Okay, then how would a body behave in the absence of this freely choosing soul?
— ToothyMaw

That's up to people who think we have souls to argue. But it stands to reason that they'd have to say bodies would do something different without souls - otherwise, souls wouldn't make a difference. — flannel jesus

So you don't think the existence of free will would matter if it were manifested by a soul? Really? Can a proponent of free will really ever point to the behavior of anyone and say for sure that that person's actions are different from what they would have been had they lacked free will?

Unless I'm mistaken, it is on you at this point to explain why free will wouldn't matter so long as it doesn't manifest in the form of matter not behaving like normal matter in the brain. Also: I don't actually think we have souls.

If we were to choose one course of action over another according to the will of said soul, would it truly be causing matter to behave in a way that it otherwise would not have?
— ToothyMaw

If it weren't, then it seems you could remove the soul and expect a person's body to behave the same way. — flannel jesus

Okay, then how would a body behave in the absence of this freely choosing soul? Is there a single pre-determined route we each would take through reality that our souls, if they existed, would allow us to deviate from? Or would one's path be a function of the existence of many possible choices, given one can choose from them freely? This possibility of matter behaving "otherwise" seems empty to me, as the only two scenarios we appear to be considering now would be that in one case we have free will, and in the other we do not. As an aside: do you think that if we had free will and it was taken away, our justifications for ideas of agency, for instance, should remain the same?

There's one way scientifically to discover souls exist, and that is to discover some significant physical behaviour inside of a brain that cannot be explained by matter behaving like normal matter. If all matter in the universe behaves like normal matter, then human behaviour by extension would have to be a consequence of matter behaving like matter.

The hypothesis that there's a soul, however, is the hypothesis (it seems to me) that some non matter "mind/soul" thing is reaching into the universe and changing something about the behaviour of matter, making it do one thing when it otherwise would have done another thing. — flannel jesus

That's really interesting, and I think you might be right. But let's say we have souls separate from the brain (a possibility suggested in the OP) that can still act on the brain, and that are endowed with the ability to select courses of action freely. If we were to choose one course of action over another according to the will of said soul, would it truly be causing matter to behave in a way that it otherwise would not have? I would say not necessarily, given multiple possible choices could have been freely made at a particular juncture.

However, if the very mechanism by which the soul acts on the brain in itself causes matter to not behave like matter as a means of effecting a soul's will - even given multiple choices could be made - then I think you would be correct.

Welcome to the forum, by the way.

If there is such a thing as a "soul," where did it come from? Did God or any other diety create it? — Null Noir

It seems to me the only way immaterial souls could be confirmed to exist for certain is if a revealed God has bequeathed us with them. Otherwise, we would have to discover the existence of souls with science or something, and that sounds unlikely, or least difficult, to me.

Question 2: If there is a "soul" inside your body, is it seperate from you or is it the same as you? In other words, who is in control of the body? Is it like a "Player vs. Vessel" situation as we see in the games created by Toby Fox (Undertale and Deltarune)? "Are you truly in control of yourself?" is the question I am trying to ask, I suppose. And let's say hypothetically, that Christianity is true, would that mean that You would go to Heaven, or "you," the soul? Since those are two separate things. — Null Noir

I feel like if God has given us souls, he would have worked some free will magic into it, even if we are not wholly, physically identified with said souls. That being said, there could be deterministic mechanisms in a soul, too, I think. Thus, the issue of whether or not one is truly in control of oneself goes deeper than just the question of the existence of souls and whether or not they encompass our entire being (that is to say, including the body). If Christianity were specifically right, then we should listen to the relevant theologians on the matter - and I am no theologian.

Question 3: If the soul is seperate from the body, why even bother to be a good person? You wouldn't even go to Heaven, your SOUL would. Would you even bother to be a good person? — Null Noir

God could just load our souls with our entire psychological being seamlessly upon death and, given he has given us the ability to choose freely according to our wills, the choices we make would indeed matter in terms of avoiding hell. Honestly, this would be a trifle for an omnipotent God.

Question 4: If the soul and the body are one and the same, how would that even work? Is it something akin to "you are the soul piloting a human body" type situation, like some spiritual people say? — Null Noir

I suppose so, but that seems to imply that the soul is physically housed in, or connected to, the body or brain in some way.

I think a common traditional mistake of both proponents and critics of the idea of AGI, is the Cartesian presumption that humans are closed systems of meaning with concrete boundaries; they have both tended to presume that the concept of "meaningful" human behaviour is reducible to the idea of a killer algorithm passing some sort of a priori definable universal test, such as a Turing test, where their disagreement is centered around whether any algorithm can pass such a test rather than whether or not this conception of intelligence is valid. — sime

Given that we know the Turing Test, for example, only measures a subset of both human and intelligent behavior, I don't think anyone (here) is saying that there is some sort of a priori "universal" test that requires the complete distillation of the breadth of human behavior and the ways we create meaning in the form of an algorithm for said algorithm to pass such a test. As such, we wouldn't be testing for "meaningful" human behavior - what you say is equated to a killer algorithm - but rather behavior that humans are likely to engage in that is considered intelligent, which could be organized according to a factual criterion. Passing just shows that the machine or algorithm can exhibit intelligent behavior equivalent to that of a human, not that it is equivalent to a human in all of the cognitive capacities that might inform behavior. That's it. We can have a robust idea of intelligence and what constitutes meaningful behavior and still find a use for something like the Turing Test.

