Babies are dependent on (M)others, and therefore make connections and loyalties very quickly, — unenlightened

I stole this from one of my posts in an earlier discussion:

The early emergence of the evaluation of social actions—present already by 3 months of age—suggests that this capacity cannot result entirely from experi­ence in particular cultural environments or exposure to specific linguistic practices, and it suggests that there are innate bases that ground some components of our moral cognition. — Karen Wynn

I see this as a very moderate expression of an argument for a genetic component to moral behavior. She doesn't make any definitive statement. She says her results suggest a genetic component. She says "...there are innate bases that ground some components of our moral cognition." That doesn't seem like any great leap to take from her studies. You, on the other hand, seem to reject even that moderate claim out of hand. You point out some hypothetical reasons why it might not be true, but don't provide any substantive refutation. I find that an unconvincing argument.

I've linked to this video many times on the forum:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FRvVFW85IcU

I would say there is reason here to suggest a human preference/desire for rules, but not necessarily that any innate ‘rules for behaviour’ exist as such. — Possibility

I don't think it's necessarily a preference for rules as such as much as it is a natural tendency to judge others.

What this also means, is that because we evolved this set of abilities for cultural learning that is more flexible, we didn't need all these hard-wired traits and instincts anymore unlike other animals... and so we presumably eventually lost a lot of those traits, as tends to happen in evolution with traits that aren't useful anymore. — ChatteringMonkey

we lack all of these instinctive algorithmic behaviors. — ChatteringMonkey

It would be a good explanation, I guess, if it were true.

I am no expert on animal behaviour but it seems to me humans can never exist (spontaneously?)like an animal in the wild without language communities and complex learning. — Andrew4Handel

Homo Sapiens have been around for 200,000 years. They were genetically equivalent to people today. Do you think evolution didn't provide them with the ability to make decisions and act on those decisions? Do you think people 100,000 years ago couldn't act without application of rules, objectivity or teleology? I'm sure they didn't have existential crises or nihilistic feelings. The problems you've identified are overlays on basic human behavior associated, I guess, with modern civilization.

It is at the heart of some eastern philosophies and meditative practices that people can think and act spontaneously, e.g. Taoism. This from The Tao Te Ching, Verse 38, Ellen Marie Chen translation with some butchering from me:

When spontaneity [Tao] is lost, then there is virtue.
When virtue is lost, then there is humanity.
When humanity is lost, then there is righteousness.
When righteousness is lost, then there is propriety.
Propriety is the thin edge of loyalty and faithfulness,
And the beginning of disorder.

There are no innate rules for behaviour and any value judgements and ought's are completely fabricated. — Andrew4Handel

There are studies that show babies as young as three months old, long before they have language, are already judging other people's behavior and making value judgements. Karen Wynn, who conducted the studies, suggests this does show there are innate rules for behavior.

I feel that we are in a nihilistic position where we can't can justify any of our actions by reference to rules, objectivity or teleology.

For example it is not wrong for me to eat a chocolate bar and it is not wrong for me not to eat one. There are no innate rules for behaviour and any value judgements and ought's are completely fabricated. — Andrew4Handel

Animals know what to do to live without some outside force motivating them. People are animals. What we need to live, to make decisions and to act, is built in to us, some of it from birth and some of it developed later through education and socialization. Of course, people are also different from other animals, so I'm sure our motivations are more complicated. Some of it is fear, some more positive factors. I've tried to pay attention to my own motivation for the things I do. In my experience, rules and rational considerations are not my primary motivators.

Stephen Pinker in "The Language Instinct" makes the case that, to a large extent, language acquisition is an instinct - genetically mediated motivation which develops according to a developmental schedule. He quotes Darwin from "Descent of Man":

Human language is an instinctive tendency to acquire an art. It certainly is not a true instinct, for every language has to be learned. It differs, however, widely from all ordinary arts, for man has an instinctive tendency to speak, as we see in the babble of our young children; while no child has an instinctive tendency to brew, bake, or write.

