You don't know what "both" means? — Luke

You're picking out the wrong thing. And yes, what does "both" mean here? We have a horse moving in 1878. We can pick out pairs of frames, but that horse isn't "here" in 2022 according to you. 1878 was a long time ago.

No, the present changes. — Luke

The present is the year 2022, at the time of this writing. All frames in this video are in 1878. That horse is long gone in 2022.

Let's be clear: are you advocating a four-dimensionalist, eternalist view of time where time is a space=like dimension, and where all past, present and future times exist, or not? — Luke

Not necessarily eternalist. I'm advocating past facts don't change. You're by contrast advocating that they both do and do not: "O was at (1,1) at t=1" but "O is not at t=1". O changes time, from past to present, but still has a past location at past time t=1.

I don't see how you reconcile this with your assertion that "O's being at (1,1,1)" and "O's being at (2,1,2)" are both true. If the change in time is from t=1 to t=2, then is the statement of "O's being at (1,1,1)" true when O is at t=1 but false by the time O changes to t=2? — Luke

No. t=1 to t=2 being a change in time is not describing O's being; t=1 to t=2 is a change in time per se. We could have O's that don't exist at t=1 and exist at t=2; that's creation. If an O exists at t=1 and not at t=2, that's destruction. But t=1 to t=2 is still a change in time. It's over that change in time that a moving object changes position. You're injecting O's being being dragged along through time into your reading of the phrase, but that's not what the phrase means.

No, the present changes. — Luke

It's not just that Luke. You're not just talking about time changing. You're talking about O's being at a particular time changing... you're specifically arguing about O "changing time", presumably changing into the present.

I believe that our present evidence, theories and statements are the truth bearers of facts. — Luke

That's not enough. How can an object move if it can't be in some place at all in the past, and how can it be in some place in the past if all objects are only in the present? And that's just the starters... wait a blink, and that very question gets re-asked about the past.

No, it doesn't, but a difference is not necessarily a change. Existing at both times precludes changing from one time to another. — Luke

Motion is necessarily what this horse did in 1878:

...whether the horse "exists at both times" (whatever "both" means) or not.

However, this change in time is required by the definition of motion: "change in position over change in time". So where is the change in time that is required in order for you to say that O moves? (Also, where does O move from/to?) — Luke

The change in time is from t=1 to t=2. O moves from (1,1) to (2,1). The answer still won't change if you ask again.

I think you overlooked the word "was". — Luke

I think you overlooked the word "is". If you're speaking at t=3, both t=1 and t=2 are in the past. You're making the claim that the past changes; in particular, you're saying that O moves through time. So when you're speaking at t=3, according to you, O is neither at t=1 nor is it at t=2 (just as that horse is nowhere on that track in 2022). The word "was" doesn't help; "was" is just the word normal people use to talk about something in the past. You are claiming the past changes; and the manner of change is such that there's nothing there any more. Everything moved to the present. So what then is the truth bearer of facts about the past, if there isn't anything in the past? What is the thing that "was" at (1,1) at t=1, at the time you're speaking being t=3, if nothing is at t=1?

The object being at t=1 and then at t=2 is also a change. — Luke

In what sense? The object is at (1,1) at t=1; therefore the object is at t=1. The object is at (2,1) at t=2; therefore the object is at t=2. So O is both at t=1 and at t=2. Where's the change?

You seem to be saying that the object does not change time. But isn't that a requirement of motion, per the definition? — Luke

Nope. The object's position changes over time; that's exactly what the definition requires.

I'm not the one saying that O's being at (1,1,1) doesn't change. It does change. — Luke

And yet it apparently doesn't:

If O's being at (1,1,1) were to change, then by what means do you think you get to say O was at (1,1)? — InPitzotl

Yes, it was at (1,1) at t=1. That's what is denoted by O being at (1,1,1). — Luke

I guess by change, you mean that "O's being at (1,1,1)" changes from true to false and back again based on when Luke thinks he needs to say O's not at (1,1,1) and when Luke thinks he needs to say O is at (1,1,1). Perhaps during the phrase "O moves from (1,1) to (2,1)", O's being at (1,1,1) starts off being false, then somewhere near the "from (1,1)" part it reverts to being true again, and as soon as you reach the "to (2,1)", it becomes false again. Something like that?

