Does Meinong's "being" mean anything?

Subsist: Seems mostly abstract: Numbers, mathematics, and such. Meinong seems to give them a sort of being of their own, mind-independent, so the word isn't idealistic in nature. Still, is subsistence prior to mathematical truths? What would he say?.................................He allows predication on nonexistent 'objects' such as Santa. — noAxioms

For Meinong there are three kinds of objects. Those that exist, those that subsist and those that absist. All these objects have properties.

Those objects that subsist, such as numbers and Santa have non-existence and being.

There is a problem with Meinong's meaning of "existence". Presumably the word "existence" is being used to describe things in a world independent of the mind rather than being used to describe things in the mind. However, I would say that "thoughts exist", and I have always used the word" exist" to refer to things that exist not only in the mind but also in the world. However, it seems that in any discussion about Meinong, the word "exist" is being restricted to things in the world.

For me, it seems clear that Santa exists in the mind and doesn't exist in the world. But Meinong says that although Santa doesn't exist in the world, has a non-existence in the world, Santa has "being" in the world. This makes no sense to me. Just because I say "the moon is made of blue cheese" doesn't mean that the moon is made of blue cheese. Just because Meinong might say "Santa has being in the world" doesn't mean that Santa has being in the world.

Anyone can say anything, Sometimes they say true things and sometimes they say false things. Perhaps this is the case for Santa's being in the world.

Is a lack of properties a property?

Anything requires predication, since a lack of properties is itself a property, and a contradictory one at that...self-referencing properties have always had the potential for paradox — noAxioms

The statement "a lack of properties is itself a property" breaks the Law of Non-contradiction. From the Law of Non-contradiction, A cannot be not A. Let A be the presence of a property.

Then the absence of a property cannot be the presence of a property.

This presumes EPP. — noAxioms

For Meinong there are three types of objects. Objects that exist, such as horses. Objects that subsist such as numbers. Objects that absist such as the round square.

Therefore, for Meinong, everything in reality is a kind of object. There is nothing in reality that is not an object. All these objects have properties. Therefore there is nothing in reality that doesn't have a property.

Therefore, for Meinong, in reality there cannot be an absence of properties.

But in UK, the public and the law seem to regard them as just usual perks of the job. Would it be the case? — Corvus

In case a moderator is reading this, the OP needs an understanding of what is true and what is false, what is better and what is worse. The OP is about the morality of man's behaviour. The following is an example of morality.

The politicians always argue that these perks are within the "law" which may well be the case, but I am sure that the public find such behaviour disgraceful.

Who would not buy their own glasses!

The issue that has emerged with these particular glasses in recent days is that they were not bought out of Starmer’s own pocket. He received a donation in May — while still in opposition — to the tune of £2,485 from Waheed Alli, a businessman and Labour peer, for “multiple pairs of glasses”.

That being legal doesn't make it moral.

Genuine practice of democracy is rare. Due to the fact, most preachers of democracy give impressions of false pretense and their ignorance. — Corvus

Yes, on the one hand Keir Starmer said 4 January 2024 that he would clean up politics.

No. I say to all my fellow politicians – Labour and Tory – to change Britain, we must change ourselves. We need to clean up politics. No more VIP fast lanes. No more kickbacks for colleagues. No more revolving doors between government and the companies they regulate. I will restore standards in public life with a total crackdown on cronyism.

On the other hand, he accepted gifts from Labour peer Lord Alli.

Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer received an additional £16,000 worth of clothes from Labour peer Lord Alli, it has emerged. The donations, first reported by the Guardian, external, were initially declared as money for his private office as leader of the opposition. The gifts - of £10,000 in October 2023 and £6,000 in February this year - were declared on time, but will now be re-categorised as donations in kind of clothing.

Hence the reason why you should keep distance from the fallacy of authority or majority — Corvus

The will of the majority is the worst form of government there is apart from for all the other systems of government which have been tried.

