The capacity to grasp what could be, might be, or should be, is what distinguishes humans from other species. — Wayfarer

There are examples now showing an animal's ability to grasp what might be.

From Crows could be the smartest animal other than primates

Crows have long been considered cunning. But their intelligence may be far more advanced than we ever thought possible.
Crows, in fact, might be like us not so much because they are clever (and so are we) but rather because they sometimes engage their cleverness simply for fun – and so do we.
The crows McCoy studies have a natural curiosity, she says. They cheekily grab scientific equipment and fly off with it in the aviary. Young birds especially, she says, love to play.
That said, “clever” animals can sometimes perform tasks beyond those strictly demanded by nature.

From Are crows the ultimate problem solvers? - Inside the Animal Mind: Episode 2 - BBC

The bird is familiar with the individual objects, but this is the first time he's seen them arranged like this. 8 separate stages, that must be completed in a specific order if the puzzle is to be solved.

The ability to work through 8 separate stages in a specific order infers that more than a simplistic instinct is at play.

The capacity to grasp what might be is now being found in animals other than humans.

There is evidence that some animals can be altruistic. Altruism is linked with having a conscience.

Altruism is the concern for the well-being of others, independently of personal benefit or reciprocity (Wikipedia). Having a conscience is being aware of the moral goodness of one's own conduct (Merriam Webbster)

From Are Animals Altruistic?
.

Take African grey parrots, for example: A recent study revealed that they voluntarily gave the tokens they were trained to exchange for food to parrots that had no tokens. The biologists who conducted this study were surprised when they realized that the parrots seemed to have a genuine understanding of when and why their partners needed their help—they would rarely give the tokens over when the window to exchange them for food was closed.

The concern for the well-being of others is an example of moral behaviour

Having a conscience is being aware when one should be being altruistic towards others but for some reason isn't.

If the African grey parrot has an understanding of when and why their partners needed their help, but doesn't provide any help for whatever reason, being torn between ought to do something but not doing something is the hallmark of having a conscience.

This is not to say that a parrots sense of morality equals that of a human, but does suggest that the parrot has a glimmer of morality, and consequently the glimmer of a conscience.

Humans are animals after all. The human animal evolved from non-human animals. The human animal didn't appear ready-formed from nowhere.

But if it did ‘make sense’ to you, nothing you’ve said would prevent you from so doing. You’re not describing a moral code — Wayfarer

If a moral code didn't make sense, it wouldn't be followed.

A moral code can be a set of principles of ethical conduct established by an individual for that individual (Dictionary.com, Definitions.net). Ethics is concerned with what is good and bad, right and wrong. (Britannica.com)

If something doesn't make sense to me then I avoid doing it.

I think that it is good that I avoid doing something that doesn't make sense to me. I think that I am right in avoiding doing something that doesn't make sense to me.

What I think good and right of necessity follows from what makes sense to me.

Morality is not an abstract concept that has no bearing on how I live my life, but is a concrete concept directly related to my relationship with the world.

If being good made no sense, and if doing the right thing made no sense, neither being good nor doing the right thing would be part of my moral code.

I have a personal moral code precisely because some things make sense and some things don't.

I'm afraid the attitude that you're describing is very close to that of a psychopathology. There's no reason for any action, other than what makes sense to me. Nature may have reasons, but there's no way you or I can know what they are. — Wayfarer

Stealing doesn't make sense to me, therefore I avoid stealing. I wouldn't conclude that my avoiding stealing because of my subjective belief that stealing is wrong should therefore be studied as a mental illness. :smile:

Humans are natural. Humans judge good and evil. Therefore, nature judges good and evil. — Patterner

P1 Humans are part of nature
P2 An individual human can make a judgment as to what is good or evil
P3 There is no consistent judgment across all individuals as to what is good or evil, and it may be that different individuals judgments are in opposition to each other.
C1 Each individual's judgment as to what is good or evil is particular to them and is subjective.

P1 Within nature, either i) there is an objective judgment of good or evil or ii) there is no objective judgment of good or evil

P1 Assume that within nature there is an objective judgment of good or evil.
P2 Humans are part of nature.
P3 Each individual's judgment as to what is good or evil is particular to them and is subjective.
C1 As within nature there is an objective judgement of good and evil, yet only subjective judgments of what is good or evil within individual humans, humans are not aware of the objective judgment of good and evil.

P1 Assume that within nature there is no objective judgment of good and evil
P2 Humans are part of nature
P3 Each individual's judgment as to what is good or evil is particular to them and is subjective
C1 As between different individuals there may be a range of judgments as to what is good or evil, it is not possible to determine an objective judgment of what is good or evil.
C2 Within nature, whilst there may be a range of judgments as to what is good or evil, there can be no objective judgment of what is good or evil.

In conclusion, within nature there may be an objective judgement of what is good or evil, but humans are not aware of it. The fact that humans are part of nature and make subjective judgments as to what is good or evil does not mean that within nature there is an objective judgment of what is good or evil.

It doesn’t present an argument or arguments, but a series of declarations. — Wayfarer

:smile: Plenty to take on board and food for thought. There is plenty to say, but limiting myself to Wittgenstein.

The basis of ethics is neither subjective nor objective, but transcendental. That is what Wittgenstein means when he says ‘ethics is transcendent’ (TLP 6.41) - objective propositions are what ethics are transcendent in respect to. Conscience is traditionally that faculty which is guided by or drawn towards a transcendent source of ethics, something lacking in animals for whom such matters do not arise. — Wayfarer

In TLP 6.421, does Wittgenstein write "Ethics is transcendent" or "Ethics is transcendental"?
What does Wittgenstein mean by "Ethics is transcendental"? (TLP 6.421)
When Wittgenstein says "transcendental", does he in fact mean "transcendent"?
How does "transcendent" differ to "transcendental"?
Why are ethics transcendental rather than subjective or objective?
Why is conscience drawn to a transcendent source of ethics?
Does Wittgenstein think that ethics can be put into propositions?
How do we know that the transcendent source of ethics is objective?
How do you know that animals have no conscience?

