Yes, that is close to a view I’ve held. One might say that some forms of empathy, when they are shared, amount to an intersubjective agreement that can look like objectivity if not examined closely.

I can’t get a fix on what point you’re making about empathy and what exactly it tells us about morality.

:up:

Chopin Nocturne Op 9 #2, while reciting, reading and or listening to Nietzsche's Night-Song, from Thus Spake Zarathustra, Thomas Commons translation for those who don't know it in German. The super abundance experienced in the Dionysian Oneness that occurs is easily a case against suicide. — DifferentiatingEgg

Different strokes for different folks. To me, that sounds more like an encouragement for suicide, not an escape.

Of course, it’s just personal taste. I’m not sure music or books have ever offered me much consolation. I’ve sometimes thought it might be nice to overdose to Strauss’ Four Last Songs (Jessye Norman) and some good whisky. I rarely read and listen at the same time.

Thanks. Yes, there often seems to be a default fear or suspicion of people or things we don’t understand.

Being social primates, it is instinctive in us to care about the way others see us, so it isn't a matter of "should care". — wonderer1

To some extent, although you’ve phrased it as “the way others see us” - do you mean that we only do it for show?

I think we are just as hard-wired not to care as any out-group or disparaged tribe will demonstrate. How do we explain the fact that we tend to care about people like us, but not so much about immigrants, the homeless, people with substance-use challenges, or trans people? Huge groups of humans seem to flip into hate, resentment and moral indifference fairly readily and generally find ways to rationalise neglect.

Feelings are far from arbitrary. They’re appraisals of situations which inform us of our relative preparedness to cope with , anticipate and make sense of them. That is, affect reports the significance and salience of events , why they matter to us. Without them, words like betrayal, cruelty and rape are ethically meaningless. — Joshs

This seems to me to be an important insight, despite its apparent simplicity.

Thanks. :up:

:up:

People experience empathy very differently. I overheard a man talking about the mass-murder of Jewish people on a Sydney beach the other day. He said, to some approval, “they started this.” Clearly, the feelings this event generates are not experienced in the same way by everyone. Especially not by people whose values include antisemitism. The same might be said of people’s empathy for trans people or for illegal immigrants. So if all we have to go on are people’s feelings, whose feelings are supposed to matter and how are they a reliable guide?

I’m not sure this can be answered in a satisfying way, except by opting out entirely and saying that it doesn’t matter, that everyone has to decide for themselves how they feel. But for me, morality is a social phenomenon: it concerns how we behave toward one another, so some account of shared value has to enter the picture.

Just look at this forum, for example. There are, for example, some prominent posters here who are vocal proponents of charity, humanism, and liberalism. And yet from the way they treat other posters here it's clear that they themselves don't practice what they preach. — baker

But even in instances of the most belligerent replies here, we can really make no substantive claims about people’s real world commitments to ideals. How do we know if people are liberal or charitable in real life? I think it’s far from clear what people practice and from their words alone we have to be wary of interpretations. Do you hold a view that if someone appears irritable and intermittently vicious on a chat forum they must be nasty and hypocritical in life? Or are you just referring to more constrained, on line hypocritical behaviours?

Because it makes practical sense to do so. Empathy exists. — I like sushi

But this doesn’t resolve the problem, since empathy is unevenly distributed across causes and cohorts. How are we to decide whose empathy sets the standard, and which feelings deserve moral weight?

I still don't think there's a better backing than 'most will agree' for a moral proclamation.

On the question's face, they shouldn't, and neither should I. But harming others makes me feel shit. It seems to do the same for the majority of people. That's good enough, and the best we can wish for imo. — AmadeusD

Got ya. Thanks.

Thanks for your thoughtful post.

The one thing that is always missed in discussions like this is that while the foundationalist view claims that there are universal moral truth, anyone who argued against foundationalism is also making -- though maybe not intentionally and without awareness -- a 'universal' claim, mainly that there is no universal truth and morality is based on cultural differences.. — L'éléphant

What I'm trying to do is articulate what an anti-foundationalist position might look like.

Anti-foundationalism isn’t the same as moral relativism. Relativism says what’s right or wrong depends entirely on culture or individual preference. Anti-foundationalism doesn’t make any claim about what is right or wrong; it only questions whether there are absolute, universal moral truths. It’s about how we justify moral claims, not about the content of those claims, so you can be anti-foundationalist without saying “anything goes.”

