1) In your honest opinion, is it fair for Earth Crisis (and Straight Edge in general) to blame societal problems solely on drugs? Or are there other elements of "society" that need to "take the blame" here, so to speak? — Arcane Sandwich

This question is actually a little more difficult than I initially thought. Because, in a way, Straight Edge seems to have provided an all-encompassing account of what our society faces and how to resolve it and adding veganism just amps that up even further - perhaps in a good way, perhaps not. I’m not sure. But I’ll give my opinion anyways:

No, I don’t think it is reasonable to blame drugs for every problem in society; to do so indicates a reductive way of looking at the problems that face us even if the core reasoning of Straight Edge has an internal logic and high level of appeal.

I will start by pointing out that, although it doesn’t indicate invalid reasoning, it seems that Earth Crisis’s core reasoning, and that of the Straight Edge movement in general (if Firestorm is any indication), is circular: people do drugs because of societal circumstances, this makes people less effective at advocating for themselves or acting morally, which then leads to the use of more drugs and/or the toleration of living on the terms of corrupt cops and politicians who themselves then enable this process.

So, according to this reasoning, it seems that the best thing we can do to interrupt this process is stop doing drugs (Or rise up and resist the bad people with violence). Whether or not that is true, this loop is not closed; there are many more reasons than drugs that people are more or less moral or more or less rational, or more or less good at advocating for themselves, including systemic factors, cultural factors, factors like upbringing - even if that last one could be related to bad experiences associated with drugs. I think that those factors could easily eclipse the problem of people doing drugs in certain circumstances.

Really, you would have to believe that the pernicious influence of drugs has suffused everything to believe that stopping doing drugs will actually rid us of all of our problems. But based on what I’ve read, that one guy (Buechner, I think) from EC said that stopping doing drugs doesn’t actually make one a good person; one still has to act with that added mental clarity.

Alternatively, you could just be a really careful nominalist. Maybe.

edit: nope, probably not

By labeling,
— Mapping the Medium

Again, nominalism isn't a tendency to proliferate labels. Nominalisation is closer to being that. — bongo fury

I think the point is that from a nominalist perspective, deriving noun phrases like "honey has sweetness" (or just "x has y-ness" in a more general form) from a self-evidently true predicate like "honey is sweet", is often valid even in the existence of ambiguity over whether or not honey does indeed possess sweetness statically or intrinsically (and thus, at all) because we are only dealing with the physical particulars associated with a subject (honey). That is to say, if a specific label (y-ness) only arises from the particulars associated with some subject, how can we rightly prescind those qualities or particulars when dealing with that subject wherever we might encounter it? It seems we would need some sort of genuine abstraction or abstract process, and I guess that could be hypostatic abstraction or something.

edit: removed the "mental" part of "mental abstraction"

Right, but this is the part where the "orca lawyer" steps in and says: "But mate, orcas kill for sport sometimes, they get a kick out of it, they think it's fun. So if the orca can hunt for sport and enjoy it, why cant I? Why can't I go and hunt whatever I feel like hunting? Why can't I shoot a 'roo or an elk or a guanaco or whatever it is that people hunt in their respective continents?" — Arcane Sandwich

Since no one else seems to want to respond: that is like asking why one cannot willfully flush their Christmas toy truck decorations down the toilet because a child has done something similar. You could do it, but that reasoning doesn't make it any less destructive to your plumbing. Except in the case of dealing with killing or maiming animals, you just killed or maimed something, so the stakes are a lot higher than having to hire a plumber.

I mean, are we going to swim out there and stop the orcas? Is the orca lawyer committed to waging a campaign to end the unnecessary killing of seals? Is that feasible? Would that be a wise way of spending resources if we want to reduce suffering? Or should we just not kill animals in the tens of thousands in slaughterhouses?

My first thought it that one might prescind qualities from a concept that don't require adherence to a category such that that concept does not possess that quality ambiguously (I'm thinking the result of an incorrect hypostatic abstraction). So, keeping up with the honey example, we could prescind sweetness from honey if it turns out through hypostatic abstraction that honey does indeed possess sweetness, and we can prescind sweetness from honey if it possesses that quality intrinsically or statically, but we cannot prescind sweetness from honey if there is ambiguity in if the honey truly possesses that trait intrinsically or statically in the absence of a valid hypostatic abstraction.

