Yes, to me, internally representing the world begets a representation of the world, something that represents, models, or stands for, the environment. We have a space in which representing occurs (internally), and presumably this representation or act of representation (sight) is the intentional object.
I could be completely wrong; that’s just how I always understood representationalism. — NOS4A2
The condition of the body, I presume? — NOS4A2
I’m curious because as far as I know representations prohibit us from seeing the world, and I’m interested in how you can see (or represent) around them. — NOS4A2
Why would the brain represent the world to you if you weren’t to view the representation? — NOS4A2
Given that both "I see cows" and "I see colours" is true, what do you think direct and indirect realists are arguing about? — Michael
Which is why arguing over the grammar of "I see X" doesn't address the philosophical substance of naive or indirect realism, which concerns whether or not distal objects and their properties are constituents of experience. Naive realists claim they are, indirect realists claim they're not. — Michael
The problem is that for each of your examples, the second sentence is wrong, not the "I see" part. — Lionino
Are the following statements also true?
"I see cows and cows are mental phenomena."
"I see colours and colours are distal objects."
"I feel pains and pains are distal objects." — Luke
No. — Michael
I'm pointing out that both "I see distal objects" and "I see mental phenomena" are true. — Michael
I'm pointing out that both "I see distal objects" and "I see mental phenomena" are true. I see cows and cows are distal objects. I see colours and colours are mental phenomena.
Which is why arguing over the grammar of "I see X" doesn't address the philosophical substance of naive or indirect realism. — Michael
Yes, we see distal objects.
— Michael
So, are distal objects a mental phenomena?
— Luke
No — Michael
What do you think "see" means? What do you think "feel" means?
Do I see colours? Are colours a mental phenomena? Do I feel pain? Is pain a mental phenomena? — Michael
Yes, we see distal objects. — Michael
Because I'm including hearing and smelling and tasting and feeling. It's not all about sight. — Michael
Yes, we experience distal objects like cows. And we experience mental phenomena like colours and smells and tastes and pain. — Michael
Do I see colours? Are colours a mental phenomena? Do I feel pain? Is pain a mental phenomena? — Michael
They mean the same thing by "visual experience" but disagree on what constitutes it. — Michael
Given that you have said such things as "perceptual experience is a representation" and "we cannot directly perceive distal objects as they are in themselves" you reject naive realism and agree with the substance of indirect realism, even if you disagree with the grammar of "we see representations". — Michael
The dispute between naive realists and indirect realists concerns whether or not experience provides us with direct knowledge of the mind-independent nature of distal objects. That's not a grammatical dispute. Whatever each group means by "visual experience" it must be such that if, as naive realists claim, distal objects are constituents of visual experience then we have direct knowledge of the mind-independent nature of distal objects. — Michael
It seems to me as if my visual experience literally extends beyond my body and that distal objects are literally present within my visual experience. This is the naive view that naive realists accepted as true, but which the science of perception has now shown to be false. Indirect realists rejected this naive view and claimed that the visual experience is a mental phenomenon that exists within the brain and is, at best, a representation of the world outside the body.
Then so-called "non-naive" direct realists accept this indirect realist view but for some reason call themselves direct realists, probably because that get confused by the grammar of "I see X".
They've just redefined the meaning of "direct perception". — Michael
I see colours and colours are a mental phenomenon.
I see trees and trees are not a mental phenomenon.
I feel pain and pain is a mental phenomenon.
I feel my hand burning and my hand burning is not a mental phenomenon. — Michael
The phrases "I see" and "I feel" have more than one meaning. — Michael
I feel pain, pain is a mental phenomenon, therefore I feel a mental phenomenon.
I see colours, colours are a mental phenomenon, therefore I see a mental phenomenon. — Michael
Indirect realists rejected this naive view and claimed that the visual experience is a mental phenomenon that exists within the brain and is, at best, a representation of the world outside the body. — Michael
Then so-called "non-naive" realists accept that indirect realist view but for some reason call themselves direct realists — Michael
To be presented is to be present. If some distal object is presented in experience then that distal object is present in experience. If that distal object is present in experience then it exists within experience.