"Democracy Is the Worst Form of Government Except For All Others Which Have Been Tried"

Winston Churchill 1947:

Many forms of Government have been tried, and will be tried in this world of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of Government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time; but there is the broad feeling in our country that the people should rule, continuously rule, and that public opinion, expressed by all constitutional means, should shape, guide, and control the actions of Ministers who are their servants and not their masters.

The contents and states of one's subjective and private mental experience cannot be presented as the basis of the objective evidence in the arguments — Corvus

If in a room of 100 people, 1 person says that they see the ghost of Napoleon, but the other 99 say that they don't, then this is objective evidence that that 1 person is suffering an hallucination.

I agree that the subjective mental experience of a single person cannot be presented as objective evidence, but the subjective mental experience of 99 people in agreement can be presented as objective evidence.

The more people in agreement, the less subjective the evidence and the more objective.

A thing having a property is an entirely different subject than something's knowledge of a property. Whether the property is conceived of or not seems off topic. — noAxioms

But how can you know about the properties of a thing-in-itself if you have no knowledge of the thing-in-itself?

Going down this path is once again why the disclaimer is there in the OP. I see no productivity to it. — noAxioms

Our only knowledge comes from mental abstractions.

Metaphysically speaking, how can we know something that doesn't depend on our mental abstractions? If metaphysically impossible, the disclaimer in the OP makes the OP unanswerable.

So, it is not bad thing to have the strict legal system in some aspect, would you not agree? — Corvus

I agree, as long as society thinks that a strict legal system is moral.

Hallucination is not extreme case. It is a subjective case. — Corvus

The Argument from Hallucination against Direct Realism is making an objective case against Direct Realism.

Anything requires predication, since a lack of properties is itself a property, and a contradictory one at that. — noAxioms

I don't think that it is grammatically correct to say that a lack of properties is itself a property.

Both the EPP and Meinong accept that properties are attributed to objects. A property is any member of a class of entities that are capable of being attributed to objects (Wikipedia - Property (philosophy). The EPP means that the existence of an object is prior to the object's predication. Meinong said that there are three types of objects, those that exist, those that subsist and those that absist.

Objects have properties. In the absence of properties there must be an absence of an object. In the absence of an object there must be an absence of properties. Therefore, in the absence of properties there must be the absence of any property

For the EPP, the lack of properties means the lack of any property. For Meinong, the lack of properties means the lack of any object, which means the lack of any property. Therefore, the lack of properties cannot be a property.

It wouldn't be accepted as valid or meaningful arguments on the basis of either non relevant or highly unlikely example. — Corvus

Hardly highly unlikely. "In the 21st century, hudud, including amputation of limbs, is part of the legal systems of Brunei, Iran, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen" (www.studycountry.com)

Again, the other party can reject the arguments on the basis of highly unlikely example or irrelevant example for the main point. — Corvus

Direct Realists may reject the Argument from Hallucination, but many Indirect Realists accept it as a valid argument.

Appealing to Extremes is a formal fallacy. — Corvus

Being an extreme case doesn't in itself make a logical fallacy.

I agree that an extreme case, where an argument is exaggerated to such a hyperbolic degree that it distorts the argument, would be a logical fallacy.

However, an extreme case, where an argument is not exaggerated to such a hyperbolic degree that it distorts the argument, would not be a logical fallacy.

The Argument from hallucination deals with an extreme case and is used as an argument against Direct Realism. That it is an extreme case does not mean that it is not a valid argument.

Isn't the law formally accepted legal system by the people of the society? — Corvus

I don't think that society would willingly accept a legal system that was immoral. I have no evidence, but I am sure that this is the case.

Isn't this an appeal to extreme case fallacy? — Corvus

Being an extreme case doesn't make it a fallacy.

Good point, so long as 'properties' isn't confined to your experience. — noAxioms

The problem is that it is impossible to talk about properties independent of our experiences of them.