Underlining declarations doesn’t make them valid arguments. — Wayfarer

Of course not. That is why the underlined declaration is immediately followed by my argument, hopefully valid.

But I hope that underlining the declarations makes it easier for the busy Forum reader, who is often contributing to several threads at the same time, to more easily follow the structure of my reply.

Headings are sometimes advised. For example, in the article Should you Include Headings and Subheadings in an Essay?

If you have ever tried reading a large blob of text, then you know how hard it can be. However, it becomes easier to read when broken into headings and subheadings.

Academic writings like essays have a standard of writing that must be upheld. While not every essay requires headings and subheadings, they are important for organizing your writing.

For example if someone's society judges them to not be fit to participate in that society and subsequently banishes or imprisons that person, I'd expect that person to find society's judgement to be meaningful. — wonderer1

The imprisoned person may feel angry, but this would be an emotion, not a subjective judgement by the prisoner.

Being imprisoned would be an objective fact for the imprisoned person, not a subjective judgment of the prisoner.

If every judgement I make, "killing is wrong", can be countered by its opposite, "killing is right", what value do my judgments have?

That's what I was getting at when I said that the tendency to idolise nature and the environment in modern culture really amounts to a kind of faux religiosity. — Wayfarer

Humans are a part of nature and not separate to it
Humans are a part of nature and not separate to it. Particular features of human existence, such as self-awareness, ability to judge, being intellectual rather than instinctive and having a morality may be explained as natural expressions of nature. Nature is using the agency of the human to express these particular features, rather than being expressed by a human existing separately to a world in which they have evolved.

Knowledge is different to good and evil
There is knowledge, the Moon is about 384,000 km away from Earth, and there is good and evil, kindness is good and killing is evil. But these are different things, in that we have knowledge about things that exist in the world, but good and evil only exist in the mind.

Human self-awareness is not evidence that humans are separate to nature
That humans are self-aware is not evidence that humans are separate to nature. If humans are a part of nature rather than separate to it, then it may be argued that it is the case that nature is self-aware through the agency of the human. Human self-awareness is the mechanism by which nature is self-aware. In the same sense, the hammer is the tool by which I hammer in a nail. It is not the hammer that is hammering in the nail.

Human judgement is not evidence that humans are separate to nature
It is true that humans are capable of judgement and are intellectual rather than instinctive, but this would be the case regardless of whether we had free will, where we can decide to act in a certain way, or were determined by forces over which we had no control. For the Determinist, all behaviour has a cause, meaning that even though we make judgements these have been determined. For the believer in Free-will, we have some choice in how we behave. That humans are determined is evidence that humans are not separate to nature, as it is nature which makes the determination. That humans have free-will is not evidence that humans are separate to nature. As with self-awareness, nature has free-will through the agency of the human. Human free will is the mechanism by which nature has free will.

Human subjective morality may be an illusion
Humans are aware of morality and have ethical dilemmas, but such concepts of good and evil, better or worse, right or wrong don't objectively exist in the world but only subjectively in the mind. However, as you wrote about the tendency to idolise nature and the environment as a kind of faux religiosity, it may well be the case that our concepts of good and evil are no more than a faux morality, no more than an illusion having no substance. The problem with a morality that is subjective is that it must forever remain particular to the individual, particular to a particular time and particular to a particular context. One person knows that Pro Life is good and Pro choice evil, another person knows that Pro Life is evil and Pro choice is good. The moral approach to slavery today is very different to that of the Romans two thousand years ago. Whilst killing may be evil, in different circumstances, during a war for survival, killing may be good.

Subjective morality has no objective foundation
If any moral position may be countered by an opposing moral position, if killing may be evil but may also be good, if Pro choice is evil but also may be good, then the concept of a subjective morality becomes meaningless. There is no objective reality against which to know whether any particular moral position is right or wrong, good or bad, better or worse.

Humans are the mechanism by which nature operates
That humans are self-aware, capable of judgement, are intellectual rather than instinctual and aware of morality is not evidence that humans are separate to nature. All these may be explained as the mechanisms by which nature expresses itself, which is though the agency of the human.

We cannot not be part of nature. However, we have qualities that, to our knowledge, no other part of nature has. I don't think it's out of line to judge us. Especially since some of those qualities are what gives us the concept of judgement. We, alone, can judge. — Patterner

Humans make subjective not objective judgements.
There are no general agreement as to foundational objective judgments. Killing may be wrong, but then again it may be right. Abortion may be wrong, but then again it may be right. It may be asked of what value are subjective judgements, when no one subjective judgment can take precedence over any other subjective judgement. Pro life believe unborn babies have a right to life and Pro choice believe unborn babies may be aborted.

In nature there are no judgements.
Apples are not right and oranges wrong. Trees are not better and mountains worse. Whales are not good and scorpions bad.

Animals do judge.
Across the animal kingdom, infanticide has been observed in totally disparate mammal species, from dolphins to lions to baboons. Since it was first witnessed in the wild, researchers have come up with a variety of explanations as to why males might kill infants of their own species. ( www.smithsonianmag.com). It may well be the case that animals do judge what course of action to take, but not necessarily why a particular course of action is morally right or wrong.