My second thought is that I'm not sure what I'm talking about at this point.

edit: that was mostly a joke. I understand what I'm saying even if the intention behind the creation of this thread is still not entirely clear yet.

You said that life is often beautiful by default. I'm not sure that I agree with that. Can you try to convince me of that, please? — Arcane Sandwich

That would be difficult, as I think I can only speak to my subjective experiences, really, which kind of means I can't say that the world in its entirety is beautiful, but rather it is beautiful (sometimes) when viewed through the lens of my experience. So, I probably can't do that, actually.

Because then you say "clearly not in some ways", and I agree with that, but then you say "as human nature appears to give away to incredible self-destruction, cruelty and apathay". Here's where I would say a fallacy, because a lot of people actually do use this fallacy IRL: "Well what about killer whales when they attack a poor seal that just wants to live? I don't see anyone complaining about that."

What would you say in response to that fallacy? Do you think it's a fallacy, or would you consider it good, sound reasoning on the part of the "orca lawyer"? — Arcane Sandwich

It is clearly garbage reasoning, for the following reasons:

We have little to no control over orcas, and even if we wanted to prevent orcas from doing what they do, we would need to insert ourselves into an ecosystem and disrupt it which could have catastrophic consequences for that ecosystem. So, it is true that orcas cause suffering, but it isn't something we should or can prevent imo. This applies to any predatory animal.

Furthermore, humans very well can mold their behavior such that we don't give in to the darkest parts of our natures, and that is not possible for something like an orca. They just kill to eat because they have to. So, humans can act ethically apart from our evolved instincts, whereas other animals almost certainly cannot.

So, deflecting to orcas is pretty dumb.

edit: didn't mean to call humans animals there.

I appear to be the only who wants anything to do with this, for whatever reason. Yes, it is moral for Earth Crisis to align with PETA and vice versa. Yes, we should all be vegans and advocate for veganism. Once again, only T's from me.

hey, who said that Life was supposed to be beautiful by default? — Arcane Sandwich

I think life often is beautiful by default, honestly. Clearly not in some ways, as human nature appears to give way to incredible self-destruction, cruelty, and apathy. Maybe It's just my privilege or something, though; those chickens in the video certainly don't live beautiful lives.

People might think that it is cogent to say or believe that honey (for example) possesses sweetness in a static or intrinsic sense according to concretized categories, when the reality is much more complicated.
— ToothyMaw

:sparkle: Happy New Year! — Mapping the Medium

Yes, Happy New Year to you too. You doing anything special? I'm not.

edit: you don't have to answer that, lol. That kind of puts you on the spot. My bad.

we have abstract qualities like "sweetness" and "hardness" that gain meaning through relations determined by the process of hypostatic abstraction, and, thus, affixing the relevant quality to a subject requires human judgments. As such, certain relations humans might make seem to be rooted in mental phenomenon as any continuum or relation referenced by the process of hypostatic abstraction originates mentally. If that is the case, then the existence of sweetness, for example, only really exists as a cohesive whole in one's mind. — ToothyMaw

If that is the case, then some properties are not static, while others are. I'm thinking that the properties related through hypostatic abstraction are not static unless the subject possesses the quality of "y-ness" referenced in the original predicate intrinsically. So, while sweetness could take as many arguments as propositions indicating something is sweet exist, whether or not something possesses sweetness statically relies upon the qualities of the relevant subject(s). — ToothyMaw

Therefore, it isn't really a category error, as this new "predicate of predicates" is derived from a physical reality: things are more or less sweet, and, thus, those things that qualify as being sweet are themselves more or less sweet depending upon a judgment. That is to say they possess sweetness - even if sweetness is not a monadic predicate in the sense that it only takes one argument. It could take many. Furthermore, if we (optionally) visualize a continuum of sweetness, it is clear that the statuses of other propositions regarding other things being sweet have no bearing on whether or not honey possesses sweetness. — ToothyMaw

By labeling, nominalism often concretizes properties that are actually relational. Nominalism argues that properties, types, or forms only exist as names or labels and does have the effect of concretizing abstract or relational properties. When we use labels to categorize and identify properties, we often treat them as more concrete than they might actually be. — Mapping the Medium

I think that this line of reasoning indicates the existence of the continuum is necessary if sweetness and properties like it exist so open-endedly in mental representation - even if those mental representations arise partially from physical observation or experience. People might think that it is cogent to say or believe that honey (for example) possesses sweetness in a static or intrinsic sense according to concretized categories, when the reality is much more complicated.

