Paintings at one point in history a kind of primitive 'Photograph,' but now I think the photograph is more 'primitive' in what it can achieve. — I like sushi

A photograph is a copy of what exists in the world, and therefore depicts what is necessarily true.

A painting is a copy of what could exist in the world, and therefore depicts what is possibly true.

Primitivism is a style of art used by artists in an industrial society that duplicates the style of art used by artists in pre-industrial societies.

Photography as an invention of an industrialised society can only copy the world as it exists in an industrialised society, and therefore cannot depict the primitivism of a pre-industrial society.

Only painting can copy what the world could have been like in a pre-industrial society, and therefore can depict the primitivism of a pre-industrial society. For example, Picasso's "Portrait of Max Jacob".

What is a painting — Moliere

The meaning of "a painting" cannot be put into words, either as a definition or a description. The meaning of "a painting" cannot be said but can only be shown.

The meaning of "a painting" may be understood by looking at the objects that have been named in the following set: {Monet's "Landscape with Factories", Derain's "Houses of Parliament", Klimt "Pine Forest", Leonardo da Vinci "Lady with an Ermine", Giotto "The Betrayal", El Greco "View of Toledo", Albert Bierstadt "The Rocky Mountains", Jolomo "The Light of Argyll"}

Because the elements of the set share family resemblances, Russell's Paradox, resulting from unrestricted comprehension, may be avoided.

As Wittgenstein pointed out, the observer who looks at the objects named in this set will discover a family resemblance between these objects, and this family resemblance will be "a painting".

In order to understand the meaning of "a painting", the set does not need to include every painting ever painted, but only a sample.

As there is no "correct" meaning to any word or expression, there is no "correct" meaning to the expression "a painting". Person A looking at this set will discover a family resemblance that will be different to person B looking at the same set. Person A looking at a set 8 elements will discover a different family resemblance to a set that contains 16 elements. But even, so there will be a family resemblance between different family resemblances.

In answer to the question, what is a painting, a preliminary meaning of "a painting" may be understood by looking at the following 8 objects.

Right, but research indicates that visible features of an organism tend to be sexually selected. So it wouldn't be about patterns in chaos, it would be about sex. — frank

It doesn't seem random that animals are often aesthetically pleasing. Evolution seems to favour aesthetic solutions.

There appears to be a direct analogy between Frances Hutcheson's explanation of aesthetics as "uniformity amidst variety" and life's dependence on an ability to discover patterns in chaos.

It would follow that if life is fundamentally aesthetic, and if philosophy is trying to understand life, then aesthetics in philosophy must be a "thing".

So I guess that is what you mean? "Great artist" = "someone I like a lot". — J

Both Derain and Banksy are artists. But are they equally great?

If greatness is determined by monetary value, they are probably equally great as a Banksy original more than likely sells for as much as a Derain original.

If greatness is determined by popularity amongst the public, then Banksy is probably greater than Derain.

If greatness is determined by the humour in their works, then Banksy is clearly greater than Derain.

If greatness is determined by an aesthetic of form and shape, what Frances Hutcheson called "uniformity amidst variety", then Derain is clearly greater than Banksy.

You are right that my equating greatness as an artist with an aesthetic of form and shape is personal to me. Others may well equate greatness as an artist with monetary value, popularity or being humorous.

I think that indicates that aesthetics is part of evolution. — frank

:100: If Frances Hutcheson is correct, and the appreciation of beauty is innate within humans, and described as "uniformity amidst variety", this clearly shows an evolutionary advantage. Specifically in the human ability to find patterns within the chaos they perceive of the world .

Strangely, mammals became more aesthetically pleasing over time. Why is that? — frank

Beauty is in the eye of the beholder. I am sure beautiful to another proboscis monkey.

Is an aesthetic judgment objective in the same way that the sting is? Can one of us be right, the other wrong? Or does it simply cash out to "what I like" and "what you like"? — J

Let there be an object in the world. Suppose this object has been named "Derain's Drying the Sails 1905".

There are different styles of painting, including the Classical, Baroque, Rococo, Neo-Classicism, Pre-Modern, Romanticism, etc.