Humans make subjective judgements.
An individual may say that "killing is wrong", thereby making a moral judgement, but this is a subjective rather than objective judgement. The subjective judgement is particular to one individual, at one particular moment in time and in one particular context. Different people make different judgements about the same issue. For example, regarding abortion, some are Pro life and some are Pro choice. Some believe that unborn babies have a right to life, and some advocate for abortion throughout all nine months of pregnancy. There is no one objective judgement towards abortion. Judgements towards abortion are subjective to each individual.

A judgement is not about a certainty.
A Judge may judge someone guilty given the evidence, but they don't know for certain that the person is guilty. It may be that the weight of evidence infers that they are guilty. A judgment infers an uncertainty. I may judge that killing is wrong. However there may be some circumstances, such as a war for survival, when I judge that killing may be right.

No subjective judgement can take precedence.
Any subjective judgment is an acceptance that it may be wrong. As subjective judgments may be different in a different individual, time and context, no subjective moral judgement can take preference over any other subjective moral judgment. Therefore, no moral judgement should be taken as having precedence over any other moral judgement. No moral judgement may take precedence over its antithesis. The moral judgement that killing is wrong may not take precedence over its antithesis that killing is right .

If no subjective judgement can take precedence, then any subjective judgement is meaningless.
However, if no moral judgement can distinguish between its thesis and antithesis, then moral judgements lose validity and become meaningless. In nature there are no objective judgements, and in humans subjective judgements are meaningless. Nature cannot judge. Humans can judge, but they cannot objectively judge, only subjectively judge. As no subjective judgment can take precedence over its antithesis, any subjective judgement becomes meaningless.

Humans are a part of nature, and as nature has no objective judgement neither do humans.
Even if the individual has free will, this has been determined by nature, of which the human is a part. Any judgment the individual makes is an expression of nature. As nature is neither right nor wrong, any human expression of judgment cannot be right or wrong. The individual may judge killing wrong, but this is a subjective not objective judgement. A subjective judgement is an illusion of an objective judgement.

Humans cannot make objective judgments, and subjective judgements are meaninglesss
Nature doesn't make objective judgements of right or wrong, true or false or better or worse. As the human individual is a part of nature, an expression of nature, neither can the human individual make objective judgments. However, a human individual can make a subjective judgement, but as no one subjective judgement can take precedence over any other subjective judgement, subjective judgments become meaningless.

Besides, what does it mean to say that h.sapiens is ‘part of nature’? Why is that meaningful or important? — Wayfarer

Whether mankind is a part of nature or separate to it has important consequences, specifically in whether mankind's relationship with nature is open to judgement or not.

Nature is non-judgemental. Nature includes all the laws, elements and phenomena of the physical world, including life. If the wind blows down a tree, this is neither good nor bad. An apple is neither better nor worse than an orange. A whale is not good and a scorpion is not bad. A lake is not true and a mountain is not false. Nature is outside any judgment.

On the one hand, if mankind is a part of nature, and not separate to nature, then any act of mankind is no more than another act of nature, no more than any other expression of nature, and is therefore entirely natural. As acts of nature are non-judgemental, then any act of mankind, being a part of nature and not separate to it, are also outside being judged. As nature blowing down a tree is outside any judgement of right or wrong, mankind cutting down a tree must also be outside any judgement of being right or wrong. It seems clear that mankind is an intrinsic part of nature and not separate to it, being totally dependent on nature for its existence, and having evolved as a part of nature over a period of at least 3 billion years.

On the other hand, if mankind is not a part of nature, and is separate to it, then mankind's relationship with nature is open to being judged, and mankind's cutting down a tree is open to be judged wrong. The question is, if mankind is separate to nature, and not part of nature, then for what reason does mankind have any responsibility towards nature.

If mankind is a part of nature, then no act of mankind within nature is open to judgement. However, if mankind is separate to nature, for what reason does mankind have a responsibility to nature, and if mankind does have a responsibility, then its relationship with nature may be open to judgement.

If there is a human fall, it is our fall from nature; our infatuation with knowledge, the this and that of our own constructions, and our concomitant turning away from life, or nature, or so called God's creation — ENOAH

Mankind falls from a nature where there is no better or worse, no truth or falsity, no right or wrong, no morality and no ethics.

Mankind is a part of nature not separate to it. Mankind was created by nature, and is an expression of nature.

When mankind attempts to separate itself from nature, it attempts to differentiate itself from a nature that is non-judgemental by introducing concepts of judgment, of right and wrong, truth and falsity, better or worse, morality and ethics.

These judgements it then projects onto the world around it, projecting its own beliefs onto a world absent of them.

Mankind perceives truth and falsity in nature because of its attempt to differentiate itself from nature through the invention of judgements such as truth and falsity. These judgements it then projects onto a world absent of them.

In which case ‘natural’ has no meaning, because it doesn’t differentiate anything. — Wayfarer

The fact that a word may have more than one meaning does not make the word meaningless

Most words have more than one meaning. For example, "heavy" can mean "having great weight" or "difficult to bear". The fact that a word has more than one meaning doesn't make the word meaningless.

On the one hand, as mankind is a part of nature, one meaning of "natural" could be everything that mankind makes, including LED bulbs. On the other hand, the meaning of "natural" could be restricted to those things that are not made by mankind, such as sunlight, and differentiated from those things that are made by mankind such as LED bulbs, which can be named as "artificial".

The word "natural" is not made meaningless because it has more than one meaning.

If you were parachuted into a completely natural environment with no artifacts and minimal clothing, I suggest you would find survival extremely difficult — Wayfarer

True, but doesn't mean that mankind is not a part of nature.

I agree that if I was parachuted into a different natural environment, such as the Sahara, I would probably die. But if a whale was parachuted into a different natural environment, such as Provence, it would also probably die.

That something is a part of nature does not mean that that something is able to survive outside its natural environment.

If a tree, one part of nature, found itself in a volcano, another part of nature, the tree couldn't survive.