All in all, discourse generally seems overrated. There'd probably be less strife if people talked less. — baker

This may well have some merit and probably explains the English speaking world’s (no doubt others too) taboo on talking about religion or politics.

Interesting response, Joshs. So for you, trans identities are real and grounded aspects of personhood, not merely self-chosen labels or socially scripted performances. So on this view, gender names something like a unified affective-perceptual-behavioral style that arises from early brain development and is later shaped, though not created, by culture? A trans person is not inventing a story out of a set of disconnected traits, but is recognising a deep pattern in how they experience themselves and the world. Does this come close to a form of essentialism? Any other tweaks to this account?

I’ve sometimes felt that I was an emotivist. One could say that shared cultural responses to right and wrong emerge because, at an intersubjective level, many of us tend to feel similar things and respond to them emotionally in comparable ways.

But how do you handle the familiar objection to emotivism: that when moral disagreement arises between people who do not share the same emotional responses, the theory seems to lack the resources to adjudicate between competing moral positions?

If morality is just about how you feel, why should anyone else care about your feelings at all, and why should you care about theirs?

Does this count as a classic? — javi2541997

Great movie; a much more devastating satire of Hollywood than many modern films like Babylon.

The songs belong to the Great American Songbook, a loose category including many of those classic tunes by George & Ira Gershwin, Cole Porter, Irving Berlin, Richard Rodgers (Lorenz Hart then later Oscar Hammerstein II), Jerome Kern, Harold Arlen, Hoagy Carmichael, et al. These are the songs you may have heard sung as popular hits by Ella Fitzgerald and Sinatra.

This specific understanding of moral naturalism is also something I am okay with, especially as pertains to the OP. There is a notion in the Anglophone world that moral realism goes hand in hand with divine command theory, and my guess is that this stems from Anscombe. I'd say it is really hard to overestimate how faulty such a thesis is. — Leontiskos

Gotya. That's a useful insight to me. Cheers.

I think the best moral philosophers are probably not academics (and that some of the worst moral philosophers are academics). Judges, school teachers, counselors, pastors, business managers, sports coaches - these are the people who are actually competent moral philosophers. — Leontiskos

I wouldn’t have expected this, but I can see the merit in the view, precisely because, as you say, …

They engage the theory on a day-to-day basis with real stakes and real consequences." — Leontiskos

Maybe you step back from an unfortunate decision that your boss made and try to understand the way he sees the world, and then compare it to the way you see the world (and try to deeply understand and even justify why you would not have made the decision he made). — Leontiskos

I think this is important. I’m interested in people who think differently from me (part of the reason I joined) and in understanding why they think that way. I also think we’re in a terrible place, even in Australia, where conservatives and progressives (for want of a better term) talk past each other and tend to regard the other side as insane or deficient. We need to listen. Having said that, I’m not especially fond of activism on either side.

The more general question here has to do with the tension between improvement and contentment. "Have I devoted sufficient energy to improvement? Is it okay to be content with where I am? Is my contentment really complacency?" It's always a balance, and it changes with age, duties, the availability of leisure, etc. — Leontiskos

Yes, I think it does come down to this.

The moral philosopher is the person who takes that perspective seriously and tries to interact with it in a fruitful way instead of just writing it off as malicious and irrational racism. The attempt to respond rationally and effectively to those racist perspectives is currently a topic of interest in the U.S. — Leontiskos

I hear you. I'm probably on the progressive side compared to you but I have conservative intuitions such as wanting to preserve certain institutions and traditions.

For example, I am currently trying to understand Nick Fuentes — Leontiskos

I’d be interested in what you find. He’s a contentious figure.

I’m intrigued by our own anti-immigration and populist politician, Pauline Hanson. A fascinating long essay was written about her party and its membership, which was useful in helping me get my bearings.

I was intrigued for a while by Roger Scruton and his understanding of the conservative tradition. What are your thoughts? I wasn't on board with all I've heard him say but I appreciated his rigour and he had a generosity that is sometimes missing from public intellectuals who focus so clearly on values.

A well-known Australian conservative commentator once described conservatism as a disposition rather than an elaborate philosophy. I wonder whether you think that’s right.

This may not belong here, but since I started this thread, I’ll ask it anyway. It seems to me that we tend to bundle together terms like conservative, right-wing, and reactionary, even though they represent quite different traditions and approaches. If you were to parse the conservative tradition and the right more broadly, how would you go about it?