As regards this object, as an example of Post-modernism I don't like it, but as an example of Fauvism I do like it.

Post-modernism is a style associated with scepticism, irony and philosophical critiques of the concepts of universal truths and objective reality and Fauvism is a style associated with strong colours and fierce brushwork (www.tate.org.uk)

So I may like and dislike the same object at the same time, meaning that the liking and disliking is not an objective thing within the object but is a subjective thing within my mind.

I may like this object as an example of Fauvism and you may dislike the same object as an example of Post-modernism. Alternatively, I may dislike this object as an example of Post-modernism and you may like the same object as an example of Fauvism.

IE, our liking our disliking an object is independent of the object itself but is dependent on what happens to be in our particular minds. Objects don't have any intrinsic art value, the mind imposes an art value on the objects in the world.

As regards what is in the mind, I like this particular object as an example of Fauvism, where Fauvism is a style having strong colours and fierce brushwork. In other words, I like this object for its strong colours and fierce brushwork.

But what explains my likes?

I like the colour red, I like Merlot, I like meat and potato pies, I like Sade, I like Mediterranean weather. I also like the elegant, the rational and the clear, as @Moliere said about adjectives often applied to philosophical arguments and thoughts.

When I see the colour red, for example, I don't consciously think "do I like this colour or not". I know instantly without conscious thought that I like it. No judgment is involved. I may judge that my seeing the colour red was caused by a postbox rather than a sunset, but I don't judge whether I like this colour or not.

What I like aesthetically does not depend on any judgment. I make no subjective aesthetic judgements.

As objects don't have any intrinsic art value, my aesthetic likes cannot be objective but only subjective.

You might come to understand it all, and be able to do the analysis on your own. But you might never come to like his music — Patterner

:100: Understanding something is not the same as liking it.

In @Moliere's terms, understanding a philosopher's point of view does not mean liking it.

B) Aesthetic judgments are partially subjective -- they are known subjectively or intuitively, like a sting, but what is known is objective, hence everyone will have more or less the same reaction (again like a sting). — J

I agree that there are two considerations, the subjective and the objective.

The subjective is about what exists in the mind and the objective is about what exists in the world outside the mind.

As regards the subjective, the expression "aesthetic judgment" is a contradiction in terms.

The word "judgement" implies an intellectual thought process. The Merriam Webster defines judgement as "the process of forming an opinion or evaluation by discerning and comparing".

When we see the colour red, we don't judge that we have seen the colour red, we see the colour red. Similarly, when we experience an aesthetic, we don't judge that we have experienced an aesthetic, we have an aesthetic experience.

As regards the objective, the object in the world that causes an aesthetic experience in a person is not in itself aesthetic.

Going back to the wasp sting analogy, it would be like saying that within the wasp's stinger there exists pain which is then transferred from the wasp's stinger into the person being stung.

There is no aesthetic within an object in the world that is then transferred from the object to the person having the aesthetic experience.

But look at the artist example instead of that one -- it's different enough. — Moliere

@Moliere: More acceptably we might subject a student to difficult circumstances in order for them to grow and learn how to cope with failure and pain.............................You learn in the process of the doing -- but having a teacher generally helps to accelerate that process rather than doing it all on your own, so there is something being taught from art teacher to art student, at least.

It is true that if a person is put into a situation new to them, then they will probably gain new knowledge from it. For example, if in holiday in Marrakesh for the first time, the holidaymaker will learn things new things about the food, architecture and culture that they would not have learned if they had stayed at home. As you say "You learn", meaning that although it may be the environment that is doing the teaching, it is "You" that is doing the actual learning.

The corollary is that if someone is unwilling or incapable of learning, then no matter how supportive the environment is to teaching, the individual will never learn. As you say "You learn".

A teacher may present a course in the philosophy of art, which may include aesthetics, but no matter how much information the teacher may present about the aesthetics of art, it remains a logical impossibility for the teacher to be able to explain or describe the subjective aesthetic experience.

Knowing the following tells us nothing about the subjective aesthetic experience. It tells us things "about" aesthetics, but it tells us nothing "of" aesthetics.

