I mean….even if I had a completely determined physical explanation for my abject hatred for the taste of Lima beans, isn’t it still me that hates that taste? What kind of explanation is really worth entertaining, that says neural pathways, or ion potentials, hate Lima beans? — Mww

I like it. Nice way of putting it.

It’s the simple representation of how a subject feels about that stuff of which he is the sole determinant factor. Which is the irreducible condition of Kantian moral philosophy: the proper moral agent will do what he’s already determined must be done, whether he feels good about doing it or not. That’s the subject’s condition because of himself: he feels like shit for what he did at the same time it’s he alone, that determined what was to be done. Or he feels great, depends….. — Mww

Thanks for clarifying.

As a moral naturalist: insofar as needless harm – whatever causes every individual human to gratuitously suffer (as well as other kinds of fauna & flora) – is "foundational" such that we cannot not know this about ourselves (or living beings), "moral claims" – non-instrumental / non-transactional norms, conduct or relationships – are "justified" to the extent they assert imperatives which when — 180 Proof

Not sure I fully understand this - are you saying that we all have an inbuilt awareness that needless harm and suffering are bad, and this functions as a basic starting point for morality? And that moral claims are justified when they express obligations that flow from that fact and when they guide us toward reducing needless harm?

Anyway, what do you think? Do you think there are viable alternatives to teleological naturalism for those who hold to at least some universal moral truths? A fairly easy example of teleological naturalism is the hedonist who says, "Humans are pleasure-loving creatures by nature, therefore we do seek pleasure," and this is seen as a ground for a pleasure-based ethic. — Leontiskos

I don’t think I have any firm commitments here but I do lean a bit towards consequentialism. I'm not a big fan of the notion of human nature. I’ve always assumed that morality is either grounded in God (more along the lines of classical theology): something is good because it reflects or participates in God’s being of perfect goodness. Or we make it up as we go and retrofit reasoning to justify it. I’ve tended to be in the latter camp, but I respect well developed ideas even if I don't share them. I also recognise that my intermittent glibness can get me into trouble.

But more importantly, perhaps, I have never had to struggle with ethical choices in life. I just know what I am going to do in almost any situation. I never want to be cruel or cause suffering. I assume I inherit this from culture and upbringing and understand that not everyone shares such a perspective or sees cruelty or suffering in the same way. I also don't claim to be "good" whatever that may be.

Thanks, good clear explanations.

I see your point that for morality to have any universal clout, it would useful to be able to point to a natural telos, since this grounds moral claims in what something is rather than in what people merely happen to agree to. If, as you say, a person does not accept that all people deserve freedom and equal status, then it's not really possible to use that as a justification for why slavery is wrong. Such is the limitation of consensus made principles.

Now by inclination and temperament, I am unlikely to accept that everything has a built in purpose or end towards which it naturally develops. I am not sure I have any sophisticated reasoning for this at my fingertips but I will consider this over the next few days. And we may come to an impasse over this one. Nevertheless I would accept your argument that telos might be a critical concept for a universal ethics.

Just out of interest, do you think there’s a risk of an is–ought fallacy if we accept telos? Isn’t there still a problem in deriving an ought from a natural fact, or would you say that the notion of “inherent purpose” overrides this because it’s built into the concept itself? It's definitional or analytic.

Act of suicide is an immoral thing to do, because it kills life. Even if it is one's own life. It is still killing which is the most evil act to com — Corvus

Are you a pacifist? Do you think killing is wrong in all situations? War; self defence?

Thanks.

Do you believe there’s such a thing as pure reason? I’m not really a science guy but don’t many cognitive scientists view reason as contingent upon how human brains work? Human habits rather than universal necessities. Big and intractable subject.

If morality is a necessary human condition, there’s no need to look for it. All the moral subject does with his philosophy, which just is the looking in some form or another, is come to grips with himself when he’s failed. — Mww

That's a tantalising comment. I'll need to think over it for a bit before I know if I agree.

he role of affect holds, but not as the senses are affected because of real objects, but the internal affect on a moral subject’s condition because of himself. — Mww

I'm not sure I understand this sentence.


I can’t follow or even get through that Kant passage, it’s too dense and complex. Something about duty and God and atheism? I’ve never understood deontology. I think Kant would consider me morally rotten.

Cool. I'm with you on Aristotle over Kant.