You are saying that the object both changes and does not change position. — Luke

Nope; I'm saying the object changes position over time. It's at one position at one time, and a different position at a different time. That's not a problem. Being at one position at one time doesn't preclude being at a different position at a different time. You're the one that says the object both changes and doesn't change position. It's you who says that O isn't at (1,1) at t=1 any more, and yet, O is at (1,1) at t=1.

You're trying to have your cake and eat it too. You need for O to be at (1,1) at t=1 to say it's in a different place at t=2, when it's at (2,1). You eat that cake when you claim that O's being at (1,1,1) changes. But then you try to have it when you try to establish what it changed from and when.

You say that the object is always at (1,1,1) but you also allow for it to change from (1,1) to (2,1). — Luke

The change from (1,1) to (2,1) is a change over time. O's at (1,1) at t=1; it's at (2,1) at t=2. Those different positions are at different times.

You introduced changeless facts into the discussion. — Luke

And you appeal to them; you just compartmentalize it.

You say that there is motion from (1,1) at t=1 to (2,1) at t=2; and
You say that there is not motion from (1,1,1) to (2,1,2). — Luke

You're just parsing the English wrong. Here, it's "(from (1,1)) (at t=1)", not "(from ((1,1) at t=1))". The "at t=1" describes when it was "from (1,1)", not where it's moving from. Similarly for the other phrase: "(to (2,1)) (at t=2)", not "(to ((2,1) at t=2))".

Of course it is motion from (1,1,1) to (2,1,2). Why is it not? — Luke

Because it's still at (1,1,1). That didn't change.

It denotes a change in position over a change in time, which is the definition of motion that you provided earlier. — Luke

Sure. It's motion from (1,1) to (2,1). That is a change.

So are you saying that the object does move from (1,1,1) to (2,1,2)? — Luke

No, I'm saying it moved from (1,1) to (2,1).

But you have just said "I'm claiming it's not motion from (1,1,1) to (2,1,2)". — Luke

Right. It's motion from (1,1) to (2,1); not motion from (1,1,1) to (2,1,2). The former is a change; when it's at (2,1), it's not at (1,1) any more. That's a change over time; it's at (2,1) at time t=2; it's at (1,1) at time t=1. The latter is not a change; when O is at (2,1,2), it's still at (1,1,1). That's what that underlined phrase represents, right?:

Yes, it was at (1,1) at t=1. That's what is denoted by O being at (1,1,1). — Luke

Now again:

If O's being at (1,1,1) were to change, then by what means do you think you get to say O was at (1,1)? — InPitzotl

Because it was at (1,1) before it changed. Right? — Luke

When would it have even been there... at t=1? — InPitzotl

Yes, it was at (1,1) at t=1. That's what is denoted by O being at (1,1,1). — Luke

What is the contradiction on my end? — Luke

There. Underlined. You're saying that if O's being at (1,1,1) were to change, then you can still say O was at (1,1) at t=1, because O's at (1,1,1). At once, O's being at (1,1,1) changes, and it doesn't change?

To repeat, if changeless facts (about the positions and times of an object) implies changeless positions and changeless times (for that object), then motion is impossible. — Luke

What are you talking about? O's always being at (1,1,1) and always at (2,1,2) does not imply O is at (1,1) at time t=2, nor at (2,1) at time t=1. Nor does it imply that (2,1) is the same at (1,1). Nor does it imply that O is not at (1,1) at time t=1; nor that O is not at (2,1) at time t=2; nay, it actually asserts both. Why would you think it implies any of those things? That implication that motion is impossible if facts about time don't change came only from Luke's own confusion.