The British philosopher and art critic Clive Bell (1881-1964) was a prominent proponent of the formalist approach to aesthetics. In this specific sense, he advocated and significantly developed an aesthetic ethos stemming back to the work of Kant. According to Kant, what we value in a work of art is its formal qualities. In Art (1914), Bell outlined his own radical take on this approach to aesthetics—an approach that served to rationalise emergent modernist practices as exemplified in the work of Post-Impressionists such as Paul Cézanne.

In the philosophy of art, the aesthetics of art is definitely a thing, as it is included in most courses on the philosophy of art. But if the student has no intrinsic inherent aesthetic appreciation then the word aesthetic will remain a just a word, as the word "colour" remains just a word to Mary in her black and white room.

There is a difference between knowledge "about" the word "aesthetic", in that Clive Bell was a prominent proponent of the formalist approach to aesthetics, and knowledge "of" aesthetics, in the same way that Mary has no knowledge "of" "colour".

There is a difference between knowledge about the context of a word and knowledge of the word independent of any context.

It'd be cruel to do intentionally but a teacher can teach knowledge of a wasp sting by having a wasp sting the student. — Moliere

What exactly is teaching knowledge of a wasp sting, the teacher or the wasp sting?

The person learns the feel of a wasp sting from the wasp sting itself, not from anything that preceded the wasp sting, such as a teacher.

If the person has congenital analgesia, no amount of teaching by the teacher will teach the person what a wasp sting feels like (Wikipedia - Congenital insensitivity to pain).

Or, what I'd rather say, is there's a difference between one's preference and one's aesthetic taste. The latter can be "trained" such that preference becomes something which can be judged from a distance — Moliere

There is knowledge "about" something and there is knowledge "of" something.

A sommelier can teach a Mormon "about" Merlot, such that Merlot is a dark blue wine grape variety that is used as both a blending grape and for varietal wines, and the Mormon can learn about Merlot.

But a sommelier cannot teach a Mormon "of" Merlot, the taste of Merlot.

An art teacher can teach an art student "about" Derain's aesthetic, such that until his passing in 1954, André Derain's aesthetic was constant, and along with his investigations into primal art and symbolism, his contributions to Fauvism and Cubism were notable in the formation of early Modern Art.

But an art teacher cannot teach an art student "of" Derain's aesthetic, the visceral beauty of particular shapes and colours.

When stung by a wasp, I feel pain. I don't learn how to feel the pain.

When "stung" by a Derain, I feel an aesthetic, I don't learn how to feel the aesthetic.

If you "know it to be true," regardless of demonstration or argument, enough said. — J

Suppose you are stung by a wasp and say that you feel pain, but I don't believe that you actually feel pain. Is it possible that you can prove to me that you do in fact feel pain?

Are subjective feelings, such as pain, and subjective value judgements, such as beauty, expressible by either demonstration or argument?

I'm not convinced, though you're getting at something important, which is that a description of a tradition or a practice is incomplete without an explanation of how to make value judgments within that tradition — J

It may well be the case that it is logically impossible for any tradition or practice to be complete. By their very nature, any tradition or practice must be incomplete.

Consider the statement "Within the tradition of painting, Derain is a great artist and Banksy is a mediocre artist"

This is a value judgement that I know to be true.

But there are no words that can justify this value judgment, as there are no words that can explain the value judgment that a rose is beautiful or a thunderstorm is sublime.

That I cannot describe my subjective experience when seeing a red postbox does not mean I don't have a subjective experience when seeing a red postbox.

In this sense, it is true that such traditions are of necessity incomplete..

As Godel showed, there are some truths within a system that cannot be proved within that system.

In maths, being an axiomatic system, the axioms cannot be proved true.

In language, Wittgenstein argued that language was built on hinge propositions, which cannot be proved true.

In the 1920's, Alfred Tarski argued that the definition of a true sentence cannot be given in the language itself, but can only be given in another language, a metalanguage.

Similarly, within any tradition, value judgements cannot be proven true within that tradition, but only outside that tradition, within a meta-tradition.

Sure, but my point was that, within each respective tradition, non-relative aesthetic judgments can be, and are, made. — J

Yes, within the aesthetic tradition that Banksy is a great artist, then the non-relative judgment may be made that Banksy is a great artist.

