Psychology is no nearer related to philosophy, than is any other natural science. — Shawn

I think I understand what Wittgenstein is trying to say here, but I think I disagree. As I understand it, the purpose of philosophy is to help us become more aware of how our minds work and how we think. What could be more relevant to psychology than that?

The theory of knowledge is the philosophy of psychology. — Shawn

Isn't this consistent with what I wrote just above? Doesn't it contradict Wittgenstein's previous statement?

I would like to point at a real life example of possibly what Wittgenstein would have agreed with. — Shawn

I don't see how your discussion of knowledge and education and their effect on identify is an example of what Wittgenstein discusses.

My personal belief is that knowledge is a form of "memory" encoded in the brain, more specifically the hippocampus. — Shawn

If you are saying that knowledge is actually stored in the hippocampus, I believe that is not correct, although it is true that the hippocampus has an important role in memory.

With the process of education a person carries the memories of what they ought to do or become in a form of narrative that educators present about how the world works or latter in one's formative process what domain of knowledge a person is apt at in relation to the narrative of the educator. — Shawn

As I understand it, although education may play an important role in forming our sense of identity, it is not the primary mechanism. A lot of our sense of self comes from our human nature built in by biology and neurology. In addition, much of who we are comes from what we learn from our day to day experience of our lives, especially when we are children. Most of that learning takes place with no particular intention or narrative. People with no formal education, unless you count normal socialization as education, still develop a sense of self.

I find education as one part of the puzzle of identity theory, or at least the part of the puzzle which is quite possibly the most important part of the bigger picture, — Shawn

Again, I don't believe this is true.

I did defend myself (and the original poster). If someone lacking expertise in a particular area will likely overestimate their abilities in that area, then someone lacking expertise in every area will likely overestimate their abilities in every area. Thus, if someone is stupid across the board, they will think they're clever across the board. Thus, characterizing the DKE as involving stupid people overestimating their abilities is quite correct. — Clearbury

Nuff said.

It's been read. — AmadeusD

I think you don't understand the DKE. — Clearbury

Too late. I've already said that four or five times about you. Anyway, that's not an argument. I've presented backup for my position and you haven't.

This is a plain-reading of the DK effect in action. I see no issue. It is meaningful, identifiable and quite specific. — AmadeusD

Yes, it seems like the way you've presented it is consistent with the definition in the paper. But it's not what the OP said. I remain skeptical of the value of DK in any situation, but that's a different question. I suggest reading the Scientific American article I linked.

it follows that if someone is stupid in general then they will overestimate their intelligence in general — Clearbury

No, it does not. It says nothing about that and the way the experiments were set up makes it clear. I think perhaps you overestimate your competence in scientific interpretation. I'm not sure, but I believe I might have made an ad hominem argument.

I think there are margins here. For example, we can generally recognize when someone is a bit smarter than ourselves. It's just when someone is a lot smarter than ourselves that what they say may sound indistinguishable from what someone a lot dumber than ourselves may say - that is, both those much dumber than ourselves, and those much more intelligent than ourselves, will think in ways that seem quite alien to us.

Plus if I can recognize that Jane is a bit more intelligent than me, and Jane can recognize that Janet is a bit more intelligent than her, then even though Janet may be so much more intelligent than I am that I can't recognise it unassisted, I can learn that Janet is really clever and not dumb if, that is, Jane tells me she is. What Janet says will still sound like gibberish to me, but I now have it on an authority I can understand that this is because Janet is very clever, rather than because she's very stupid. — Clearbury

This is all very nice, but as I noted in my response to the OP and your previous post, it doesn't have anything with DK. DK is not about who's smarter than whom. It's about who is more competent than whom in a specific area of expertise which may or may not have anything to do with intelligence, e.g. humor and grammar.

I don't think the poster has misunderstood the Dunning-Kruger effect. And isn't Wikipedia written by those who fancy themselves experts in matters they have no expertise on? — Clearbury

See below. In particular I suggest reading the Scientific American article. It's not long.