Surely the first statement of yours quoted above (in bold) can be read as saying that nothing moves, or that there is no such thing as a thing that moves from one position at time t1 to another position at time t2? Do you also assert that there is something that moves from one position at t1 to another position at t2? Maintaining both statements is a contradiction. — Luke

This was explained already. You're confusing a change in place over time with a change in place-and-time over time, the latter of which makes motion incoherent. I'm not claiming this isn't motion; I'm claiming it's not motion from (1,1,1) to (2,1,2). The change here is from O's being at (1,1) to O's being at (2,1); not from O's being at (1,1,1) to O's being at (2,1,2). Think about it; (1,1,1) and (2,1,2) are different points-in-time, sure, but so are (1,1,1) and (1,1,2), and the latter is just called staying still. But it gets worse than this...

If O's being at (1,1,1) were to change, then by what means do you think you get to say O was at (1,1)? When would it have even been there... at t=1? Nope; that's no good... that's the very thing you'd be claiming changed... that O was at (1,1) at t=1. So if you can't say that O is at (1,1) at t=1, given you're going to claim that its being there changes, then how can you claim it was ever not at (2,1)?

That is the contradiction, and it's on your end. If you're going to claim that facts about where an object is in place-and-time change, then you cannot get motion off the ground in the first place.

Or to rephrase it, see the "right" and "wrong" column again:

Do you agree that D1 and E1 do not animate? — InPitzotl
Yes, I agree. — Luke

Okay, then you're wasting my time.

What "road narrows" usually indicates is that the road gets narrower as you travel down the road. — Luke

Nope. That's B2, C2, and D2. The sign is just telling you the road is shaped like D1.

I'll try to compress your wrongness here... Luke, you are very confused; possibly hopelessly so.

Exhibit A:

This does nothing but replace x-coordinates with a-pixels. — Luke

What the heck is an a-pixel? And what do you mean "replace x-coordinates"? a and b here are numbers; (a,b) expresses an x,y coordinate with x=a and y=b. 12+1=13; so (13,7) is one pixel right of (12,7), and (7,13) is one pixel down from (7,12). FYI, this is grammar school level competency.

Exhibit B:

You've said that nothing moves or changes position in various ways recently: — Luke

None of those things say "nothing moves"; none of them say "nothing changes". Incidentally, isn't this you?:
Exhibit B2:

Nothing about it has changed — Luke

...so I would like to know, Luke, if you're going to prefer to be consistent and claim that you are saying nothing changes, or honest and admit that you are just building straw men.

Exhibit C:

You have used mathematics to demonstrate that there is an increase, but you then explain this increase as mathematical. — Luke

...exactly what you would expect, if the increase is mathematical. That 5 is an increase from 3 ipso facto makes it an increase in value because it is that value being described by increase.

Exhibit D:

If the colours are approaching the colour on the right, as you say, then I don't see how each x-coordinate isn't also approaching the colour on the right. — Luke

This I believe is the first time in my life that I have seen a mathematical form of guilt by association fallacy. The fact that you don't see why this is wrong, I'm afraid, disqualifies you from having this conversation; it's basically a tacit admission that you don't understand what approach means. But to let you in on it, no. It doesn't work like that. We would never say given f(x)=x/2, that x approaches 5 as it approaches 10 because it is associated with a f(x) value; and that's a case where x and f(x) are both numbers in the first place. In Banno's image, x is a number and "f(x)" is a color.

It might be clearer if you could explain what the increase represents in terms of the hill. What does the increase in the x-coordinate represent there? — Luke

Coordinates are grammar school material, Luke. You shouldn't be confused in the first place.

I am of the opinion that, absent of time, nothing changes in space. — Luke

I think the main problem here is your own confusion.

Therefore, I think you need to account for the assumed change in space (absent of time) and/or what such change represents or corresponds to. — Luke

...I smell an epistemic double standard. The value of your opinion is proportional to the justification. You're not only lacking that; you're apparently so allergic to opposition, you invent straw men even on points you agree with (exhibit B).