He also quotes William James from "What is an Instinct":

Nothing is commoner than the remark that Man differs from lower creatures by the almost total absence of instincts, and the assumption of their work in him by “reason.”...[But] the facts of the case are really tolerably plain! Man has a far greater variety of impulses than any lower animal; and any one of these impulses, taken in itself, is as “blind” as the lowest instinct can be; but, owing to man’s memory, power of reflection, and power of inference, they come each one to be felt by him, after he has once yielded to them and experienced their results, in connection with a foresight of those results…

…It is plain then that, no matter how well endowed an animal may originally be in the way of instincts, his resultant actions will be much modified if the instincts combine with experience, if in addition to impulses he have memories, associations, inferences, and expectations, on any considerable scale…

…there is no material antagonism between instinct and reason…

To me, this suggests that human behavior beyond just acquisition of language is motivated by instinct modified and expanded by learning and experience.

My take so far is that, as of yet, there isn't a settled philosophical definition of what "rational" means. Mine fully included. — javra

Agreed. As I noted, it's best if definitions are agreed on, or at least discussed, early in a thread.

It’s the job of the metaphysician to stand upon the practical foundation of scientific truth and spin a cognitive narrative of a cerebrally inhabitable world that imparts logical-conceptual coherence to physical things. — ucarr

You use a different definition of "metaphysics" than I, or many others, do. A confusion of definitions just about always happens when discussing this subject. For me, metaphysics is the foundation upon which science is built. I don't want to sidetrack your discussion, so I won't go any further.

I think you're right. Your definition of "rational" is a valid one.

I don't think it is easy to have a discussion like this without recognising that reason belongs to a web of interrelated ideas and values and any deep discussion will lead us irrevocably to matters of truth and reality. — Tom Storm

As I noted in my response to @javra, above, I don't think rationality is really capable of dealing with "a web of interrelated ideas and values."

First off, as a matter of opinion, we disagree on what the term rational ought to refer to. I for one believe it should be roughly described as “the ability to discern and apply reasons (like causes and motives) and comparisons (with ratios as one example among humans) for the sake of optimally fulfilling goals, be these needs (like physical sustenance so as to maintain physical health) or desires (with improved eudemonia as one example sometimes spoken of by philosophers)”./quote]

It's not a question of what "rational" ought to refer to, it's what it actually does refer to. It doesn't mean just good, effective thinking, at least not in a philosophical context. It has a specific meaning and it's not the one you've given above. It's closer to the one that I've given, although we could argue the specifics.
— javra

If the cultures in which (your sense of) rationality prevails happen to callously and obliviously bring about the steady obliteration of the inhabitable planet - and, via rational inference, of themselves as a peoples in the process - while those cultures devoid of rationality (as you've defined it) do no such thing, what’s one to make of rationality’s value? — javra

Again, it's not my sense of what it means, it's what it actually does mean. You propose a more holistic approach to knowledge and understanding, which I endorse. Rationality is reductionist. Logic only applies to propositions, statements of fact. Question - How many true propositions does it take to paint an accurate picture of reality. Answer - Trick question. Reality can't be described effectively with any number of propositions.

I am happy with Pinker's definition but I recognize its problems. Is not part of the issue that some of us see reason as superior pathway to truth (small 't') - and let's not get onto that one either. — Tom Storm

I think we're coming up against the problem that we never did define what "rational" means back at the beginning. For me, it means a systematic search for knowledge and understanding following a formal system such as logic, the rules of which are specified in advance. It's probably too late to go into that now.

I define it as the use of knowledge to attain a goal, where “knowledge,” according to the standard philosopher’s definition, is “justified true belief.” — Tom Storm

Well, I think justified true belief as an explanation of knowledge is wrong-headed, so that doesn't resolve anything for me. No, I don't want to talk about JTB.

Is he talking consciousness or metacognition? — Tom Storm

Jaynes defines consciousness as "the human ability to introspect." I interpret that to mean that consciousness is self-awareness - the capacity to think abstractly about ourselves. Does that answer your question?

If rationality is using knowledge to achieve goals, then probably. — Tom Storm

If all it takes to be rational is using knowledge to achieve goals, then animals are rational. Any mental process that may lead to action is rational. That takes all the meaning out of the word. It's certainly not how we've been using the word up till now in this discussion.