The question is about the relationship between existence and properties. But what do we mean by "properties". You raise the problem as to how we can know something that is outside our experiences.

However, you present an impossible task when you say "Good point, as long as "properties isn't confined to your experience", in that how can we discuss something that we have never experienced. We can only talk about things we have experienced. We cannot talk about things we haven't experienced. We can only talk about those aspects of properties that we have experienced. We cannot talk about those aspect of properties that we haven't experienced

Kant made the point when he said that we cannot discuss things-in-themselves, as they are the other side of anything we experience. Something outside our experiences is an unknown, and if unknown, we cannot talk about it. It is impossible to know about something about which we have no experience. It is impossible to know how those aspects of properties we have experienced relate to those aspects of properties we haven't experienced.

When we do discuss properties, we can only discuss those aspects of the property that we know about, and we can only know something by experiencing it. There may well be aspects of the property that we haven't experienced, but these aspects must remain unknown to us. Being unknown, we cannot talk about them. Everything we know about our experiences we can describe in words as part of language. The properties we describe in language only includes those aspects of properties that we have experienced.

We only know about properties because of our experiences. Because we have experienced the colour red, we are able to talk about the property of redness. We are only able to describe the properties we have experienced in words, within language, and this surely is the distinguishing feature of what we know about properties. Everything we know about properties can be described in words. For us, a property is a description. We can only describe what we have experienced.

A property is a description in language of something we have experienced. A property is not something that exists independently of the human mind in the mind-independent world. Such a thing would be a thing-in-itself, an unknown unknown.

What we mean by "properties" is of necessity confined to our experiences, and exist as propositions within language.

Morality only judges the moral actions of the folks. Legality judges the acts and also hand down the punishments according the law, hence legality precedes morality. — Corvus

The law could state that the punishment for stealing anything valued up to £50 was the amputation of the right hand.

You are right that the law judges the act and hands down a punishment according to the law.

Are you arguing that a particular law must be followed by a society even if that society believes that that particular law is morally wrong?

Isn't it itself an act of moral wrongness to break the law, revolt and overthrow the system? — Corvus

No, as only moral laws are valid. It is not morally wrong to break a law that itself is not moral.

I agree that it is the moral thing to do to follow the laws of the country.

However, the assumption is that laws are founded on moral principles. Only laws founded on moral principles are valid laws. If a law is not founded on moral principles then it is an invalid law. Therefore, the moral thing to do is to follow valid laws, and valid laws are founded on principles of morality. It is not immoral to not follow invalid laws, those laws that are not based on principles of morality.

Breaking a law not founded on moral principles is not morally wrong.

You have options to get adjusted to the system whatever system you live in, and flourish under the system knowing it and abiding by it — Corvus

Even if the system is morally wrong? In abiding by a system that is morally wrong, then one is condoning it, meaning that abiding to a morally wrong system is in itself an immoral act.

There is the commonly held principle (does it have a name? "EPP" if not) that existence is conceptually prior to predication, prior to it having any property at all. So an apple is red only if the apple exists Santa is not meaningfully fat — noAxioms

What does prior in "existence is prior to predication" mean?

From SEP - Existence

There are two sets of reasons for denying that existence is a property of individuals. The first is Hume and Kant's puzzlement over what existence would add to an object. What is the difference between a red apple and a red existing apple? To be red (or even to be an apple) it must already exist, as only existing things instantiate properties

The thing's existence is prior to any predication to it and so it is incoherent to think of existence as a property had by the thing. This thought is behind Aristotle's thesis that existence is not a further feature of a thing beyond its essence.

Hume argued (in A Treatise of Human Nature 1.2.6) that there is no impression of existence distinct from the impression of an object, which is ultimately on Hume's view a bundle of qualities.

From Merriam Webster, "prior" may mean i) earlier in time or order ii) taking precedence (as in importance).

For an apple to be red, the apple must exist.