So let's talk about that word change. That is an English word; used by English speakers. Applied to change-over-place, we can examine how people in the wild use that word. Here are some samples:

Progressive lenses are different in that they offer a gradual change in power from the top of the lens to the bottom, offering a smoother progression from one correction to the next. — Eye care specialists of Colorado

From here.

Gradients are used in places where you want a more natural change in color rather than using one solid color fill throughout the shape. — Amadine tutorial

From here.

Here are two examples of roof pitch expressed as horizontal run and riser vertical change in height (rise) for a roof with a 38 degree slope: — Inspectapedia, Roof Slope Calculation

From here.

The road changes width, offers poor sightlines, and sometimes offers no shoulder at all for pedestrians and bike riders. — Rockingham Planning Commission

From here.

The last reference (RPC) is similar to my early example of a "road narrows" sign, with the explicit use of the word "change" by Markatos-Soriano and Keeney. Here's an image:

Here, D1/D2 depict what a "road narrows" sign is trying to warn people about. The sign is up where a road does something like D1. That part of this image doesn't animate; i.e., there is no change in time here of the road. Roads simply don't do what's shown in B1/B2/C1/C2. And a road like A1/A2 would be described as not changing width.

Similarly:

...Banno's image is depicted here as E1. That is a gradient; it is what the Amadine tutorial calls a natural change in color as opposed to a solid fill. Just as D1 does not animate, E1 does not animate; i.e., there is no change in time of this coloring, in contrast with F1/F2/G1/G2, where there is such a thing. Still images, which is what Banno's image is, cannot do what F1/F2/G1/G2 does.

So here it is boiled down for you Luke. Do you agree that D1 and E1 do not animate? Do you have an alternate view of what Markatos-Soriano and Keeney are complaining about before the RPC, or what the Amadine tutorial is describing? Ostensively speaking, D1 and E1, especially opposed to B1/C1 and F1/G1 and friends, are changes that are not changes over time. By contrast, ostensively speaking, B1/C1 and F1/G1 show changes over time.

FYI, I'm not advancing any opinion on your stated opinion anyway (outside my sensitivity to epistemic double standards)... my point is only about the existence of changes other than change over time, as all of the quotes-in-the-wild above describe.

This doesn't tell me what the increase in the x-coordinate represents. I imagine it represents something in space? — Luke

The coordinates are labeled x and y thusly: (x,y). For any a and b, (a+1,b) is one pixel right of (a,b). (a,b+1) is one pixel down from (a,b). (0,0) is the coordinate of the leftmost topmost pixel. — InPitzotl

No. I'm asking what the increase in the x-coordinate - that you mentioned earlier - represents. — Luke

What do you mean by "no"? You asked me what an increase in x coordinates means in terms of space. I gave you a full specification of the coordinate system in an image, including the spatial relation you asked for. If you're looking for something else, I'm afraid you have to rephrase your question.

Why must the ordered sequence of the colours in the picture be from left to right? More to the point, why must the sequence approach "n" at all? Who or what is calculating the ordered sequence to "n" to enable the "approach"? In other words, what initiates the ordered sequence being followed? — Luke

I don't see any real questions here. This is just a giant chain of leading questions based on dubious premises.

"Because that's the phrase under question:
'The claim is equivalent to saying the color at an x coordinate approaches the color at the right as the x coordinate increases.'" — InPitzotl
That's circular. — Luke

No, it's reference. Surely you're not trying to make an argument against staying on topic in a thread? This is the example you're asking about, right?

You seem to be making an assumption that somebody claimed that only in this direction does a color approach another color. But you dreamed that claim up whole cloth, then leaned into it as if to prove someone wrong. It's downright Quixotic. The only special thing about increase in x coordinates here is that Banno posted an image and made a claim about a change of color from left to right.

But you still hold these relative views and don't consider them to be problematic or incompatible with your opinion that nothing moves or changes position, right? — Luke

Nope. I never said nothing changes or moves position; you said I said that.

Like I said, "without time". — Luke

That does not follow.