I like where you're going with this. Are you now envisioning a fractal-like nature of sweetness that maintains that thread in the continuum? — Mapping the Medium

I'll have to think about what you mean by that, unless you can expound a little?

even if sweetness is not a monadic predicate in the sense that it only takes one argument. It could take many. Furthermore, if we (optionally) visualize a continuum of sweetness, it is clear that the statuses of other propositions regarding other things being sweet have no bearing on whether or not honey possesses sweetness. — ToothyMaw

It also helps to think about the commonly understood definition of 'a property'. Is a property a static characteristic? — Mapping the Medium

I might be overreaching here, but this is what I think:

What you are getting at here is that we have abstract qualities like "sweetness" and "hardness" that gain meaning through relations determined by the process of hypostatic abstraction, and, thus, affixing the relevant quality to a subject requires human judgments. As such, certain relations humans might make seem to be rooted in mental phenomenon as any continuum or relation referenced by the process of hypostatic abstraction originates mentally. If that is the case, then the existence of sweetness, for example, only really exists as a cohesive whole in one's mind.

If that is the case, then some properties are not static, while others are. I'm thinking that the properties related through hypostatic abstraction are not static unless the subject possesses the quality of "y-ness" referenced in the original predicate intrinsically. So, while sweetness could take as many arguments as propositions indicating something is sweet exist, whether or not something possesses sweetness statically relies upon the qualities of the relevant subject(s).

Okay, this is how I see it:

If there are many propositions that could express that certain things are sweet, and sweetness is constructed from the properties of things being more or less sweet, then to turn the predicate "honey is sweet" into "honey has sweetness" seems valid, as it indicates a relation between one thing (honey) and a tangible property that corresponds to the original predicate being turned into a relation (that is to say the relation between things being more or less sweet and those things having the property of being sweet).

Therefore, it isn't really a category error, as this new "predicate of predicates" is derived from a physical reality: things are more or less sweet, and, thus, those things that qualify as being sweet are themselves more or less sweet depending upon a judgment. That is to say they possess sweetness - even if sweetness is not a monadic predicate in the sense that it only takes one argument. It could take many. Furthermore, if we (optionally) visualize a continuum of sweetness, it is clear that the statuses of other propositions regarding other things being sweet have no bearing on whether or not honey possesses sweetness.

So, my theory is that the "has" in "honey has sweetness" just represents a judgment that honey exists according to some measure of being sweet such that it possesses the more general property of sweetness by virtue of things being more or less sweet.

I think that it might be useful to look at the examples @Mapping the Medium has provided.

In terms of the honey example, this is my understanding: you can say honey is sweet, and that may be regarded as true depending on the perception that honey is indeed sweet, as you are stating a simple predicate. When you perform the hypostatic abstraction, however, you take that predicate and turn it into a relation between honey and the object "sweetness" (honey has sweetness). The logical functioning of introducing "sweetness" consists solely in the truth values of those propositions that possess the property of being sweet. This last part indicates that there is a collection of propositions that might indicate certain things are sweet, including the one we started with, and they must possess sweetness if sweetness is itself a measure that exists on a continuum that entails the property of "sweet".

If you guys think there is something wrong in there just say so; I'm sure there is.

I'm reading about him on Wikipedia and the SEP and it appears he just transposed firstness, secondness, and thirdness (terms he used when he was feeling appropriately abstract) onto a bunch of categories because he liked threes.

I think one could easily come up with some sort of relation that might justify more names. I mean, I read what he said about it, and he said that he just "thinks not" that we could endlessly perform hypostatic abstractions to derive more "intentions". So, I suppose that is the closest we might get to insight: he doesn't think it is useful to repeat the process past twice. For whatever reason.

I suppose in a concrete example of the type we talked about in this thread it would be useless to go past one or two applications of hypostatic abstraction, though. So I guess the examples might fit into the triad.

But I could be wrong on all of this, so take it with a grain of salt.

