woman...that is some advanced scientific lexicon — Merkwurdichliebe
Some of the points that I have listed go beyond the issue of whether people should be allowed to have control over their own bodies. They show what the possible consequences are of preventing women from getting abortions. Does "society" want to pay that price? — Agree-to-Disagree
abortion campaigners were primarily successful because they tapped into public fears (and therefore politicians’ concerns) that women were dying from backstreet abortions. — care.org.uk
medical science is trying to reduce discrimination against men by allowing them to have a womb transplant. — Agree-to-Disagree
There are a number of other issues which also complicate abortion: — Agree-to-Disagree
I seem to recall reading a biological snippet about C S Peirce who was very much a working scientist - spent years doing hydrological measurement. He said something similar. Very disdainful of armchair experts. — Wayfarer
What are your thoughts? — elucid
Beware of unearned wisdom — Bret Bernhoft
What are your guys’ thoughts? — Bob Ross
In a society where govenments try to tell you what is true and raise you into believing what you believe — Hailey
1) the expertise, the craft that goes into the artwork is lost in the AI generation. — NotAristotle
2) relatedly, the production of the art is devalued; the AI creates the illusion of creativity, when really it's just outputting pre-programmed inputs, but it's not really producing anything, it's dead; the producers of the art are taken for granted in the AI "generation" of the art; if there is no Van Gogh, there simply is no art. — NotAristotle
Here is an excerpt on dependence: — Leontiskos
problem of consciousness' relation to QM — Moliere
Further -- the big conflict here, with respect to interpreting the sciences in a philosophical manner, is on different notions of causation. The SEP has a lovely page on Teleological Notions in Biology, which you won't find in chemistry except as metaphor. The intersection between physics and biology is interesting specifically because it's where we might be able to understand the relationship between our traditional notion of causation in science (not quite billiard-ball, anymore, but still), and the frequent use of teleology in understanding living systems. That is -- putting biology first isn't so crazy as it sounds because we're not modeling the world off of natural selection, but instead questioning what sort of causation is truly fundamental. — Moliere
Or, if we are dedicated Humeans, we'll note that neither is fundamental at all, that there is no most basic kind of causation that everything can be reduced to, that it's a mere habit of the mind. — Moliere
To understand biology you need to study biology. To understand chemistry you need study chemistry, and all the same for the other subjects. The intersection between these fields isn't so clean as you present. — Moliere
why not biology as a first science rather than physics? Maybe the results in physics, at certain times at least, aren't fundamental but specific to the system they're studying, and the aggregates of the physical world don't follow the same rules. — Moliere
T Clark, have you ever in the past, do you now, and might you in the future think of yourself as a "masshole"? — BC
Right, in MA towns below a certain size have to do the town meeting. It works better than you might expect but not great. I was almost the town administrator for a town that had an open meeting and select board. — Count Timothy von Icarus
I have no illusions this is possible on the federal level, but at the local (and perhaps state) level, it would be an interesting experiment. — Mikie
It was by no means an abuse of authority. I admit it might have been an error of judgement but it's been reversed. — Wayfarer
The OP said nothing about 'the hard problem', that was introduced by you. — Wayfarer
And this then also neatly describes why consciousness is so impossible to find in all our myriad brain scans. This is puzzling because we think we should have the resolution of scans we need to be able to identify what it is that "causes," consciousness. But instead the brain is like an expert magician, who pulls a rabbit out of a hat even when he's inside an MRI. — Count Timothy von Icarus
And finally, the posts were not deleted, they were moved to more relevant thread, so as to keep this thread more on topic, which is already a complex and contentius topic in its own right. — Wayfarer
Moderator note: the comments specifically about the hard problem of consciousness have been moved to the most recent thread on that topic, so as to maintain the focus of this thread on the OP. Please feel free to carry on with that conversation in the other thread. — Wayfarer
The first presents a functional analysis of the target phenomenon, which fully characterizes the target in terms of its functional role. The second presents an empirically-discovered realizer of the functionally characterized target, one playing that very functional role. Then, by transitivity of identity, the target and realizer are deduced to be identical. — Hard Problem of Consciousness - IEP