That mankind is not able to survive in a different natural environment does not mean that mankind is not a part of nature.
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But our 'separateness' from nature seems perfectly obvious to me - we live in buildings, insulated by clothing, travelling in vehicles, none of which are naturally-occuring. — Wayfarer

This is a circular argument. If mankind is a part of nature, then anything mankind does, such as building houses, is a part of nature.

With man's insatiable need to make nature conform to his needs and even wants, what are your opinions about our current relationship with nature? Is it becoming better or worse? — Shawn

As mankind is a part of nature, not separate to it, mankind's relationship with nature is outside any judgment of better or worse.

Mankind is part of nature, not separate to it. Mankind is not separate to the surrounding world, but is an intrinsic part of the world. Mankind lives inside a world, and this world is what is called nature. Mankind is as much a part of nature as the surrounding world is part of nature.

Mankind's relationship with its surrounding world is the same relationship as one part of nature's relationship with another part of nature. When mankind tries to change its surroundings, this is no different to one part of nature trying to change another part of nature. The wind, being one part of nature, blows down a tree, being another part of nature. Mankind, being one part of nature, knocks down a tree, being another part of nature.

Mankind's relationship with its surrounding world is outside any judgment of morality, any judgement of better or worse. One part of nature trying to change another part of nature is part of the natural process, and therefore outside any judgment of morality. If the wind blows over a tree, is not relevant to ask if this is for the better or worse, as this is part of the natural process. It follows that mankind, as one part of nature, in trying to change another part of nature, the surrounding world, is also outside any judgement of morality, any judgment of better or worse.

Therefore, as mankind is a part of nature, not separate to it, mankind's relationship with nature is outside any judgment of better or worse.

Somethimg which you alone can provide, hence the point of the exercise! — Wayfarer

True. Perhaps this is the search. The search for how to transcend one's own innate and inherent abilities.

My advice would be to start with a concise paragraph expressing the point of the essay. — Wayfarer

:up:

I'm going through various sources, including Dr Matt Williams' breakdown of how an essay may be graded, which I found useful.

However, I feel that even though an amateur cook and Michelin chef both follow the same New York Cheesecake recipe, the cheesecakes they end up making are more than likely to be significantly different.

Therefore, there must be something over and above the recipe itself that accounts for the difference, and that is what I am looking for.

....but...do you have something in mind already? — Amity

I have a content in mind, but I want to learn how to express this content within the format of a formal philosophical essay.

The content is one thing, but the form of of a philosophical essay is another thing, and it is the formal structure of a philosophical essay that interests me at the moment. The Philosophical Writing Challenge is a perfect opportunity to try to work out how to structure a philosophical essay.

As Peter Horban wrote in Writing a Philosophy Paper, a philosophical essay is not an exercise in literary self-expression, a report of of what various scholars have said about a topic or a presentation of one's personal beliefs, but is a reasoned defence of a thesis.

But how exactly does one give a reasoned defence of a thesis?

How does one structure a reasoned defence?

As you indicated, this in part requires working out where exactly is the boundary between presenting one's personal belief in the validity of a thesis and giving a reasoned defence of one's personal belief in the validity of a thesis.

Hello and welcome to the Philosophy Writing Challenge - June 2025. — Moliere

Really great to see this challenge up and running. — Amity

I appreciate your initiative and the opportunity to take part.

You say that your favorite version of "truth" is one where you can never know what the "truth" is — Harry Hindu

Thank you for your replies, but am now off on holiday.

Perhaps deflationary towards truth. As the SEP article on Truth writes

One long-standing trend in the discussion of truth is to insist that truth really does not carry metaphysical significance at all. It does not, as it has no significance on its own. A number of different ideas have been advanced along these lines, under the general heading of deflationism.

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How is your version independent of us if it is a correspondence between something that exist in the world and something that exists in the mind? — Harry Hindu

In my vision there is a postbox, which I know because it exists in my mind. I believe that there is something outside my mind that caused me to see a postbox in my mind, but I don't know what that something is.

The correspondence theory of truth doesn't apply, as there is no correspondence between a known thing in my mind and an unknown thing in the world.

I judge p is true = refers to a proposition that can be judged true
I judge "p" is true = refers to any proposition whatsoever
You're saying that only the former can be "recognized as true." What I don't understand is how this recognition differs from judging that it is true. Do you mean "recognition" to refer to a pre-linguistic or pre-propositional experience? — J

Thankyou for the fun thread, but several days of sunshine abroad beckon.

Recognition and Judgement
Frege says force is separate to content. I take this to mean that the content p in "I judge p is true" is separate to the force "I judge _is true".

My belief is that proposition p must be truth apt prior to being able to be judged. A proposition is truth apt if it corresponds with the world. This means that a proposition must be recognized to be truth apt before being able to be judged.

Therefore, before judging a proposition, we must recognize that the proposition ""The oak tree is shedding its leaves" is truth apt and the proposition "five legged blue creatures that breathe fire freely roam in Cyprus" isn't.

The problem with Frege's belief that force is separate to content
However, we can only recognize a proposition such as "a b c d e" as being truth apt if we know the meaning of a,b, c , d and e. IE, we know the content of the proposition.

This begins to support Rodl's point that the content cannot be separate to the force, as we are already making a judgment that the proposition is truth apt even before we start to judge whether the contents of the proposition are true or not.

It is interesting that all the examples of propositions I have come across have been truth apt, whether on this thread, such as "That oak tree is shedding its leaves", "the grass is green", "the Earth is round" or Frege's "the accused was in Rome".

IE, the content cannot be separate to force, as the content must be known prior to judging that the content is suitable to be judged.

