Rather, in accordance with your claim that art provides an "religious jag," whatever art is congruent with their religious views would have the greatest potential to "induce an arrest in normal everyday consciousness" (what you claim is the goal or function of art) and whatever art was incongruent with their system of beliefs and meaning would likely fail to induce such an arrest in normal consciousness. Right? — praxis

I don't think it's that cut and dried. After all, secular humanists can enjoy the older, religious works of art, and religious people can enjoy some modernist art too. In that way, the function of art as providing an arrest in normal everyday consciousness transcends questions of meaning in that social sense (re. roles, etc.)

But to be really clear, then perhaps i should stick to "mystical" instead of religious (taking "mysticism" in the sense of certain types of experiences that are common across most human beings, because of neurological similarities - deep or transcendent feelings of awe, wonder, ego-loss, etc.). I do believe that mysticism is more at the root of religion than the kind of "social glue" factors that rationalists usually canvass, though they are important too.

And as I pointed out previously, the Left is interested in socially-made injustices. — Maw

Sure, but have you actually identified socially-made injustices, or are you confusing them with inequalities that are the result of natural endowment? IOW, how much due diligence have you done separating out the factors?

the lines between socially constructed inequalities and inequalities that are the result of "natural endowment" are blurred for you — Maw

Leftists always project. :)

It's simple: even given complete equal opportunity, the Left doesn't assume that outcomes will be equal, or that potentials are equal. — Maw

My argument is that it's an unexamined assumption - it's not something you proclaim, because it's obviously so stupid. But it's the logically necessary premise on which your house of cards must be built, otherwise you'd be bothered by the question of which unequal outcomes you observe are the result of differences in natural endowment, and which are the result of oppressive human action (and therefore a matter for justice to sort out) - because obviously you wouldn't want to accuse people of oppression if they're not actually guilty of it, right?

it's mistaken to apply any umbrella term to a diverse range of thinkers that spans over 100 years. — Maw

The term "liberal" has been used as an umbrella term for those thinkers for several hundred years, and they're not all that diverse, they share some core principles.

So what happens to a religious in-humanist when they visit a gallery? — praxis

Their head explodes.

You are simply more interested in pseudo-science which suggests that these inequalities are the result of inherent genetic dispositions of gender and ethnicity. — Maw

As I've pointed out twice in this conversation, both things are possible: inequalities as a result of systemic imbalances and oppression, and inequalities as a result of different natural endowments. You are the one who's ignoring an important factor, I'm acknowledging both.

Your whole spiel about "equal potential" and that the Left wants "equal outcome" is a tired strawman that I would expect from a high school student. — Maw

Well then it should be easy for you to knock down then, shouldn't it? (But please, without circular reasoning ... without assuming that all inequalities must be caused by systemic factors ;) )

My point is is that there is no 'umbrella' term with which to fit these diverse set of thinkers. — Maw

Yes there is, they were called "liberals" - and as I said, Hayek used the term "classical liberal" to distinguish that older strain of liberalism from the social democracy that had come to be called "liberalism" in the US.

Do you know of anyone good, other than Baker & Hacker, who fit the OP's criteria of writing a commentary that takes on the PI aphorism by aphorism? — John Doe

No, as an amateur of philosophy that's as far as my knowledge of detailed commentaries on the PI goes too! :) Although there are umpteen "introductions" to W. (Stern, Grayling, etc.) I really don't think there are any others with that kind of fine-grained approach. (Maybe Kripke, who wrote some detailed stuff on a few passages, IIRC? I haven't read those, but they're probably worth checking out.)

they're perfectly content to stay with their folk understandings of these things — MindForged

We just disagree on this. My experience of people is that they are generally very interested in philosophical topics and engage with them with enthusiasm - if they're presented to them.

The point there was that for, say, particle physics questions you should got to the particle physicist, not just any physicist, because the former has the best and truest grasp of the topics in that part of the discipline. — MindForged

As I said, I'm not arguing against specialization, but for more of a balance of specialization and general thinking among philosophers.