Just a final question to consider. In cultures existing prior to, or unaffected by, our current conception of empiric and propositional logic-based reasoning, would you say there was no distinction between rational and irrational thinking, or reasonableness and unreasonableness? — Janus

I don't mind trying to answer, but I don't have much insight to offer. To start, I'll say again - irrational and non-rational are not the same thing. Intuition is not irrational, it's non-rational. I don't know what happened in ancient cultures. Julien Jaynes in "The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind" claimed that consciousness did not develop in humans until about 4,000 years ago. I've always been skeptical of that, but I don't know for sure. As I noted before, I think rational thought is probably not possible without self-awareness. If Jaynes and I are both right, I guess that would mean that there was no rational thought until about 4,000 years ago.

So I am not claiming that these processes of reasoning are deductively valid or empirically based, but they are different ways of balancing, measuring and associating things which have their own kinds of logic. — Janus

Seems like you are changing the meaning of the word "logic" in mid-discussion. We can leave it at that. If we go on we'll get into more and more nitpicking which I don't think will lead to a satisfactory resolution for either of us. This has been a really good discussion.

Not exactly, I am just saying that rational thought processes may be going on that we are not aware of. There doesn't seem to be any logical contradiction or impossibility in that conjecture. — Janus

I see no reason to believe that rational thought processes must be executed consciously. If the brain/mind can do strict logic or any other form of associating ideas consciously,why could it not carry on with such processes in the absence of conscious awareness. I mean, maybe it can't do that; but if that were so we would need evidence and an argument to establish it. — Janus

Well, now we've raised the question of whether rational thought processes have to be conscious. I vote yes, but I don't have a definitive argument to back that up.

I agree that intuition probably works by associating images, impressions and concepts. Alchemy, astrology, acupuncture, hermeticism and homeopathy are some examples of ways of intuitively associating qualities of elements, things and processes via perceived similarities or affinities. There is a logic to this, which is not empirically based in our modern scientific understanding, but I would call it rational nonetheless, — Janus

You start out associating intuition with discredited ways of knowing - alchemy, astrology, etc. I don't understand that. Intuition is not something esoteric or mysterious. It's an everyday process our minds use all the time. Then you describe those intuitive processes as a kind of rationality. It seems like you are identifying rationality as anything the mind does to collect information or solve problems.

So whats your point? — Benj96

You say:

I think it is possible to be criminal and also rational in the case that the law is irrational. — Benj96

From that I infer that in cases where a law is rational, you think criminal acts are not rational. I was disagreeing that is necessarily true.

I think it is possible to be criminal and also rational in the case that the law is irrational. — Benj96

Why does it matter whether or not the crime is rational? Seems to me that robbing a bank so I can be rich could be just as rational as buying illegal drugs to help my friend. Which is not to say they are morally equivalent.

Continuing this approach, having a reason versus having a rationale. A reason is offered as causally sufficient and self-evident. I used metal to build this wheel instead of wood so it will last longer. A rationale is an internally coherent explanatory framework which is invoked precisely when there is no exemplary reason. I do not know where I dropped my watch, so I chose to search for it under the streetlamp because there is more light there. A rationale is invoked as a reason when no more specific reason exists. — Pantagruel

Your example is a good example of the problem with making a definitive distinction between the two concepts. I think calling "I used metal to build this wheel instead of wood so it will last longer" a rationale would be just as accurate as calling it a reason.

I don't tend to keep the terms separate and I think others will not have this way of separating them, but I do have a dash of that tendency myself. — Bylaw

Yes. As I noted, that difficulty in separating the concepts is the reason I didn't start a discussion like this one previously. As it is though, this has turned out to be a really good one for me. I've really been able to make what I think clearer to myself.

Though I want to add that those rational processes of further testing need to use intution right through. They are not just intuition, but the process relies on it. — Bylaw

Yes. Reason is an iterative process. Rough and tumble.

I wasn't so much concerned about intuition missing anything, but more about the implicit rational thinking that might have been going on sub-consciously when we find that an intuitive response has suddenly appeared in our consciousness. — Janus

This comment took me by surprise, even startled me a bit. You are proposing that intuition includes some sort of secret logic we are not aware of. My first reaction is that the idea is absurd, but I'll try to give a more thoughtful, perhaps reasoned, even rational response than just that.

I see two possibilities. 1) There is no secret rational component to intuition. And 2) It doesn't matter one way or the other. Let's start with 1. In my experience, intuition works by making non-rational connections between unlike ideas. That's consistent with reading I've done that claims that fundamental mental processes work by making analogical, metaphorical connections rather than linear ones. I'm not capable of taking that argument any further at this point, so we'll leave it at that.

