As if there were a single uniform interpretation of the Christian gospel. — Wayfarer

Jesus raises Lazarus from the dead. Jesus turns water into wine.

What room is there for interpretation, here? "Well, he didn't really raise him from the dead, the Gospels just say he did."

That doesn't seem to be an interpretation, unless it's assumed the authors of the Gospels didn't mean what they said. What's the basis for that assumption? That seems to be an assertion that Jesus didn't raise Lazarus from the dead.

I have a friend who is a Catholic priest and he sees Jesus as a metaphor and an invitation for contemplative prayer. He has almost no interest in the story as fact - it is a teaching aid, like most holy books. The issue is people hold different levels of understanding - a shallow or deep faith. The same could be said for science, with its dogmatic materialists and more nuanced naturalists. — Tom Storm

So, I take it, the Catholic priest doesn't believe the Gospels, or believes in them, or the Jesus they portray, only as metaphor. The sophisticated, knowledgeable Christian doesn't believe Jesus did what the Gospels say he did, or I suppose even said what they say he said.

The Jesus of the Gospels seems disposable. Why do they bother with Jesus? This is my question.

No. I’m maintaining that excluding all races and genders except black female from consideration for a position is racial (and gender) discrimination, which I equate with racism/sexism. Am I mistaken in equating the two? — Pinprick

Based on the definitions I related, I don't think the nomination is racist. To be racist, it seems you must contend that a particular race is superior than another; that must be the basis of the distinction made. If the nomination isn't based on a belief in the superiority of a black woman over others because she's black or a woman, it doesn't appear to come within the definitions. I think you have an uncommon definition of racism.

So, the reason a traditional theistic reader obtains such unusual results from scripture (whether it be through the midrashim of the Jew or the exegesis of the Christian) is because their fundamental assumptions vary greatly from your own. — Hanover

Well, I don't know the "traditional theistic reader" comes to the same conclusions as de Chardin or Barth (for example). I'm inclined to think that if they believe in Jesus, they believe in the Jesus of the Gospels. I get the impression Christian philosophers/theologians don't, or would rather think of Jesus as different from that Jesus in very significant ways.

You have added to that list of atrocities doing handstands in church and pestering people in the streets. — T Clark

Well, I wouldn't call them atrocities. I'd call the former preposterous, the latter annoying and hectoring. I'm not an atheist, by the way, though my conception of God doesn't inspire me to gymnastic feats or induce me to irritate others with my view of the divinity.

I think what you're not seeing is Jesus as archetype. I also think you need a bit more philosophical theology - that book you mention seems a good source for the same. — Wayfarer

So, Christianity portrays Jesus as an archetype? I don't think so.

You see, this is my point. I'm quite certain that Christian philosophers theologians see Jesus differently than I do. I suggest, though, that they see Jesus differently than most Christians do, differently from how he is described in the Gospels.

What's called the Gospel of John was the last of the Gospels written, by my understanding, and likely was written after the death of Paul. It's only in that Gospel that Logos is referred to, and it seems clear that the concept was borrowed from pagan philosophy. The other Gospels are quite dissimilar. Paul, of course, borrowed from pagan philosophy (and the ancient pagan mystery religions as well). He was born in Tarsus, well known as a center of Stoicism. The process of assimilation had already begun. Tertullian's peevish comment "What has Athens to do with Jerusalem?" notwithstanding, the early Christians were eager to incorporate the pagan thought even then. The supposed correspondence between Seneca and Paul is an example of the Christian quest for acceptance by the pagan elite.

Since the establishment of Christianity as Roman religion, it has informed every single intellectual pursuit thereafter until the past 100 years. — Garrett Travers

It's remarkable, no doubt about it. What it's "achieved" is amazing. It's success is in part, I think, due to its tendency to assimilate so well. It assimilated the Roman Imperial State, much of pagan philosophy, much of pagan worship (through the cult of the saints and otherwise). It's assimilating still.

Gummy bears are also popular. — frank

Bad for the teeth, though.

You clearly need to eat more special brownies. — frank

I dunno. I ate all those special hosts and they never did me any good. Brownies would be tastier, though.

Gosh. That's not how his name is spelled, is it?

Clearly the nomination is, and always has been politically motivated. As to whether it's racist, let's be daring and innovative, and consult dictionary definitions of "racist."