But within the aesthetic tradition that Banksy is not a great artist, then the non-relative judgment may be made that Banksy is not a great artist.
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How could a tradition develop its aesthetic criteria in such a way that D and B can both be given a fair look? I'm not saying this can't be done; the "how" is what interests me. — J

The problem is, who within a tradition actually decides what "aesthetic " means?

No-one would want the government to specify the meaning of aesthetic. The art critics depend on their livelihood on the art market. The art market is in sway to the big auction houses. The big auction houses depend on their income from the mega-rich. The mega-rich are part of the capitalist system.

I don't see how a tradition can develop an aesthetic criteria that is able to transcend the tradition that developed it.

Does the aesthetic transcend reason? — Moliere

You make the case that the problem of epistemology, what we know and how we know it, derives from reason rather than any aesthetic.

But then I wouldn't think that these ways are exactly ways of aesthetic judgment -- rather they are dealing with the usual problems of knowledge.

You make the case that reason is not essential to doing philosophy, as philosophy is an action, and we generally don't reason about our activities.

We generally don't reason about our actions in a deductive manner, and doing philosophy is an activity.

You make the case that philosophical argument does involve aesthetic thought, in the use of adjectives such as elegant, the rational and the clear

Such as the elegant, the rational, the clear, and other such adjectives often applied to philosophical arguments and thoughts.

But is it the case that in epistemology, what we know and how we know it is wholly founded on reason and the aesthetic plays no part?

For example, we observe that the sun has risen in the east for the past 100 days and we make the logical deduction that this is because the sun rises in the east. That the sun rises in the east becomes part of our knowledge, and we know this because of our observations.

But what accounts for the leap from the particular, that the sun has risen in the east for the past 100 days, to the general, that the sun rises in the east. What has accounted from particular observations to general knowledge.

It cannot just be reason, as there is no reason why a limited number of observations should of necessity give a general rule.

And yet the idea that the sun rises in the east is a general rule, a law of nature, is so elegant, rational and clear that we easily accept it as part of our knowledge

But these terms elegant, rational and clear are aesthetic terms, in that there is no logic that can prove that something is elegant rather than inelegant, rational rather than irrational or clear rather than unclear..

Such as the elegant, the rational, the clear, and other such adjectives often applied to philosophical arguments and thoughts.

Even our reasoned deductions are based on aesthetic preferences.

I would say there's no Bansky or Derain language game. An artist is more like a farmer than an interlocutor. Her art is like seeds that sprout in the souls of the observers. — frank

As you say, the physical works of Banksy and Derain stand independently of how they are either priced in the art market or described by art critics. For example, an original Braque valued by the art market at £100,000 would probably not sell for £20 on Bayswater Road.

You describe Banksy as an artist, and it may be that his style does happen to appeal to me

But then again, it may be the case that Banksy is a cartoonist whose jokes don't happen to appeal to me.

It is difficult to escape the language game when describing Banksy as an artist.

I think we are both walking a straight line onto the same whole page — Fire Ologist

:up:

So the interesting question would be, are Derain and Banksy creating within the same tradition? If not, does "clearly nonsense" mean that you do see a tradition-independent criterion for aesthetic value? — J

Within the tradition that agrees paintings such as Banksy's "Girl with Balloon" has aesthetic value as works of art, then Banksy's "Girl with Balloon" has aesthetic value as a work of art.

Within the tradition that agrees paintings such as Derain's "Drying the sales" have aesthetic value as works of art, then Derain's "Drying the Sails" has aesthetic value as a work of art.

This is Relativism. The Derain and Banksy have an aesthetic value as a work of art within their own traditions.

The question is, is there such a thing as aesthetic value over and above each tradition.

The more fundamental question is does "aesthetic value" have the same meaning in all language games.

Does "aesthetic value" in the Bansky language game mean the same thing as "aesthetic value" in the Derain language game?

Or is it the case that "aesthetic value" in the Banksy language game is defined as "something like Banksy's "Girl with Balloon" and "aesthetic value" in the Derain language game is defined as "something like Derain's "Drying the Sails".