Are you suggesting that the last part is a mistaken move? — All sight

No, it really is a rule structure that is in fact conducive to human flourishing (or any of that basket of closely related goals).

The objectivity was implicit in the fact that ancestors who happened to live in ways that sketchily and searchingly accorded with those rules, howsoever "blindly" (without knowing what they were doing) tended to survive and flourish. And the objectivity is still there when the rules and goals are made explicit, streamlined, made more coherent, as time goes on.

Yeah, it's a kind of boostrapping process. There are natural Schelling points for co-operation that arise, even with "blind" actors (e.g. at the animal level), and then as reason develops, by means of conscious reflection we start to tease out an implicit consistent structure in what we find ourselves doing, which we then in turn start to think of as an independent structure of rules that has to be pursued or enforced.

I don't think it is either, morality is an attempt at discovering a self-consistent ruleset that's objectively conducive to human flourishing (or any of a basket of closely related moral goals). But the co-operative/competitive dynamic is how the ruleset gets enforced and played as a game.

And if not - can you recommand the closest book to the concept I'm looking for? — Amit Mish'an

The Hacker and Diamond/Conant recommendations above are good for the specific thing you asked for (Hacker's a bit out of date and a bit idiosyncratic in places, Diamond and Conant are more au courant, and really excellent IMHO), but wrt the broader question of generally getting a handle on what the later Wittgenstein was banging on about, I highly recommend the book of lecture notes by Alice Ambrose, a Cambridge student of his: Wittgenstein's Lectures: Cambridge, 1932-1935

It's not specifically a book on the PI, and the lectures are from a time before he wrote the PI, it's also not a book it would be wise to take seriously as a detailed guide to W's thought (after all, it's just notes, and as a young student she may have misunderstood some things), but there are some neat formulations you don't find anywhere else that I think give a good entry point or inroad into a better understanding, and it's a very alive-feeling book, that gives a good sense of Wittgenstein thinking on the hoof, and of his excitement as a philosopher in the process of discovery. At any rate, it's what "unlocked" the PI for me.

They're apt to treat some things more fuzzily. — MindForged

Some yes, but mostly it's binary. Planes either fly or they don't, etc.

Outside of what they get from religious activities and social networking, — MindForged

That's my point - what they get from those things isn't very good, it would be better if they got things from clever people who had actually spent a lot of time thinking about them. It's really just division of labour - somebody has to think about the big picture, otherwise there's a gaping hole in our everyday understanding of the world (which can be filled with any old haphazard rubbish). Social networking, yes, but informed social networking is better than uninformed.

We just don't hardly ever need to think about that wide range of things at once in ordinary life. — MindForged

That's begging the question - we may not, but do we need to? Maybe we need to. Maybe a consistent, structured picture is better than an inconsistent, haphazard one. A topic for big picture philosophy! :) Also, I think you underestimate people's curiosity and interest in the world, especially when they're younger.

I'm not going to hit up any random physicist for, say, particle physics questions. — MindForged

Why not? Who would be a better person to ask so that you, as a philosopher, could be more informed about the topic and be able to incorporate it into your big picture?

Curiously my post to which you're responding hasn't appeared, but what the hey.

the results from systemic oppression, or structural imbalances — Maw

But that's what's yet to be demonstrated. If you simply pre-judge that every observed inequality of outcome is the result of "systemic oppression or structural imbalances," then all you've got is a pseudo-science, because you're denying empirically obvious and evident differences in endowment for the sake of a fantasy idea of what human beings are like.

IOW, you are effectively starting with the unexamined assumption that people have equal potential, therefore any observed difference in outcome must be the result of "systemic oppression or structural imbalances."

The reality is that some inequalities are the result of systemic oppression and structural imbalances, yes, and historically a lot were; but some aren't, and today most aren't. (For example, in Sweden, which has the most highly developed system of gender equality of any country on Earth, 85% of nurses are female. Go figure.)