On to 2. It seems clear to me that rational processes are ones we have to be conscious, aware, of. They have to be put into a language, possibly mathematics or logic. It is the essence of reason that it has to be transparent. You cannot claim to be rational if you can't provide a description of the chain of logic you've followed to reach a conclusion for others to examine and validate. Again in my experience, rational evaluation is something I have to apply to a hypothesis after I come up with it.

The tricky thing about intuition is that we don't know whether these processes of comparison, measurement etc.,have gone on subconsciously. — Janus

I don't know if you saw the excerpts from the SEP about abduction I posted in a response to ByLaw previously. The issue discussed in those texts is the distinction between generating hypotheses and validating them. Yes, intuition might miss something important. Brainstorming is a process of quickly tossing out ideas without trying to exclude those that probably won't work. The process is meant to generate a lot of hypotheses for further testing. That's where reason/rationality comes in.

Thinking, from the perspective of an individual is (IMO) almost always strategic and goal driven. — Bret Bernhoft

I don't see that as true in my case. Based on my experience of my own thinking, much of it is wandering and playful. Curiosity leads me off in directions with no obvious utility. It's possible to let thinking take you where it wants to go with no clear goal. That's the kind of thinking that's the most fun. Thinking is, or at least can be, play.

Ok. But if experience is empirically contingent, then there must be some empirical differentiator? Even if it is like the same light shining on two differently coloured plates. The plates absorb different spectrums of the light, so are experiencing very different aspects of the same thing. (Which reflects in the colours they reflect.) — Pantagruel

People are aware of their own experiences at different levels and in different ways. I don't think that means the processes themselves are different. If you and I look at exactly the same image under the same conditions we are likely to have somewhat different experiences.

No but often it seems that very different perspectives on the mind do suggest that some people do have fundamentally different experiences of thought. — Pantagruel

I think that's true, but I don't think a difference in the experience means there is a difference in the mechanisms or processes of thought among different people.

deduction, induction and abduction — Bylaw

I had not heard of "abduction" used in the context of logic before, so I looked it up. What I found was interesting and relevant. From the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy?

In the philosophical literature, the term “abduction” is used in two related but different senses. In both senses, the term refers to some form of explanatory reasoning. However, in the historically first sense, it refers to the place of explanatory reasoning in generating hypotheses, while in the sense in which it is used most frequently in the modern literature it refers to the place of explanatory reasoning in justifying hypotheses. In the latter sense, abduction is also often called “Inference to the Best Explanation.”

This entry is exclusively concerned with abduction in the modern sense, although there is a supplement on abduction in the historical sense, which had its origin in the work of Charles Sanders Peirce — SEP - Abduction

And then:

The term “abduction” was coined by Charles Sanders Peirce in his work on the logic of science. He introduced it to denote a type of non-deductive inference that was different from the already familiar inductive type. It is a common complaint that no coherent picture emerges from Peirce’s writings on abduction. (Though perhaps this is not surprising, given that he worked on abduction throughout his career, which spanned a period of more than fifty years. For a concise yet thorough account of the development of Peirce’s thoughts about abduction, see Fann 1970.) Yet it is clear that, as Peirce understood the term, “abduction” did not quite mean what it is currently taken to mean (see Campos 2011 and McAuliffe 2015). One main difference between his conception and the modern one is that, whereas according to the latter, abduction belongs to what the logical empiricists called the “context of justification”—the stage of scientific inquiry in which we are concerned with the assessment of theories—for Peirce abduction had its proper place in the context of discovery, the stage of inquiry in which we try to generate theories which may then later be assessed. As he says, “[a]bduction is the process of forming explanatory hypotheses. It is the only logical operation which introduces any new idea” (CP 5.172); elsewhere he says that abduction encompasses “all the operations by which theories and conceptions are engendered” (CP 5.590). Deduction and induction, then, come into play at the later stage of theory assessment: deduction helps to derive testable consequences from the explanatory hypotheses that abduction has helped us to conceive, and induction finally helps us to reach a verdict on the hypotheses, where the nature of the verdict is dependent on the number of testable consequences that have been verified. (As an aside, it is to be noted that Gerhard Schurz has recently defended a view of abduction that is again very much in the Peircean spirit. On this view, “the crucial function of a pattern of abduction … consists in its function as a search strategy which leads us, for a given kind of scenario, in a reasonable time to a most promising explanatory conjecture which is then subject to further test” (Schurz 2008, 205). The paper is also of interest because of the useful typology of patterns of abduction that it puts forth.)