People tend to hold overly favorable views of their abilities in many social and intellectual domains. The authors suggest that this overestimation occurs, in part, because people who are unskilled in these domains suffer a dual burden: Not only do these people reach erroneous conclusions and make unfortunate choices, but their incompetence robs them of the metacognitive ability to realize it. Across 4 studies, the authors found that participants scoring in the bottom quartile on tests of humor, grammar, and logic grossly overestimated their test performance and ability. — Dunning and Kreuger - Unskilled and unaware of it: how difficulties in recognizing one's own incompetence lead to inflated self-assessments

Dunning-Kruger effect, in psychology, a cognitive bias whereby people with limited knowledge or competence in a given intellectual or social domain greatly overestimate their own knowledge or competence in that domain relative to objective criteria or to the performance of their peers or of people in general. — Britannica

The Dunning-Kruger effect is a cognitive bias in which people wrongly overestimate their knowledge or ability in a specific area. — Psychology Today

The Dunning-Kruger effect is the idea that the least skilled people overestimate their abilities more than anyone else. This sounds convincing on the surface and makes for excellent comedy. But in a recent paper, my colleagues and I suggest that the mathematical approach used to show this effect may be incorrect. — Scientific American - The Dunning-Kruger Effect Isn’t What You Think It Is

That's very funny. — Tom Storm

I will say what my old friend Alesandro Battaglia, a passionate Italian, might have said in my place - the OP offended my essence.

On the Necessity of the Dunning Kruger Effect — Brendan Golledge

I think it is wonderfully ironic that you clearly don't understand the Dunning Kruger Effect very well and that your opinion of your competence in that regard exceeds your actual performance.

The Dunning–Kruger effect is a cognitive bias in which people with limited competence in a particular domain overestimate their abilities... the Dunning–Kruger effect is often misunderstood as a claim about general overconfidence of people with low intelligence instead of specific overconfidence of people unskilled at a particular task. — Wikipedia - Dunning Kreuger effect

First, a personal opinion - The Dunning Kreuger effect (DK) is pretty much useless if not actually meaningless. It has only reached prominence because people can use it to insult other people and their ideas. Thinking about it, I'm not sure any reference to DK can be used in any philosophical context except as an ad hominem argument.

So, as Wikipedia says, DK has nothing to do with smart people vs. stupid people, which means that nothing you've written about in your OP has anything to do with DK. I'm going to leave it at that and not go on to comment on the rest of your thoughts even though I think they are unsupported, mean-spirited, and wrong.

However, there is a lack of clarification about what exactly the references or type of understanding are being creating here. Are we understanding something about nature? Or merely the manner in which we mathematically model it? Are we referencing noumena or symbols on the black board? — substantivalism

Isn't this the question of all metaphysics, or conceptualization, or envisioning, or whatever you want to call it. Our concepts are never the same thing as what they describe, explain, or denote.

They are just manners of speaking which our mind has an obsession with partaking in despite the vexing frustration of physicists. They don't imply any grand philosophical consequences, — substantivalism

Everything that can be put into words is a metaphor. That's all thinking really is - metaphors piled on metaphors piled on more metaphors. That's what reality is. But that seems to me to be a much broader question than the one you were asking in the OP. I thought we were talking conceptual models vs. shut up and calculate specifically in science and even more specifically in physics.

Its actually completely irrelevant whether its comprehensible or not at those scales. — substantivalism

I'm not sure about this. I've been thinking about it for a while. At human scale, the conceptual model, the narrative, the object; i.e. what you call "colloquial ideas of understanding, visualization, or explanation," came first. That's what we call "reality." Now, at sub-atomic scale, it is what you call "empirical virtues such as falsifiability, empirical adequacy, and the mathematization of nature" which came first. I think people just find that confusing, disorienting, and I'm not sure how big a deal it actually is.

the language of quantum mechanics are derivative of analogues, metaphors, and analogue modeling — substantivalism

As I noted, all of what we call reality is "derivative of analogues, metaphors, and analogue modeling."

They are seen as a part of the previous generation which we have passed and are 'long dead' figuratively speaking along with their progenitors who are literally dead. — substantivalism

You said this before and, as I noted then, I don't see that this is true.

Interesting. A lot going on here. Some thoughts.

The Mainstream is rather consistent in stressing empirical virtues such as falsifiability, empirical adequacy, and the mathematization of nature in general. However, such approaches are usually met with a disapproval at colloquial ideas of understanding, visualization, or explanation and in certain situations such notions are even seen as unscientific addons that in truly objective science. . . away from popular science articles, science fiction stories, or documentaries. . . can be eventually abandoned. Classical cases regarding this usually revolve around Special/General Relativity and Quantum mechanics/field theory where if any such colloquial understanding/explanation is found lacking they are directed not to 'better approaches' but to the mathematics simpliciter. Our language and our visualizations pail in comparison to the supreme abstract generalizer of mathematical/logical syntax... — substantivalism

This doesn't strike me as true at all. Special and general relativity are full of what you call "ideas of understanding, visualization, or explanation," e.g. space curved by mass. The only place I've heard a "shut up and calculate" approach is in relation to the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. Given all the interpretations of QM developed to help us picture what is really going on at the subatomic scale, this clearly is not a general prejudice in that area either.