...are patently straw mans of Christianity. No mainstream version of Christianity thinks that by default we go to hell; or that you merely 'pick the right religion' to go to heaven. — Bob Ross

I don’t really have a dog in this fight. People have very idiosyncratic views about what Christianity stands for, both from within and outside the faith. The version I grew up with didn’t believe in a vindictive account of hell and saw it more as a gentle place of re-education or simply a state without God.

I'm not aware of any Christian tradition that guarantees hell for all. However, many mainstream Protestant faiths, especially fundamentalist literalists, do seem to embrace a hellfire-and-damnation view. I’ve certainly heard sermons claiming people will go to hell for being gay or for atheism, with warnings of “weeping and gnashing of teeth.” Some might even consider Protestant literalism a heresy (I think David Bentley Hart who I quite like, despite his sometimes being an arrogant shit, holds that view).

Firstly, great post.

The contemporary thinker I personally follow most closely is Peter L. P. Simpson, who defends what he calls "ethical naturalism," but it's hard to specify the contours of such a thing without getting into his book. Also, I don't think that level of detail is necessary in order to avoid the problem I've pointed to with regards to relativism. I think 180's approach does a fine job avoiding the problem I've raised in this thread. — Leontiskos

Cool. I'll have a look. That's helpful.

I think so. I admit that I didn't follow your conversation with Fire Ologist very closely, but I myself think well-being is a perfectly reasonable and defensible moral standard. When people want to argue for a more "transcendent" standard they are usually concerned with specific, rarefied moral truths or norms (e.g. "You should be willing to sacrifice your life for the good of your family if push comes to shove"). — Leontiskos

Nice. I need to refine my understanding of this.

Note, though, that the person who seeks money will have a harder time rationally justifying their position than the person who seeks well-being. This is because—as Aristotle points out—money is a means of exchange without intrinsic worth. If one does not seek money for the sake of the things that money can buy, but rather seeks money and the accumulation of money as an end in itself, then they would seem to be acting in an intrinsically irrational way. Put differently, you should be able to give someone everything money can buy and at that point they should have no real desire for money. If they still desire money at that point then they desire a means without an end, and are therefore irrational. — Leontiskos

That's a great point well put.

I would suggest that no one can opt-out entirely, except perhaps the hermit who abandons all civilization and lives self-sufficiently in the wilderness. Aristotle calls such a person a 'god' given that this is basically impossible to do. If we interact with other human beings then we must also decide how to interact with other humans beings, and anyone who does that already has moral positions, whether they understand them or not. — Leontiskos

Yes, I have often thought this too. For me, as a non-philosopher with finite time and years left, there is an issue around what I can legitimately acquire in terms of knowledge and perhaps more importantly understanding and wisdom. It's clear to me that most of the significant debates in philosophy, including moral philosophy, require some significant reading and study. Most of the recurring questions of philosophy have not been conclusively answered, and some of those answers are more complex than the average person can ever hope to understand. It's hard to know what to do. Sometimes a little bit of knowledge can be a dangerous thing, as we sometimes see on this forum.

What is a person's mandate to figure all this out? It often feels that as public discourse grows increasingly coarse and belligerent, and good philosophy becomes harder to acquire, it is sometimes tempting to just say, "Fuck it, I know what I like and I can’t really do much better than that," or even to opt out entirely.

I support the idea of social welfare, free education and medical services and, most importantly, taxing the rich to a much greater degree than is presently happening. But no government seems to have the balls to do it — Janus

Agree.

OK, then we disagree on that. I think their attitude is simplistically self-serving and sociopathic. For me sociopathy is not an "all or nothing" proposition, but is on a spectrum. — Janus

One of the problems for me is that each side in this discourse seems to think the other is sociopathic. Today’s discourse is polarized and antagonistic. I’d like to see more civil conversations between people with different worldviews. I’m reluctant to call individuals sociopathic.

It seems part of Christianity's success is precisely its vagueness, its amoebic, shape-shfting identity. How its concepts mean everything and nothing, how it can go a million ways. How it's ungraspable. — baker

I can see that.

This is the feeling superior to others that I'm talking about. — baker

Seems to me that on a discussion forum feeling superior or better informed to the other person is a frequently occurring idea.

Maybe part of the issue is that people arrive here to defend positions.

So you'd say Christianity is not (particularly) successful? — baker

It's a reasonable quesion.