The first video, "Ecocide", was a little like being punched in the face. I definitely agree with the lyrics - I think they even capture an arguably appropriate attitude - and after reading about the band on Wikipedia I think I probably do agree with them in general, even the straight edge parts. I personally don't drink or do drugs (except caffeine) and think veganism is the way to go even if I have failed at it lately. I guess that means I'm not exactly living up to the wise words of Buechner at the moment. So, for me at least, T's all the way down. Cool that they like Peter Singer.

what Claude the A.I. tells you seems fishy to me.
— Arcane Sandwich

If you really think that I am trying to promote AI in my work, you are sorely mistaken, and there is no reason to discuss this further. — Mapping the Medium

No one is skeptical of you or your intentions, I think he just doesn't think much of AI.

If you carefully and thoroughly review my work, you will see how right you are and that nominalism is the problem. — Mapping the Medium

I don't know if I've said anything that goes against nominalism, honestly. I would just separate the abstract notion of hardness from something actually being "hard" in some cases, for example. I don't really think hardness as an idea is an independent entity, as it exists as a result of our perceptions and mental models of the world. No to mention, we couldn't have hardness if there was not a variety of things of various "hardnesses" as it might be measured, so these abstract continuums and such seem to arise naturally to me. Or maybe I'm being naive. I don't know.

Not that AI is useless. Maybe I'll read what you linked.

I got ChatGPT to tell me I solved the double-slit experiment once. Needless to say, it turned out to almost certainly be bullshit.

Taking your idea as a sketch, let me see if I can add some color to it. I would say:

(a) This honey tastes sweet to a human being.
(b) Therefore, this honey possesses sweetness in itself, if by "in itself" we mean an object-subject relation.
(c) Any object-subject relation can be reduced (abstracted away) to a something-something relation.
(d) And in a something-something relation, there are two individual variables, "x" and "y", such that something binds them, and that something is a relation.

However, that relation itself, can be treated either as a unary predicate, or as an individual variable "z", but then you would need a fourt element to play the role of the ternary, binding predicate.

Does that make any sense? I'm not sure that it does. — Arcane Sandwich

Yes, I think that makes sense. The object-subject relation between the honey and perceived sweetness is provided by relations that should be able to be abstracted until we can isolate it as two variables bound by some relation in the form of a unary predicate or something. At that point I suppose we could say that we have achieved...something.

This is the most rigorous representation I could come up with quickly of the current status of the example with the honey.  

The following argument can be made when someone tastes honey:

[[tastes]] = {(sweet: -> T), (like honey -> T)}

We also have another argument that seems necessary that says that:

[[tastes sweet]] = {possesses sweetness -> T}

This second argument is backed up by the fact that we know sweetness as a measure is entailed by the things that make something sweet and that “sweet” as a judgment occupies a region on some sort of sweetness continuum.

Therefore, the person in question could make the logically sound utterance after tasting the honey:

(a) This honey tastes sweet.
(b) Therefore, this honey possesses sweetness.

This is, clearly, only valid from the viewpoint of the person making the value-judgment associated with the honey tasting sweet. That is to say that in this example we see that the hypostatic abstraction is only valid with a subjective judgment made by a human and even then it is still limited by that person’s experiences, as someone else might not believe that honey qualifies as sweet (hypothetically; of course everyone finds honey to be sweet).

Thus, objectively, we cannot say that honey possesses sweetness in a general sense, as we are measuring it according to an inherently subjective measure.

But it's somehow "unsatisfactory", innit. I mean, if that humble first-order formula is all that I can possible contribute to this conversation, then that makes me quite sad. I take that as a personal flaw about my own persona, though. — Arcane Sandwich

You definitely helped me think about it more rigorously. And as far as I can tell there is plenty of room for more conjecture, so don't be glum! :up:

edit: you introduced rigor to the conversation. I shouldn't have just framed that in terms of myself. Sorry.

I would have to buy them. Maybe this coming month when I get my check.

edit: didn't read the free account part

Does that make any sense? — Arcane Sandwich

Not on its face, no. But I'll think about it.

edit: yes, that makes sense

Hypostatic abstraction is a formal operation in logic that transforms a predicate into a relation. For example, "Honey is sweet" is transformed into "Honey has sweetness". In this example, it might be thought of that 'sweetness' is now a 'property' of honey.
— Mapping the Medium

Here's how I might go about this from a formal point of view (again, I might be wrong about this, so, grain of salt and all of that sort of cautionary talk).