But experience exists within the brain and distal objects exist outside the body. Therefore distal objects do not exist within experience and so are not presented in experience. — Michael
Are distal objects and their properties constituents of experience such that their mind-independent nature is presented to us or is experience nothing more than a mental phenomenon, with is features being at best only representations of those mind-independent properties? — Michael
The question is whether or not I directly perceive some distal object. That I directly receive some aspect of the world (i.e. my mental phenomena) isn't that I directly perceive the particular aspect of the world that direct realists claim we directly perceive (i.e. the distal object). — Michael
I see things when I dream and the schizophrenic hears voices when hallucinating. Sensory organs are not involved. — Michael
Another picture that may prove helpful, with the lines representing some relevant causal connection.
amr0096dgaltgb9e.jpg — Michael
Do I see things when I dream? Does the schizophrenic hear voices when suffering a psychotic episode? — Michael
This is where you're getting confused by grammar into thinking that indirect realists are saying something they're not. — Michael
Take the picture here. If indirect realism is true then if we remove the mental image then we have no knowledge of the distal object. And I believe that's correct. The mental image is the necessary intermediary. — Michael
I might agree that perception does not always provide us with direct knowledge of distal objects, such as in cases of illusion, hallucination or error. But I do not agree that perception never provides us with direct knowledge of distal objects. In fact, I would say that perception more often than not does provide us with [some] direct knowledge of distal objects. — Luke
I have direct knowledge of the colour red and indirect knowledge of a distal object reflecting light with a wavelength of 700nm. — Michael
The meaning of "direct perception" is such that if perception is direct then perception provides us with direct knowledge of distal objects. Therefore, if perception does not provide us with direct knowledge of distal objects then perception is not direct.
Given our scientific understanding of the world and perception it is clear that perception does not provide us with direct knowledge of distal objects. Therefore, perception is not direct. — Michael
that they have a "real look" is a confusion, much like any claim that distal objects have a "real feel" would be a confusion. There just is how things look to me and how things feel to you given our individual physiology. — Michael
...a non hallucinatory experience of a distal object by definition requires the existence of a distal object. — flannel jesus
...distal objects are not constituents of experience. — Michael
…it is nonetheless the case that it is only mental phenomena of which we have direct knowledge in perception… — Michael
What are hallucinations if not an experience of a distal object without a distal object? — flannel jesus
Naive realists believe that distal objects are constituents of experience and so that experience provides us with direct knowledge of distal objects. — Michael
The grammar of "I experience X" is not restricted to a single meaning.
Which is an irrelevant argument about grammar. — Michael
Experiencing a mental representation and experiencing a distal object are not mutually exclusive. "I feel pain" and "I feel my skin burning" are both true. The grammar of "I experience X" is not restricted to a single meaning.
Indirect realists describe this as "seeing representations" and non-naive direct realists describe this as "seeing distal objects". This is the irrelevant semantic disagreement that amounts to nothing. — Michael
Indirect realists claim that perceptions involve mental representations, e.g qualia and sense-data, as contrasted with naive realists who don't. That's the substantive philosophical issue, — Michael
The relevant philosophical dispute is that distal objects are not constituents of experience and so that our experience only provides us with indirect knowledge of distal objects. — Michael
Indirect realism opposes direct realism based on the fundamental meditative role brain-produced phenomenal experience plays in our contact with the world. Illusion, hallucinations, and error are consequences of, and are only possible because of, this mediation. — hypericin
That contact with the world is mediated by an appearance that is itself not the world can only mean that contact with the world is indirect. The fact that direct contact with the world is not possible does not constitute an argument against this. — hypericin
You seem want to argue that because direct, immediate experiential contact with the world is impossible and even incoherent, therefore, there is direct, immediate experiential contact with the world. No, if unmediated experience of the world is impossible, experience of the world is therefore mediated. — hypericin
Again, if we do not perceive/experience/have awarenesw of internal objects, what are we perceiving/experiencing/aware of when we hallucinate? External objects? — hypericin
The representational theory of perception that claims that perceptual content is some mental phenomena (e.g. sense data or qualia) that represents the external world is indirect realism, not direct realism.
Direct realism, in being direct realism, rejects the claim that perception involves anything like representations. — Michael