The problem if the proposition is not truth apt
But suppose proposition p does not need to be truth apt before we can try to judge it.

Consider an example of a proposition that is not truth apt, such as "five legged blue creatures that breathe fire freely roam in Cyprus". On what grounds can we judge the content when the content is meaningless.

A judgment about a content can only be made when the content has meaning, and as content cannot give itself meaning, any meaning must be external to the content itself, such as the world.

For Rodl, force is inside content
If force is inside the content, and the content doesn't correspond with the world, then what is the content to be judged against. It can only be judged against itself, which leads into an infinite regress.

If force is inside the content, and the content corresponds with a world external to it, then any judgment is founded within the world, and there is something for the judgment to be made against

Therefore, for Rodl also, where force is inside content, judgment is only possible if the content has a meaning external to itself, such as the world.
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When Frege and Fregeans talk about truth-aptness, they're not referring to facts on the ground about what is the case. They're talking about the kinds of propositions to which assent could be given. — J

But this means that a judgement must be made about what kind of proposition can be assented to even before a judgment can be made about the content of that proposition.

A judgement about what kind of proposition can be assented to can only be made if the contents are known. For example, a judgment cannot be made giving assent to the proposition "a b c d e" without knowing what a, b, c, d and e mean. But what a, b, c, d and e mean is the content of the proposition.

The contents of the proposition must be known before being judged. This means that the contents of the proposition are already known before being judged. If the contents are known in order for a judgment to be made, the contents cannot be separate to the judgment

Hegel was idealist — Wayfarer

True, and he also believed in the existence of an external world.
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Berkeley denies the existence of matter as an independently real substance, but he does not deny the reality of the external world. — Wayfarer

As you say, Berkeley believed in the existence of an external world.
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His book is titled ‘an introduction to absolute idealism.’ If he was an indirect realist perhaps he wouldn’t have used that description. — Wayfarer

I presume that you haven't found a quote by Rodl in his book An Introduction to Absolute Idealism where he says that a mind-independent world doesn't exist.

but the "content" that Frege is upholding isn't the apples, it's the proposition "There are apples in that tree". — J

Frege's "content" surely does not mean any possible proposition, but only those propositions that are capable of being judged true, which means only those propositions that are able to correspond with the world.

Frege said force is separate to content.

Frege's position is that there can be propositions having content independent of being judged or asserted. Such that "p" is independent of "I judge p is true" or "I assert p is true".

There is a difference between "I judge p is true" and "I judge "p" is true". The thread is titled p and "I think p" not p and "I think "p"",

Suppose Frege means by content the proposition, such that "I judge "p" is true""

Then "p" can be anything. For example, "p" could be "five legged blue creatures that breathe fire freely roam in Cyprus", in which case "I judge "five legged blue creatures that breathe fire freely roam in Cyprus" is true".

But "p" can be any one of an almost infinite number of possibilities, an almost infinite number of possible propositions, an almost infinite number of possible contents.

But Frege wrote in 1915 - ‘‘My basic logical insights’’: ‘‘When something is judged to be the case we can always cull out the thought that is recognized as true; the act of judgment forms no part of this’’

The thought must be recognized as true, and the thought "five legged blue creatures that breathe fire freely roam in Cyprus" can never be recognized as true.

It makes more sense that what is being discussed is "I judge p is true", where p is not just any possible proposition but only those propositions that can be judged to be true.

This is why Frege himself gave the example of "the accused was in Rome" rather than "the accused dressed only in a hat flew over the rooftops of Rome" and why this thread gives the example of "the oak tree is shedding its leaves" rather than "five legged blue creatures that breathe fire freely roam in Cyprus".

Frege says that the content is separate to the force, where p in "I judge p is true" is separate to "I judge_is true"

The content cannot be any possible proposition, but only those propositions that are capable of being judged true.

And those propositions that are capable of being true correspond with the world. Hence a foundation of Realism.
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Hence "absolute idealism." — J

As a cat is an animal, an Absolute Idealist is an Indirect Realist. Absolute Idealism is a type of Indirect Realism.

But how is it different after many repetitions from the initial time, when, upon seeing the word, you heard it in your mind? What has changed after the many repetitions? — Patterner

I was thinking about how we learn the meaning of a word. When we see something that is named "apple", this has to be repeated several times before we are able to associate the name "apple" with our concept of "apple".

But what forms do they take in your mind? — Harry Hindu

"Think" exists in my mind as an imagined sound.
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How do you know they exist in your mind? — Harry Hindu

When I hear the sound "think", real or imagined, I know that the sound must exist somewhere. If I know the sound hasn't come from outside my mind, then I know that it must have come from inside my mind.
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Are "I", "think" and "p" just scribbles and that is the form they take in your mind, or do the scribbles refer to other things that are not scribbles and those are what exist in your mind? — Harry Hindu

"Think" exists in my mind in its own right, and doesn't refer to anything else.

If "think" in my mind didn't exist in its own right, and referred to something else, such as "A", then this "A" must refer to something else, such as "B", ending up as the infinite regress homunculus problem. As I see it, I am my thoughts rather than I have thoughts.

Therefore things in my mind must exist in the own right without referring to anything else.
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In seeing these scribbles on the screen, are the same as what is in your mind? — Harry Hindu

When I see the word "think" on the screen I hear the sound "think" in my mind. After many repetitions, in Hume's terms, this sets up a constant conjunction between seeing the word "think" and hearing the word "think". Thereafter, when I see the word "think" I instinctively hear the word "think", and when I hear the word "think" I instinctively see the word "think".

The sound "think" doesn't refer to the image "think", but corresponds with it.