Further, the term "Classical Liberal" is erroneously considered to be a branch of political philosophy under which, (per Rubin) John Locke, Adam Smith, and JS Mill, Jefferson, et. al. in the pitiful attempt to give it an air of intellectualism. — Maw

Those thinkers did represent a "branch of political philosophy" - it used to be called "liberalism" until the term was hijacked by more socialist-influenced liberals (people who would have been called "social democrats" in Europe) who pushed the liberal faction in the US further to the Left in the course of the 20th century, so Friedrich Hayek (I believe it was, in the 1960s) coined the term "classical liberal" to denote the older form of liberalism. The term has been used that way among conservatives and libertarians since then, but it wasn't invented by them as some sort of grand cover-up plan, far less by the IDW people.

There's nothing "amusing" about the name, it's just cringingly stupid. — Maw

Hey, blame the journo who invented it in an attempt to mock/smear them.

you imply that identity is what we give to the object. But this is exactly what the law of identity seeks to avoid. — Metaphysician Undercover

The fact that you are trying to guess at an identity doesn't mean you can't in fact hit upon it. Of course the identity you're looking for is the one the thing actually objectively has, but since you don't have a hotline to God or backchannel to reality, you have to work on the principle of generate-and-test.

Presumably the way the world "behaves" matters at all levels and in all disciplines as opposed to just being restricted to the everyday world. — MindForged

But how the ordinary world behaves is of concern to the vast majority of people in their everyday lives, and part of philosophy's job is (or Rand and I would say ought to be) to give ordinary people in their everyday lives some sense of the big picture - otherwise, in lieu of a rational big picture, they'll accept an irrational big picture, or flounder around in a state of permanent anxiety.

At best you'll get an attempt at unifying other people's work. Which... is fine but everyone can't be doing that otherwise the entire discipline stagnates. — MindForged

I don't say every philosopher should work on big picture stuff, or that philosophers should stop specializing. Surely it's possible for philosophers to walk and chew gum. All I'm saying is that the discipline is skewed too much to specialization, has been for a hundred years or so, and that it's just an artifact of an academic system that brings with it politics, turf wars, status seeking, etc.

There has to be specialization, but as people like Dennett demonstrate, the most interesting things often go in in interdisciplinary studies. (And that's another thing philosophers can do as part of their big picture job - help specialists co-ordinate and work together.)

There is a natural progression from the law of identity to the law of non-contradiction. The goal is to know, or understand the object. First we identify the object, you might say we point to it, or assign a name to it. If we can do this, then we can say that it has an identify according to the law of identity. Having an identity validates the claim that it exists, as an object. Next, we describe the identified object, and we must do this according to the law of non-contradiction. We cannot assign contradictory properties to the identified object because this is repugnant to the intellect, making the object unintelligible. These principles are designed so as to make the object intelligible, they are what appeals to the intellect in its goal of knowing, or understanding the object. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah, I agree with that, so far as navigating everyday life goes; but zooming out a bit more, I see identification as secondary (or subsequent to) to discovery, or the knowledge-gathering process. One identifies what is already known, but to bring things into knowledge is a different process, a process of generate-and-test. That's a process of punting, guessing at, possible identities the thing could have (possible coherent bundles of features that are logically interlinked, etc.), and then testing the implications of that possible identity as the object bumps into the rest of the world (including one's experiments and interventions with it). If it doesn't behave as expected, then either we try on another possible identity, or adjust the one we had.

I think we went through this in a long (fun!) argument we had on the other board ages ago, where we disagreed about the priority of public language vs. private identification being foundational.

And I take it the clear answer is that the majority of this community does not hold her work in very high esteem. — John Doe

Sure, that's always been obvious. But there are many possible reasons for that other than "She's a moron and her philosophy is shit."

I'd be careful defending any political position that fails to adequately account for the views expressed by a large community of intelligent and hard working individuals from across the political spectrum. — John Doe

Well if you put it that way, then Rand isn't "ignored," but a modestly popular taste on the Right. (Lots of books sold, remember?)

And if you want to use "intelligence," as a criterion, what better measure of general intelligence do we have than IQ tests?

It's a stupid idea. Much better to limit democracy.