The example of attempting to prevent a sickness from spreading by decapitating kittens, while perhaps valid with respect to the proposition that all kittens should be decapitated, has no parallel among phrenologists, for example; to be a phrenologist is to engage in harmful, pseudoscientific bullshit for the purposes of rationalizing white on black racism no matter how you cut it. No phrenologist has ever claimed that a certain dimple or feature associated by the phrenologist with people of color somehow indicated some positive trait relative to the white man. This is to say that there are some positions that cannot be rationally or morally justified in a larger context by digging deeper into motives or whatever you might do in moving beyond the material position because there are only a few plausible reasons for adopting that position. In light of this, I don’t think that we need to litigate every single seemingly odious and/or controversial assertion or position to find out some sort of deeper, justified reasoning. Racists, for instance, are often stupid or misinformed and, quite predictably, parrot certain talking points, bits of pseudoscience, or misinformation/disinformation such that they can be easily identified. I don’t think you have refuted that some positions cannot be explained except by explicitly racist, bigoted, etc. reasoning or appeals to pseudoscience or other notable falsehoods, and, thus, sometimes one is justified in classifying someone merely based on their professed "material positions" - be that as a bigot or a misinformed person or both. So no, I don’t grant that we must always go beyond the material position - or at least not in the way you propose.

I mean, a material position, as you define it, could carry just about any content, as the only condition you seem to put on it is that it is a proposition that one adheres to. It could contain an entire antisemitic conspiracy theory of whatever variety one might imagine - if that is what someone is putting out there. We don’t need to go beyond such a statement to justify writing them off as an antisemite, as they are saying something explicitly antisemitic; at least some of the statements people are concerned with deeming evil put out there by other people are not nearly as opaque as what KK says. I think that answers SQ1.

Overall, I think you are conflating people that can be dismissed with those that should not be on the basis that people should limit their use of moral language when faced with a certain amount of uncertainty - which is somewhat reasonable. My problem with that is that you have not addressed anything about the relevant thresholds for dismissal or the specific cases in which the material position implies or explicitly states bigotry or something else morally undesirable.

When one side condones or mitigates the deliberate murder of innocents, I tune out and ignore them.
— BitconnectCarlos

Okay, but why? The OP is asking, "Why?"

If someone is downplaying or supporting the intentional targeting of civilians, that person is wicked.
— BitconnectCarlos

Okay, but why should wicked people be tuned out and ignored? Is it supposed to be self-evident, such that no real explanation is possible? — Leontiskos

Isn't that it is recognized as a war crime enough? Aren't war crimes pretty much as universally understood to be bad as anything else? Are you saying we need to provide moral facts in support of our stances such that we believe we can justifiably dismiss terrorists? If that is the case, then I'm not sure anyone can dismiss anyone on any grounds.

I'm going to keep going.

Beyond mythology, perhaps this could be interpreted in a purely physical sense, as the difference between determinism and freedom. — Arcane Sandwich

This post is directed at compatibilists mostly. When I use the term "free" in the following post, I just mean being able to do as one wishes uninfluenced by external factors. I am not making a metaphysical claim about libertarian free will in the premises of the following argument unless stated otherwise.

Taking into account my last post: if one positions at one end of a continuum “totally free” (metaphysical libertarianism) and the other “determined” (determinism), then we might have a way of measuring whether or not all of our actions, when summed, represent a value corresponding to having sufficiently free will. That is, if one grants that the sum of all of one’s decisions is either more or less determined, or more or less free, and that every action carries with it a degree of either freeness or that of being determined. Thus, if we would just agree on a bounded region on the continuum corresponding to having sufficiently free will, we could measure if people can be considered to have free will.

The application of this system would need informing from neuroscience and other sciences; there would be factors like “belief” to take into account - which, if sufficiently entrenched independently of one’s will, might be considered to determine actions in the way that being physically coerced might (although I could be wrong on that). There would also be clear applications of psychology, sociology, etc.

But the point is this: if we all agree on what level of determinedness or freeness constitutes having free will, we can, through science and an application of an alignment system, measure it. That is to say, this could resolve the issue of free will if those who believe in it would just agree on a region on the continuum that constitutes enough of a lack of determinedness of our actions such as to constitute having free will.

No apology required, friend. I afford you every right every right to call me dense, naive, or whatever else suits your fancy. I guess we can postpone the conversation until other people can handle it. — NOS4A2

Yeah, I'm sure you do, but having a right to do something doesn't make it a good thing to do. Thus, I apologized.