So let me try to spell it out again. If we have a goal (end) then some things will be appropriate unto that end and some things will be inappropriate unto that end. Thus following my formula from above, you could rationally say, "If you share this goal then it is wrong for you to do X," but it would be irrational for you to simply say, "It is wrong for you to do X [regardless of any ends]."

So on the means/ends (or means/goals) understanding of morality, how would one secure the possibility of culpability? How would one be justified in saying, "You are wrong to [hold slaves, say]"? Rather than blathering on, I will let you try to answer this question, but it would apparently have something to do with common ends/goals, no? — Leontiskos

Yes, I think you're correct on this.

If we think that the best goal for a society is to promote flourishing then there are better or worse ways to achieve this end. I think this is fair.

Is your sense of what counts as flourishing pure Aristotle or is it also built around some Christian commitment? I made the assumption, perhaps wrongly, that you were aligned with Thomism.

I would argue that most Western ethics (secular and identity politics) seem to be derived from Christian values (and I guess classical Greek), though I know some people might consider this anathema. But how could it not be the case after a couple of millennia?

That seems a theme in the perennial philosophies, doesn't it? — Wayfarer

To be honest morality seems less important there than metaphysics and experience.

[

Then, why should anyone care about what you think is moral or immoral if it is just your emotions speaking? — Bob Ross

That’s right. Perhaps they shouldn’t. But the interesting thing is society likes to set codes of conduct to organise behaviour if it wishes to avoid anarchy and terror. Most people care enough about this and share emotional reactions to the same things. Do we need any more than this?

Seems to me this is how society already functions. We don’t agree on moral foundations but we also don’t want to be robbed and killed.

As I said above, you have to 'be it to see it'. (I'm not being holier-than-thou, I'm far from being holy). But the understanding has soaked in that it's necessary to develop insight into one's own psychodynamic processes - which encompass your circumstances, culture, proclivities, the totality of your being (psuche or soul). A lot of the conflict about morality and belief is obviously grounded in attachment to symbolic meanings and slogans, 'the writhings and thickets of views'. A philosophical mind has to see through that. — Wayfarer

So are you saying that morality is best understood beyond preconceptions, homilies and slogans, by looking inward through self-reflection?

I found the Soren Brier paper: Peircean cosmogony's symbolic agapistic self-organization as an example of the influence of eastern philosophy on western thinking (quite a mouthful). — Wayfarer

Wow! As you say a fantastic title (in the Victorian sense of the word).

If I had my time again, I would read Peirce (very complicated).

Do you hold a particular view about the foundations of moral positions? I am assuming you might locate morality alongside our sense of the sacred? If so, say some more.

although my mother always said she believed there must be more to life than just this world, and she purchased a book from a book club entitled German Philosophy from Leibniz to Nietzsche — Janus

Interesting. My mum was a searcher and was especially interested in Jung, mysticism, and Gnosticism. She was friends with a close colleague of Carl Jung’s, so conversations often turned to what gnosis meant. I forget the answer. Like yours my mum always said there must be more to life than "this". But curiously, when she was dying, she ended up in a palliative care and when asked if she wanted to see the spiritual care worker, she responded, “No, that’s all bullshit.” At the point of death, she had no faith or interest in the spiritual realm, a break from her whole life. Having worked in palliative care, I have seen many religious folk, including nuns and priests lose their faith as death approaches, generally without distress. I’m not sure what this signifies, but it is the opposite of what people often think.

Early Buddhism was in modern terms ascetic, even if Buddhism rejects the extreme ascetic practices of other sects. It was in our terms extremely moralistic, the monastic code had hundreds of rules, some of which, if they were breached, would result in expulsion. The philosophical point, though, is the 'avoidance of the extremes' - of nihilism, on the one side (under which materialism falls), and 'eternalism' on the other (under which a lot of religion falls). — Wayfarer

That certainly sounds like the opposite of what I would preference. :wink:

As for Westen culture, I'm of the view that there it is a still-unfolding dialectic between theism and atheism, materialism and idealism. — Wayfarer

I think that's fair and some of the directions you have pointed to appeal to me also.

One other question I would like to ask is whether you believe there are cross-cultural moral commonalities. — Janus

There seem to be cross-cultural commonalities in most areas, from morality to spirituality.