But on the time-relative view that you endorse, which is analogous to the space-relative view, there is an O-ghost. The O-ghost on the space-relative view is the increasing x-coordinate. — Luke

That's not an O-ghost (in my endorsed "view"); that's just O moving. Refer to this:

Under "reference", I show O moving from (1,1) to (2,1). O here is the yellow dot with the gray border.

Under "right", I show the same thing using a spatial coordinate for t. In this depiction O looks like a thick gray line, because it is smeared through all intermediate points, because if O is ever at some point (x_k,y_k,t_k), it is always at that point.

Under "wrong" there are two O's, and one of them doesn't belong. There's the O that actually traces a path in time; that is, the genuine O, the real deal. That is the thick gray line. And then there is that second O that moves through the genuine O from (1,1,1) to (2,1,2). That second O is the ghost that doesn't belong. That is the reified fictitious monster you keep trying to find in Banno's image that isn't there.

Incidentally, none of these depictions have to do with time-relative versus time-fixed references. I can describe points in both the left and the right images using both time-relative and time-fixed references.

What about the increasing x-coordinate(s) and their associated colour(s) "approaching" the colour on the right? — Luke

I was chocking this up to a mistake earlier and ignoring it, but you repeated it here. The increasing x-coordinates are not approaching the color on the right; they are just increasing, as it says on the tin. The colors are approaching the color on the right; but that phrase is an underspecification. Approaching is something an ordered sequence does, and we have to specify how the colors are ordered so we can meaningfully say it's approaching the color. That is what the phrase "as the x-coordinate increases" does... it imposes the order.

This was already explained to you.

This doesn't tell me what the increase in the x-coordinate represents. I imagine it represents something in space? — Luke

Are you trying to ask how the coordinates are laid out in graphics? The coordinates are labeled x and y thusly: (x,y). For any a and b, (a+1,b) is one pixel right of (a,b). (a,b+1) is one pixel down from (a,b). (0,0) is the coordinate of the leftmost topmost pixel.

I don't see why you've needed to introduce an ordered sequence of values, — Luke

Because that's what you asked me to do:

I’m asking you to explain this “approach” to the x-coordinate absent of time, so your analogy that includes time doesn’t help. — Luke

...Banno's image consists of an array of pixels. The x coordinates form a finite ordered sequence. The colors associated with the x coordinates form a corresponding finite ordered sequence. Approaching a value is a description of what ordered sequences do.

or why the sequence's order had to have been specified by "as the x coordinate increases". — Luke

Because that's the phrase under question:

The claim is equivalent to saying the color at an x coordinate approaches the color at the right as the x coordinate increases. — InPitzotl

So you maintain that there is no time when O is not at A — Luke

Correct. "O is at A" no matter what time you say it. "O is at A" is a time-fixed claim. "O is at A" is true at t=1, and "O is at A" is true at t=2.

However, you also hold the view that things do "change in time"? — Luke

Correct. "O is at P1" is a time relative claim. "O is at P1" is true at t=1. But "O is at P1" is false at t=2. "O is at P2" is false at t=1. "O is at P2" is true at t=2. Time relative claims have truth values relative to the time under consideration. P1 to P2 is a change in position of O over the change in time of O from t=1 to t=2.

I find these to be opposing views. — Luke

"View" is not the right word to apply here; these are manners of speaking.

According to this latter view, "as you change the x coordinate, you get a change in color". — Luke

Almost. This phrasing is x-coordinate relative, not time relative. "as you change the x coordinate" is telling you what it's relative to.

This is the view of change-over-space that you and Banno believe is possible without time? — Luke

It's not time relative; it does not matter when you say it. And it's not time fixed; it's not talking about a particular point in time. It is x-coordinate relative.

But in your view nothing "changes time"; nothing changes its x-coordinate or its t-coordinate. — Luke

Correct. There isn't an O-ghost that moves from O-at-A to O-at-D. There's just the O-at-A and the O-at-D. And there's no coordinate ghost that moves from 850 to 900. There's just a coordinate of 850 and a coordinate of 900.