Another question is, does aesthetic value exist outside the words "aesthetic value"?

But I think there is a solution to that, and that is, we need to think linearly AND holistically; we all takes wholes and reason linearly about them. — Fire Ologist

I agree.

I know intuitively and aesthetically that Derain's "Drying the Sails" is an important piece of art and I also know intuitively and aesthetically that Banksy's "Girl with Balloon" is an unimportant piece of art.

But this is philosophically insufficient, in that I must also argue my case using reason and logic why this is the case.

I must apply reason and logic to intuitive and aesthetic beliefs.

Linear thinkers versus wholistic thinkers. — Fire Ologist

According to Copilot (which seems correct), Descartes is a linear thinker, using deductive step-by-step reasoning. Heidegger, however, is a wholistic thinker, using recursion and evocation, employing a language that often resists reduction to simple logic.

Descartes is said to be one of the founders of modern philosophy. He was a Rationalist, using reason to gain knowledge. Heidegger broke with traditional philosophy. He contributed to phenomenology, existentialism and hermeneutics, which led to postmodernism.

Logical objective facts against intuitive subjective feelings.

Absolutism versus relativism.

The truth against my truth.

The problem with relativism is that Derain's "Drying the Sails 1905 has an aesthetic value equal to that of Banksy's "Girl with Balloon", which is clearly nonsense.

Do you think that aesthetics in philosophy is a thing? — Moliere

For philosophy to progress, aesthetics must be a thing, as there is a natural limit to reason and logic. Aesthetics is able to transcend both reason and the logic reason depends on.

I guess each person has their favourite philosophers, and their choice is probably more intuitive than logical.

In understanding the world, there is a limit to reason and logic, in that we cannot appreciate the beauty of a rose using either reason or logic.

There are however notable differences between reason and logic. Reason is a broader term than logic, and is about understanding and making judgments using logic in order to arrive at sound conclusions . Logic uses a sequential process, using formal rules and principles in order to ensure the validity and coherence of an argument. As logic is limited as a sequential process, good reasoning, which is based on logic, must also be limited by such a sequential process. (https://thisvsthat.io/logic-vs-reason)

We cannot fully understand the world using reason and logic, as reason and logic only allows us a sequential understanding of the relation between the parts. Reason and logic are sequential, as in the syllogism. Starting with A is leads into B and concludes with C.

In order to appreciate beauty we need to be aware of the whole at one moment in time. In Kant's' terms, we need an instantaneous unity of apperception. In other words, we need intuition and the aesthetic.

The beauty of a rose cannot be proved using the sequential argument of reason or logic, but only shown using a momentary unity of apperception, a momentary intuition or momentary aesthetic.

Therefore if philosophy is to understand the world in a deeper sense, reason and logic, as temporally sequential, are insufficient and need to be transcended by the instantaneous and momentary, such as intuition and the aesthetic.

Well one is a working physicist and the other is a jobbing philosopher — apokrisis

We got locked into this black and white thinking on causality at the point in history when the Scientific Revolution collided with Catholic Church..........................As a debate, it destroys all that is actually interesting about Nature from a well-informed metaphysical point of view. — apokrisis

Perhaps that is exactly why we need "jobbing philosophers", to help us work through the metaphysical maze.

But then you have Don Lincoln saying " The quantum foam isn’t just theoretical. It is quite real." — apokrisis

And then you have Eddy Keming Chan saying...

The popular idea that quantum physics implies everything is random and nothing is certain might be as far from the truth as it could possibly be.

Dr. Don Lincoln is a Senior Scientist at Fermilab and Eddy Keming Chen is an Associate Professor at the University of California, San Diego.

What makes a Senior Scientist right and an Associate Professor wrong?
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One can always concoct conspiracy theories about how quantum theory is secretly deterministic — apokrisis

I don't think that the debate about whether the quantum theory implies determinism or not is a secret plot by powerful conspirators (Merriam Webster - Conspiracy Theory)

I don't think that is something Scientific American would engage in.

Does Quantum Mechanics Rule Out Free Will?

The article by John Horgan notes "Physics as a whole, not just quantum mechanics, is obviously incomplete."