I think people have unrealistic expectations of democracy - its core function is simply to avoid civil war, and then secondarily to manage whatever can and ought to be managed by a State. That discussion about "can" and "ought" should go on outside the democratic process, as part of the great conversation of society - that's where you'll get the greater proportional contributions of smarter people.

But the idea of "one man one vote" is core to the idea that, given the power of strength in numbers, and given the fact that if you zoom out, human beings are about as equally dangerous in the raw, then when you have groups of people with strongly held, opposing opinions, the best way to handle it is by a vote, that everyone agrees at a meta level to abide by, in the secure knowledge that if they can convince others and get their turn, they'll be able to implement at least some of what they want to implement.

So the law of identity is really used independently of the logic, enforcing the idea that if this is the identified thing, which the logic is being applied to, then it and only it, is the thing which the logic is being applied to. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's an interesting way of looking at it, and it would explain why Aristotle actually didn't formulate the Law of Identity as such, didn't seem to think it that important, and didn't connect it through to the Law of Non-Contradiction (which really was Aristotle's thing). All that - the way we think of the Law of Identity today - seems to be a later development with some of the Schoolmen, Leibniz and Locke.

Aristotle said "Every thing is a something." And I think that's the core idea that's important - the idea that beings have identities, natures, specific ways they are and aren't. And then you get into the whole thing of actuality and potentiality and all the rest of it.

I don't understand why belief in God has to be a "taint" on philosophical study. Belief in a world of matter is just as much a bedrock assumption for many rationalists and humanists, is that a "taint?" Idealists might think so! :)

It's all good so long as people are prepared to examine their bedrock assumptions - even if they come out at the end of the process still holding to them, the journey is instructive for them, and for their audience.

But this is just an obviously false idea, especially once alternate logics started getting real development (starting with Intuintionistic Logic Heyting made based on Brouwer's intuitionism about math). Different logics make different metaphysical assumptions; intuitionistic logic is anti-realist (it was juxtaposed against math platonism for a reason). — MindForged

Sure there are alternative logics, but the question of interest is which form of logic does the world happen to behave in accordance with? At the level of the middle-sized furniture of the world, at least, it seems to be good old-fashioned binary logic.

This is probably the source of stigma of philosophy not making progress. It continuously drills down, making issues clearer while creating ever more positions people can hold on every issue. — MindForged

And that's something philosophers can do, but the question is whether it's worth doing - or whether philosophers doing that has been simply an artifact of the academic system.

Thinking about the big picture is also something philosophers can do - and in fact, in the eyes of most ordinary folks, they're paying a portion of their taxes in the hope that philosophers will do that dirty job that they don't have time to do, because they're so busy living ordinary lives. That philosopher are failing to take up their proper obligation and public responsibility, is part of Rand's complaint about philosophy as practiced.

the majority of educated people — John Doe

Generally a good guide, but not always.

(Also, I'd be careful about that sort of appeal to authority - libertarians have the highest IQ of all the political persuasions ;) )

though it's notable and interesting that you want to move in the direction of how Sellars views philosophy, so obviously the big-picture vision is not entirely dead in analytic departments — John Doe

Well that's why I referenced him - like, come on guys, get off your arses, it's not totally alien to your own tradition. So what if you get it wrong and other philosophers laugh and point? Try.

Ultimately, her thought is not of high enough value to justify the personal expenditure for most individuals — John Doe

We'll just have to agree to disagree.

I think that a great work of art is basically a microcosm, a miniature universe, with its own internal logic, and its goal or function is, as Schopenhauer suggested, to induce an arrest in normal, everyday consciousness. It's basically the secular version of a kind of religious or mystical experience. Art galleries are the humanist temples secular people go to in order to get a religious jag without religion.

An important side-effect is the cleansing of the doors of perception (you look at things afresh when "coming up for air" after being absorbed in a great work).

I would say also that art shouldn't be too much divorced from craft, and that some 20th century art took a bit of a wrong turn when it tried to do that. Over-intellectualized art is another blind alley, as is pure conceptualism.

Also, while art is in part a dialogue between artists down the generations, if it gets too introverted and self-referential and you need a secret decoder ring to "get" it, then again, it's drifted too far from the main point.