"Transforms a predicate into a relation". Using "honey", "sweet", and "sweetness" as the three basic terms, I would symbolize "honey" as an individual constant, "i", next I would symbolize "sweet" as a unary first-order predicate, "S", and finally I would (controversially) treat "sweetness" as an individual constant, not a predicate. Here is how that would work. There's two steps to it. The first step is this:

1) S(h). This means "honey, as an individual thing, has the property of being sweet."
2) S(hs). This means "honey, as an individual thing, and sweetness, as an individual thing, are related by the relation of "being sweet".

The problem here, however, is that you cannot say (1) and (2) at the same time. You cannot define "S" as a unary predicate and then attempt to use it as a two-place predicate. Either you use two different predicates, or you go about this in a completely different way. — Arcane Sandwich

Your logic looks correct to me. S(hs) just reflects that honey is not intrinsically sweet. We know it isn't because the relation of being sweet in S(hs) is based in that we know that there are observable qualities that make honey sweet, and we also know what makes something sweet in general. Since we cannot prescind the sweetness of honey from the existence of fructose/glucose, we conclude that to measure the fructose/glucose in a sample of honey is to measure its sweetness. Thus, sweetness is not a static property, but rather one that can more or less be measured, and, thus, to claim that honey possesses the property of being sweet is an abstract value judgment based on a measure of sweetness.

What they have in common is where we need to focus our investigation into the rewards and pitfalls of hypostatic abstraction. — Mapping the Medium

That's a little vague.

I suppose you are referring to that we cannot rightly perform a hypostatic abstraction if the thing in question does not possess that trait intrinsically without some amount of subjective or linguistic value-assignment. Thus, I do think @alleybear is/was on to something.

edit: sorry for presuming you to be male.

edit 2: fixed the language I used.

I think he was just referring to the emission of light, which is directly related to the energy it emits. To take issue with the wording because it would require organisms to perceive that energy for it to technically qualify as "light" seems a little pedantic. But maybe he'll indicate what he meant.

The sun is bright. ... The sun has brightness.

Is brightness a static, intrinsic property of the sun? — Mapping the Medium

Yes, I would say it is intrinsic. There is either light or no light, and so long as a light exists it has a brightness. Therefore, the sun must have brightness so long as it exists. This is to say that anything that exudes light must exist on the continuum of brightness and must therefore have brightness. This is only negated when the sun ceases to exist, at which point it no longer needs to have the quality of having brightness for it to have possessed brightness intrinsically; that the quality of this brightness depends upon the sun's existence, and would persist for its whole lifespan, means it is intrinsic to the sun.

But is 'hardness' a static, intrinsic property of a diamond? — Mapping the Medium

No, because hardness is a trait associated with a continuum implied by our language and abstraction of the term. So, what is defined as hard can change, even if diamonds are probably hard by most measures.

Is hardness a static, intrinsic property of a diamond? ... Does a diamond possess hardness? — Mapping the Medium

I would start by seeing if the language indicates that the quality of hardness can exist on a continuum and if such a thing can be measured. In the case of hardness, it does look like it can exist on a continuum, and if we can determine that diamonds exist at some point on this continuum (presumably all diamonds are of equal hardness) such that they measure up as being hard, we can then say that they possess the quality of hardness. How we measure hardness I'm not sure, but I do think this makes diamonds intrinsically, or at least statically, hard.

I see sweetness and beauty, when used to describe something, as value judgements. Value judgements are analog; measures of fructose or glucose are specific and digital. Sometimes there is relevant correspondence between analog notation points and digital ones, and sometimes there isn't. — alleybear

So, do you think there is sufficient correspondence between fructose/glucose and perceived sweetness (value judgment)? It sounds like you must if you think sweetness is not a static property of honey. Or so it seems to me from the angle you're taking.

Hypostatic abstraction is a formal operation in logic that transforms a predicate into a relation. For example, "Honey is sweet" is transformed into "Honey has sweetness". In this example, it might be thought of that 'sweetness' is now a 'property' of honey.

