My point was that the missing feelings in a philosophical zombie has, in actuality, no bearing on the ‘feelings’ which the average person, being a genuine person or a philosophical zombie, has: they still cry, they can hug you, they can demonstrate concern for you, etc. even in the case that they are a philosophical zombie. — Bob Ross
This is my point: this ‘ultra-feelings’ is just another part of humanity’s mythology. There’s no need for anything extra nor is there any evidence of it, and a being doesn’t have to go metaphysically beyond a complex bit of machinery to ‘have feelings’ (in a non-ultra sense). — Bob Ross
I think you may have misunderstood me: I am arguing exactly that this is false. The reason historically people and animals were abused is based off of this false assumption: no, if a being is demonstrating obvious signs of being able to feel, being concerned, desiring, etc., then no matter if it is a lower life form or a robot, it thereby has feelings because that is the true standard of what it means to feel. — Bob Ross
Except no they are not because they are a P Zombie. Again your entire argument is nullified by the definition of a p zombie.I am just trying to convey to you that (I think) it is a false dilemma--as regardless of whether a person is a PZ, where they cannot ‘feel’ in this ultra sense, they are still demonstrating the capacity to love, feel, and desire just the same as yourself (in a non-ultra sense): — Bob Ross
A philosophical zombie still has 'feelings' and 'cares' in the sense that you can see with your own eyes: they can express gestures of gratitude, they avoid pain, sit down and listen to your problems, they can still love you, etc.;
I think if you really reflect about what you can know (directly from experience), you will find that the warmth or frigidity of other people is a reflection of your pyschological state of mind. For example, imagine you sincerely believed that solipsism was false, wouldn't that bring some wanted warmth into experience for you? even though nothing changed about reality other than your state of mind, you would now experience a warmer kind of coexistence with other people. Now, imagine you believed it is true (or maybe that it is even indeterminate), then you lose that warmth--see how this is not a reflection of the truthity of the actual position of solipsism? It is a depiction of your state of mind. If you dive into yourself, then you can fix the issue without getting an answer to solipsism. — Bob Ross
Can one be arrogant enough to believe he is the sole source and author of all great music, all architectural marvels and technological achievements, the author of all our epistemology and the content found in all youtube videos.
And if he does believe that...why getting in the trouble to debate it with him self in a public forum? — Nickolasgaspar
My point would only be that this: I Am!, is an action, a process; who we define ourselves to be, say, against the crowd, is not given to us as an inherent fact. People believe they have "thoughts", and those are precious gems that come from who they are, their identity as a singular person, something special from inside only them, when most of the time they are platitudes or regurgitation--though sometimes what is common is most true (it all depends). As Heidegger says: what is most thought-provoking is that we are not yet thinking. — Antony Nickles
I think I was trying to say the same thing. What I meant was that, yes, we have singular experiences but there is nothing that ensures our individuality (nothing taking the place of the metaphysical "mind"). — Antony Nickles
The idea that some men must work for governments in order for rights to be meaningful and useful is nonsense. I can confer a right to you and defend it just as any king or official can. — NOS4A2
(Of course we can have individual experiences outside of language--like seeing a sunset that leaves us speechless--but those instances don't structure our relation to ourselves and others.) — Antony Nickles
Is that how you protect someone’s right to life, by begging the government to restrict our rights?
Or in other cases, abortion control, the right to life via not being chopped up in a womb and sucked out with a vacuum. All this talk of protecting life suddenly falls on deaf ears when this subject comes up. I don’t believe any of it.
What kind of weapon would you use to protect your children, should the need ever arise? Ballots and petitions? Beg a politician? — NOS4A2
Likewise, let’s say they are actually right (that there are philosophical zombies, with no minds, no consciousness, and let’s say no wills of their own): does that change your experience of them? No. Are you justified in doing abhorrent things to them now that you know? No. Are you alone?. NO: you still interact with them, can talk to them, they can relate to you, they can love you, you can love them—and why would it matter that you are able to think of your own accord while they cannot? — Bob Ross
2. More generally, there can be no deductive refutation of this solipsism
employing only premises a committed solipsist would accept: all logically
correct derivations from solipsistically true premises lead to conclusions
that are solipsistically true as well. Any route to a successful refutation of
solipsism must travel via nondeductive inferential paths.
4. Every solipsistic theory that is strict – as defined below – and axiomatic
is the close translational analogue of an axiomatic nonsolipsistic theory. If
the solipsist can axiomatize her nonsolipsistic theories, she can do the same
with their solipsistic correlates.
Any axiomatic theory and set of axioms for that theory in the non‑
solipsistic language can be carried over into the solipsistic language
as a theory with corresponding axioms, provided that the latter
theory is strict. Importantly, it is easy to argue – see the reply to
the third interpretation of the Private Language Argument – that
basic mathematical theories are all strict. Hence, a solipsist can
avail herself of, say, Peano/Dedekind Arithmetic together with its
familiar set of axioms.