Merriam-Webster (online):

"having, reflecting, or fostering the belief that race (see RACE entry 1 sense 1a) is a fundamental determinant of human traits and capacities and that racial differences produce an inherent superiority of a particular race."

Dictionary.com:

"noun
a person who believes in racism, the doctrine that one's own racial group is superior or that a particular racial group is inferior to the others.
adjective
of or like racists or racism:
racist policies; racist attitudes."

Cambridge English Dictionary (online):

"someone who believes that their race makes them better, more intelligent, more moral, etc. than people of other races and who does or says unfair or harmful things as a result:

Two of the killers are known to be racists.
She cannot understand how her husband could be branded a racist.

racist
adjective disapproving
coming from or having the belief that people who belong to other races are not as good, intelligent, moral, etc. as people who belong to your own race :
He furiously denied being racist.
They were the victims of a vicious racist attack.
racist remarks."

Collins English dictionary (online):

"NOUN
1. a belief or doctrine that inherent differences among the various human races determine cultural or individual achievement, usually involving the idea that one's own race is superior and has the right to rule others
2. an overt policy, system of government, etc., based upon or fostering such a doctrine; discrimination
3. the maintenance of social, economic, and political structures that deny privileges and opportunities to members of certain racial groups
4. hatred or intolerance of another race or other races."

These definitions indicate that according to the most common usage, one is a racist if one believes members of a particular race, or one's own race, are better or superior to members of another race. I don't think it can be maintained, reasonably, that Biden or his administration want to nominate a black person based on the belief that black people are better or superior to white people. Is that what you maintain--the nomination is based on the belief the black race is superior to the white race?

Isn't there a branch of philosophy concerned with ignorance and what we don't actually know? — TiredThinker

There are enough philosophers who pontificate regarding Nothing to make up a school if not a branch. Will that do? Let's call it "Noughtism" or "Nought-ism" the study of that which isn't (I don't think "nihilism" works). We're forever ignorant of what is not.

Well, there are a lot more of us than there are of them, and we all have guns.

Heidegger thought the Holocaust was like modern industrialized agriculture, and people adore him. Free Whoopi!

Just can't miss a chance to excoriate Heildegger, you know.

Speaking of American legal realism, this is how we do the law in our Glorious Republic:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1AuCgkBmag4

Here's another idiom, meaning much the same as the one about sucking eggs: You would teach your grandmother to milk ducks. Even better, and less common.

I'd think it would be obvious that I'm something of a legal positivist, or perhaps American legal realist, having favorably quoted O.W. Holmes, Jr. on law and justice. Regardless, I've long thought it an error to conflate law and justice, and law and morality for that matter. I've tried, ever so hard, to explain that to clients over the years as well. So I'm afraid your arguments are quite familiar to me and have been for some time, and raise no concerns. Thus you purport to teach me, figuratively speaking, to suck eggs or milk ducks in locus avius as it were.

Exaggeration, by the way, can be a form of humor, as can irony. I get the impression humor is something unfamiliar to you, so I call it to your attention.

You would teach your grandmother to suck eggs, I see. That's an actual idiom, by the way, though it's peculiar enough to please me, so try not to take offense.

Perfidious Albion, the Holocaust, European guilt, the bizarre and deadly belief in a divinely bestowed homeland which hasn't been a homeland since Hadrian's legions crushed the Bar Kokhba revolt in 135 C.E. at the latest, Christian fundamentalism, not to forget fanaticism and political expediency, all combined to create this bloody, running sore which shows no sign of healing. Makes one believe it Nemesis (the Greek goddess, I mean).

I am not even saying it's a horribly bad system. ALL I AM SAYING is that the justice system is not in the service of justice. It is in the service of law. — god must be atheist

The law isn't quite the wacky, unprincipled, standardless, unpredictable, haphazard, amoral or incoherent system you may think it to be, intent on finding people guilty on any basis, and festooned with madcap juries running amuck without thought or guidance.

But as I've noted before, the law is simply the law. "Justice" to some isn't justice to others, and that makes the service of justice speculative and uncertain. But the law is always the law no matter what anyone believes. Think what you like of it and be damned.

As Justice Holmes noted to some poor lawyer appearing before him: "This is a court of law, young man, not a court of justice." I think he was saying something along these lines..."Know something about the law before you slink into my courtroom, you buffoon, and waste time prattling about what you think is just or unjust."