It seems strange to advocate or better demand that science or physics in general be visualizable given the pop-cultural scientific mentality that nature is in some sense: Incoherent to our sensibilities, far stranger than anything we could think of, paradoxical, and esoteric in rather astoundingly unintuitive ways. We will fail if we try to view nature on our terms conceptually. . . so why even try. Better to abstract away far as possible from any specific notion. — substantivalism

I don't think science or even physics in general is seen as "incoherent to our sensibilities." People call QM weird, but as far as I understand it, it's just the way things are. Maybe dispensing with metaphysics, i.e. visualization and explanation, is the right way to approach it. Why should we have to expect that the behavior of the universe at that scale has to be comprehensible in the same terms as baseballs and toothbrushes.

Further, visualizability or an emphasis on analogical/metaphorical language as opposed to mathematical/axiomatic frameworks to understand scientific theorizing seem so antiquated. — substantivalism

Again, I don't understand the basis of this claim.

They object that, "Any approach that one could take to analogue model modern mathematical models are bound to fail." — substantivalism

Who are these "they?"

the ten cent phrase that, "Science ONLY deals with description and not with explanation." — substantivalism

I have never heard this. I have heard science only deals with how things work, not why. That's not the same as your phrase and it makes sense to me in most situations.

In the modern age of extreme theoretical abstract modeling (string theory, alternative models of gravitation, quantum gravity, etc) it demands GREATER attention, which has been neglected, as to how we construct and use such modeling techniques so that they can be used as powerful heuristic tools to get past the current mainstream gridlock. — substantivalism

As I noted, maybe at this scale it makes sense to dispense with metaphysics. Why kill ourselves trying to fit quantum gravity blocks in classical mechanical holes if they don't fit. I don't know. It's way out of my league.

Forms of reductivism which are so popular are easy to interpret as by-products of numerous approaches to visual models BUT perhaps the notion of STRONG EMERGENCE could be conceptually better understood by treating such language as having to do with some mental HIERACHY change of the models we use. — substantivalism

I'm not sure that this is an issue where the question of emergence is useful. We use different models of physical behavior at different size and energy scales all the time independent of whether they arise because of strong emergence, e.g. microscopic vs. macroscopic descriptions of the behavior of gasses.

I’ll look and see if it’s available on my streaming services. Thanks.

It's a magnificent film — Tom Storm

For me, Marlowe in the “Long Goodbye” was, in spite of his goofy, sloppy appearance, a man with a fierce moral center. It’s ironic to me that the main character in “Heart of Darkness” was also named Marlow, and also a man of moral strength in a jungle of corruption. I’m sure that’s a coincidence, but I wish it weren’t.

Just finished "The Big Sleep" by Raymond Chandler and now starting his "Farewell, My Lovely." — Jafar

After Watching a couple of movies based on Chandler‘s work, a few months ago I decided to read some of his novels along with some by Dashiell Hammett. I was surprised at how different they were from the movies. Much more convoluted and, I thought, unconvincing plots and uninteresting characters. Maybe you should take that with a grain of salt given that my favorite Chandler movie is the “Long Goodbye” by Robert Altman. That was widely criticized as being far from the standard vision of Philip Marlowe, but it’s one of my all-time favorites.

On somewhat related note, there is a TV show on Netflix right now, “Spade”, that is also a revisionist presentation of Hammetts main character. I only watched one episode, but I thought it was done very well.

have read one or two Dostoevsky novels and feel qualified to speak about the rest — Jamal

Hey, I resemble that remark.

I think the plan you’ve laid out is the right one for someone new to philosophy.

I have a bit of a different attitude towards philosophy than most people here do. I once started a discussion called "You don't need to read philosophy to be a philosopher" which may or may not be true. I certainly have read philosophy books, but generally on subjects where I have a specific interest.