It cannot be the case that an apple exists and at a later time the property "is red" is added, so meaning i) is not relevant.

In Hume's view, existence is no more than a bundle of properties. Therefore for Hume, ii) is not relevant.

We can only know about the existence of something in the world by observing its properties. If we never observed the property red we could never know about the existence of an apple in the world.

In what way does the existence of something take precedence over its properties, when that something cannot exist without properties?

Looking at it the other way round, in what way do the properties of something take precedence over the existence of that something, when there would be no properties if that something didn't exist?

It seems, that the word "prior" is not the correct word in relating the existence of something with the properties it has. Perhaps the phrase should be "existence requires predication"?

Humans are more important. — Patterner

For humans, humans are more important than cats.
For cats, cats are more important than mice.
For mice, mice are more important than cockroaches
For cockroaches, cockroaches are more important than bed bugs.

Philosophically, is it right that one part of nature is more important than another part of nature?

Why do you think that is the case? Does morality precede legality? Or vice versa? — Corvus

It is the moral thing that morality precedes legality, even if that is not always the case.

I don't think the public would accept a legal system that was not fundamentally moral. Sooner or later they would revolt and overthrow the system.

If you are a citizen of a country, then would you have choice not to accept the legal system? — Corvus

True. I have no choice, regardless of whether I believe the system to be immoral or not. Though I could emigrate.

That's why the difference between being able to judge and not being able to judge is more philosophically important than the difference between the electron and the Higgs Boson. — Patterner

That means that philosophical questions about the nature of time, space and the Universe are less important than philosophical questions about the human mind.

Is it right that humans consider themselves more important than the world in which they live?

But that's completely groundless speculation. — Wayfarer

Perhaps, but as you correctly wrote:

The capacity to grasp what could be, might be, or should be, is what distinguishes humans from other species — Wayfarer

As to why the ability to judge should be argued to be of special importance—it very obviously is — Janus

Why is the ability to judge of "special" importance? I agree that it is an important philosophical question, but why more important than other philosophical questions, such as those of space, time, existence, consciousness, the quantum theory, knowledge, the origin of the Universe, etc?

Is there a philosophical difference between the electron and the Higgs Boson? — Patterner

A very good philosophical question. The philosophy of particle physics is an academic topic.

For example, the Cambridge University press has a series about elements in the philosophy of physics.

From Philosophy of Particle Physics

This Element offers an introduction to selected philosophical issues that arise in contemporary particle physics, aimed at philosophers who have limited prior exposure to quantum field theory. One the one hand, it critically surveys philosophical work on the representation of particles in quantum field theory, the formal machinery and conceptual implications of renormalization and renormalization group methods, and ontological and methodological questions raised by the use of effective field theory techniques in particle physics. On the other, it identifies topics in particle physics that have not yet received philosophical attention and sketches avenues for philosophical analysis of those topics.

There is the commonly held principle (does it have a name? "EPP" if not) that existence is conceptually prior to predication, prior to it having any property at all. So an apple is red only if the apple exists Santa is not meaningfully fat. — noAxioms

I believe that for Bertrand Russell, there is something that is an apple and is red.

Being an apple is a predication in the same way that being red is a predication.

Should one say existence is prior to predication or existence is contemporaneous with its predication?

It is not as if something exists and then at a future date a predication is attached.

Certainly, mortality is relative. But I'm suggesting there's a common reason for all morality.........................Perhaps moral codes are all rooted in what gives the individual the best chance of continued life and prosperity. — Patterner

Moral absolutism is a meta ethical view that some or even all actions are intrinsically right or wrong, regardless of context or consequence (Wikipedia - Moral absolutism)

Is it possible for a moral code to be intrinsically right, even though it may not give the individual the best chance of continued life and prosperity?

That process is nothing to do with morality. — Corvus

I agree that once the criminal laws have been established, it then becomes a legal rather than moral judgment.