I don’t think there is a single “Christianity” as such. There are multiple religions that use the title Christianity and often consider themselves to be the truer account. Which one of these is most successful? Or are they all successful?

I don't believe morality is a matter of "positions" at all, but of a compass based on the ability to empathize with others. To harm others is undesirable and hence bad because it feels undesirable and hence bad to many or even most people. The other point is that a community is inherently based on mutual respect and care. The fact that some people lack such empathy-based respect and care means that they are, if they don't conceal their disposition, considered to be sociopaths, and sociopathy is generally considered to be a condition of mental illness or incapacity to function in a way compatible with pragmatically necessary social values. — Janus

When I talk about positions, I mean (as one example) how one constructs the notion of human flourishing. I know a number of academics who are conservative. They are often steeped in Greek philosophy and hold the familiar Aristotelian notion of eudaimonia as the goal or telos of a good life. Yet they are also right-wing, Liberal voters who are happy to cut people off welfare and dismantle safety nets.

In my view, their positions would cause considerable harm to the powerless. And yet they and I both ostensibly hold that flourishing is the goal of a moral system. They think that society is enhanced if people's independence is promoted and vital to this is not subsidising sloth and inertia through welfare. I do not think they are sociopathic, they just hold a different worldview. And relative to my worldview they are mostly "wrong" on this.

We live in a pluralist culture where most people think their views are good and right. The best we can do amongst this mess of contradictions is select the views we endorse and try to promote or nurture them. Or opt out entirely, which is also tempting.

First I would need to know your definition of moral naturalism. — Leontiskos

I don’t have one.

My understanding is that it’s the view that moral facts, if they exist, are grounded in natural facts about the world rather than in anything supernatural or non-natural. But I have encountered a range of uses of the term.

I imagine that if you’re going to pick a goal for morality, like wellbeing or flourishing, moral naturalism woudl identify facts that support that choice. But does this start to look like a secular substitute for transcendent grounding?

I'm an emotivist so I have to just observe these things - my moral thinking doesn't generally extend beyond my own mind and behaviour ( — AmadeusD

So how would you go about arguing something is wrong or disagreeing with others about moral assessments?

Part of my interest in the issue is whether or not it’s worth discussing morality, although we can't seem to escape it.

A utilitarian will just do a short-term vs. long-term contrast and say that some short-term suffering reduces long-term suffering, and is thus preferable on the utilitarian calculus. — Leontiskos

That seems tedious.

Interesting. But it depends on what you mean by a foundation.
— Tom Storm

I mean basis, rationale, justification, grounding, etc. "I have no reason to maintain this position, but I am going to do it anyway." — Leontiskos

Ok. So I always assumed a foundation for morality meant something philosophically important, serious and disciplined or potentially transcendent in source. Can one not say that the foundation of my moral thinking is whatever gets me money? I’m assuming that a foundation need not involve beneficial concessions toward others?

I apologise that I didn't respond to your very thoughtful contribution. I must have missed it.

Slavery comes up because it was once practised within the arguing culture, and now no longer is. Slavery is brought up by the critic, because they know the relativist to be very likely to consider slavery wrong. And they think that's a gotcha, but by thinking that they demonstrate cultural relativism. The envisioned success of the rhetoric depends on the expected shared values. No?

Moral discourse is predictable to some degree. That is why you can always find some kind of "obviously wrong" thing to throw in the face of a relativist - to shut them up. — Dawnstorm

Yes, that’s true. The anti-foundationalist would probably say that things can still count as better or worse relative to shared cultural goals and values, without being grounded in anything transcendent or universal beyond that. We want safe traffic, so we create road rules. Many of these rules are partly arbitrary; we can drive on different sides of the road or adopt different turning conventions, but there are clearly practices that work better or worse for safety. None of this makes road rules objectively true independent of contingent human purposes and conditions. How different is morality to this?

It follows that if you want to be a consistent person and you think what I've said is true, then you must change either your actions or your words. So it seems fairly clear that it does change something. — Leontiskos

I understand your point but (and I'm not trying to be a dick here) I'm under no obligation to be consistent. My views on many things are inconsistent. I do concede that wilful inconsistency may exclude one from most reasoned arguments and discourse.