For me it all starts with what I know, what I believe, what I value, and what I see. This is from one of my favorite philosophers, Emerson:

To believe our own thought, to believe that what is true for you in your private heart is true for all men, -- that is genius. Speak your latent conviction, and it shall be the universal sense; for the inmost in due time becomes the outmost,--and our first thought, is rendered back to us by the trumpets of the Last Judgment. Familiar as the voice of the mind is to each, the highest merit we ascribe to Moses, Plato, and Milton is, that they set at naught books and traditions, and spoke not what men but what they thought. A man should learn to detect and watch that gleam of light which flashes across his mind from within, more than the lustre of the firmament of bards and sages. — Emerson - Self-Reliance

That's what philosophy is for - to help us "learn to detect and watch that gleam of light which flashes across [our] mind from within." It's about self-awareness. How we think. What we value. How we know what we know. How should we act. For me that means everything starts with your own ideas - what's important and interesting to you. Philosophy is a tool to help you figure things out that matter to you. So, what matters to you?

Are you sure with these numbers? — Linkey

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Classical_Athens

As far as I know, in ancient Greece the "lottocracy" was trusted more than democracy, — Linkey

The population of ancient Athens was about 250,000 people with only about 30,000 able to vote. That's comparable to a large town or small city. In the US, about 250,000 million people are eligible to vote.

What I like about it is that my vote really matters and no one cares about yours. — Hanover

Yes, this is true. My daughter lives in Michigan, another state where votes matter. I had just moved here when "Don't blame me, I'm from Massachusetts" became a popular bumper sticker.

Some of your questions are trivial. Concerning the necessity to gather information before voting, I have an idea of using a lot: a group of 200 random people would be chosen, the state will give them the money for studiing the subject, and possbly they will vote instead of the whole population. This is one implementation of the "lottocracy", for me there are better ones, but they are more difficult for explaining. — Linkey

So somehow you’ve gone from hundreds of millions of people voting on laws to 200 people voting. I don’t think you’ve thought this through very well.

An interesting instance in unit voting: — Hanover

As the article notes, it seems a lot like the electoral college system. I place both of them under the classification of “seemed like a good idea at the time.”

Proportional representation is an electoral system that elects multiple representatives in each district in proportion to the number of people who vote for them. If one third of voters back a political party, the party’s candidates win roughly one-third of the seats. Today, proportional representation is the most common electoral system among the world’s democracies.

In the US Senate we have the opposite of this. Each state gets two senators, no matter what it's population. That means California, with 34 million people, gets the same number as North Dakota with 750,000. Something similar happens with our presidential elections - each state gets a slate of electors matching its number of senators and congressmen. Whoever gets the majority of votes in 49 of the states gets all the electors from that state. One state, Nebraska, has proportional representation for presidential electors.

What if we made it mandatory form a quorum with at least half of the possible attendees? — javi2541997

In my town, that would be about 4,000 people. As I noted, only about 200 choose to come.

One of the major problems in referendum and initiative is that much more HEAT than LIGHT is required to get a measure passed. — BC

And this would be worsened a hundred-fold if the OP's plan for internet voting were implimented.

It's much more direct than your town electing representatives to meet and make decisions. — BC

When towns get to be a certain size, they do elect representatives to the town meeting by district.

How many people make up a quorum? — BC

Good question. I don't think there is a quorum. I'm not sure of that.

On the other hand, who is held responsible (later) for bad decisions? An elected assembly is in office long enough for bad decisions to sometimes come home to roost. — BC

There is also an elected board of selectmen and an unelected town manager who make the short term decisions. Town meeting mostly deals with budgets and other big issues.

No, we don't have a 'democracy' like the town meetings of New England. — BC

I really like the idea of the town meeting and I've enjoyed participating. It can be inspiring and effective on a very small scale, i.e. a few hundred people. After that it becomes cumbersome and breaks down. I live in a town of about 14,000 people and the crowd at town meeting is usually a couple of hundred, although it's open to all registered voters. Is that direct democracy?

We have a short fiction contest here once or twice a year. What you have written is at least as good as many of those submitted for the contest. You should hang around and turn it in as your entry.

Probably there is no big difference, but I am not sure these two systems will always produce the same results. For me, the system I described is evidently optimal. — Linkey

Millions of people in dozens of jurisdictions disagree with you.

This is a good idea, but maybe I don't fully understand the principle from your quote. — Linkey

The quote describes it simply and clearly and it's easy to understand. You should read it again.

It is quite unclear how to solve this problem; — Linkey

For me, the best system can be as follows: if we have e.g. 3 candidates, each voter ranks each candidate with 1-3 numbers, and rank 1 means 10, 2 means 5, 3 means 0. — Linkey

Why would we possibly bring in a new system when there is an existing one, ranked choice voting, that has been in use for a long time and works well?

