There are other choices available. There is still a choice being made, and it is Y. It being entirely deterministic or not seems to have nothing to do with the fact that a choice is being made, and by something capable of considering alternatives.
Your definition of 'choice' seems to be different than the usual one, which is a selection between multiple options. You apparently think the alternative options are not open to being chosen, rather than your processes having the option, but rejecting them.
Going to court and pleading 'not-guilty because physics made me do it' doesn't stand up. Your criteria for making the selection is what made you do it, and it is that criteria for which you are responsible
That doesn't seem at all obvious to me. An agent who doesn't know what the future holds can still undergo a process of "decision making" even if that agent is fully deterministic and it will always make the same decision given the same starting state.
A deterministic chess program for example, which looks at a number of legal moves and decides which one it "likes" more based on some position-rating algorithm
Just to be clear, the ANTECEDENT brain state is what I describe as the physical and electrical state of the brain. While pondering occurs (obviously) DURING decision making (assuming there is, in fact decision making). Thus they are different entities, but are not mutually exclusive.
— LuckyR
But the subsequent 'pondering' is also describable as physical and electrical state of the brain. They're just a little bit later. This is of course presuming that 'pondering' is a function of the brain, which plenty of people deny.
Long story shory, in Determinism antecedent state X always leads to resultant answer Y, never Z.
Given said determinism, agree. It doesn't mean that decision making is not going on, that choices are not being made. That would be fate, something different than determinism.
In Free Will antecedent state X can lead to resultant answer Y or Z depending on the decision making process which occurred.
There you go. That definition says that there can be no free will given deterministic physics, and it even goes so far as to imply that truly random acts are the only example of free will.
This makes it sound like 'pondering' and 'physical and electrical state of the brain' are necessarily mutually exclusive, sort of like 'computing' and 'transistor switching' are similarly exclusive, instead of one consisting of the other.
Activist scholarship is dog shit, in my opinion. Woke corporate racism, that Diversity, Equity, Inclusion mantra, flows straight from that rotten core. The Skokal and grievance studies affairs basically prove that they peddle in nonsense.
I don't think visual artists are worried much about elephants stealing their jobs or taking over their niche in the aesthetic ecology.
Am I correct in thinking that there’s not a clear line dividing subjective to objective reality of objects if we have tools that allow us to do so ?
Real is anything that is contained by reality. In that case you might ask what is reality? which can be subjective or objective, objective in terms of agreed upon consensus or subjective that which is in your private world such as a certain emotion.
So what is your point? I am against the extreme regulation of drugs. But there must be at least some regulation, as your pilot example shows (although weakly, as it seems at least as much a regulation of pilots as drugs).
For me the most convincing argument I suppose you could call it, is intelligent design combined with aesthetics. Why is our vision hard wired to like beauty ? Is it universal?
That’s true. But we could trust ourselves, our families, our friends, our communities, without seeking the blessing from some distant authority. We could fully and easily reject corporations and powerful individuals, especially if there were no state mechanisms with which they could achieve monopoly, subsidy, contracts, and power.
Let me give you an example and let me know your take on it. Let's say there's just me and a little kid at a pool (and I don't know this kid)(no lifeguards: nothing other than us two). I am dangling my feet in the water and the kid starts drowning in the deep end. I am the only one around that could save this little kid, but I don't want to risk getting an ear infection and since this matter (i.e., the potential ear infection) pertains to my body I think that I have the right to not consent to saving this kid.
Do you think I have the right, in that scenario, to not consent to saving the kid? I don't think I do, because consent doesn't matter in the instance that one could save someone else's life without any foreseeably significant unwanted bodily modifications.
Here's another example I would like your take on. Imagine I go out and stab an innocent person in both of their kidneys. The cops show up, arrest me, and the victim gets sent to the ER. Turns out, I am the only one with the right kidneys to save them (viz., there are no donors available that would match, etc.): do I have the right, as the egregious perpetrator, to keep my kidneys if I do not consent to giving them to the victim?
I don't think so: what do you think
In such a case it is ultimately her choice.
My responsibility comes beforehand, making sure we both share the same moral outlook.
I would make sure that whomever I am having a child with share the same moral views.
If you like government so much, maybe you’d like Somalia better when they had one. It had all the regular stuff: totalitarianism, corruption, political oppression, and of course they turned their weapons on their own citizens and committed genocide. I guess they got their tax dollar’s worth.
Hey, the fact that some nations are worse than us, doesn't mean that our system works perfectly.
This is a good point that I had not thought about before; however, you aren’t going to like my refurbishment (of my view) here (;
I would say that you are right insofar as I cannot say that the obligation to not abort (in the case of consensual sex) is contingent in any manner on ‘reasonably anticipated’ consequences of ones actions. For example, if this were true (that I could make them contingent), then I should never go driving, because there is a small percentage chance, even with taking all the precautions, that I could injure someone in a manner that would be my fault. Likewise, there is a small percentage chance that people having sex while taking every precautionary measures (like contraceptives) will conceive.
My resolution is to say that the obligation to sustain that life (of which their condition one is culpable for) is contingent solely on one’s culpability and not ‘reasonable inferences’ pertaining to the consequences of ones actions. Thusly, in the case of driving, I am accepting that there is a chance that I may be at fault for another person’s injuries (due to, let’s say, a car crash or something) and, in that event, I cannot appeal to the fact that I took a lot of precautionary measures to prevent injuring people with my care to get out of the obligation to help this person that I am, in fact, culpable for their injuries. Same thing is true, I would say, for consensual sex: appealing to all of the precautionary measures they took to prevent conception does not exempt them from their obligation to sustain that new life, since they are culpable for it.
How much have you payed for the Department of defense and have you gotten your money’s worth? I wager you have no clue what you’re paying for or where your money goes, whether to the fire department or into right into a politician’s pocket.