Again, this is a bit off topic since the OP inquires about the validity of teleological explanations in the case where the laws of evolution of a system would be indeterministic. — Pierre-Normand

In classical mechanics, the evidence is that this universe is deterministic. In a deterministic world, it seems clear that teleology is not a valid theory.

In quantum mechanics, some believe it is compatible with a deterministic universe and some believe it is compatible with an indeterministic universe. In an indeterministic universe, I agree with @Tom111's conclusion that teleology does not seem to be a valid theory.

So yes, it seems that quantum mechanics does not affect the question as to whether teleology is a valid theory or not.

Any certainty dissolves into the vagueness of quantum foam. — apokrisis

There is no certainty that there is a quantum foam. Quantum foam is only a theory (Wikipedia - quantum foam).

Quantum foam (or spacetime foam, or spacetime bubble) is a theoretical quantum fluctuation of spacetime on very small scales due to quantum mechanics.

Some interpret quantum mechanics as describing an indeterministic universe, but others believe there is an underlying deterministic process.

For example, "Quantum mechanics in an entirely deterministic universe" by László E. Szabó published 1995 in the International Journal of Theoretical Physics.

This paper explores the compatibility of quantum mechanics with a deterministic universe, challenging the widely held belief that the two are incompatible.

There is no current certainty that the theory of quantum mechanics implies an indeterminate universe.

Mechanism versus teleology in a probabilistic universe — tom111

Is there any evidence that the universe is probabilistic?

For example, the equation ${d = 0.5 * g * t^{2}}$ gives the distance an object falls under gravity from rest. No probability is involved.

I may not know how far the object will fall in a certain amount of time, and it is true for me that the future is uncertain. For me, the future is about probabilities

But where is the evidence that the universe is probabilistic?

The problem seems to lie with the word 'essay' or perhaps in 'philosophy'.
Some take a narrow view of both. Some further clarification required. — Amity

From page 1 of this Thread:

Resources were requested for help on what exactly an academic philosophy essay should look like, and provided by @Amity so I've appended them here:

https://philosophy.tamucc.edu/graphics/berkich/texts/james-lenman-how-to-write-a-crap-philosophy-essay.pdf

https://philosophy.tamucc.edu/graphics/berkich/texts/james-pryor-guidelines-on-writing-a-philosophy-paper.pdf

https://www.southampton.ac.uk/~assets/doc/University_life/learning_teaching/posing_the_question.pdf

I'd like to participate next time! — Moliere

"My hope was to elicit both kinds of writing, at least, if with more effort than we usually put into OP's and responses."

This challenge was a fantastic opportunity to learn and improve. I look forward to next year's Philosophical Writing Challenge. I have an idea for my topic. (edited)

Philosophical Writing Challenge 2026

Attempt one at 4)

Perhaps Rule 4) should read "Must be philosophical writing. The Title and Topic are chosen by the author."

4) is a rule rather than a guideline, as a guideline can be ignored.

"Essay" has a specific meaning within philosophical writing.

The expression "fall under the broad category" is redundant and slightly confusing. "Must fall under the broad category of philosophical writing" says no more than "Must be philosophical writing".

This allows, as you say, "both kinds of writing".

As Zachary Fruhling writes, philosophical writing includes the novel, the poetic, the aphoristic, the journal, the epistle, the dialogue, the letter, the philosophical essay, the exegesis, the compare and contrast, the blog, the treatise, etc.

Attempt two at 4)

However, this wording doesn't avoid the problem of Threads that ramble in all directions. As you say "more effort than we usually put into OP's and responses"

The piece of philosophical writing must be a consistent piece of work. If it starts as a poem it shouldn't morph into a dialogue. If it purports to be a philosophical essay, it shouldn't leave out a thesis.

Perhaps Rule 4) should read "Must be philosophical writing. The Title, Topic and Form are chosen by the author. There are many different forms of philosophical writing, including the poetic, aphoristic, essay, etc, but whichever form the author chooses, their writing must be consistent within their chosen form"

These two sources may be useful

1) The Royal Institute of Philosophy and its Think Essay Prize

2) The John Locke Institute's Global Essay Prize and its questions for philosophy

It is interesting that both these sources restrict their philosophical entry to philosophical essays, where philosophical essays have specific requirements.