I'm trying to redefine "truth" in a way that is meaningful in that maybe truth is not a relation between some state of the world and our ideas of the world. Instead "truth" can be thought of as a relation between some idea and the success or failure of some goal. — Harry Hindu

There are many definitions of "truth" (SEP - Truth)

My favourite is a correspondence between something that exists in the mind and something that exists in the world, such that "the oak tree is shedding its leaves" is true IFF the oak tree is shedding its leaves.

Unfortunately, being an Indirect Realist, I don't think we can ever know what exists in the world, meaning that we can never know "the truth".

What you want seems to be similar to the Anti-Realist approach to truth, such as Dummett's, where truth is not a fully objective matter independent of us, but is something that can be verified or asserted by us. (SEP - Truth - 4.2).

Separate in what sense? You would at least have to agree that they are both held by the one mind. — Wayfarer

I agree that all these exist in the mind "I", "think" and "p".

But I can hold in my mind two separate thoughts, "I need to buy some bread" and "Paris is in France". Just because these two thoughts are in my mind doesn't mean that they aren't separate thoughts.

In my mind is the thought "I like apples", where "I" is separate to "like apples". If "I" wasn't separate to its predicate "like apples" then "I" would be no more than any contingent predicate. In other words, if "I" wasn't separate to its predicate, then for example, "I" would be "like apples", "I" would be "visited the Eiffel Tower", etc.

The "I" is self-conscious regardless of any contingent predicate.
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His book is titled ‘an introduction to absolute idealism.’ If he was an indirect realist perhaps he wouldn’t have used that description. — Wayfarer

Absolute Idealism and Indirect Realism are not incompatible.

Kant was a Realist even though his theory was called Transcendental Idealism.

I have read that 80% of phd philosophers are Realists. In fact, I challenge you to find a quote by Rodl in his book An Introduction to Absolute Idealism where he says that a mind-independent world does not exist. This would of course lead to the situation that the Universe began when Humans first appeared, which I am sure even Rodl does not believe.

Rodl's main influence was Hegel, and he sees himself re-introducing Hegel's Absolute Idealism. (Wikipedia - Sebastain Rodl)

According to Hegel, in order for the thinking subject to be able to know its object, there must be in some sense an identity of thought and being (Wikipedia - Absolute Idealism)

Hegel is not an Idealist in the sense of Berkeley, for whom the world does not exist outside the mind.

For example, I am both an Absolute Idealist and an Indirect Realist.

the force/content distinction allows us to say things we want to say about both logic and thinking. — J

To my understanding:

In my terms, Frege is a Direct Realist in that he believes that force is separate to content. For example, in the world apples exist independent of any observer.

In my terms, Rodl is an Indirect Realist in that he believes that force is inside content. For example, when we see a red object, as the colour red only exists in the mind and not the world, not only our thought about the colour red but also the content of the thought, the colour red, exist in the mind. However, it may not be the case as Rodl says that force is internal to content, but rather force is content

In my opinion, Rodl's argument that self-awareness can be used to show that force must be inside content is a non-starter, as the self-consciousness of the "I" is separate to not only to any thought but also to what is being thought about. This means that self-consciousness has nothing to say about the relation between a thought and what is being thought about, in other words between the force and content.

However, there are other arguments that may be made to show that force cannot be separate to content.

If we link the truth to our goals does that resolve the problem? The information we use to accomplish some goal is true. The information we use that causes us to fail in our goals is false. — Harry Hindu

Are you saying that if we start with a preconceived notion of the truth, and this is supported by observations, then this shows that our preconceived notion of the truth was correct.

The problem becomes when we only use those observations that agree with our preconceived notion of the truth and reject any observation that doesn't.

It is both multiple observations and the logical categorization and interpretation of those observations that constitutes knowledge. — Harry Hindu

I agree, observations and reasoning are important.

Plato’s explanation of knowledge as justified true belief has stood for thousands of years.

The question is, which justified beliefs are true.

Problem one is that there is no one definition of truth, and problem two is that, even if there was, how would we know what the truth was.

Remember, that distinction suggests that thought can be objective only if it is detached from the subject who thinks it. However, first-person thought (I have pain) challenges this by showing that the act of judgment is self-conscious and cannot be isolated from what is judged. — Wayfarer

Self-consciousness is inside the "I" not the "I think"

Consider "I think p". Where exactly is the self-conscious part?

It is the "I" that is self-conscious, the subject that is self-conscious. Neither the act of judgement nor the "I think" are self-conscious.

"I think" is no more self-conscious than "I run" is self-conscious, or "I talk" is self-conscious.

As running and talking are outside the subject's self-consciousness, thinking is outside the subject's self-consciousness.

It is not the act of judgement "I think" that is self-conscious, it is the subject, the "I", that is self-conscious.

Therefore, this particular argument that a thought cannot be objective because it is inside the subject's self-consciousness is not a valid argument, because a subject's thoughts are outside the subject's self-consciousness.
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Rödl then goes on to argue against the possibility of first-person propositions as such, suggesting instead that the first-person pronoun is not a form of reference but an expression of self-consciousness. — Wayfarer

First and third-person propositions both refer to something outside the subject's self-consciousness

I agree that the first-person pronoun "I" is an expression of self-consciousness, because it is the "I" that is self-conscious.

In the first person "I know my hand hurts" and in the third person "I believe the oak tree is shedding its leaves"

As my thoughts are outside my self-consciousness, my knowing is also outside my self-consciousness.

In the expression "I know my hand hurts", "knowing my hand hurts" is outside the subject's self-consciousness.

Therefore, the first-person proposition "my hand hurts" is not an expression of self-consciousness, but refers to a hand that is hurting. In the same way, "the oak tree is shedding its leaves" refers to an oak tree that is shedding its leaves.