These are my thoughts on it:

I think we are justified in hypothesizing a continuum between lawful and chaotic, because many actions one might take in D&D could have values that reflect contributions to one's alignment that scale with the magnitude of the consequences of the actions or the degree to which the actions inherently represent one’s alignment. That just seems to suggest a continuum to me. But the existence of such a continuum requires some elaborating on if one desires to simply label a character "neutral" as it were:

If we do indeed surmise that there is a continuum between lawfulness and chaos, then it seems that there must be a bounded region on this continuum that consists of neutrality that the neutral character fits into through their actions. If that were not the case, we couldn’t always treat "neutral" as a discrete term describing a character when applying the system of alignment; a character would just be between lawful and chaotic and thus only more or less neutral. Furthermore, if we hypothesize that every action has a corresponding lawful or chaotic value, and the totality of one's actions is either more or less lawful or more or less chaotic, then on this continuum there must be an indicator delineating lawfulness from chaos for any given combination of actions (or so I think). Thus, we can sum these actions (lawfulness corresponding to positive values and chaos corresponding to negative, or vice versa) to represent a sort of neutrality value measured around the indicator. This neutrality value would have to exist within the bounded region representing neutrality on the continuum for the character in question to be truly metaphysically neutral.

Thus, if there is a continuum between, say, allowing one’s decisions to be totally controlled by strict ideology and not being controlled by ideology at all, and one were actually inclined to try to apply some sort of alignment system, there might be some calculable bounded region that corresponds to a happy middle ground we could label "neutral" or "reasonable" or something. This could apply to other things too. But I’ll just see what everyone thinks of what I just wrote before continuing.

No need to get so personal among total strangers. — Arcane Sandwich

Fair enough. Sorry, @NOS4A2. I could've said what I wanted to without the insults. I hope we can continue to be on good enough terms to have productive conversations still.

It isn't true that sacrificing someone's freedom can be justified for The Greater Good, and for two simples reasons. You do not know what The Greater Good is nor how to attain it. — NOS4A2

NOS, if we don't do what is necessary to protect the environment no one will even be around to enjoy the freedoms you claim to have in mind for humanity. Either we do what we have to, or no one has any freedoms. Should I say it in a different way? The Greater Good means doing what it takes to maintain a society that affords the people in it at least some freedoms, even if it means that some must be restricted.

You are being dense.

Furthermore, I don't see a fundamental difference between not allowing people to have bazookas and curtailing our freedoms in some small ways (such as imposing certain laws to reduce pollution) for the continuance of a society in which people are free to live comfortably. Why don't you argue for people to have the right to possess and shoot bazookas, NOS?

I want neither an Islamic nor environmentalist caliphate to govern my life, is what I'm saying. — NOS4A2

First off, that doesn't address the point I was making. Second, if you are not aware that your life is already governed in many ways by far more sinister and predatory entities than environmentalists, you are naive.

You speak of curtailing another's freedoms as if it's something you do every other Tuesday. Is this common behavior for you? Or is it a sort of fantasy you have? — NOS4A2

I'm going to forego the sardonic responses that come to mind when I read this.

Since you can both predict the end of our species and
provide the means to prevent it, what are the answers? — NOS4A2

That is at least partially an easy question to answer, but mostly irrelevant to our discussion. What I, some random person on a forum, thinks we ought to do, doesn't matter. What does matter is that it is true that sacrifices of freedom can be justified for the greater good. That is, if one isn't so conspiracy-minded that one believes that people who want to protect the environment are equivalent to Jihadis. Sure, the latent potential to control and transgress rights is there even with environmentalism, I guess, but it would be really dumb to think that those two groups - jihadis and environmentalists - are comparable in terms of their goals, the degree to which they (might) want to stifle freedoms, and how they would go about it. In fact, it would be moronic.

I’m not ok with the end of life on Earth. I just believe you’re more likely to bring it about before any of your bogeymen, and you’ll make our remaining time here more miserable while doing so. — NOS4A2

Okay, so let's unpack that. You appear to be saying that a worldwide Islamic caliphate is less likely to make life on Earth difficult to maintain than if we curtailed a few freedoms for everyone and protected the environment (that is, if the curtailment of freedoms were necessary to do so). Or you are saying that jihadis cause less destruction in pursuing their radical, violent agenda than people who want to protect the environment who might try to legislate some changes in the way we live. Or you could be saying both. You don't see any problems with either of those statements?

I prefer to let justice be done though the heavens fall, myself. — NOS4A2

Then you are okay with the end of organized life on Earth because you think no one has the right to transgress your rights unless you transgress theirs, and every person who has ever claimed to believe in a greater good is a swindler. Got it.

There are groups of people who have a lot of power that push for profits through the destruction of the environment to our detriment and without regard for suffering or the existential threat the destruction poses. It seems to me that the corporations, billionaires, and lobbyists in question are transgressing our rights to maintain our ways of living. If that is true, are we not justified in resisting forcefully?

edit: by forceful I mean taking preventative measures that might include restricting freedoms - economic or personal. I don't mean violence.