I’ve generally held that morality seems to be pragmatic code of conduct that supports a social tribal species like humans to get along, hence almost universal prohibitions on lying, killing, murder, and other harms, along with a concurrent veneration of charity and altruism. Hierarchies also seem baked into this.

Anyway you didn't answer my other questions. Of course you are under no obligation to do so. — Janus

Just did. No issues, I just don't have any interesting answers

Do you think the culture, the shaping it does and the values it produces are real in the sense of being actually operative? Are linguistic practices themselves real happenings? What about biology? Is it all a matter of cultural construction too? Do you believe there is an actual world which contributes anything to our sense experience and contributes to shaping culture? — Janus

I have no firm commitments and no expertise, but I guess at a basic level I would say we are the products of inherited concepts and values, and we are shaped by our particular form, meaning our biology, or mode of being. This means reality generally appears to us in a particular way. I use these words without committing to materialism or scientistic models of reality. They are terms we cannot really avoid in conversations like this. I think what we call the “actual world” is fraught. If you mean the world of gravity, water, and buses that can run over people, then I have no problem accepting that. If you mean politics and religion then these are somewhat arbitrary social constructions. I am also open to idealism, but I don't see how this is a particularly useful view.

Jesus mate, you must have been a precocious child of 7 or 8 to be thinking in terms of culture, reality construction, potential worlds beyond our sense experience and human reality being perspectival. What were you reading at the time? — Janus

The usual kids’ books, with the most influential being Huckleberry Finn, as it happens. That gave me a healthy skepticism of civilisation and adult behaviour. But much of it came from going to a Baptist school and having a best friend whose father was a Baptist minister. I was never able to believe in God or in many of the positions adults seemed to hold dear. We had modest debates about God and values, and this promoted a series of views in me that have been swirling around ever since. Bear in mind that the Baptist community I knew was not like the American version; ours was liberal and saw the Bible as a series of allegories for learning, not true stories. I think this also had an impact. But who knows?

I’m not posting this to evangelise Buddhism (although undoubtedly it will interpreted that way by some), but to point out the distinctively Buddhist attitude towards questions that are elsewhere considered foundational to morality and philosophy. Why? Because nearly always these begin with the desire for certainty, ‘man’s desire to know (the very first line in The Metaphysics!)

European culture has for centuries ricocheted between the horns of the dilemma: God or atheism, mind or matter, idealism or materialism, science or religion. But maybe there is no resolution possible on the level at which the dilemma is posed. The Buddhist remedy is presented as the insight into the binding process that culminates in suffering/existence (‘ Such is form, such its origination, such its disappearance; such is feeling, such its origination, such its disappearance;… These expressions are all, of course, formulaic, as they are chanted rather than read; all Buddhist sutta s were transmitted orally for centuries before being committed to writing.) — Wayfarer

I appreciate the story. I think you’ve touched on something I agree with, and that is the alarming tendency toward dualistic thinking in the West. Father Richard Rohr, who I have a modest familiarity with, appeals to me in this space, even if he is considered a heretic by some. I’m also attracted to the notion that no final resolution is possible at the level the dilemma is posed. I tend to think that, for me and my path, a search for ultimate answers isn’t really useful. I should just get on with things and try not to cause harm.

What else do you know about Buddhist origins of morality (recognising that there are different schools)? Given your account here, do you think the debate about moral facts is something Buddhist teaching would generally bypass? The Western tradition seems to be a continual search for foundational justification.

I would have thought you are too level-headed to take such thinking seriously, even at an early age. — Janus

At around 7 or 8 I came to the view that culture (and by extension, reality) could be constructed in many different ways, that there was potentially a world beyond our sense experience, and that human reality was ultimately perspectival. By this I also meant our worldviews and values, which I thought people inherited from culture and which, in many cases, were a sham. By “illusory” I didn’t mean a Matrix-style reality (though that did seem a possibility to me in the early 1970s). I still believe that human beings live in a world of values shaped by culture, linguistic practices, and our biology, something along the lines of phenomenology. But I simply don’t have the time or disposition to make a serious enquiry into it.

Sure, but you're relying on all sorts of metaphysical premises in this. For example: that humans are social animals, that human flourishing requires cooperation, and that human flourishing ought be sought. That's pretty basic Aristotelianism (as opposed to Hobbesianism), and it is filled with metaphysical presuppositions. There is no tension between experience and metaphysics. Metaphysics is known precisely through experience. — Leontiskos

Fair. Yes, I think it’s probably quite difficult not to hold any metaphysical presuppositions. And no doubt we all inherit philosophical models and values from our culture; though not always good ones.