The question of whether you need a "guidebook" and knowledge of context (personal and social) is variable - whether it'll be worthwhile making the effort to know the context around the art depends on the quality of the artist, whether you're rewarded by making that effort or not.

But then, for the rest of us, why bother with her over the thousands of similar people for to whom we might extend the same courtesy? — John Doe

Well one obvious reason would be because she was a tremendously influential novelist as well. I mean, I like Anscombe as much as the next guy, but she didn't write best-selling philosophical novels that kick-started a sizeable political movement that still exist to this day.

So, it might be interesting to, you know, try and figure out why, what her message was, etc.- not just if you find her political position broadly congenial, but especially if you're against it.

Another reason she's interesting is because very few philosophers in recent times have tried their hand at a complete, systematic "big picture" philosophy with many levels, from synoptic overview to ethical, even aesthetic advice for everyday life. One might say that's because it's been demonstrated to be a fruitless or hubristic endeavour, but really it hasn't; the twee tone of faux humility that's characterized much of academic philosophy in the 20th century, especially in the analytic tradition, has really just been more of a fashion statement and "house style." It's how you write to get published and be clubbable among other academic philosophers. It's actually refreshing to read someone who isn't constrained in that way and is unafraid to have a go at trying to understand how "things, in the broadest possible sense of the term hang together in the broadest possible sense of the term."

I don't think there's anything wrong with an adversarial approach, and it doesn't negate a sort of "meta-love." Any competitive game is co-operative at a meta level.

Essentially the trick is to keep competitive discourse a game (in the course of which new things and truths can be discovered) and not let it get personal.

I think it's both morally okay and entertaining to be abusive in the abstract (re. what one considers to be stupid ideas and whoever holds them in general). But not directly to the person, no.

But of course there's a question of degree and threshold there (how much an abstract criticism "hits home"), so there's room for disagreement on where the line is.

But discussions would be a bit dull without a few insults thrown around here and there. As with most things human, discussion is a bit of an art.

She wasn't "officially" a philosopher no, but she had a decent enough educational attainment (in the context of her milieu) to be not entirely discountable as a thinker. IOW, she was notably bright and did well at school and university, so people who try to make out that she was thick and utterly discountable are protesting too much.

It's true that her understanding of philosophy and the history of philosophy isn't what's standard these days, but again, that's down to the context of her education - IOW, her understanding of philosophy and its history is what was current at the turn of the century in pre-revolutionary Russia. (e.g. consider that one of her tutors was a minor Russian Idealist philosopher.) One might say, in a trope, that her understanding of philosophy is frozen in amber, from a past time and another culture, and that's why it looks a bit strange to people who have been weaned on either the post-Frege/Russell analytic tradition or the post-Lukacs continental tradition.

The problem with most criticisms of Rand (apart from the ad homs and strawmen, which are obviously irrelevant) is that they miss the point that she has the classical understanding of identity, and most of her philosophy is built on that foundation. For example, criticisms of her ethics on the basis of the standard analytic is/ought distinction (such as Nozick's), completely miss the point that she really does take seriously the Aristotelian view that things have specific natures, which bypasses the Humean problematic entirely.

I do quibble with her stance on Kant somewhat - but again, she's reacting to one particular standard late 19th century view of Kant that she was taught, which is that Kant was a species of idealist.

In sum, once one understands her context and limitations better, one tends to cut her some slack, and within those limitations, she's actually quite an interesting philosopher. But of course many people will be unwilling to cut her that slack, for the obvious reason that she was vehemently anti-Communist and pro-Capitalist.

I am not putting forth an ideal society. — Andrew4Handel

What was all that stuff about "stewardship" then, if not a rough sketch of your ideal?

But is possible for a doctor to grow her own peas and clean her own toilet and play in an amateur orchestra. — Andrew4Handel

Yes, it's possible, but there's an opportunity cost to everything - the more peas, the more toilet cleaning, the less doctoring, and/or the less leisure for the doctor.

pseudosicentific nonsense — Baden

Whether it is "pseudoscientific nonsense" and "racist "or not is a topic for potentially civil debate - but not on this forum, apparently, and since I respect the Forum's prerogatives - after all, we wouldn't want this wonderful resource to get into trouble, would we? - I'll leave it at that.