I go for the world where no one transgresses another’s freedoms so long another doesn’t transgress theirs. — NOS4A2

So, there is never a justification for transgressing other's freedoms unless one's own freedoms are directly being transgressed. That isn't what you were saying earlier, which was basically that all of the ideologies you listed are equally injurious to our freedoms, which is clearly not the case. You say they all fall into the same category, but does intent actually mean so little to you? Is there no such thing as a greater good worth compelling or limiting people's actions for ever?

I mean, if all it took was a small decrease in quality of life for everyone so that humanity could continue to inhabit the Earth, you don't think that could be justified? In opposing that measure would you not be transgressing the freedoms of countless others - perhaps billions - to live their lives through your principled opposition to having your freedom to pollute and destroy transgressed? I think according to your own reasoning you are wrong, NOS.

Furthermore, there is no redeeming value to be found in ignoring or allowing Jihadism, and I see no reason not to help the people who are most affected by it, which is Muslims, reform their religion successfully, if only because many of them don't want to live in an Islamic state themselves. I mean, those people are having their freedoms transgressed by the Jihadis, are they not? You should want to help them, NOS.



I hope you are just agreeing with him because you took an adversarial position towards the OP in the first place. NOS is being really unreasonable here, as usual.

Neo-nazis aim for a white-ethno state governed by Hitlerian principles. Commies aim for a a totalitarian state and the abolition of property. Republicans aim for a state governed by a piece of paper. Greens want the state to control the economy and the weather. Every power-seeker and politico from fringe to establishment seeks to transgress your rights. That’s how politics works. That should be obvious to anyone with half a brain. What isn’t obvious is that we need to reform one and not the other. — NOS4A2

First off, neo-Nazis are indeed to be fought, just not with rifles or bombs because they don't usually commit to armed warfare against any ideologies or people who oppose them - at least in the US. That is because they would get stomped. So, they scuttle around on the fringes of the internet only coming into the light to seize political opportunities like a mouse might seize upon a rotten bit of cheese to safely further their idiotic agenda and sate their appetites for relevancy. That is very different from Jihadis. They will just cut your head off for disagreeing, stone your wife to death, and take your daughters as sex slaves. One of those two things is a much more overt threat to one's liberty, as anyone with half a brain would be able to tell.

As for the rest of those groups: yes, sometimes those groups seek to transgress one's rights. But there is something to be said for the degree to which freedoms are transgressed, and the reasons for transgressing those freedoms. "Greens", for instance, clearly have no desire to curtail certain freedoms for the sake of curtailing freedoms, but rather to maintain organized life on Earth. Which you should view as absolutely justified if you aren't psychotic. As for communists: yes, communism undoubtedly lends itself to the curtailment of freedoms, I grant that. But you seem to think everyone except for big-brain NOS is being scammed out of their rations by a bunch of grifting idealogues.

That, I would argue, is largely not the case, especially for the groups you just mentioned. One isn't a nazi if one doesn't hate, one isn't a communist if one doesn't want property to be publicly owned, and one isn't a Republican if one doesn't support King Donald when the rubber meets the road. One also doesn't care about the environment if one opposes measures to stop destroying the environment - even if that means curtailing some freedoms in (probably) relatively mild ways. Those are essential qualities that are required for membership of those groups and that inform those groups' ideologies. That is to say, most of those people in those groups understand what they are supporting. If anyone is being misled by ideology, it is the person who would equate the potential for transgressing freedoms between all those groups because they can't understand the limitations of looking at the world in such stark terms as you do, NOS.

So, I would argue that certain ideologies should be reformed over others, largely because the degrees to which freedoms would be transgressed and the reasons for transgressing those freedoms, are, once again, not identical across the ideologies, and the people who support the ideologies know it - just like you do, NOS. A Nazi is not equivalent to a "Green", and you know it. If that still doesn't make sense, here is a quick thought experiment:

Would you rather live in a white, Nazi ethnostate predicated on Hitlerian principles (whatever the fuck a Hitlerian principle is), or a United States that has made some economic sacrifices and sacrifices of personal freedom to support not destroying the environment? Which of those two worlds transgresses more of one's freedoms in all likelihood?

You’ll note the caveat “…so long as he doesn’t transgress another’s right to do the same”. When that happens all bets are off. — NOS4A2

NOS, they literally aim to set up a state governed by Islamic principles, probably through armed conflict. Jihadists must transgress others' rights by definition or they are just cosplaying. That should be obvious to anyone with a big wrinkly libertarian brain such as yourself.

I don't have much to offer to this complex problem. What I would say is that we need to hold Islamic groups responsible for Islamic individuals, such that this pressure causes Islamic groups to eschew Jihadism. — Leontiskos

Fair enough. I do think that it cannot be accomplished by people external to Islam, however, and some progressive Muslims need to take a stand. In fact, I would say that a coalition of progressive, open-minded Muslims pushing for reform would be worth far more than anything any of us could ever do or say from the outside to change attitudes and influence Muslims not to be radicalized.