Then you're committed to the value of human flourishing and you think everyone should recognize your value whether or not they do. — Leontiskos

On this, I’d say we can organise human life in almost inexhaustible ways. My own preference (and the one I think makes most sense and should be promoted) is to promote harmony and wellbeing for as many people as possible. But I settle on this because it seems the most reasonable way to achieve a goal. I don’t consider it to be a fact independent of human contingencies. Do you think this is an important distinction or does this count as moral realism?

Four stellar paragraphs. Thanks.

One possible terminological consideration would be to cast the debate in terms of the contrast between 'contingent' with 'unconditional' rather than between 'relative' and 'absolute' (or 'foundational'.) — Wayfarer

Indeed, I was actually going to raise this but thought I had done enough damage already. :up:

nterestingly, the 'cartesian anxiety' is a theme taken up in The Embodied Mind, where it is proposed that this anxiety is a strong motivating force in current culture. But they see it as a false dilemma which needs to be overcome. — Wayfarer

That resonates with me.

Their analysis is too lengthy to summarise here, but it's one of the source texts for enactivism, a key theme of which is the transcending of the subject/object, self/world division. — Wayfarer

If I were of a more scholarly cast I think this is precisely where I would go looking for a coherant model of thought in this space.

Nevertheless I think there's a real gap in philosophical discourse where the unconditioned should be. If everything is contingent, then the best that can be hoped for is a kind of social consensus or inter-subjective agreement. But then, if we're part of a flawed culture, there's no reason that either will provide us with a proper moral foundation. — Wayfarer

Wow! The sting in the tail is the last sentence. I think this can be the problem, and perhaps ultimately why anti-foundationalism is often resisted. By "proper" I am assuming one that allows for flourishing, solidarity - you might also include higher contemplation?

We might still be subject to Descartes' 'evil daemon', meaning that what we've gone through life thinking is real and substantial might in the end be illusory. I think that's a legitimate cause of angst. — Wayfarer

Hmm, I've been pondering this since I was 7 or 8.

The question of whether anti-foundationalism allows moral assertions depends on whether we believe morality requires a metaphysical foundation. — Astorre

Yes, and that's the quesion I am posing.

moral norms can be justified not through eternal truths, but through intersubjective practices, the goals of shared life, and the ability of norms to work cooperatively. Anti-foundationalism then doesn't boil down to relativism—because norms may not be "absolute," but still rational, critiqued, and improveable. In this understanding, a "position" arises not from metaphysics, but from the practice of reasoning. — Astorre

I think we are in agreement about the possibility of this lens.

But there are likely to be good arguments against it too.

Nice. I think this is a rich source for further discussion. The matter of pure reason is interesting. I understand reasoning, I’m not sure what “pure” adds to it. I guess Kant meant by this an entirely a priori understanding. Like you, I tend to think the role of affect and experience has a significant role in reasoning but I’m no expert. Many seem to think a sound morality is a form of rationalism.

So, as above, you could rationally say, "If you share my premises then it is wrong for you to hold slaves," but it would be irrational for you to simply say, "It is wrong for you to hold slaves." If there is no reason for anyone else to share your premises, then we have the same problem I pointed out in my first post. In other words, I would want to ask why anyone should share your values in the first place. That is the key question, and your claim that you can justify the conclusion of an argument to those who agree with (or share) the premises is not at all controversial. (Incidentally, this is what Rawls eventually admitted about his work, namely that it is not capable of reaching out beyond his own cultural context — Leontiskos

Good. Exactly. I think this is the key issue we should explore. I'd need to think though how to answer thsi without making a mess of the reasoning. I'm not ideally placed to do this. :wink: We really need an experienced anti-foundationalist.

Best I can do is this; and I'm going the long way around. An anti-foundationalist might argue that in a society caring about solidarity ("inclusion" to use the trendy woke term) is not about metaphysical necessity, it’s about practical consequences and shared aims. Cultures that reject solidarity tend to produce fear, domination, and instability. They undermine trust and cooperation, which woudl seem essential for any functioning society. So even without universal moral facts, there are strong pragmatic reasons for solidarity: it helps communities flourish, reduces harm, and supports mutual security.