Do you prefer more analytic writing yourself or do you find something like what Nietzsche does equally worthy of attention (regardless of content, talking purely stylistically here!)? — I like sushi

It is not so much as preferring analytic to creative philosophical writing, or vice versa, as both have their place within philosophy. Philosophy needs both analytic and creative writings, and would be damaged if either were absent.

One of the first "serious" books I read was Nietzsche's "Thus Spoke Zarathustra". Three days ago I bought George Orwell's "Homage to Catalonia" and today have ordered Daniel Defoe's "Robinson Crusoe". So I do like creative writing.

The format of the analytic philosophical essay is certainly not unknown. For example the Philosophy Writing Challenge gave several resources, including James Pryor's "Guidelines on Writing a Philosophy Paper", who noted:

A philosophy paper consists of the reasoned defence of some claim. Your paper must offer an argument. It can't consist in the mere report of your opinions, nor in a mere report of the opinions of the philosophers we discuss. You have to defend the claims you make. You have to offer reasons to believe them.

Yes, the importance of the philosophical essay may be taken for granted by philosophers. However, on the one hand, in being taken for granted it can become the hinge on which philosophy is founded, and on the other hand in being taken for granted it can be ignored. When ignored, writing on philosophy may be no more than a list of personal opinions, a mere report of the opinions of other philosophers stripped of any context and claims made but not defended.

It seems to me that there is more to the creative philosophical writings of Nietzsche, Orwell and Defoe than being a negation of the philosophical essay. Creative philosophical writing is more than listing personal opinion, more than repeating other philosopher's opinions and more than making unjustified claims.

Taking the Forum as an example, it seems to me that much of the writing is neither one thing nor another. Neither creative, in the sense of Nietzsche, nor analytic, in the sense of the philosophical essay, where claims are made and then defended. I am including myself.

Even on this writing challenge, that specifically wanted a philosophical essay, perhaps only four essays fulfilled the role of philosophical essay: i) Wittgenstein's Hinges and Gödel's Unprovable Statements, ii) Cognitive Experiences are a Part of Material Reality, iii) Technoethics: Freedom, Precarity, and Enzymatic Knowledge Machines and iv) An Exploration Between the Balance Between State and Individual Interests.

Both creative and analytic philosophical writing are important. It may well be that the importance of the philosophical essay is taken for granted by philosophers, but that doesn't mean that the requirements of the philosophical essay should then be ignored.

If you could support that intuition then I think your essay would be strengthened. — Moliere

Appreciate your comments :up:

No, but it is an indication that there might be paradoxes or incoherences within the theory — Tobias

Radical individualism is a coherent political philosophy that may work in certain contexts and not in others.

It may work in a hippy commune of a dozen people living in the woods, but is unlikely to work if 100 million people in the USA decided to adopt it.

I am still missing where the paradox is.
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The libertarian conception of the individual extends to the assertion that self-ownership entails ownership of the fruit of one's labour. — Tobias

The essay is about radical individualism.

Has a connection been made between radical individualism and libertarianism.
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Also Benkei did not attack all forms of radical individualism, but a specific libertarian variation of it, if I understand correctly. — Tobias

He seemed to attack all forms of it.

This essay argues that radical individualism is less a coherent political philosophy than a theatrical pose that conceals its reliance on collective institutions, rationalizes inequality and rebrands domination as personal freedom.

If a philosophy is in practice unworkable, it may mean that its assumptions are flawed. — Tobias

Yes, but that does mean that an unworkable philosophy must be a paradox.
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Find problematic, counterintuitive or incoherent notions within the theory and then focus on how they shape the thoughts of notable figures. — Tobias

Exactly, that is what the essay should have done.
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There is less of a following for radical individualism in Europe — Tobias

I'm not so sure. There are plenty of hippy communes in Europe who could be called radical individualists. They renounce the power structure of institutions and the constraints these institutions put on their lives.

For example, there is the "free town" of Christiana in Copenhagen. It was founded in 1971 by a group of anarchic squatters and artists who took over an abandoned military base and proclaimed it a “free zone”.

