are you thinking of examples of nobility expressed as an attribute of power? Like Jesus (if his story wasn't mythical).

If anything has value - should exist, should be done - there must be a proper use of the galaxy, a use which results in the most good and least bad. — Leftist

I can't see any merit in this idea. Humans make meaning and create values which don't exist outside of our value systems. We can choose to value or to denigrate the galaxy. Makes no difference, if it's the latter, it's just humans shaking a puny fist of defiance at the enormity of the unknown.

One problem with this whole way of setting up the issue, however, is that it presupposes we can make sense of the very notion of a single, canonical, physicalist description of the world, which is highly doubtful, and that in arriving (or at any rate approaching) such a description, we are attaining a viewpoint that does not in any way presuppose our own cognition and lived experience. In other words, the hard problem seems to depend for its very formulation on the philosophical position known as transcendental or metaphysical realism. From the phenomenological perspective explored here, however — but also from the perspective of pragmatism à la Charles Saunders Peirce, William James, and John Dewey, as well as its contemporary inheritors such as Hilary Putnam (1999) — this transcendental or metaphysical realist position is the paradigm of a nonsensical or incoherent metaphysical viewpoint, for (among other problems) it fails to acknowledge its own reflexive dependence on the intersubjectivity and reciprocal empathy of the human life-world. — Joshs

That's a fascinating point.

What's the difference between a physicalist monism and a non-physical one? Is consciousness not physical? Or alternatively, if consciousness is not physical, why isn't the rest of the universe non-physical? — Manuel

Indeed. I guess idealists Like Kastrup would say that physicalism is itself a kind illusion and the universe is entirely mentation - material objects are what mental processes look like when seen from a particular perspective. Sometimes this strikes me as just the opposite of Dennett - instead of consciousness being a type of illusory phenomenon, the body is the illusion.

What consequences follow from proclaiming one term instead of another one? — Manuel

Good question - in the scientific realm of quantum fields what does physical even mean? The consequences of idealism vs materialism make little difference in practice to how one lives it would seem to me, except that idealism makes room for a reboot of the idea of the supernatural.

For my money enactivist approaches in cognitive psychology do a better job of this than the alternatives, via a monism that avoids the kind of idealism championed by Wayfarer, Kastrup,, Hoffman, Kant and others. — Joshs

Cool. Thanks.

Appreciated. Davidson.

I like Zahavi’s critique of Chalmers’ position:

“Chalmers's discussion of the hard problem has identified and labeled an aspect of consciousness that cannot be ignored. However, his way of defining and distinguishing the hard problem from the easy problems seems in many ways indebted to the very reductionism that he is out to oppose. If one thinks that cognition and intentionality is basically a matter of information processing and causal co-variation that could in principle just as well go on in a mindless computer–or to use Chalmers' own favored example, in an experienceless zombie–then one is left with the impression that all that is really distinctive about consciousness is its qualitative or phenomenal aspect. But this seems to suggest that with the exception of some evanescent qualia everything about consciousness including intentionality can be explained in reductive (computational or neural) terms; and in this case, epiphenomenalism thre — Joshs

That's clever.

I find myself less engaged in this matter as the pages pile up. The options seem to be:

1) There is a hard question. Insert explanation - generally something about metacognition and qualia.

2) There is not a hard question. Insert explanation - generally something about a category mistake or eliminativism.

Why does it matter? Is it mainly down to the role each perspective plays in supporting a contested ontology? Either 1) a physicalist monism (therefore keeping atheism safe from woo OR 2) an ontological dualism allowing for more traditional forms of Western theism OR 3) a non-physicalist monism (idealism), mysticism and the East? 4)?

Is this ever just about consciousness?

It has its own logic and lived experience can be a very powerful force in terms of how deeply felt such feelings are held. — Manuel

True that.

My intuition is that pessimism (which I share many sympathies with) is very much person dependent. Some people are more predisposed to such views, others are not. — Manuel

Interesting. Probably right. I sometimes wonder if there is intellectual pessimism and emotional pessimism. Personally I have usually taken pessimism for a disposition. Generally my answer to existential angst has been the same as Pablo Casals', "The situation is hopeless, we must take the next step.' Is this just a version of Camus' insistence that we must see Sisyphus as happy? Even pessimism comes with choices.

11) A nihilist.

Understand.

You do make me laugh sometimes. Thanks. :rofl: The Catullus was a particular nice touch.

Yes, but my question is about your inital comment. On the sites you mentioned:

Could you call Dawkins a smug cocksucker? Is the problem with 'cocksucker' or which public intellectual the term is applied to? — Tom Storm

A bit intemperate of me to say that. Could you call Dawkins a smug cocksucker? Is the problem with 'cocksucker' or which public intellectual the term is applied to?

I think it's interesting to advocate libertarianism from an evolutionary standpoint. — Shawn

Sure. I never use evolution as a basis for advocating anything. What humans may have done and what humans require may be two utterly different things.

I don't have any issues with how banning works on this site.

Philosophy aspires to something more than utility. — Wayfarer

Indeed, you can find whatever you want in philosophy, it's a hot mess.

Even if this were true how would it help today? :wink: Behavior is largely determined by situation - class, status, economic market systems, labour market, technology, codes of conduct (ethics), political participation, immigration and population changes/increases, poverty, and diversity. In a tribe it's not hard to develop/maintain a shared view of things and fairly easy to manage behaviours.

What's normal by today's standards is far from what's nice. — Bug Biro

Can you give an example of normal today being far from nice? I would have thought it's a nicer world today in many places, except in some countries where it is still like the 1500's.