No one says, "I don't have any foundation for my position but I am going to maintain it anyway." — Leontiskos

Interesting. But it depends on what you mean by a foundation. I’ve met people who do something close to what you describe, and I’ve done it myself. I would put it like this: X is my belief about what is right, and I situate it within a contingent, revisable understanding of what seems to work better for promoting wellbeing. It isn’t grounded in any ultimate moral foundation, but in practices, experiences, and judgments that remain open to challenge and change.

That said, I also like the idea that moral judgments may be grounded in natural facts about people. Humans experience suffering as bad, and conditions that reduce it tend to support wellbeing and social functioning. For that reason, reducing suffering counts as morally better.

One issue I have with this is that some people like suffering and the idea: "no pain, no gain" has some merit for any athlete or high achieving person who has to work hard and sacrifice many things (suffer) to achieve a goal. I guess the moral naturalist would qualify this by identifying unnecessary suffering and that which is not chosen. What are your challenges to moral naturalism?

It really seems analogous to a cancer cell in the body of an organism. Is anyone seriously going to think that cancer is a good thing? — Janus

Good points. This is heading towards a position of moral naturalism, isn't it?

I get what you are saying. I just think this is a retreat from the can of worms you opened up. — Fire Ologist

To me most philosophy is a can of worms. :wink:

Yes, so instead of saying morality requires fixed foundations and authority (which is where I am headed), you seem more inclined to admit fixed laws are hard to come by, and maybe impossible to come by, so “no one really has a foundation for morality.”

I think that is right. That is what morality is about. Maybe Nietzsche was right and we need to move “beyond good and evil.” So your question and intuitions are valid. — Fire Ologist

It's one direction I lean towards. But I am unsure what I think.

It’s like this: checkers involves a certain checkerboard, and pieces that distinguish two players (red and black typically) and certain rules. If someone removes entirely one of these things, and suggests some other game, that’s fine, but it’s no longer checkers. I get that morality has way more at stake (to us) than a game of checkers, but I don’t see how we can tell anyone else “that is wrong” or “he is bad” meaningfully, absent something objective they both stand under. — Fire Ologist

That's great - I often make this point except I use chess as the analogue.

So to me, we can’t avoid playing the morality game, so we are all forced to figure out the rules. But if we don’t admit this, and do not subject ourselves and others to the exact same rules, we are just resisting the game we already play. — Fire Ologist

Yes.

Great post.

Yes, you’ve made that point already. I can definitely see the argument. I’m tempted to pose what if no one really has a foundation for morality, some just think they do and therefore believe their views are grounded?

But part of me also wonders: if Leon is right, does it really change anything? All it means is that I can’t argue meaningfully with certain members on a philosophy forum because they’ll probably claim my position fails a test of reasoning.

What really matters is the world. I can still vote, belong to organizations, and support values and promote alliances based on my view of what constitutes a better way of organizing society. Do I need any more than this?

Our society is a messy clusterfuck of pluralism, competing values, and beliefs. It seems that all we can really do is argue for the positions we find meaningful.

Thoughts?

Where does this leave the original question? — Fire Ologist

I think Joshs answered it on page 1. Part of his answer:

What unites these figures is that they reject foundationalism, the idea that morality needs an ahistorical, metaphysically secure ground, while also rejecting the relativist conclusion that norms are therefore merely subjective or interchangeable. The label “relativism” is typically applied by critics who assume that if universal foundations are unavailable, then only relativism remains. But these thinkers reject that forced choice. They are trying to articulate forms of normativity that are historical, situated, and contingent without collapsing into “anything goes.” — Joshs

I remain sympathetic to this view and would like to learn more. But I’m not a philosopher, so morality for me amounts to pragmatically identifying the kinds of behaviour I want to see, or not see, in my culture, based on a view of what promotes wellbeing. I think this is generally how morality operates, except where people follow more rigid, proscriptive belief systems.

Ultimately, if you have the tools, you can construct an argument to ground morality in natural ethics, religious ethics, pragmatic ethics, anti-foundationalism, whatever you like. What others think about these options will largely depend on their worldview.

The Christian desire that everyone should worship Jesus and insistence that they do so and should be compelled to worship no other gods far exceeded that of the Jews, however. It eventually lead to the destruction of pagan world, though that world survived in certain ways through the Christian assimilation of certain pagan religious traditions, and sometimes even pagan gods via the cult of the saints.

I wonder how and why this enormous alteration in the ancient world took place. — Ciceronianus

You raise some fascinating questions. Have you encountered any decent books that have explored this theme in a useful way?