A am sure that the best political system would be a “referendum democracy”: if an online referendum will be performed at least each week, and these referendums should cover not only laws, but also decisions within the competence of the judiciary power (fines and punishments). — Linkey

This would be a monstrous, horrible, monumental disaster.

Theoretically, this problem can be solved as follows: the voter does not just vote for one of the candidates, but gives each candidate a score on a ten-point scale. — Linkey

There is already a better system than this in place in a number of jurisdictions. It’s called ranked choice voting. This from the web - https://campaignlegal.org/democracyu/accountability/ranked-choice-voting

Ranked choice voting is a process that allows voters to rank candidates for a particular office in order of preference. Consider a race where four candidates – A, B, C, and D – are running for a single seat such as Governor. In an election utilizing RCV, voters simply rank the candidates 1-4, with the candidate ranked as “1” being the voter’s highest preference for Governor. If a candidate is the first choice of more than half the voters, that candidate wins the election. But if no candidate gets the majority of the vote, the candidate with the least amount of support is eliminated, the second choice support for that eliminated candidate are redistributed, and this process continues until a candidate wins more than half of the vote.

Published in 1924, Burtt's work explores how the shift to a scientific worldview in the 17th century was underpinned by (often unstated) metaphysical assumptions.

I find the metaphysics of science interesting, so I bought it. I’ve only just started reading, but it looks pretty good so far. I especially like that he has been very specific about what’s included in the metaphysics of modern pre-quantum physics as well as medieval and ancient science.

But I don't understand how anything Anderson says refutes a potentially physicalist understanding of the world. He refutes reductionism very well, but my attempt to invent a "best we can do now" version of physicalism was not meant to affirm reductionism, quite the contrary. — J

I think the only way the kind of physicalism you described can be tenable is if we buy into reductionism. I can easily identify phenomena that are obviously not physical, e.g. the mind, society. The only way those can be reasonably considered physical is if you could support the claim that they are reducible to physics.

I read the first issue online. I don’t think I’ll read anymore. Thanks for the quick summary. A little too creepy for me.

So they don’t live happily ever after?

There is a conceptual understanding of "me" operating in the world. But the direct, first person realisation of being conscious precedes any other knowing, and is "absolute" in the sense that I don't need anything else for that. — Carlo Roosen

This is an argument we have here all the time - the hard problem of consciousness. As I see it, there is no hard problem of consciousness.

I was wondering, even while I do agree with the premises to some extend and it seems logically correct, I do not agree with the answer. — Carlo Roosen

Here's my take. Neither of the premises is true. Neither is false. Whether reality is deterministic or we have free will can not be verified or falsified empirically.

The author's argument against scientism doesn't claim to show science is irrational, but rather that it's core principle (that the scientific method is the only way to render truth about the world and reality) cannot be established with the scientific method - which he asserts makes it self-defeating. — Relativist

He said more than that. He said science can not be shown to be a rational method of inquiry. My post was an attempt to refute that. We don't have to take this any further. I just thought his argument was sloppy and wanted to express my disagreement.

Indeed, that science is even a rational form of inquiry (let alone the only rational form of inquiry) is not something that can be established scientifically. For scientific inquiry itself rests on a number of philosophical assumptions: that there is an objective world external to the minds of scientists; that this world is governed by causal regularities; that the human intellect can uncover and accurately describe these regularities; and so forth. Since science presupposes these things, it cannot attempt to justify them without arguing in a circle. And if it cannot even establish that it is a reliable form of inquiry, it can hardly establish that it is the only reliable form. — Relativist

I don't think this argument holds water. Or maybe it's nihilistic. To start, I don't think science is the only valid way of understanding the world. Is it valid? Yes, I think so. Is it rational? Yes, I think it is. What standard would we apply to determine rationality? Here's a first shot.

• It's a formal system of study with established and documented methodology.
• The assumptions and presuppositions underlying that methodology are understood and acknowledged.
• The results are documented.
• Procedures for data reporting, reduction, verification, and interpretation are included in the system methodology.
• The results can be compared with observations in the real world and predictions made before the study takes place.

As I indicated, that's just off the top of my head. Looking at this now, it strikes me this is really just a description of the scientific method. The position described in the quoted text is just Hume's problem of induction. It's always seemed obvious to me that the perfect refutation of that position is that induction works. Beyond that, it strikes me that if the scientific method is not rational, then there is no rational way of knowing the world.