But the criminal justice system will only work if the criminal laws are moral.

Would you accept as a citizen of a country criminal laws that were not moral?

The punishment is a legal judgement. It has nothing to do with morality. — Corvus

Yes, legal judgments are different to moral judgements. But as bread is different to wheat, bread is made from wheat. Legal judgements are founded in moral judgments. Any law not judged to be moral would be unacceptable

From Law vs. Ethics: The Debate Over What’s Legal and What’s Right

While the law functions as a system of rules backed by political authority to maintain order, ethics is a broader concept grounded in personal, cultural, and societal values.

Law is a formal system of rules enforced by governmental institutions. The law’s objective is to maintain social order, protect rights, and promote justice.

Justice, after all, is a product of moral values.

The protection of rights is a moral duty.

Social order is the moral thing to achieve.

If Legal judgment is not founded on moral judgment, where does legal judgment get its authority?

Perhaps moral codes are all rooted in what gives the individual the best chance of continued life and prosperity. — Patterner

Moral Relativism rather than Moral Absolutism.

Moral normativity is effective for the time period and the societies we live in...................That would be a fallacy of anachronism. — Corvus

OK, lets consider 2025 and avoid anachronism.

Stoning to death is a legal punishment for adultery in Iran, and therefore normative within Iran today (Wikipedia - Capital punishment in Iran).

Some within Iran may disagree with this law. That some disagree with the moral normativity of the society that they live in, does it follow that this makes them necessarily morally corrupt or morally insensitive?

Of course there would be folks who don't agree, or understand the maxim...In that case, they would be treated as morally corrupt or morally insensitive......................Morality is also based on what is called "normativity" — Corvus

Slavery was normative in Ancient Rome and played an important role in its society and economy (Wikipedia - Slavery in ancient Rome)

It may well be that the minority who did not agree with slavery were treated as morally corrupt or morally insensitive by the majority

But does that mean that they were in fact either morally corrupt or morally insensitive?

It would be like asking "Why 1+1=2", wouldn't it? — Corvus

Some would say that 1 + 1 = 10

It depends on what number system you are using.

Doing X harms others, therefore X is morally wrong. Could this be not a justification of moral code? — Corvus

The moral code "Doing X harms others, therefore X is morally wrong" can be described.

But, how can you justify in words why that X harming others is morally wrong?

Why is harming others wrong?

I think it's because what is described nowadays as philosophy doesn't have the foundational concepts required to comprehend why it's important. — Wayfarer

Why is one difference more philosophically important than another difference?

Life may be common throughout the Universe, and H.sapiens may not be the only example of something that can judge the world around it. In which case, being able to judge may be a natural expression of the nature of the world.

Yes, something having the ability to judge, such as a human, is different to something that doesn't have the ability to judge, such as a tree, but how can this be argued to be of special importance, if no more than a natural expression of nature.

Why is the difference between being able to judge and not being able to judge more philosophically important than the difference between the electron and the Higgs Bosun?

Does everyone who does things that don't make sense have a disorder? — Patterner

No.

Intuitively doing something that makes sense

Sometimes people do things intuitively because it makes sense at the time. Sometimes these acts are intuitive, such as giving up a well paid job or starting to take a particular drug. It may not be possible to put their reasons into words, other than the feeling that it is the right thing to do.

Sometimes these acts are beneficial, such as finding another job that is even better paid, and sometime these acts are detrimental, such as in becoming an addict.

The consequence of an intuitive act is only known subsequently. The consequence of an intuitive act that makes sense at the time can only be known subsequent to the act. Sometimes it may be beneficial and sometimes it may be detrimental. With hindsight, someone who makes an act that is subsequently seen to be detrimental can be said to have a disorder, and someone who makes an act that is subsequently seen to be beneficial can be said to be sensible.

Whether someone who makes an intuitive act because it makes sense at the time can only be said to have a disorder or be sensible subsequent to the act when the consequences of the act are known.