I've been in front of many judges. The terrible truth is that they're just lawyers who get to wear black robes and sit on chairs placed higher that those of the other lawyers in the room. There's no reason to think they'll be any more or less qualified in the law than any other lawyer, regardless of who or what they are. If you're lucky, they've read the pleadings, listened to the evidence and argument, perhaps done some research or had someone do it for them, take the job seriously and try to make an honest judgment. That's the best you can expect from any of them.

Yes it can, but this assertion as a kind of motto is not worth anything. It has to provide that ground in practice. The USA in her time nominally supported freedom but there were many social groups disenfranchized even more so than now — Tobias

Yes, that's true. And as for the French Revolution, the Terror followed it, and eventually Napoleon. This suggests a community is incapable of promoting individual freedom or inclined against it by its nature, absent law--which I suppose may be deemed communal. We can't give up the law, though. But retirement beckons, so perhaps soon. Regardless, the law's certainly an expression of sovereignty, so that won't work.

Maybe Stoic "freedom" truly is what she means. There is no sovereignty for the Stoic Sage. Nobody is sovereign over the Sage; the Sage is sovereign over nobody, and this constitutes Stoic freedom.

She could have just said so.

She asks how a free community is thinkable, in which you ar efree with others. We think of a free community in terms of isolated individuals free from interference by others. — Tobias

I think a community can, as a community, as a nation, assert its commitment to the freedom of all its members/citizens. The U.S. does that and has done that since its foundation; so have other nations (France, most notably, since the Revolution). So that in itself is quite "thinkable." It's apparent, in fact, so I assume that's not what she refers to, and this of course raises the question--what does she mean?

A nation of course may go beyond mere assertion and adopt laws which restrict the power of government and guarantee certain freedoms. That would be the exercise of sovereignty in favor of freedom, at least to an extent. How renounce that and achieve the wished for freedom? Or does she speak of individuals renouncing any claim to sovereignty of some kind over others, e.g. someone claiming his/her individual freedom.rights have priority over the freedom/rights of others? The conflict of rights, if not freedoms, is something we certainly know of and of course is something the law must address wherever legal rights exist. It's likely inevitable and in many cases has to be considered on a case-by-case basis. Perhaps she's recommending we refrain from engaging in such conflicts? Is that what she's touting, using Epictetus as an example?

you win a bottle of Laphroaig, — Banno

Mmmmm. Laphroaig. It's so smokey.

Reading Arendt is not like being led through an argument so much as inundated by it. — Banno

That's well put. I wish I had thought of it.

I think Arendt would agree that the Stoics emphasised virtue rather than freedom, and that she would add that private virtue was brought together with the will by Augustine to give us the fraught notion of freedom. Central to Christian concerns is the freedom to choose to go with or against the will of the Lord, who sees into one's soul and judges us on our private thoughts as much as our public actions. — Banno

Augustine, having conceived (a nice way to put it, I believe) Original Sin, had to find a less obviously unjust way by which we could be condemned to the flames of hell. Christ's sacrifice wouldn't do the trick, not entirely. If it in itself removed the stain of Original Sin, did that mean that those who lived before the sacrifice no longer writhed, so justly, in agony for all eternity? Did that mean that those born after it were clean of stain? Of course not. So, Original Sin had to be a proclivity to sin, but not an overwhelming one. We had to choose to sin, or at least appear to do so, and presto! Free Will was born.

I don't need to read this shit. — frank

Indeed you don't. Yet it seems you do.

What I think Arendt wants to do is reconceptualize freedom in a non individualized manner. how exactly I do not know but she is making the point that freedom can only exist within a community that fosters it, that gives you something to be free with. — Tobias

Perhaps a community which fosters a desire for it, instead. Free from, would make more sense than free with, I think. I find it hard to conceive of a community which fosters freedom as we think of it now--or at least as I think of it. Perhaps those damn Romantics, with their emphasis on individuality, bear some responsibility for this perspectives. I like to poke at them now and again, as well.

For me though I have the same problem with the analytic tradition, the logic chopping is abhorrent and when they explain it to me in lay terms I think "óhh but could you not have said that clearly?" — Tobias

Fair enough.

He was a despicable little man, wasn't he? Still, hardly the first 35 year old eager to jump on an 18 year old, and perhaps her being Jewish made the affair more naughtily thrilling to him. The bit about "being worthy to meet" the relationship of teacher and pupil notwithstanding is certainly banal, and of course self-serving.