My question to you is this .... In this example, is 'sweetness' truly a static property of honey? It is true that we can measure the amount of fructose and glucose in a specific sample of honey, but can we discern the differences in quality of sweetness to the taster? Consider the same with the word 'beauty'. — Mapping the Medium

I think that since we just predicated the quality of sweetness to honey, we have to ask what the degree of separation the quality of sweetness has from objective, scientific markers of what makes something more or less sweet - if they exist. It does indeed seem that the sweetness of a sample of honey cannot be prescinded from the amount of fructose or glucose that exists in that sample of honey (science has shown us that those things directly cause a perception of sweetness), or what would be causing that perception of sweetness? A hallucination? Therefore, the synechistic layer resides in that the sweetness of honey must exist on a continuum that relates smoothly to a scientific measure. As such, I would say that sweetness is not a static property of honey because we can measure the changes in intensity.

Okay, maybe; but why would any for-profit corporation or military organization ever build an "ethical android" that would be useless as either a slave or a killer? — 180 Proof

Think about this: if you were to have an android in your house that would help take care of your family or something, or even if we just had androids walking around doing things at all, people would undoubtedly want these androids to be able to behave morally because they would inevitably be in positions to act morally. And, if that is what the consumers would want, I think corporations would provide it.

So, while there is a difference between an android capable of behaving morally and an android that has substantial moral beliefs like a human might, corporations will have incentives to create some sort of android that can behave ethically. In the OP I'm just discussing androids that are internally morally comparable to humans.

Furthermore, an ethical android is no more useless as a slave or a killer than a well-programmed human, so already we see that people tend towards thinking about these androids inconsistently.

edit: also: when I say "beliefs", I really do mean beliefs comparable to what humans have, not just habits.

I find that poem very compelling and think things may ultimately play out that way. I think Brautigan said more about it in a short poem than I could in a book.

edit: to be clear this is the first time I've seen this poem.

edit 2: I get it. The further along the path we get to the end situation in which we are "watched over by machines of loving grace" the stronger the urge or necessity of getting there. What a brilliant poem. I suppose giving androids the same status as humans with or without a means of self-reflection would advance us towards that end.

A classic. If only it were so simple. And where is the Zeroth Law? Or was that never technically added to the fictional handbook?

Even humans sometimes do not live up to their own moral standards. Because morality sometimes is such a grey area between right and wrong it is hard to program this type of ambiguity into a machine with the expectation that it makes 100% correct moral choices when faced with scenarios where right and wrong are to be distinguished because even as humans we struggle with it. — kindred

Yes, I noted that that is the ideal case, but that it is far more realistic that any ethical android would inevitably get "stuck" on some moral problem in a way that a human might not, and that this reality necessitates some means of self-reflection. I then point out that truly moral self-reflection probably requires the human traits of empathy and compassion.

The biggest issue with creating self aware androids is their capacity to carry out morality in human terms and expectations, because we differ from the outset in terms of our makeup our priorities would differ. — kindred

Their priorities, both moral and otherwise, would be what we program into them, largely. Or so I would think. As such, they may develop new priorities, but the development of the new and relevant moral priorities requires characteristics associated with humans and a capacity to self-reflect. So, I'm not saying that they wouldn't think differently or have properties humans wouldn't, but they could easily be morally recognizable if we program them accordingly - even if they lack some human characteristics.

If empathy could somehow be programmed into androids, then they’d be more capable of making better ethical/moral choices, but that is not the question. — kindred

I agree that that isn't the question. The question in the OP is essentially whether or not we should try to create ethical androids in the absence of an appropriately meaningful mode of self-reflection for them.

The question is whether it is possible to do so i.e. grant androids the same level of empathic self-reflection as humans, and if we could do that I so no issue with doing so as an android capable of moral decision making is obviously desirable. — kindred

Ok, yes, I agree that if we had a means of making empathetic, compassionate androids that they could very well be desirable, but we don't have that right now. Furthermore, we need to avoid validating the double standard in the OP, and that might require some thoughtfulness in how we go about the whole thing.