Now you can respond, “So what?” And I woudl say such a quesion is morality in action. Do we want to find ways of working together or not? Sure, we don’t have to. We could create a culture of death, pain, and suffering if we wanted. But who would really support that? Human beings are social animals who cooperate to attain goals and thrive. That's morality right there, pragmatic and unfounded on anything beyond human experince.

Seems to me that without moral facts I can still argue that slavery is wrong if I believe it is not an effective way to achieve the goal of overall flourishing. If you ask me why we should care about overall flourishing, I would say: because flourishing reflects the kinds of lives and communities we have reason to value. Lives with less suffering, more security, and greater opportunities for cooperation and mutual respect. These reasons don’t depend on eternal truths; they grow out of human experience and the practical need to live together.

I think that's the best I can do with this for now.

What if they instead claim morality is just an opinion and proceed to rely on their own opinion? When we evaluate whether an opinion is “valid,” we can only do so through our own judgment; hence in that sense, yes, morality always comes back to one's own opinion.

There's no one else to blame. — Banno

Yes. As you say that's a differnce sense of subjectivity that the first account.

What interests me most in these discussions is how people believe they can ground their morality.

But he insists that his view is not relativist but ethnocentric: we always reason from within our own inherited practices, vocabularies, and moral sentiments. For Rorty, the key point is not that “anything goes,” but that justification is always to someone, to a community with shared norms, without implying that all communities are equally good or beyond criticism. — Joshs

For me this view just seems inherently common sensical. But I'm always somewhat fearful when something seems like common sense.

Heidegger rejects relativism because he doesn’t think the disclosure of Being is a matter of subjective or cultural “points of view.” Historical “worlds” are not interchangeable frameworks chosen by agents; they are ontological conditions that shape what can count as intelligible at all. The difference between epochs is not a difference between equally valid beliefs, but a transformation in how being itself is revealed. — Joshs

There's a lot in this to unpack but I see where it's headed. Sounds promising.

What unites these figures is that they reject foundationalism, the idea that morality needs an ahistorical, metaphysically secure ground, while also rejecting the relativist conclusion that norms are therefore merely subjective or interchangeable. The label “relativism” is typically applied by critics who assume that if universal foundations are unavailable, then only relativism remains. But these thinkers reject that forced choice. They are trying to articulate forms of normativity that are historical, situated, and contingent without collapsing into “anything goes.” — Joshs

That's a helpful summary and pretty much what I've been attempting to describe. Appreciate your reply.

Just as a preliminary point, I don't think I've ever said anything like that. I don't even know what "foundationalism" or "anti-foundationalism" are supposed to be. On TPF "foundationalism" is often used as a kind of vague slur. It is one of those words that is applied to one's opponents but is never adopted by anyone themselves. — Leontiskos

Good to know and apologies if I have made some assumptions. I've tended to view myself as sympathetic to anti-foundationalism.

So then the question remains: Is it possible to make moral claims from the position of "anti-foundationalism"? That depends on what you mean by "anti-foundationalism," but in a general sense I am more interested in what you yourself believe than what so-called "anti-foundationalists" believe.

But I will try to revisit this when I have a bit more time. — Leontiskos

Fair points. If you get a chance, yes please. I think your perspective on this will be useful.

Cool, please have your say on that thread too. I may be more of a Hobbsian and have always disliked Rousseau, but I suspect that more than anything it's one's disposition that informs this choice.

You make your points well and I thank you for your patience. I apologise that I seem unable to see this. I have read Lewis' book (many years ago) but I not yet convinced. I'm going to start a thread on relativism versus anti-foundationalism. I think there is a more nuanced position to take than simple relativism.

Is slavery wrong? I can definitely see how it would be wrong from a human values perspective. If you essentially accept the Western tradition, that life should be about values like flourishing and freedom and well-being and the minimisation of suffering, then slavery is not an ideal way to go about it.

Morality to me seems to be a code of conduct, and we can argue about what conduct best achieves goals like flourishing, cooperation, and the minimisation of suffering. I can't see how we can have a moral fact that floats free of human values, but that does not stop us from reasoning within the values we share.

If someone wants to claim that all morality is just an opinion and all opinions are equally valid, then they undermine their own ability to debate moral positions. But if we instead treat morality like a system with aims and constraints (something like a game with rules and goals) then we can meaningfully explore what strategies best achieve those aims.