It's fascinating to me that people use the term 'Social Justice Warrior' as a derogatory appellation, because it assumes that caring about social justice, whether through talking about it and the ways in which to secure it, and/or securing it through direct action, is somehow meaningless, or misplaced, as if obtaining social justice was impossible or futile or unnecessary etc., when, historically (and presently), that stance is wrong and misguided. — Maw

In the first place, we all recognize that there's a well-meaning impulse behind SJW activism. But you can call a thing a name without the thing actually exemplifying that name. Would it be wrong to laugh at the term, "The Democratic People's Republic of North Korea?"

In the second place, "social justice" is an Orwellian oxymoron. "Social justice," like many other Left-wing buzzwords, actually reverses the meaning of a commonly-understood term - IOW, it means, precisely injustice.

And you wonder why we laugh.

Like most people of all races, blacks have authored some of their own problems. — Bitter Crank

You realize saying that sort of thing makes you a "racist" and a "Nazi," right? :)

Yeah dude, totally not racist, sexist, transphobic... — Maw

Yes, correct. None of what I said was in the least bit racist, sexist or transphobic. The fact that you think the opposite demonstrates one of the reasons why the Left has lost and will continue to keep losing for the foreseeable future.

Which sarcastic one-liner just underlines my point. — Baden

Which sarcastic one-liner evidently went over your head.

The topic of the conversation when you came bustling in with your irrelevant tu quoque was the Left and the reasons why it's being laughed at, and the reasons why it failed, and will continue to fail for the foreseeable future.

If you and Maw could possibly restrain yourselves from reflexively committing fallacy after fallacy for a moment, perhaps it might be an interesting conversation to have.

What civil discourse is possible with the targets of your scorn? — Baden

I don't know, it depends on whether I'm deplatformed by them or not.

I was giving an example of the division of labour and how it creates menial tasks. — Andrew4Handel

And unless are you saying that there will be no necessity to sort peas or clean toilets in your ideal society, then you're implicitly admitting that your ideal society will also have division of labour and have menial tasks to do, so it's not something you can be against in principle.

I think we should interfere to improve the quality of peoples live as much as possible. — Andrew4Handel

I'd rather leave them be to improve their lot by their own efforts, or not, as they choose. I'm not prepared to impose some pretty pattern that's arisen in my head, on their lives.

Ultimately it seems like you will never agree with any tactic or idea the Left has, unless it moves to the Right. — Maw

No, that's not the case at all. I expect that there will be some core principles on which we'll never agree (unless obviously one of us does shift our core beliefs); but I also expect some measure of civil discourse and occasional compromise, and I don't appreciate being demonized by people who are so all-fired sure of their position that they prejudicially view anyone who disagrees with them as evil, stupid, deplorable, racist, sexist, homophobic, xenophobic, Islamaphobic - you name it

despite the introspection and self-critique the Left went through after Trump' s election — Maw

If there had been any genuine, heartfelt self-critique, the Left would not have continued to do for the past 18 months exactly what it did to lose the election.

Self-critique involves considering the possibility that you might be entirely wrong in your asssumptions, not merely mulling over possible tactical tweaks.

But thanks for the amusing Freudian slip: "critical self-defense." :D

Again, this:-

I think division of labour is problematic — Andrew4Handel

Contradicts this:-

Someone has to sort odd peas, or clean toilets — Andrew4Handel

But you seem oblivious - it's like you have two hermetically-sealed compartments in your thought that aren't sparking together. It parallels your not noticing that a claim of dispossession implicitly affirms the principle of private property, or that a claim of theft implicitly affirms the principle of private property.

It is too late to claim we are starting on a level playing field. — Andrew4Handel

That's not the "claim," the recommendation is that we ought to be maintaining a level playing field now, and now, and now, and now ...

the self-flagellation that occurred immediately after Trump's election — Maw

Thanks for providing an example of what I was talking about :)