And surely the way to go about empowering any reformers does not contain committing war crimes, like droning people all over the place or supporting the genocide of the Palestinians.

But I would like to raise a related issue: how do we deal with militant politico-religious groups anywhere, including our own?

How do we deal with American Christian Nationalism? Who is responsible for 'causing' it? Should it be stamped out? Should it be punished? Forbidden? Who has the responsibility for solving the problem of American Christian Nationalism? — BC

Difficult question. A simple answer is that those of us who are not ideologically aligned with or politically adjacent to such groups should go about making it difficult for these people to enact their agenda. Yes, I know. Honestly, I'd have to think about it quite a bit to come up with a more substantive answer on how to deal with it. On whether or not it should be allowed: if influencing the government to adopt Christianity as what would essentially be a state religion is necessary for Christian nationalism to be Christian nationalism (and that might not be the case, if I'm being generous), then we cannot let it exist. I mean that sincerely: it must not exist if we are to preserve the separation of church and state. How we go about fighting something like that, once again, I'm not totally sure.

There ought to be no way to deal with Jihadis save for leaving them alone. In fact, one ought to go out of his way to defend the jihadi’s right to speak, believe, and live he wishes, so long as he doesn’t transgress another’s right to do the same. Nothing does more for Jihadism, and brings more to its cause, than its oppression. — NOS4A2

Does the existence of Islamic reformers actually constitute oppression of jihadists, though? If anything, jihadists would be the ones inclined to impose their own political and religious beliefs on others, probably through force or armed conflict by definition. I mean, they literally want to establish a state based on Islamic principles. I don't see how they couldn't transgress others' rights in the process, and I can't think of many plausible things more antithetical to freedom. Shouldn't a libertarian like yourself have some sympathy for those reformers who want some freedom for themselves?

Okay, cool, that's a lot different from what you were saying. We can actually discuss this.

Do you think there might need to be something at work in one's brain other than an appreciation of how horrible US middle east policy is to get one to blow oneself up on a bus and kill dozens of innocent people while yelling words of praise to one's God? That isn't meant to be snarky; I genuinely wonder how you might rationalize what seems obvious to me: radical interpretations of scripture in the Quran tend towards producing mass-murdering maniacs at a (relatively) high rate. I consider that to be partially a problem with Islam, as those scriptures are given meaning by shared interpretations of a shared book. Although I think our policy definitely factors into the attitudes of jihadists heavily, and almost certainly fuels radicalization, one group just seems to be consistently more belligerent, at least in terms of acting violently for religious reasons, than others.

None of that justifies our barbaric policies or actions, or our potentially worse belligerence on the world stage, of course. I mean just look at our support of the genocide of the Palestinians. There is clearly no justification for that.

Stop supporting Israel
Get US military out of the Middle East
Stop supporting repressive Islamic regimes
Mind our own business
Stop supporting Israel — T Clark

For fuck's sake, T, did you even read the OP? I said that our current foreign policy makes no sense if we care about reducing jihadism. I agree with you that we should pull our military out of the middle east in an intelligent way and stop supporting Israel.

edit: when I talk about supporting reformers, I don't mean with APC's and foot soldiers. Maybe I should have made that clearer?

Duly noted. Thanks, sandwich.

I think I get it, yes. If we suppose that radical interpretations of scripture are a necessary component of jihadism, we get your argument:

1) If the radical interpretations that give rise to jihadism can be religiously tolerated in a secular society, then jihadism is compatible with secularism.
2) Jihadism is not compatible with secularism.
3) So, the radical interpretations that give rise to jihadism cannot be religiously tolerated in a secular society. — Arcane Sandwich

And we can simplify it to get an argument like the one you made in the first place. We get a modus ponens like:

1) If those radical interpretations of scripture that give rise to jihadism are incompatible with secularism, then the concept of religious tolerance does not apply to those radical interpretations of scripture.
2) Those radical interpretations of scripture that give rise to jihadism are not compatible with secularism.
3) So, the concept of religious tolerance does not apply to those radical interpretations of scripture that give rise to jihadism.

Or am I making a mistake somewhere?

I've got it.

1) If jihadism and the radical interpretations of scripture that give rise to jihadism are to be tolerated, they must be compatible with secularism.

2) Jihadism and those radical interpretations of scripture that lead to jihadism are not compatible with secularism.

3) Therefore, jihadism and the radical interpretations of scripture that give rise to jihadism should not be tolerated.

I present the modus tollens version:

1) If religious tolerance applies to jihadism and those radical interpretations of scripture that give rise to jihadism, then they must be compatible with secularism.
2) Jihadism and those radical interpretations of scriptures that give rise to jihadism are not compatible with secularism.
3) Therefore, religious tolerance does not apply to jihadism or those radical interpretations of scripture that give rise to jihadism.

edit: it isn't quite modus tollens is it

Thanks, sandwich. I'll use those resources for sure.

Okay, cool.

Yes, I see. I'll try to make it simpler. How do you get the logic symbols in your posts?