As Harry Frankfurt (1958) has noted, however, the foregoing view is not as easy to make sense of as might at first appear. Abduction is supposed to be part of the logic of science, but what exactly is logical about inventing explanatory hypotheses? According to Peirce (CP 5.189), abduction belongs to logic because it can be given a schematic characterization, to wit, the following:

The surprising fact, C, is observed.
But if A were true, C would be a matter of course.
Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true.

But Frankfurt rightly remarks that this is not an inference leading to any new idea. After all, the new idea—the explanatory hypothesis A—must have occurred to one before one infers that there is reason to suspect that A is true, for A already figures in the second premise.

Frankfurt then goes on to argue that a number of passages in Peirce’s work suggest an understanding of abduction not so much as a process of inventing hypotheses but rather as one of adopting hypotheses, where the adoption of the hypothesis is not as being true or verified or confirmed, but as being a worthy candidate for further investigation. On this understanding, abduction could still be thought of as being part of the context of discovery. It would work as a kind of selection function, or filter, determining which of the hypotheses that have been conceived in the stage of discovery are to pass to the next stage and be subjected to empirical testing. The selection criterion is that there must be a reason to suspect that the hypothesis is true, and we will have such a reason if the hypothesis makes whichever observed facts we are interested in explaining a matter of course. This would indeed make better sense of Peirce’s claim that abduction is a logical operation.

Nevertheless, Frankfurt ultimately rejects this proposal as well. Given, he says, that there may be infinitely many hypotheses that account for a given fact or set of facts—which Peirce acknowledged—it can hardly be a sufficient condition for the adoption of a hypothesis (in the above sense) that its truth would make that fact or set of facts a matter of course. — SEP - Pierce on Abduction

I bolded text I think is especially relevant.

Right? — Pantagruel

Not sure what you're asking. Did I mean what I wrote? Yes. Does it seem wrong to you?

Yes. Another thought is that when reasoning, there are moments of 'microintuitions'. They can be all sorts of things - moments of feeling into semantics, the 'I have checked that enough' qualia, 'it feels like some step is missing here' qualia, tiny thought experiments where one circles around a step in reasoning, quick dashes into memory looking for counterevidence and so on. All these little tweaks and checks. — Bylaw

Agreed. Reason and rationality don't have to be done formally, in writing, with little checklists. We can do it on the fly. Did I say this before? - Maybe the difference between reason and rationality is that reason welcomes intuition and insight into the process.

We're talking about different aspects of thought. — Vera Mont

I guess you just have a different experience of thinking than I do.

I'm asking why you would need a new generalization in thAe first place. I'm describing a premise from which a practical, mundane chain of reasoning may start. A situation is identified. Why would it have to be new? — Vera Mont

Okay. How is a real situation in which the subject may find himself non-rational? — Vera Mont

As I've noted in my last couple of posts in this thread, my part in this discussion is itself a good example of what I'm trying to describe. It has been clear to me for a long time, based on my experience of my own thinking process; i.e. intuition, insight; that much of thinking is not rational. The description I've provided is just about the first time I've tried organizing my thoughts on this subject and putting them into words. That has been what I would call a rational process, but it's roots are in experience, not reason.

Exactly. It is as if we can manage without intuition, often. Or, it is as if everything in science, say, is reasoned and empirical. Conclusions are formed, hopefully, after testing and rational analysis, but the process of science requires intution and other non-rational processes. Often if one asserts this, one is told 'but they are fallible.' Well, sure. And of course reasoned/rational processes are also fallible. But yes, intuition is fallible but necessary. We can't weed it out and function. And then as a related issue, some intuition is better than other intuition. Some people's intuition that is is better than other people's. — Bylaw

Yes. As you note, you don't use intuition and insight as a replacement for reason. They do different things. Reason can't do what intuition does. More than that, reason knows it needs intuition. I guess maybe rationality doesn't. Maybe that's the difference. Reason has the humility to know that it doesn't provide, can't provide, all that's needed.