True, but this is true for almost every interpretation of quantum mechanics. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Right, but this is true of virtually all of quantum foundations. Mach famously held that atoms were unfalsifiable and unscientific. Quarks were held to be unfalsifiable pseudoscience until just a few years before they were "verified." Lots of elements of string theories are unfalsifiable. — Count Timothy von Icarus
My counterargument would be that if you bracket off these issues as non-scientific it puts a stigma on them (and indeed a prohibition on research in quantum foundations was dogmatically enforced from on high until the late-90s). Philosophers in general lack the skills and resources to pursue these ideas; they have to be done by physicists. In many cases, we see theories that are initially attacked as unscientific coming to mature and eventually develop means of testing the theory against others. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Per Poppers evolutionary view of science, we need such suppositions because they are the "mutations," that allow science to keep "evolving." Of course, most mutations result in the death of the organism (or the scientific career), but occasionally they are hugely successful. — Count Timothy von Icarus
In any event, we currently have a number of theories about what causes quantum phenomena that are empirically indiscernible given our current technology and knowledge. By what rights should we select any of them as canonical? The idea behind enforcing the Copenhagen Interpretation as orthodoxy was that this secured science against metaphysics, but this is not what it did. Instead, it enshrined a specific type of metaphysics and epistemology as dogmatism. — Count Timothy von Icarus
How so? Certainly it's a problem that is taken seriously. The rapid coalescence of support for the Many Worlds Interpretation over that past decade is often based around the conception that the interpretation is "more likely," because it answers the Fine Tuning Problem. — Count Timothy von Icarus
But the question remains, "why do the origins of consciousness yield so slowly to the same methods that have allowed us to understand so many other phenomena with a great level of depth." — Count Timothy von Icarus
It is very frustrating to the point of willed ignorance that you keep misinterpreting/misrepresenting the hard problem of consciousness. In your own words, can you even summarize it correctly?? — schopenhauer1
The hard problem of consciousness is a philosophical problem concerning why and how humans and other organisms have qualia, phenomenal consciousness, or subjective experiences.[1][2] This is in contrast to the "easy problems" of explaining the physical systems that give humans and other animals the ability to discriminate, integrate information, perform behavioural functions, or provide behavioural reports, and so forth.[1]
The easy problems are considered "easy" not because they are literally easy, but because they are problems that are in principle amenable to functional explanations: that is, explanations that are mechanistic or behavioural, as they can be explained (at least in principle) purely by reference to the "structure and dynamics" that underpin the phenomenon in question.[3][4][1] Proponents of the hard problem argue that conscious experience is categorically different in this respect since no mechanistic or behavioural explanation could explain the character of an experience, even in principle. — Wikipedia - Hard Problem of Conscioiusness
It occured to me the other night that the von Neumann–Wigner interpretation of quantum mechanics, that consciousness is what causes wave collapse (or decoherence), solves the Fine Tuning Problem quite nicely. — Count Timothy von Icarus
And this then also neatly describes why consciousness is so impossible to find in all our myriad brain scans. This is puzzling because we think we should have the resolution of scans we need to be able to identify what it is that "causes," consciousness. But instead the brain is like an expert magician, who pulls a rabbit out of a hat even when he's inside an MRI. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Your challenges still helped me flesh it out, so thank you. — frank
It's specifically about your assessments of past behavior. You assume you know the rules you were following. Kripke's skeptic suggests that there is no fact of the matter. The fiction of "quadding" is just meant to illustrate this. — frank
I think the problem is that following the rules of addition are exactly the same as following the rules of quaddition up to the number 57. What in your mental processes would have been different so as to prove that you weren't quadding rather than adding? — frank
Then I ask you for a fact about your previous behavior that shows that the rule you were following was addition rather than quaddition. — frank
You haven't been doing addition. It was quaddition. — frank
I ask you to add 68+57.
You confidently say "125."
The skeptic asks, "How did you get that answer?"
You say "I used the rules of addition as I have so often before, and I am consistent in my rule following."
The skeptic says, "But wait. You haven't been doing addition. It was quaddition. When you said plus, you meant quus, and: x quus y = x+y for sums less than 57, but over that, the answer is always 5. So you haven't been consistent. If you were consistent, you would have said "5."" — frank