Well I appreciate your seeing the point. In general what I've laid out is what irks me about those who hold to subjectivist or consent-based moralities when these same people engage in forms of moralizing that necessarily go beyond their own positions — Leontiskos

I can see that.

It's that double standard that is problematic: holding others to a standard that one dispenses with oneself whenever it is convenient to do so. — Leontiskos

A point well made.

Yes, I have no per se objection to "moral naturalism" or that specific form of negative utilitarianism (although I would tend to go further myself). — Leontiskos

And I found this part of the conversation useful. Thanks again.

It's not a projection, it's a fact. Not everyone thinks the way you do, it's not universal, it's not a given, it's not something that can or should be taken for granted about people. — baker

Two things. 1) not everyone thinks like you do either. 2) I am not speaking for others, I am talking for myself.

How much suffering someone experiences along with the pain they're feeling is not the same for all people. — baker

Of course. People ought to make their own decision on this. But the option should be available for those who, like me, would probably prefer that option even if not ultimately taken..

The secondary question of whether this idea could be twisted through "peer pressure" or by unscrupulous relatives is distinct from the question of its usefulness.

But this idea -

you have internalized your local cultural standard of what makes life worth living — baker

Still looks like a projection, or appears to be a patronising dismissal of someone else's' view. The implicit assumption that someone is unable to make an independent assessment of this scenario for themselves.

In other words, you have internalized your local cultural standard of what makes life worth living and from when on life isn't worth living anymore. — baker

Maybe that's a projection on your part. Certainly an overly complicated frame. If I experince irreversible pain I would like to die.

Reification — Treating “the normal” as a property things have, rather than a judgement relative to a practice. — Banno

Not following this one closely, but this resonates with me.

The word normal is also often used as a quasi-virtue. Not merely a statement of social acceptability but a marker of goodness.

Do you think that accounts for 100% of them at all times?

I would go so far as to say that the remarkable Paul of Tarsus was more responsible for the founding of Christianity than anyone, including Jesus. — Ciceronianus

I think that's a widely held view these days.

My OP was intended to be a summary of the factors I think most contributed to Christianity's success. I don't contend no other factors were involved. — Ciceronianus

What is the intention of an OP like this? Is it simply that Christmas time has you pondering, or is it an opportunity to reflect on the idea that major religions spread through politics and terror rather than the efficacy of their beliefs?

For those of us in Australia, we look on incredulously at the apparent religiosity in your homeland.
I often think of that HL Mencken quip from the 1920's - "Heave an egg out a Pullman window, and you will hit a fundamentalist anywhere in the United States."

I suspect that even with all that institutional power and the canny absorption of other faiths, a religion is unlikely to endure and thrive unless it genuinely meets some psychological or social need. Coercion may explain expansion but I'm not sure it accounts for long-term persistence, or meaning for adherents.

For those who are not Christians, like me, it is often difficult to understand why the faith resonates so strongly and what hold it has on people. We tend to look to cold facts of history and politics for an explanation, but perhaps the reasons run deeper than that.

Countries where medically assisted suicide and euthanasia are legal are basically telling people, "If you can't live up to our culture's standards, then it's better that you don't exist at all. And we are gracious enough to make options for this available to you." Some people internalize this and make use of those options. (And there is no shortage of those who will comment on this with, "Finally, at long last." — baker

I don’t know if that’s true. I am currently well and healthy, but I want to retain the option of ending my own life if circumstances deteriorate. If I were to develop a terminal illness that involved significant suffering, I would want that option available.

All fair points. I'm not sure what I think. That's partly why I'm here.

Okay, but do you see how this is a bit like the insanity defense? When a judge calls someone to account for their actions they might say, "I was insane, I was not in my right mind. I cannot be held to account for my actions. — Leontiskos

Sure, I have no defence.

So it seems that you do think there are moral truths that apply to other people whether they want them to or not, given that you literally enforce those truths on others' behavior. — Leontiskos

It has always seemed self-evident that one ought not allow the strong to harm the weak. But perhaps I should never have intervened, and in future, perhaps I won’t.

I find the account of moral naturalism fairly convincing, and I suspect that, if they reflected on it, many secular people would intuitively base their morality in a similar way.

If I have time I'll think about it some more but I'm not sure I have much left to say on this. I appreciate your patience and rigour.

Would you call Jesus a philosopher? Or would you, perhaps, say there’s not enough agreement on what comes from an actual person and what is mythology?