So how can you hold both the time relative view where "you change the x coordinate" and the time absolute view where you don't? — Luke

They aren't views; they are manners of speaking. Our language is filled with relative and fixed references; "yesterday" is a time relative reference to a day, "Jan 27, 2022" is a time fixed reference. The fact that sometimes I use relative references and sometimes fixed references is not a conflict.

In the previous post I considered first B1 at time T1 let's say, then B2 at T2, then B3 at T3, where T1<T2<T3. But the x coordinate ordering here is (B2=B3) < B1. This demonstrates that the ordering has nothing to do with the ordering of consideration. What does it have to do with then? Exactly what it says on the tin... an increase of x coordinate values. If I remove the "at"'s in all of the above, I still get a time ordering with fuzzy time relative references ("first B1, then B2, then B3"), and it still has nothing to do with the x coordinate ordering, which is still the same ordering (B2=B3) < B1. So where is this alleged conflict you see?

I’m asking you to explain this “approach” to the x-coordinate absent of time, so your analogy that includes time doesn’t help. — Luke

Not sure what you're looking for; if it's analogous, it's the same property. But okay.

Given an ordered sequence of values v₁, v₂, v₃, ..., v_n, and a distance metric D; if the sequence has the property that $i \lt j \Rightarrow D(v_j,v_n) \lt D(v_i,v_n)$, then we say that the sequence approaches v_n. (FTR, this is a simplification good enough for our purposes here).

Surely the statement refers to a change in the degree of difference of the color at a given x coordinate? — Luke
No, it refers to a change in degree of difference of the color over different x coordinates. — InPitzotl

"or how an x-coordinate can increase." — Luke
This is a Type B question. Single points do not change, — InPitzotl

You said earlier:
"...The claim is equivalent to saying the color at an x coordinate approaches the color at the right as the x coordinate increases. ..." — InPitzotl — Luke

I’m looking for you to explain this “increase” in the x-coordinate. You said it, not me. I asked you what this change in the x-coordinate represents and how it increases. — Luke

Consider three points: B1=(900,10), B2=(850,1), B3=(850,17); their colors are C1=(253,204,155), C2=(253,216,218) and C3=(253,216,218) respectively.

Given this particular set of points and associated colors, the statement above is describing the ordered sequence (253,216,218), (253,204,155). Each element in this sequence is "the color at an x coordinate". The sequence's order is specified by "as the x coordinate increases"; the order of said x coordinates is 850, 900. The statement is claiming that this sequence approaches the color on the right.

"But it is changing in time" — InPitzotl
You said in your previous post that I was responding to:
"When O moves from A=(1,1,1,1) to D=(2,1,1,2), nothing is changing time." — InPitzotl
Now you are saying that something is changing in time? Well, which is it? — Luke

Those look like different phrases to me. Refer to your quote here:

You are simultaneously asserting that nothing changes place while relying on a change of place (change of x-coordinate) in your calculation. — Luke

"Change time" without the "in" is used as an exact analog to "change place" in this quote. B2 doesn't change places to B1; B2 and B1 are merely different places on the same image. The "change" presumably involves a time at which something is at B1, followed by a time when it is at neither B1 nor B2 but traveling, followed by another time at which it is at B2 and not B1. O doesn't do that either. There's no such thing as a time when O is not at A.

"Change in time" with "in" contrasts with this; to me, this indicates a time relative view. O changes in time; as you change time coordinates, you get a change in position. Analogously, the color changes in x coordinates; as you change the x coordinate, you get a change in color.

It seems to me that you have ignored some of the more difficult questions I put to you, — Luke

Fundamentally speaking, you're trying to illustrate a problem with the notion of a change-over-place as opposed to a change-over-time. Your questions can so far be classified into one of three types, which I'll just label here. Type A questions can be trivially addressed by a proper analog from place to time. Type B questions assert something that is ridiculous when applying the analog from place to time. Type C questions are non-analogous only in the sense that they apply particularly to change-over-time.

such as how a colour in Banno's image can "approach" the rightmost x-coordinate, — Luke

This is a Type A question. A time analog would be a video comprised of 1110 frames of 1x662 images. If we were to take the Euclidean distance of colors to the color at 1106 (0-based frame indexing) as they change-over-time in such a video and map the progression over-time, the graph would look like this:

...incidentally, this is the exact graph I showed you three days ago, which shows how the color's in the image approach the color at 1106 over-x-coordinate.