Frege did indeed believe that force is separable from content, but he probably wouldn't agree that therefore you have to separate "I think" from "p" — J

To my understanding:

For Frege, perhaps it is more the case that force is separate to content, rather than force is separable from content.

As I see it, for Frege, force is always separate to content. For Rodl, force is always part of content.

For Frege, given that force is separate to content, doesn't this mean that "I think" must be separate to "p"?

I am using "p" as "the oak tree is shedding its leaves", for example.

What is a force of judgement? = "I think that _ is true", "I judge that _ is true", "I believe that _ is true", "I doubt that _ is true", "I am certain that _ is true", "I hope that _ is true", etc.

What is the content? = "p", "the oak tree is shedding its leaves", "Pat is reading a book", etc.

Frege believed that the content can exist independently of any judgement about it. For example, he might believe that an oak tree shedding its leaves can exist independently of anyone observing it.

What does "I think p" mean. It does not mean "I think "p"". It means "I judge that p is true". For example, "I judge that the oak tree is shedding its leaves is true", which means that in my judgment, in the world is an oak tree that is shedding its leaves.

For Frege, the content is separate to the force. The content "p" is separate to the force "I judge that _ "

Therefore, for Frege, one has to separate "I think" from "p" as "I think" is separate to "p"

The OP was examining a common but still controversial claim -- that when we think, there is some accompanying "I think" that characterizes the act of thinking, and which according to some is also a type of self-awareness or self-consciousness. — J

As I see it:

Every act of thinking requires an object being thought about and a subject doing the thinking.

In every act of thinking, the "think" is accompanied by both "I" and "p".

Frege and Rodl

Frege and Rodl would agree that i) "I" requires "think" and "p" - ii) "think" requires "I" and "p".

Frege believes that force is outside content, such that "I think" is outside "p". This means that "p" doesn't require "I think".

Rodl believes that force is inside content, such that "I think" is inside "p", meaning that "p" is "I think".

Self-awareness
In every act of thinking, I am aware that it is "I" that is doing the thinking, not someone else, such as Pat

This self-awareness precedes the act of thinking

It could equally be the case that "I run", "I eat", "I laugh" or "I think"

The expression is "I think p", not "I "I think p"", which would lead into the infinite regress homunculus problem.

Re-wording
When I think p, accompanying "think" are both "I" and "p", where the "I" is self-aware.

Do you still believe that the person you saw when you were young is Santa Claus? Why or why not? It seems that you can only ever change your knowledge is by making more observations that you seem to be saying that you cannot trust, so how can you ever say that you learn anything? What does it mean to you to learn something, or to learn from a mistake? — Harry Hindu

Zero-knowledge proof
In general, the more observations the better one's conclusion ought to be. However, in practice, most people are entrenched in their positions, regardless of how many new observations they make.

Even so, this does not take away from the fact that observations cannot be guaranteed to be trustworthy, as anyone reading mainstream media would testify.

However, this doesn't mean that certainty cannot be discovered from uncertainty. Zero-knowledge proof is an interesting concept, and not only in computer sciences.

Wikipedia - Zero-knowledge proof

In cryptography, a zero-knowledge proof is a protocol in which one party (the prover) can convince another party (the verifier) that some given statement is true, without conveying to the verifier any information beyond the mere fact of that statement's truth.

The YouTube video Zero Knowledge Proofs I found interesting.

Santa Claus
I see an oak tree in France shedding its leaves, and someone else sees an oak tree in Brazil shedding its leaves.

An oak tree can exist in different locations at the same time because the oak tree is a concept that can be instantiated in different locations at the same time.

Santa Claus as a concept can also be instantiated in different locations, and can exist in Regent Street, Times Square and Greenland at the same time.

It depends what you mean by Santa Claus.

For telling about the world, inductive logic is good enough.  It is not about the absolute truth, but it is about the probability of the truth — Corvus

:up:

Is pain a suitable subject for the analysis of propositional content? — Wayfarer

Why not?

A propositional attitude is a mental state towards a proposition (Wikipedia - Propositional attitude). I know is a mental state towards the proposition "my hand hurts".

What I'm wondering is, do you think this challenges the thought1/thought2 distinction as such, or is this a special case involving what used to be called "incorrigible knowledge"? — J

I don't think it challenges the think1/think2 distinction, but only extends it.

As I see it, I have knowledge about things inside my mind, and have beliefs about things outside my mind.

Inside my mind

Think1 = I know "my hand hurts" means I know the proposition "my hand hurts". This seems reasonable because the proposition is inside my mind.

Think2 = I know my hand hurts. This is valid.

Think1 = I think "my hand hurts" means I am thinking about the proposition "my hand hurts". This is not a propositional attitude. This seems reasonable as I do think about things.

Think2 = I think my hand hurts. This is invalid.

Outside my mind

Think1 = I know "the oak tree is shedding its leaves" means that I know the proposition "the oak tree is shedding its leaves". This seems reasonable as propositions exist in my mind.

Think2 = I know the oak tree is shedding its leaves. This is invalid, as I cannot know things that exist outside my mind.

Think1 = I believe "the oak tree is shedding its leaves" means I believe the proposition "the oak tree is shedding its leaves". This is invalid, because it is not a propositional attitude, and I can only have a belief in a propositional attitude.

Think2 = I believe the oak tree is shedding its leaves. This is valid, as I can have a belief in things that exist outside my mind.

But formal logic cannot tell you truth about the world...................For analysing truth of the world, you need to use material logic — Corvus

The problem is that Material Logic is an inductive logic, where the conclusion may be likely but not certain

Premise 1: The sun has risen every day for the past thousand years.
Conclusion: The sun will rise tomorrow.

Formal vs. Material Logic: A Comparative Analysis

Even Material Logic cannot tell us the truth about the world.