Clearly explained! — Janus

Thank you. I'm glad it was clear to you. That was the first time I really tried to write out the point I was trying to make, after toying around with it in my mind for a long time. The description I wrote was a good example of what I was trying to describe. It was intuitively clear to me based on my experience of my own thinking process that much, most, of my thinking is not rational. Taking that intuition and putting it into words was a rational act, but in its heart, at its birth, it was not.

Situation: I am standing on a hard surface in the dark.
Problem: I am not satisfied to stand here until daybreak (Memory has kicked in with two pieces of information: it's night and it usually ends with sunrise) — Vera Mont

You're not describing a new generalization. This is something you learned when you were three-years-old. Memory is not reason.

I don't see any of that as irrational. — Vera Mont

Again, non-rational is not the same as irrational.

Even when we think, we reason internally as an internal discussion. — Pantagruel

This is not my personal experience. Most of my useful thinking, things other than worrying or fantasizing, takes place subconsciously. It pops up and then I have to apply reason to check whether or not it makes sense.

Whatall premises? How so? — Vera Mont

Here's my thinking. Non-trivial premises come from one of two places 1) They are established using deductive logic from previous premises or 2) They are established by inductive logic from empirical observations. If you follow every chain of deductions backwards, you will ultimately come to at least one premise that has to be established empirically.

How do people turn empirical observations into generalizations that can be used as premises? 1) They look at patterns they or others have seen before with other observations or, if that doesn't work or if they haven't seen similar observations before 2) They generate new generalizations that can be tested. If you follow every chain of generalizations backwards, you will ultimately come to at least one that has to be established based on a new generalizations.

How do people generate new generalizations from observations? I do it by pouring information into my brain, letting it spin around for a while until a pattern emerges, an insight. Intuition. Generating a new premise, a hypothesis, is not a logical process. It requires that something new be created where there was nothing before. Then that new idea can be tested using empirical methods. You have to have a hypothesis before you can apply logic. Before you can be rational.

Sometimes "reasonableness" is contrasted specifically with instrumental rationality in submitting to judgment also the worthwhileness of the goal and the acceptability of the means of achieving it, so a broader decision-making process. — Srap Tasmaner

This makes sense to me. As I wrote previously:

Reason takes into account issues beyond the bare facts, e.g. clarity, civility, contemplation, cooperation. — T Clark

It would have made sense to add the worthiness of the goals to my list.

That makes no difference to the kind of thinking that is applied to a problem. The whole chain of reasoning may be invalidated at the end by one irrational premise or one false datum along the way, but the process itself is either rational or irrational. — Vera Mont

I agree with this but, as I noted, I think premises are by their nature non-rational, which is not to say irrational.

I do gain something, even from some of the futile, circular ones. — Vera Mont

Yes, I too have gained from those types of discussions. I've learned to avoid them if possible. I also try to keep the opening posts on threads I start very specific so I have a better chance to really examine the subject I'm interested in.

I think that ambiguity is the reason I never took on the task of clarifying the distinction. There's just too much room for pointless disagreement descending into "sez you." People have a lot invested in what is considered reasonable or rational and what is not.
— T Clark

I think the terrain can be mapped. — Pantagruel

As I noted in my response to @Vera Mont, this discussion seems to be proving me wrong.

scientistic and hermeutic approaches to understanding and intentionality — Pantagruel

Can you briefly summarize these. That may be an unreasonable, although not irrational, request.

The premises or belief from which the thought begins may be entirely false (religious tenet, cultural assumption) and the information may be incorrect (optical illusion, misuse of language, inaccurate measurement, deliberate lie) and therefore the conclusion derived from them entirely wrong, disastrously wrong, as long as they are internally consistent, the thought is rational. — Vera Mont

Sure, the premises may be wrong, but they also may just be non-rational. In a recent thread I made the claim that all premises, if you trace them back to their source, are non-rational.

I suppose... But don't they in just about every kind of opinion and belief? Avoiding all of those subjects doesn't leave much to discuss. The weather, traffic, our children and our dreams... — Vera Mont

I'm mostly thinking about here on the forum. There are some topics I avoid because I don't think the discussion will go anywhere useful. This one seems to be proving me wrong in that regard. For many here, rational is a value judgement. They don't acknowledge the legitimacy of things they don't consider rational or the distinction between irrational and non-rational.