If the main criticism is that my view has no ultimate, metaphysical foundation for right and wrong beyond human context, then yes, I agree. But I do not see why that means we should abandon having views on how to organise society. Human beings still have needs, vulnerabilities, and preferences, and these give us more than enough ground to reason about better or worse ways to live together.

But is there something here, some other understanding of "an aspect of reality beyond our known reality" that I'm missing?

if not, then this appears to be a classic case of language leading us astray. — Banno

I think then, that you and I are in agreement. We certainly know that the phrase, beyond our known reality, is often code for the Platonic realm or any number of alternate worlds. Let's not go there.

This issue may simply be to difficult for me.

Is it not the case that what we call reality today is "beyond" what we called reality 500 years ago? — Tom Storm

If the question asks is there a possibility that there is an aspect of reality beyond our known reality, how could we rule this out? I don't think this is a useful frame however since hypothetical aspects of reality are moot.

How do we know there isn’t anything beyond our reality?

Because reality is what there is.

To posit something "beyond reality" is to posit more of what there is. It is to extend reality.

This is why the extent of our language is the extent of our world. — Banno

This makes sense. But from my perspective reality is a vexed term to begin with. What exactly do we mean by this word - the totality of facts, not things?

In a not untrivial way, some people's reality (on account of language acuity and education) is definitely larger than others who have more limited capabilities. I don't think this is an equivocation on the word, but you may think so?

Is it not the case that what we call reality today is "beyond" what we called reality 500 years ago?

This got complicated. For the non-philosophers, is there a 2 or 3 sentence answer to the OP from your perspective? From my perspective we can’t ‘know’ but I guess it depends upon what’s meant by know… or ‘beyond’.

Of course, if aliens are not just carbon-based, that should make alien life more abundant and increase the likelihood that we hear from aliens in a less massive time frame.

Final thought: each day that we do not detect aliens strengthens the case that aliens are carbon-based lifeforms only, like us. — NotAristotle

Fair. My own view is that if there’s intelligent life out there, distance may not matter given technologies that would look like magic to us. We can imagine that the laws of physics we currently cherish might have 'workarounds' we simply don’t yet understand. And how would we determine that they aren’t visiting, or even aren’t here now? The usual assumption is that we’d be able to detect them and that they would announce themselves, but I don’t see why that follows.

or perhaps they have already been here but we never noticed it — javi2541997

Exactly, see above.

That said, I have no good reason at present to believe they’re here, or even that they exist.

It's definitely about the role of government, but they want a government that recognizes people's rights. They want a social safety net. — frank

I'm a fan of welfare safety nets and we have reasonable ones in operation here in Oz. Rights based thinking is not as interesting to me and I am often turned off by activists.

Honestly, identity politics is heavily embedded in the older black people I know. They'll go to their graves that way. — frank

Good to know. I have had almost zero contact with black folk, so there's that. I know a lot of First Nations Australians and what you say is true there too.

The older left (people my age) here are often somewhat snooty about identity politics. Needless to say they are mainly white. They see it as what happens when the reformist left is undermined by corporate power and replaced with a form of politics that atomises or divides people into smaller interest groups, which ultimately serves those in power rather than challenging them en bloc.

I can see all these arguments and am unsure what I personally believe any more. The older I get, the less certain I am. And the less I care, to be honest...

Where people stand politically is often a reflex action. How committed they are to the actual implications of their beliefs may be an entirely different matter. I know plenty of left-leaning people who might march on behalf of the homeless, yet if a homeless service tried to open a low-cost apartment building on their street, they could be even more vigorous in opposing it.

My point was if you look at the rudder of a progressive boat, it's compassion. We shouldn't just let people suffer when we can help, and the government is the best way to coordinate that care. — frank

Maybe it’s less about compassion then and more about the role of government in society?

But now that they're older, they're actually irritated by the complaints of young people. Maybe it's obvious why. — frank

Could it be that the complaints have changed and that identity politics is annoying to them?

All that is required for what I've said is that someone thinks it is true that everyone should not be intolerant. Whether this is a 'fact' is not very important. — Leontiskos

That's helpful.