That is because they did not stop with self-reflection. Self-reflection by itself is not action, and does not cause action. In his book, How People Change, psychoanalyst Allen Wheelis sums up the sequence of as follows:

Suffering > insight > will > action > change — Questioner

First off, I think that it is true that self-reflection can be an action in itself, which I argue for below. But we know, even based on this linear chain you provided, that self-reflection can result in changes that result in a will that result in an action that could cause some change. If I am right, and this chain is right, about this and that self-reflection is an action, we can safely say that there could be an emotional ought, as the composition of causes that qualify as actions changes.

Furthermore, that chain seems relevant to me only if by "suffering" he means being exposed to suffering of others. As such:

I think we are conflating literature on psychology with an examination of how people ought to act in a moral sense. Wheelis probably understands the way people actually change far better than me, but we are talking about a hypothetical that could, as far as I can tell, fit within what little of Wheelis' examination of psychology has been presented here. So, I can only agree that Wheelis is likely right, but it doesn't come close to ending the discussion.

I think that the relevant kind of insight isn't just magically generated in one's head when exposed to suffering, and I think Wheelis would agree. Think about it: does everyone who is exposed to the same suffering generate meaningful moral insight? No, and that kind of implies another step, a necessary personal quality, or even an action in there. Or, as I would argue, the act of an empathetic person reacting mentally with compassion to generate some sort of moral insight into themselves or the human condition, for example.

A person's moral reality is a psychological reality, sure, but it doesn't have to strictly abide by this model of how we change in a general sense; it doesn't have to be recursive, and, once again, I think could probably fit within this model of how people change if we truly wanted to force it.

edit: I see that Wheelis is dead. That sucks.

It is precisely because we cannot extricate ourselves from our emotions that we need to view them as having some sort of worth or at least examine them in terms of what they do or do not impel us to do
— ToothyMaw

Emotions themselves are, as I wrote, our natural bodily and mental reactions to events and are, mostly, outside of our direct control. On the other hand, viewing and examining those emotions, which you propose, are human actions and judgments. — T Clark

How many things that guide your behavior do you think actually have intrinsic worth outside of, or regardless of, human views and judgments? Is it not true that attaching value to the emotions that guide us morally based on some examination gives those emotions worth, even if it isn't intrinsic?

You are conflating the belief in an imaginary, supernatural being with the sum total of all cause-and-effect manifestations in existence. — Questioner

I found the science educator. :razz:

Sorry, leaving you alone now.

Self-reflection can only lead to changes in ourselves. — Questioner

That is demonstrably false. Look at any effective activist that has ever existed.

If our emotional burnout results from watching the suffering of others, over which we have no power, then to disengage is the self-preserving role. — Questioner

I never said anything about self-preserving. I agree: to disengage at a certain point is indeed the safe thing to do, for sure.

So, if exposing yourself to emotionally stimulating things - especially as they relate to empathy and compassion - makes you more morally effective, an argument for an emotional ought could be made. That is, if one thinks morality is a fundamentally human endeavor.
— ToothyMaw

But you are not calling for morality, you are calling for action. — Questioner

When I say "emotional ought" I refer to the act of stimulating one's emotions in a healthy way to encourage self-reflection, which itself should entail some concrete actions. Nonetheless, self-reflection is an action anyways, so it is a non-issue.

edit: I see you are newer to the forum. Sorry if I'm being a little combative. It is my default on the forum from so many years of arguing with other combative people.

I can't think there is any "ought" to emotions. They just are. They don't follow a design, but are instinctual reactions to what we experience around us. — Questioner

Yes, but these instinctual reactions reinforce or modify our rational moral views by encouraging self-reflection. That is the impasse we find ourselves at, essentially. We make ourselves more effective or grounded by intentionally stimulating our emotions, or you are like the android I mentioned earlier in the thread:

I find myself imagining an android programmed to adhere to a set of morals completely and totally without exception. It should carry out its limited programming as well as it can once implemented. The conclusion from our discussion is that we don’t really want this unless the android is capable of rigorous self-reflection. This self-reflection might even be able to be programmed, but can empathy or compassion (the strongest markers of morality) really be extracted from the human condition? Guilt? Self-loathing in the more extreme conditions? If not, this self-reflection is a pale imitation of the real thing. — ToothyMaw

So, if exposing yourself to emotionally stimulating things - especially as they relate to empathy and compassion - makes you more morally effective, an argument for an emotional ought could be made. That is, if one thinks morality is a fundamentally human endeavor.