1) If certain radical interpretations of scripture that give rise to jihadism are incompatible with secularism, then the concept of religious tolerance does not apply to those radical interpretations of scripture nor to jihadism.
2) Certain radical interpretations of scripture that give rise to jihadism are incompatible with secularism.
3) So, the concept of religious tolerance does not apply to those radical interpretations of scripture nor to jihadism. — Arcane Sandwich

Looks good. Thanks for simplifying it; I should have done that myself and saved you the work.

Here's my argument, it's a humble modus ponens:

1) If jihadism is incompatible with secularism, then the concept of religious tolerance does not apply to jihadism.
2) Jihadism is incompatible with secularism.
3) So, the concept of religious tolerance does not apply to jihadism. — Arcane Sandwich

Sounds about right. But I don't think many people actually think we should tolerate jihadism. People might, however, think we ought to tolerate the kind of fundamentalism that might give rise to jihadism. Maybe we could modify your argument in some way to account for that:

1) certain radical interpretations of scripture directly give rise to jihadism.
2) If certain radical interpretations of scripture that give rise to jihadism are incompatible with secularism, then the concept of religious tolerance does not apply to those radical interpretations of scripture.
3) if jihadism is incompatible with secularism, then the concept of religious tolerance does not apply to jihadism.
4) Jihadism is incompatible with secularism.
5) Therefore, because of (1), those radical interpretations of scripture that directly give rise to jihadism are incompatible with secularism.
6) Therefore, religious tolerance does not apply to jihadism or those radical interpretations of scripture that give rise to jihadism.

I'm with you, @ToothyMaw, I think veganism is more ethical than non-veganism. But I just don't see how other people are under the obligation to convert to veganism if they're under no obligation to convert to anything in general. I mean, given that there are several different Ethics out there, how are we to decide which one is the best? Honest question. — Arcane Sandwich

I think it is unreasonable to expect me to be able to resolve the is/ought problem when I argue for veganism, because if we truly didn't already bypass that problem in some ways, no one would be vegan or straight edge or would take up any difficult to maintain moral stances on anything. The fact of the matter is that if one cares about suffering, one should care about animal suffering, and if one doesn't care about animal suffering but cares about human suffering, there is a good chance one is selectively applying the reasoning that unnecessary suffering is wrong according to categories in an arbitrary way. Or one could be a cowardly, sadistic supporter of killing animals whose last refuge is to be found in hiding behind unresolvable philosophical problems (not referring to you, sandwich). But that is almost certainly an edge case and not representative of non-vegans in general.

So, I can only rigorously appeal to other vegans to fight for a world in which animal suffering is minimized by emphasizing what I wrote earlier: a world in which we are all vegan is probably ideal if we want to follow vegan reasoning to its logical conclusion.

None of that is to say that veganism can't be wrong, but it looks like it isn't from where I'm standing.

You know, I think most people walk around thinking that there is no way that they, as individuals, could be ethically obligated to change their lifestyles drastically merely because the necessity of a change hasn't presented itself in their lives. However, I like to think that most people, if they were just in the right state of mind, and were aware of the facts, would value reducing non-human suffering enough to be vegan without it needing to interfere with their lives in some way.

It reminds me of people who think they can fight without training. This belief is entirely irrational and does not present as being irrational until one gets into a fight or actually pursues training, at which point they should realize just how fragile the bridges of their noses are or how easily someone significantly smaller than them could choke them out. At that point, one has been educated, so to speak, on some of their deficiencies.

And if one's delusions of being able to fight survive being folded in half by a purple belt or clubbed by someone who knows how to throw a good leg kick, then maybe nothing can be done for them.

Of course, veganism is different because one has been eating meat their whole life (presumably) and it is socially acceptable, so there is quite a bit of inertia there.

This seems to indicate that if there is a selfish theory of ethics that is sufficiently supported, then we ought to adhere to it, as it seems wrong to just retreat to other less supported theories because we don't like selfishness.
— ToothyMaw

Here is where I disagree. If the evidence in favor of a "selfish ethics" in the style of Ayn Rand is nothing more than Richard Dawkin's book about the selfish gene, then I have the right to ask for two things: a better selfish ethics, and better evidence in support of it. That's just for starters. I then need to see a definitive solution to Hume's is-ought problem. Furthermore, I then need to see why selfish ethics are better for everyone in general (i.e., for society at large) than non-selfish ethics. Finally, I then need to see if selfish ethics are better for non-human animals than non-selfish ethics. Until all of that is delivered, I have no obligation to support an ethics of selfishness, in any way, shape or form. — Arcane Sandwich

I think I agree that all of that would have to be delivered, too. I'm just saying that a selfish ethics is not off the table merely because Ayn Rand or somebody hasn't been able to produce a theory strong enough to deliver on the conditions you list. I agree with you on this one.