:rofl: I do know he is a national socialist and that is, of course, uncomely. However, I do wonder why you always react so strongly to him. He is also a very interesting thinker. He really is, despite his unwelcome affiliation with some of the most heinous villains in history. — Tobias

Well, perhaps something more than uncomely.

I don't find him interesting, I'm afraid. I confess I find it very hard to read his work--his student, the young woman he seduced while her teacher, who wrote the essay being discussed in this thread, was a model of clarity in comparison to him. I find him, to the extent I can understand him, to be romantic, mystical, muddled; inclined to obfuscate if it suits his purposes, inclined to pontificate, a "self-infatuated blowhard" as it seems Don Idhe called him in reviewing his rhapsodic musings on the Parthenon while ranting about modern technology (Heidegger was apparently not content with merely likening the manner in which the Jews were killed by the Nazis in the camps to the mechanisms employed in modern agriculture in his critique of technology--his only mention of the Holocaust, apparently).

H.L. Mencken used to call William Jenning Bryan "the Great Mountebank." I feel much the same about Heidegger.

But to be frank I like to poke at sacred cows, and there's none more sacred in philosophy.

As the character played by the incomparable Strother Martin in Cool Hand Luke said (the Captain?), what we have here, is failure to communicate. Not on your part, but on the part of Arendt.

If she is saying what you think she's saying, it would be a relatively simple thing to express, I believe. I don't think she does do so with any clarity, and leaves us to wonder what's going on with freedom and what it has to do with sovereignty and why giving up sovereignty will make us free. I think she gets caught up in the avalanche of references, names, debates on causes and free will, and dualisms she unleashes on the unwary reader. But perhaps I'm too impatient. Or, perhaps I've been a lawyer for too long, and so am suspicious of what seems to be a set-up, or an effort to "baffle them with bullshit."

I understand she's making a distinction between ancient and modern points of view regarding freedom. I don't necessarily agree with the distinction I think she makes, but believe there is a difference.

My guess is status and position were more important in Graeco-Roman times than freedom. Julius Caesar was assassinated because he usurped the authority and honors, the imperium, of the Senate, not because the people of Rome longed to be free. His much wiser grand-nephew created a new form of government, the Principate, in which the form of the rights and privileges historically held by the Senate was preserved and honored, while actual authority was held by Augustus and his successors.

Totalitarianism is at least as old as the work of its first and possibly greatest proponent, Plato. Freedom wasn't an issue to him because it was insignificant at best, an inconvenience at worst. Plato dreamed of the ruthless and regimented imposition of perfection. The Christian conception of freedom would be much the same during the time the Church dominated society, though the Church likely thought freedom more dangerous and opposed it with greater zeal. There was one truth, one goal.

That began to change, though, and my guess is that concerns regarding freedom as we understand it now began to arise in the conflict among nations and sects that arose when theocracy failed. Just a guess, though.

The question is where freedom fits in relation tot his Stoic enterprise of overcoming unreasonable or unnatural desire. I don't know enough of the topic to be sure, but at first blush freedom does not look to be of great significance to the Stoics. — Banno

Not much significance at all. It's more a concern for those who desire or disturb themselves over things or matters which aren't in their control.

Ciceronianus might be happy to note the essay can also be read as criticism of Heidegger, who still holds on very much to an idea of freedom and authenticity in conversation with oneself. Arendt invokes the political. — Tobias

I rejoice in any criticism of Heidegger, but frankly wish he had spent far more time "in conversation with himself" than he did.

It is clear to me that she thinks freedom is not to be identified with sovereignty... Do we at the least agree here? That Arendt, for better or worse, thinks freedom is to do with choice and novelty within the re publica? As opposed to the capacity to achieve what one wills without regard for the public space?

The discussion of "inner freedom" at about p146-7 seemed to be an oblique reference to stoicism. The implication is that Stoic ideals such as control of one's passions or acting in accord with nature morphed under the influence of Augustin and Paul into something closer to modern ideas of freedom as acting in accord with one's will. I take the change to which she refers to be between a more ancient notion of the freedom to choose within a polity to a supposed freedom to chose despite a polity. — Banno

I'm under the impression that she speaks of "individual freedom" or "inner freedom" as if it's a kind of "sovereignty" over oneself, which it would seem is consistent with what appears, to me, to be a tendency on her part to believe in a kind of inner dialogue or conflict between one me and another me, one me being the will, one being desire, another me being acting-me, yet another being acted-upon-me; I don't know, it gets confusing (not enough mees in me to comprehend this, perhaps). But I may be wrong. I find it difficult to follow her thought, distracted as I am by the names she so relentlessly drops throughout the article.