It is good that evolutionary science can give a plausible account for the reliability of our cognitive faculties, but that cannot be your source of confidence in them. You have to "help yourself to a little something" (Plantinga's expression) to even start.

But so does everyone, no matter their beliefs. Theists aren't better grounded just because they help themselves to imaginative origin stories and rationalizations of why the good Lord would not allow a malicious demon to systematically deceive them. — SophistiCat

:up: Yep, we still can't get from 'reason is divine' to any particular divinity or even any particular malicious demon. I guess our primary source of confidence in the logical absolutes are that they continue to demonstrate their usefulness and without them... chaos. What more do we need? :wink:

Ok. I see what you mean. Thanks for clarifying.

I'm not entirely sure I understand your reasoning. I don't think I have ever spent much time thinking about sexuality or the role of attractiveness, I have been too busy in the 'doing' (of relationships).

Maybe it would help me if you gave me an example of a moral position that tracks to your idea. If you took an act like lying or stealing and then demonstrated how this sits in the type of web you seem to be referring to.

I do agree with you that in culture our positions on most things we do and manufacture provide opportunities for an ethical understanding. But it isn't consistent and is understood differently by people and cultures.

I believe we need to be able to come up with completely new concepts that could have never been fathomed before, of course however, our language is limiting and our thoughts are like glue to the world around us, but what if we observed the world through breaking it down further and if gaps between those micorscopic concepts were also looked at? — obscurelaunting

In order to do what?

Start there, and you're left with the idea that there are no coincidences, and that all has meaning. We study the Bible, therefore, not because it is more holy than the blade of grass or more imbued with meaning, but simply that it has been studied more extensively for the purposes of finding meaning, and we benefit from history's most insightful from having previously studied it. The same can be said of the sacred texts of other traditions as well. — Hanover

Thank you, I'll need to sit with that for a while.

Is this aesthetics? In a way I suppose, but the beauty is found in the meaning. — Hanover

Yes. That's how I should have put it. That's much better.

Nice. Thank you.

Good points.

Did the Greek understanding of reason generally identify this faculty as human or divine in origin?

In relation to Hoffman, I noted this exact question. He must have been asked this before and surely has responded. Do you see his hypothesis as basically a non-physicalist monism - a kind of modern spin on idealism? It seems to match Bernardo Kastrup's Analytic Idealism model in many respects. There seems to be a revival of idealist philosophy expressed in more contemporary language and metaphor

Badly worded questions coming: As far as we know, the laws of logic or logical absolutes (if we prefer) are universally true - but arguing against them, or in favour of them, is obviously circular. We seem to be trapped by their necessity. Is it your view that these axioms, like the maths they make possible, must be discovered rather than invented? Does this provide any other insight into the use of reason in addition to its ubiquitous utility?

:cool: :halo:

Life is just a bunch of distractions. If you were not already focussed on something, then what would you be doing exactly? — believenothing

When I was around 10 my Dad told me that life was just filling in time until you die. He winked and said, 'Make it good and be of use to others.'

Christ, any moment now you'll be telling me that god is superfluous to human experince....:wink:

Nice. Well that does make sense. Never thought I could call this objective but I guess it fits. I hear you on details and devil.

You raise interesting points. I was struck by something Rorty said about truth. 'We don't need to define truth, we know how to use it.' I kind of feel the same about morality. I'm not generally big on definitions, actions are more interesting to me. Anyone can say any kind of guff about ethics and principles. But what is it that we do?

Well, we surely need some theory to be able to judge the doing as good or bad. — Metaphysician Undercover

Suffering bad. I can take each case as it comes, I don't need to write a paper on it. :wink:

I'm neither a theist nor idealist and yet I subscribe to "objective morality" (i.e. a form of ethical naturalism), so is that – am I – irrational or confused by your lights? — 180 Proof

Cool. Tell me more. How do you get objective morality? Or do you mean an objective process or an objective source of morality? I suppose I could say morality is objective if I set as a foundational principle human flourishing (or similar) and then identify objective steps that lead to this goal. But this foundational goal itself would be subjective, wouldn't it?

I perceive a little inconsistency between this (metaphysics and ontology are just personal preferences), and your earlier statement, that you are the "product of enculturation". How do you suppose that one's metaphysics and ontology could escape one's enculturation, to acquire the status of personal preference? — Metaphysician Undercover

I've always assumed that one's personal preferences are derived by enculturation. But I should have also said that there are likely to biological factors. I'm not really trying to nail down a totalizing explanation for all things.

I think that the vast majority of knowledge is not "about reality". Knowledge mostly consists of how to do things. You being pragmatist must recognize this. But this gives moral philosophy a supreme position on the epistemic hierarchy, because it deals with what we should and should not do. But then we must go even higher than this, to ground our moral principles, so we turn toward understanding reality, and this is metaphysics. — Metaphysician Undercover

Nicely argued. There's a lot unpack there. First take: I generally hold that my morality is based on preferences - derived from upbringing, culture, society, biology and aesthetics. I don't like the aesthetics of violence, abuse or 'will' being forced upon others. It's terribly ugly and unpleasant. For me morality is in the doing not in the theory. I generally hold to human flourishing as a key guide. Does it harm or help? This is not a science and should be an open, ongoing conversation.

That makes sense. Somehow these matters always take us back to Plato, right? :cool:

Aristotle's 'immanent realism' (i.e. that forms are real only when they are instantiated in particulars). — Wayfarer

Would you consider this a useful refinement of Plato's idea of instantiation? Does Aristotle still propose a realm of forms?