Moral codes
A moral code is an example of something that is followed intuitively because it makes sense at the time.

As Wittgenstein wrote in the Tractatus, ethical values cannot be put into words. The reasons why something is moral cannot be put into words, even though the moral code itself can be put into words. "Thou shall not kill" can be included within a proposition even though why thou shall not kill cannot be. One follows the moral code because it intuitively makes sense. This doesn't mean that one cannot break one's own moral code if the circumstances require it, for example, if "thou shall not kill" conflicts with one's personal survival.

Moral codes can be described but not justified.

The capacity to grasp what could be, might be, or should be, is what distinguishes humans from other species. — Wayfarer

There are examples now showing an animal's ability to grasp what might be.

From Crows could be the smartest animal other than primates

Crows have long been considered cunning. But their intelligence may be far more advanced than we ever thought possible.
Crows, in fact, might be like us not so much because they are clever (and so are we) but rather because they sometimes engage their cleverness simply for fun – and so do we.
The crows McCoy studies have a natural curiosity, she says. They cheekily grab scientific equipment and fly off with it in the aviary. Young birds especially, she says, love to play.
That said, “clever” animals can sometimes perform tasks beyond those strictly demanded by nature.

From Are crows the ultimate problem solvers? - Inside the Animal Mind: Episode 2 - BBC

The bird is familiar with the individual objects, but this is the first time he's seen them arranged like this. 8 separate stages, that must be completed in a specific order if the puzzle is to be solved.

The ability to work through 8 separate stages in a specific order infers that more than a simplistic instinct is at play.

The capacity to grasp what might be is now being found in animals other than humans.

There is evidence that some animals can be altruistic. Altruism is linked with having a conscience.

Altruism is the concern for the well-being of others, independently of personal benefit or reciprocity (Wikipedia). Having a conscience is being aware of the moral goodness of one's own conduct (Merriam Webbster)

From Are Animals Altruistic?
.

Take African grey parrots, for example: A recent study revealed that they voluntarily gave the tokens they were trained to exchange for food to parrots that had no tokens. The biologists who conducted this study were surprised when they realized that the parrots seemed to have a genuine understanding of when and why their partners needed their help—they would rarely give the tokens over when the window to exchange them for food was closed.

The concern for the well-being of others is an example of moral behaviour

Having a conscience is being aware when one should be being altruistic towards others but for some reason isn't.

If the African grey parrot has an understanding of when and why their partners needed their help, but doesn't provide any help for whatever reason, being torn between ought to do something but not doing something is the hallmark of having a conscience.

This is not to say that a parrots sense of morality equals that of a human, but does suggest that the parrot has a glimmer of morality, and consequently the glimmer of a conscience.

Humans are animals after all. The human animal evolved from non-human animals. The human animal didn't appear ready-formed from nowhere.

But if it did ‘make sense’ to you, nothing you’ve said would prevent you from so doing. You’re not describing a moral code — Wayfarer

If a moral code didn't make sense, it wouldn't be followed.

A moral code can be a set of principles of ethical conduct established by an individual for that individual (Dictionary.com, Definitions.net). Ethics is concerned with what is good and bad, right and wrong. (Britannica.com)

If something doesn't make sense to me then I avoid doing it.

I think that it is good that I avoid doing something that doesn't make sense to me. I think that I am right in avoiding doing something that doesn't make sense to me.

What I think good and right of necessity follows from what makes sense to me.

Morality is not an abstract concept that has no bearing on how I live my life, but is a concrete concept directly related to my relationship with the world.

If being good made no sense, and if doing the right thing made no sense, neither being good nor doing the right thing would be part of my moral code.

I have a personal moral code precisely because some things make sense and some things don't.