I don't think the Stoics were all that concerned about freedom of any kind, except perhaps to the extent that it was necessary to act in accordance with nature. Virtue was the good for the Stoics. One could be virtuous without being free to do whatever one likes. For them it was quite unnecessary, and even improper, to exercise sovereignty over anyone--for Epictetus I'd say in particular, as others are not within our control. Epictetus was a slave and if one believes he said what Arrian says he said, it didn't matter to him that he wasn't free for much of his life. He thought it unimportant that Emperors and others could punish or kill him if he chose to act virtuously (so it seems did certain Roman Senators who were Stoics, who were executed by Emperors). Stoics didn't associate themselves with any polity, believing with Diogenes the Dog that they were citizens of the world.

I would say that is probably influenced by a dualistic approach at seeing oneself and one's own actions. — Garrett Travers

Dualism has plagued us for centuries. I doubt there has been any greater source of philosophical futility.

It constitutes an act of sovereignty over one's own self and the exercise of the sole right to the action therein contained. Human action is sovereignty, and it requires force to impede, or compel. — Garrett Travers

I have a fondness for Stoicism, and think there are things which are in our control in significant respects. In these dark times, I think of Montaigne's saying that "Not being able to govern events, I govern myself." But I think when we speak of governing ourselves or having sovereignty over ourselves, we should understand that we speak metaphorically. I think Arndt isn't doing that when she refers to individual sovereignty, and in this fashion makes individual sovereignty appear equivalent to the imposition of authority over others, and as objectionable.

I confess I don't understand why she claims that freedom is identified with sovereignty to begin with, except to the extent she does so for rhetorical purposes. It's not clear to me that my freedom to act necessarily constitutes an exercise of sovereignty over anyone. She refers to Epictetus, but I would say that he clearly maintains that we need not be subject to the sovereignty of others, and that we shouldn't exercise sovereignty over them. She may be distinguishing that view from the more modern view she feels has developed. It seems to me, however, that sovereignty is for her a bete noir and she juxtaposes it with freedom to persuade others to think of it as such as well.

It's not often that a field of science has arisen from the Philosophical Radicals of Bentham and latter John Stuart Mill all the way from England. Bentham and John Stuart Mill had a profound influence on the development of the United States. Sadly, the birth of socialism from the Philosophical Radicals in England found no welcoming from the United States. It seems that selfishness and greed prosper more than anything else nowadays instead of Bentham's liberalism. — Shawn

It's interesting that Mill subsequently (after the adoption of the Reform Act of 1832, supported by the Philosophical Radicals) argued in favor of plural voting, with the more educated given a greater number of votes than others in his Representative Government. It seems he became more leery of the idea of universal suffrage under the influence of Coleridge and others, even lauding government by an elite he called the "clerisy."

I don't know that Utilitarianism has triumphed, bu it remains a useful practical standard to apply in ethical and political issues.

Well, she was Heidegger's lover, poor woman. It's not surprising she wondered how she could go on, after that. It must have been a struggle.

Clearly, I'll have to listen to this. But in reading (not all that much, really) about Hermes Trismegistus and works attributed to him, it seems they're inconsistent in some respects, and very busy, if you know what I mean. There are all sorts of beings involved, some of whom were, it seems according to one account stuffed into humans as a kind of punishment. It gets a bit confusing. Esoteric knowledge by its nature may be available only to those with skill who have studied deeply confusing matters, but I wonder if it's worth the effort.

I think philosophy is incapable of addressing spiritual matters and that they are more in the realm of art. Mysticism or esotericism is interesting to me to the extent they may address those matters, but one hopes for something simpler. Or at least I do. I think it's difficult to say with any certainty what took place in the ceremonies and rituals of the ancient mystery religions (particularly in the case of Mithraism, which I find fascinating) and I wonder if they were less complicated than they've been made out to be by those who claim to interpret them.

It surely is a right. My behavior is such that I allow you to use it, yes, just as my behavior is to allow you to speak when I give you the right to speak freely. — NOS4A2

I don't think I understand you. Are you saying I don't have the right to speak freely unless you give it to me?