Disregarding 3), our answers to 1) and 2) are mostly different because you seem to hold some reservations about whether or not universal vegan claims can be made in the presence of skepticism about veganism's true moral correctness.
— ToothyMaw

Perhaps, though I'm not sure if I would phrase it like that. Can you elaborate on that point, please? — Arcane Sandwich

I'm saying that you appear to think that the reasoning for veganism, that is, that we ought to stop consuming animal products to reduce non-human suffering, cannot be generalized to apply to everyone, because it is possible that veganism is indeed not correct. I think that this doesn't make much sense if we have no reason to doubt that the reasoning could apply universally. To demonstrate this point, imagine this: there is a world in which everyone is vegan, and a world in which people eat meat and consume animal products. According to vegan reasoning, the first world should be more desirable, all other things equal, because it should entail significantly less non-human suffering. Actually, I would argue that it is a fact that that world would almost certainly entail less non-human suffering.

So, then we ask: if non-human suffering is to be avoided, then should we not try to bring about the world in which everyone is vegan? Aren't we obligated to fight for that? That world is far more plausible than some world where society is organized around some contrived, ethical-killing bullshit that no one is actually willing to bring about.

You might argue that I cannot get an ought from an is, but I think you cannot argue for a world in which we are not all vegan if you want to efficiently bring about the greatest reduction of non-human suffering possible.

As for 3), I didn't do any research and just said what came to mind, and I think your answer is better in some ways.
— ToothyMaw

Maybe it is, maybe it isn't. I'm not sure. At this point in the conversation, it might be useful to cite other people besides just the two of us. Maybe Peter Singer says something in Practical Ethics, but since I haven't read that book myself, I wouldn't know. — Arcane Sandwich

I read it years ago, so my memory of it is cloudy. I'll go see if I can get some material from Singer that supports it one way or the other. I seem to remember something about preference utilitarianism and fruit trees. I'll get back to you.

Our answers are entirely different, lol. But that doesn't mean that we can't agree on other points. — Arcane Sandwich

Disregarding 3), our answers to 1) and 2) are mostly different because you seem to hold some reservations about whether or not universal vegan claims can be made in the presence of skepticism about veganism's true moral correctness.

As for 3), I didn't do any research and just said what came to mind, and I think your answer is better in some ways.

1) No, people are under no Ethical obligation to convert to veganism. Why not? Because veganism might be wrong. That is why it makes sense to discuss it in a philosophical sense and a political sense. I'm not saying that veganism actually is wrong, far from it. For all I know, veganism could be right. — Arcane Sandwich

2) No, if one does not want to be a vegan, one is not necessarily being selfish. At least not if veganism turns out to be wrong. If it turns out to be right, then that is a different matter. — Arcane Sandwich

3) Yes, it is Ethical to be selfish, as surprising as that sounds. There are Ethical theories about selfishness, and people sometimes even talk about a "selfish gene", which is the title of a book by Richard Dawkins. However, what I would argue is that there is no single Ethics, there are may different Ethics or ethical theories, or theories about morals, and, since that is the case, then, by definition, I am under no Ethical obligation to embrace some specific Ethics of selfishness, or any general Ethics of selfishness, or even the very concept of selfishness as a positive moral value instead of a neutral moral value, or even a negative moral value. — Arcane Sandwich

You seem to have answered 1) and 2) in a way that is compatible with the claim that you are under no obligation to accept an ethics of selfishness or to embrace selfishness as a positive moral value, for the reason of there being many different ethics. But I don't think that the existence of many different ethical theories implies that you are under no obligation to embrace any given ethical theory; there are degrees of plausibility, rigor, etc. that indicate if you ought to embrace it.

Allow me to introduce an analogy. There might be a proliferation of, say, ways of opening a chess game that might lead to you winning, but that large number of openings doesn't mean that one or another opening was not superior from a statistical standpoint in terms of the likelihood of it leading to a win. In fact, a calculation regarding this is probably done by any great chess player every time they play a game. I would view the large number of ethical theories in a similar way. Some are more or less rigorous and plausible, and able to be universalized, even if each of them might resolve the question of what is right and wrong in their own way. So, just because something could resolve the question doesn't make it the best choice, or even one of the best choices.

This seems to indicate that if there is a selfish theory of ethics that is sufficiently supported, then we ought to adhere to it, as it seems wrong to just retreat to other less supported theories because we don't like selfishness.

edit: your reasoning seems more linear than I would expect and appears to be pre-loaded with some ideas, such as the idea that the existence of many ethical theories means one has no obligation to adhere to any one theory due to its merits.

If one perceives there to be an ethical obligation, and this obligation, appropriately supported by the facts, indicates that everyone ought to do it, then shouldn't everyone do it?
— ToothyMaw

Should they? The usual philosophical retort here is that we're running into Hume's is-ought problem. — Arcane Sandwich

When I mention "facts", I just mean facts related to the treatment of animals and those that indicate we could easily avoid the concomitant suffering by all stopping consuming animal products. So, the "ought" I am talking about is a softer one, as it really only functions in the presence of (what I believe to be reasonable) suppositions consistent with those facts.