I'm afraid the attitude that you're describing is very close to that of a psychopathology. There's no reason for any action, other than what makes sense to me. Nature may have reasons, but there's no way you or I can know what they are. — Wayfarer

Stealing doesn't make sense to me, therefore I avoid stealing. I wouldn't conclude that my avoiding stealing because of my subjective belief that stealing is wrong should therefore be studied as a mental illness. :smile:

Humans are natural. Humans judge good and evil. Therefore, nature judges good and evil. — Patterner

P1 Humans are part of nature
P2 An individual human can make a judgment as to what is good or evil
P3 There is no consistent judgment across all individuals as to what is good or evil, and it may be that different individuals judgments are in opposition to each other.
C1 Each individual's judgment as to what is good or evil is particular to them and is subjective.

P1 Within nature, either i) there is an objective judgment of good or evil or ii) there is no objective judgment of good or evil

P1 Assume that within nature there is an objective judgment of good or evil.
P2 Humans are part of nature.
P3 Each individual's judgment as to what is good or evil is particular to them and is subjective.
C1 As within nature there is an objective judgement of good and evil, yet only subjective judgments of what is good or evil within individual humans, humans are not aware of the objective judgment of good and evil.

P1 Assume that within nature there is no objective judgment of good and evil
P2 Humans are part of nature
P3 Each individual's judgment as to what is good or evil is particular to them and is subjective
C1 As between different individuals there may be a range of judgments as to what is good or evil, it is not possible to determine an objective judgment of what is good or evil.
C2 Within nature, whilst there may be a range of judgments as to what is good or evil, there can be no objective judgment of what is good or evil.

In conclusion, within nature there may be an objective judgement of what is good or evil, but humans are not aware of it. The fact that humans are part of nature and make subjective judgments as to what is good or evil does not mean that within nature there is an objective judgment of what is good or evil.

It doesn’t present an argument or arguments, but a series of declarations. — Wayfarer

:smile: Plenty to take on board and food for thought. There is plenty to say, but limiting myself to Wittgenstein.

The basis of ethics is neither subjective nor objective, but transcendental. That is what Wittgenstein means when he says ‘ethics is transcendent’ (TLP 6.41) - objective propositions are what ethics are transcendent in respect to. Conscience is traditionally that faculty which is guided by or drawn towards a transcendent source of ethics, something lacking in animals for whom such matters do not arise. — Wayfarer

In TLP 6.421, does Wittgenstein write "Ethics is transcendent" or "Ethics is transcendental"?
What does Wittgenstein mean by "Ethics is transcendental"? (TLP 6.421)
When Wittgenstein says "transcendental", does he in fact mean "transcendent"?
How does "transcendent" differ to "transcendental"?
Why are ethics transcendental rather than subjective or objective?
Why is conscience drawn to a transcendent source of ethics?
Does Wittgenstein think that ethics can be put into propositions?
How do we know that the transcendent source of ethics is objective?
How do you know that animals have no conscience?

Underlining declarations doesn’t make them valid arguments. — Wayfarer

Of course not. That is why the underlined declaration is immediately followed by my argument, hopefully valid.

But I hope that underlining the declarations makes it easier for the busy Forum reader, who is often contributing to several threads at the same time, to more easily follow the structure of my reply.

Headings are sometimes advised. For example, in the article Should you Include Headings and Subheadings in an Essay?

If you have ever tried reading a large blob of text, then you know how hard it can be. However, it becomes easier to read when broken into headings and subheadings.

Academic writings like essays have a standard of writing that must be upheld. While not every essay requires headings and subheadings, they are important for organizing your writing.

For example if someone's society judges them to not be fit to participate in that society and subsequently banishes or imprisons that person, I'd expect that person to find society's judgement to be meaningful. — wonderer1

The imprisoned person may feel angry, but this would be an emotion, not a subjective judgement by the prisoner.

Being imprisoned would be an objective fact for the imprisoned person, not a subjective judgment of the prisoner.

If every judgement I make, "killing is wrong", can be countered by its opposite, "killing is right", what value do my judgments have?