But is it valid to say, "Humans generally try to reduce suffering, therefore it is true that everyone should try to reduce suffering?" — Leontiskos

I’m not sure. I’d say humans generally find suffering unpleasant and therefore try to avoid it. And because we’re social animals, we also often try to reduce suffering for members of our own tribe, community, or culture. I’m not convinced many of us care much about the welfare of strangers or the suffering of people we don’t like. Personally, I have a strong dislike of suffering and wouldn’t want even my enemies (not that I really have any) to suffer, but that’s just my own emotional preference. I suppose I’d like others to try to reduce suffering as well, but I have a mental block when it comes to calling it “true” that we should all reduce suffering. I’m not sure in what sense I can say it is true.

My point about "fruitful dialogue" has to do with reason-giving in moral contexts. So if someone thinks their moral utterances are true, require reasons, and can be rationally engaged, then the problem I've pointed out dissipates. But at the prevailing meta-ethical level this simply isn't true on a cultural level. — Leontiskos

:up:

When someone brings up tolerance there is usually an accusation at play. There is usually the premise, "One should not be intolerant." Now it surely does not make sense to say, "One should not be intolerant," while at the same time being undecided on whether there are moral "facts," no? And emotivism of whatever variety will be of no help unless one believes that emotions are sufficient grounds for binding moral norms. — Leontiskos

Thanks, I see what you’re saying, but it never occurred to me that moral positions require objective facts. This deserves its own thread. As a non-philosopher, my view has generally been that humans are social and cooperative: we seem to try to reduce suffering and promote well-being, and our moral views tend to reflect what supports those goals. Moral discussions are simply humans attempting to find the best ways to achieve this.

Conservatives are usually willing to let nature take care of social problems. They think that when we interfere with nature (due to an overload of compassion), we inevitably undermine a process that leads to social health and well-being. This process happens to be brutal, but conservatives are ok with that. This is because compassion isn't their driving value. — frank

Just thinking out loud. Isn't the way conservatism functions different across cultures and contexts? There are conservatives on the left, for example, old-school class warriors who dislike the identity politics of the current left. They hope to conserve the left of the early to mid 20th century. In Australia, political conservatives generally support community welfare programs, such as pensions, unemployment benefits and free healthcare, while the radical right (a small boutique group) might oppose such programs. Perhaps the majority of Australians actually favor a form of progressive politics, so conservatism here may resemble the left in countries with a more libertarian (?) ethos. I'm not sure many lefties I know are especially compassionate. How does one gauge that? I don’t always go by their politics. I go by their behaviors toward others in real life. I think a lot of the left take a kind of rights-based perspective, which is somewhat separate from compassion.

Secondly, the point originally being made about Crisp is a moral claim (hence the words "fear and resentment"), and yet the people who tend to make such claims also tend to deny moral realism, which logically takes all the sting out of their reproach. ...It's remarkable to me that on TPF moral realism is so thoroughly repelled that members regularly fail to provide any rational justification for prohibiting even the most grievous offenses, such as the slave trade, but on the other hand this has been par for the philosophical course for centuries. — Leontiskos

I’m don't know if there are moral facts or if morality is grounded in anything beyond emotional responses, perhaps emotivism is correct, of which, presumably, there are more and less defensible versions.

Interesting you see Crisp as making a moral claim. I didn’t think of it like this. I think the idea that people fear and resent 'the strange' is human nature. I know I do. I don’t consider this to be located in a specific moral framework, more a vague aesthetic/emotional one or one wherein we find ourselves unable to make sense of something. I also don't know if Crisp is right in his view. It seemed like an interesting position to raise in the context of the discussion, since it tackled tolerance differently.

"I am homosexual/trans/etc." is classified and understood as a "sin", — Moliere

I’ve often thought that sin and mental illness are connected for many people. The notion that one is going against nature/god.

I do too, tho I've also been disappointed by face-to-face interactions in real time as well. — Moliere

All interactions can disappoint. For me there are always distinct advantages to being face to face someone in real time. But perhaps not for everyone.

Sound to like you’ve thought a lot about these themes and have acquired wisdom.

Perhaps we here can attempt to create this "much better" conversation? — Moliere

I doubt it. I think we need face-to-face discussions in real time, not the anonymous often polemical world of forums. But who knows?

I don't like the romanticizing of mental illness. — Moliere

The issue for many people is that normal behaviours have previously been described as mental illness; homosexuality, even feminism. Of course, many religious folks might still agree. And now trans identities… even many progressives view this as mental illness. But let's not go there.