Skepticism with regards to the normative moral status of veganism does not mean that people are not obligated to do it, it means that we just shouldn't take it as a decided issue and acknowledge that it can be discussed. But being able to discuss it does not make it not obligatory for everyone in the absence of decisive arguments against veganism.
— ToothyMaw

Here is where critics of veganism say that there are indeed decisive arguments against veganism, and that until vegans can reject those arguments, no one has the ethical obligation to convert to veganism. I'm just playing Devil's Advocate to the best of my ability here. — Arcane Sandwich

You would have to provide one of these arguments, as I can't remember coming across any arguments against veganism that really seemed all that decisive.

I mean, no one would say that it isn't wrong to torture and kill other humans merely because some crazy person (or people) might be skeptical of the validity of the position of being against torturing and unjustly killing other humans in pretty much any case, right? I certainly wouldn't, but your reasoning seems to suggest such a thing could actually be undecided. Note that I'm just talking about the reasoning here; I am not disputing that humans should not be tortured and unjustly killed.
— ToothyMaw

Critics of veganism will point out that there are insufficient metaphysical and scientific reasons for comparing humans to non-human animals, as far as Ethics and moralities are concerned. What would you respond to them, in that regard? — Arcane Sandwich

If one can imagine, or grant, that animals can suffer in ways similar to us, then one can rightly compare humans and animals at least insofar as the capacity to suffer is concerned. And if you do that, it kind of follows that we shouldn't, say, throw lobsters into boiling pots of water if they can consciously perceive pain like a human, if at least partially because we wouldn't do that to a human or something else that could consciously perceive pain. That is to say, if the experience of being boiled alive is consistent across animals and humans, we can establish a baseline that indicates which actions are more or less acceptable without dubious comparisons.

So, I'm not saying that animal suffering is as important as human suffering, or that the two are qualitatively identical, but if you grant that animals can suffer, often really intensely, then it should be as obvious that animal suffering is undesirable as it is that human suffering is undesirable. If you accept that and what I wrote above, then I think veganism follows without comparing humans and animals in fallacious ways.

edit: if my argument at the end there is really similar to someone else's, I didn't mean to copy it. I just wrote what came to mind.

No, people are under no Ethical obligation to convert to veganism. Why not? Because veganism might be wrong. That is why it makes sense to discuss it in a philosophical sense and a political sense. I'm not saying that veganism actually is wrong, far from it. For all I know, veganism could be right. — Arcane Sandwich

Wait, what? If one perceives there to be an ethical obligation, and this obligation, appropriately supported by the facts, indicates that everyone ought to do it, then shouldn't everyone do it? Skepticism with regards to the normative moral status of veganism does not mean that people are not obligated to do it, it means that we just shouldn't take it as a decided issue and acknowledge that it can be discussed. But being able to discuss it does not make it not obligatory for everyone in the absence of decisive arguments against veganism.

I mean, no one would say that it isn't wrong to torture and kill other humans merely because some crazy person (or people) might be skeptical of the validity of the position of being against torturing and unjustly killing other humans in pretty much any case, right? I certainly wouldn't, but your reasoning seems to suggest such a thing could actually be undecided. Note that I'm just talking about the reasoning here; I am not disputing that humans should not be tortured and unjustly killed.

1) Does everyone have to convert to veganism? — Arcane Sandwich

I think this speaks to people thinking there might be some way of ethically consuming animal products as a sort of “out” from veganism, and that does indeed seem to me to be a necessary condition for people not being obligated to be vegan. But, I think that if people consider themselves to be bound by “ought's” so to speak, or any sort of moral obligation, especially with regards to the wellbeing of animals, they should themselves be vegan in the lack of a means of producing animal products without suffering or death (if that is even possible). So yes, everyone ought to convert to veganism.

2) If one does not want to be a vegan, is one being selfish? — Arcane Sandwich

Yes, I think it is probably selfish to not want to be vegan because one would likely be knowingly and explicitly participating in processes that harm animals. If this is the case, there is a good chance this is because of an internal calculation that the suffering is happening far enough away and out of sight enough that one is not participating, or they possess the belief that animal wellbeing doesn’t matter or are just generally apathetic. All of those things, I contend, are selfish reasons for not being vegan. Thus, to not be a vegan because one does not want to be a vegan, appears to be selfish.

A side effect of the simpler conclusion that just not wanting to be vegan is selfish is that every vegan that wouldn’t want to be vegan because they like meat or animal products would be selfish. So, I’m not entirely sure on this one. I think that another necessary conclusion should be that selfishness - as reflected in eating meat - mostly only matters when it leads to bad actions like eating meat.

3) Is it Ethical to be selfish? — Arcane Sandwich

No, it is not ethical to be selfish, even if we have evolved to be so.

I'm on it, sandwich!

Would anyone else like to participate in this thread by providing another example that we can apply Peirce's Precisive Abstraction to? — Mapping the Medium

Sure, just give me a little bit. Still chewing on that last post; I'm trying hard to understand his semiotics stuff, but it is really abstract.