Radical individualism is a coherent political theory that can work in certain contexts.

The institutions mentioned in the essay are as diverse as the (federal) state, the corporation and academia. None of the three people discussed though, draw any power from the European Union — Tobias

The essay is about individuals who pretend to be radical individualists but in fact rely on authoritarian, collective institutions that wield immense power.

This is not a problem particular to the USA.

but to point out the gross simplifications that liberals and libertarians tend to make. Which the author indeed unmasks very strongly. — Tobias

That radical individualism may in practice be unworkable doesn't make it a paradox. It is no more a paradox than Icarus' attempt at flight using a pair of wax wings made by his father Daedalus.

Even if it might be an incoherent decision to follow radical individualism in one's daily life, this does not mean that radical individualism as a political philosophy is incoherent.

Suppose we take the quote by John Stuart Mill as an example of a liberal or libertarian position. It may well be a simplification of his position, as it is just one quote.

However, it seems that the author of the essay is not attacking radical individualism in itself, but rather is attacking the hypocrite who purports to be a radical individualist, yet in fact does not believe in it.

This essay argues that radical individualism is less a coherent political philosophy than a theatrical pose that conceals its reliance on collective institutions, rationalizes inequality and rebrands domination as personal freedom. By examining its philosophical roots and public champions we expose a paradox at its core: the celebration of liberty through authoritarian means.

John Stuart Mill is not a hypocrite who purports to be a liberal but in practice does not believe in liberalism.

I would disagree with that. Why would institutions be 'suspect'? It is akin to saying gravity is suspect. Also the second part of the sentence is questionable. There are all sorts of examples of people sacrificing themselves for a higher goal and lo and behold, they are not derided but revered as heroes. — Tobias

It depends what is meant by "Institution".

I am sure many parents would sacrifice their lives for the institution of their family, and if they did would be revered as heroes.

However this is not the meaning of institution as used by the author in this essay. The author is referring to institutions as large, complex, highly formalized bodies with immense power. For example, in the European context, bodies such as the European Union.

We focus on three figures: Elon Musk, Donald Trump and Jordan Peterson. Though differing in style and domain all present the image of a self-legitimating individual opposed to collective authority. Yet each depends on immense institutional power. Musk benefits from public subsidies and corporate scale, Trump commands state machinery and nationalist rhetoric, Peterson draws authority from platforms and institutional critique.

I am sure that no one would sacrifice their lives for the institution of the European Union, and if they did, would be more derided than revered.

The EU in their publicity material may say that their goal is the benefit of its citizens, but in practice, the EU acts as if its citizens are there for the benefit of the EU. This is why institutions with immense power such as the EU are suspect. This is the type of institution referred to by the essay.

You mean the etymology of the word "Dimitri"? — Quk

No, more as you said "His biography from birth to the present time"

A history is hardly universal. — Quk

There is the concept of "chair" in the mind in thought and language and particular instantiations of it in the world, such as "this chair". Similarly, there is concept of "Dimitri" in the mind in thought and language and a particular instantiation of it in the world, having, as you say, a unique history.

Logic isn't a set of rules we invented to think clearly. It's not even something minds discover about reality. Logic is the automatic byproduct of existence itself. — tom111

If the OP is correct, in that logic is the automatic by-product of existence itself, then Kant's project in his Critique of Pure Reason has failed.

The Law of Identity states that each thing is identical to itself.

Kant in the CPR argues that we can never know anything about the thing-in-itself.

But if we know that the thing-in-itself follows the Law of Identity, and that the thing-in-itself is identical to itself, then we do know something about the thing-in-itself. IE, it is identical to itself.

The question is, where do things such as chairs exist. Do they exist in the mind as a concept in thought and language, or do they exist in a world independent of any observer?

If things only exist in the mind as a concept in thought and language, then the Law of Identity also only exists in the mind as a concept in thought and language.

However, If we define him by constants, his identity will remain constant. — Quk

The Law of Identity is about identity in logic and is not relevant to personal identity.

Dimitri's weight, which changes through his life, certainly doesn't define his identity. Even his personal identity may change throughout his life.

The only constant thing through his life, his identity, will probably be the label "Dimitri".