But what do we do about "To know something means consciously knowing something"? Which sense(s) of "thought" is being appealed to here? — J

No sense of thought is being appealed to.

I can only have knowledge of things inside my mind, such as pain. Everything outside my mind can only be a belief.

If my hand hurts, then I know my hand hurts. If I know my hand hurts, then I consciously know that my hand hurts. To know something means to consciously know something.

Present time

Let Think1 = I think "my hand hurts"
Let Think2 = I think my hand hurts

Think1 means that I am thinking about the proposition "my hand hurts". I can think about the proposition regardless of whether my hand is hurting or not. I can know that my hand hurts and think about the proposition "my hand hurts" at the same time, but my hand hurting does not require Think1. I have no propositional attitude towards the proposition.

In Think2, "I think" means "I believe". Therefore Think2 means "I believe my hand hurts". But this is not a valid expression, in that if my hand hurts, this is not a belief, it is knowledge.

If I know my hand hurts, no sense of thought is being appealed to.

Future time

At a future time, I can reflect on my past experience.

Let Think1 = I think "my hand hurt"
Let Think2 = I think my hand hurt

Think1 means that I am thinking about the proposition "my hand hurt". I can think about the proposition regardless of whether my hand hurt or not. I can know that my hand hurt and think about the proposition "my hand hurt" at the same time, but my hand hurting does not require Think1. I have no propositional attitude towards the proposition.

In Think2, "I think" means "I believe". Therefore Think2 means "I believe my hand hurt". But this is not a valid expression, in that if my hand hurt, this is not a belief, it is knowledge.

If I know my hand hurt, no sense of thought is being appealed to.

Whereas "I think p" sounds less clearer than "p", and has some points to clarify. — Corvus

Yes. If I said "I think the oak tree is shedding its leaves" I would sound more uncertain than if I had said "the oak tree is shedding its leaves".
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When you say "I think I think p", it sounds something is wrong and deeply wrong in grammar and its meaning, and will be rejected for its clarity. — Corvus

In ordinary language when chatting at the bus stop, I agree. But perhaps not on a philosophy forum.
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When you say, "I know p", you will be expected to prove that you know p. — Corvus

Agree
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"I know I think p" is a psychological statement with no objective meaning to deliver apart from to yourself. — Corvus

And hopefully to others on this thread about "p and "I think p""

I know my thoughts, as my thoughts are inside my mind.
I have the thought that the moon exists.
Therefore, I know my thought that the moon exists

I believe that the moon exists.
I can justify my belief that the moon exists.

A belief is true if it corresponds with what exists in a mind-independent world.
The insurmountable problem is how can the mind know about a world that is independent of the mind.
Therefore, truth about a mind-independent world is unknowable
Therefore, knowledge about a mind-independent world is impossible.

However, this is why we have axioms in logic, science and mathematics and hypotheses in general life.

For instance, do the statements, "Santa Claus exists." and "Barak Obama exists." hold the same level of uncertainty? — Harry Hindu

On the one hand I saw Santa Claus in person at Hamley's Regent Street store when I was very young, yet have never seen Barak Obama. On the other hand, many people have told me that Santa Claus is not real.

Do I believe what I have seen with my own eyes, or what people tell me?
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The world is all there is, included the ideas in your mind, and the book on the table that represent those ideas in Tolkien's mind that you can have knowledge of by reading the scribbles therein. — Harry Hindu

The Direct Realist believes that there is a book on the table. However, the Indirect Realist would disagree.
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I don't know what Kant means by unknowable things-in-themselves. — Harry Hindu

The problem is, how is it possible to know about something that exists in a mind-independent world when all we have is our minds.

From Wikipedia Thing-in-itself

In Kantian philosophy, the thing-in-itself (German: Ding an sich) is the status of objects as they are, independent of representation and observation.

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You can also depend on the process of causation in a deterministic universe as providing another level of certainty. — Harry Hindu

The same effect can have many different possible causes. I see a broken window, and even if I know that something caused the window to break, one particular effect can have many different causes. There is no certain means of knowing what the cause was, a stone the previous day, a rock the previous week, a seagull the previous week, a crow within the hour, a window cleaner, etc.

The cause may determine the effect, but the affect could have been determined by many different possible causes.
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You're contradicting yourself again. First you define knowledge as "justified true belief". You then say that you can justify your belief, but then say you cannot know things-in-themselves. — Harry Hindu

From SEP The analysis of knowledge

The tripartite analysis of knowledge is often abbreviated as the “JTB” analysis, for “justified true belief”.Much of the twentieth-century literature on the analysis of knowledge took the JTB analysis as its starting-point.

From Wikipedia Thing-in-itself

In Kantian philosophy, the thing-in-itself (German: Ding an sich) is the status of objects as they are, independent of representation and observation.

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All knowledge stems from both observation and reason. — Harry Hindu

A Direct Realist believes that they directly observe things in a mind-independent world. The Indirect Realist disagrees.
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Are our senses and reason useful? — Harry Hindu

That is my point. What is important are our senses and our reason. What exists the other side of our sense is open to debate.
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Now how is it that you can get to the thing-in-itself - other people's ideas - by seeing scribbles on your computer screen if not by taking what you know from prior experiences and using that to predict how the scribbles appeared on your screen and what they refer to? — Harry Hindu

How to get from what we experience in our senses to what exists the other side of our senses, and whether it is even possible, has no agreed solution.

From Wikipedia Phenomenology (philosophy)

Phenomenology is a philosophical study and movement largely associated with the early 20th century that seeks to objectively investigate the nature of subjective, conscious experience. It attempts to describe the universal features of consciousness while avoiding assumptions about the external world, aiming to describe phenomena as they appear to the subject, and to explore the meaning and significance of the lived experiences.