Unless you have an objection that the colors in the video approach the color at frame 1106, then all you're doing is begging the question.

or how an x-coordinate can increase. — Luke

This is a Type B question. Single points do not change, even in a change-over-time sense. You are trying to have your cake and eat it too. You're demanding that a single point change and then turning around and demanding there be multiple points in time.

"Motion by the way is change in position over change in time." — InPitzotl

Per this definition of motion, how can O move if "nothing is changing time"?
Analogously, how can O move if nothing is changing position? — Luke

Position here refers to the x,y,z coordinates. P1=(1,1,1) is an x,y,z coordinate. P2=(2,1,1) is an x,y,z coordinate. Statements like R1="O is at P1" are time-relative statements; we consider the truth value of such statements to change depending on the time of consideration. R1 is true at t=1; R1 is false at t=2.

A=(1,1,1,1) includes a time coordinate; this is equivalent to "P1 at t1". D=(2,1,1,2) likewise is equivalent to "P2 at t=2". The statement "O is at A" is thus equivalent to "O is at P1 at t=1". That is a time-fixed statement. The truth value of time-fixed statements do not change over time. If it is ever true that O is at P1 at t=1, it is always true. The past cannot change.

O does not move from A to D; O is always at A and always at D. O moves from P1 to P2 by virtue of having-been at P1 at some time, and then having-been at P2 at some different time. In the time-slice of t=1, O is at P1. In the time-slice of t=2, O is at P2. Those are different locations at different points in time, and that is what I said motion was... a change in position over a change in time.

Likewise, in Banno's image, in the coordinate slice x=850, the color is (253,216,218). In the coordinate slice x=900, the color is (253,204,155). There is no more anything moving from x=850 to x=900 here than there is something moving from (1,1,1,1) to (2,1,1,2); the color is always (253,216,218) at x=850 just as O is always at (1,1,1) at t=1, and the color is always (253,204,155) at x=900 just as O is always at (2,1,1) at t=2.

Perhaps you allow for an object to change in position — Luke

Sure. It changes position over time in the exact same fashion that Banno's image changes color over x coordinate.

It seems logical to me that if nothing is changing in time then nothing is changing in place, either. — Luke

But it is changing in time, just as Banno's image is changing in space. You're just misconceiving what a change is. The "thing" you're asking me to show moves from the left to the right is the "thing" you're assuming moves from the O at (1,1,1) at t=1 to the O at (2,1,1) at t=2, and that is the reified erroneous object you presume to exist that there is no such thing as. There is no such thing as that moving thing; there is only the O at (1,1,1) at t=1 and the O at (2,1,1) at t=2, and it is that thing that meets the criteria requisite to say O moved from (1,1,1) to (2,1,1).

Then nothing moves or changes (according to your definition of motion). — Luke

No, there's no such thing as Lukeian motion. It suffices for InPizotlean motion that the O-at-P1-at-t1 and the O-at-P2-at-t2 are in different places at different times; it's just the Lukeian concept of motion that requires this reified O-ghost to move through the O-at-P1-at-t1 into the O-at-P2-at-t2 for there to have been a motion of O. My definition makes no reference to this reified O-ghost.

Because the picture you look at can't exist without time. — Cornwell1

We have some crossed wires here.

I've shown that a change in t coordinate does not correspond to a change in color. You respond to that by trying to demonstrate, in effect, that there are at least two t coordinates. It appears to me that you're a wee bit behind what you replied to.

Your discussion on block universes might be of some interest in the thread, but it has little to do with the thing I've been discussing.

The very observation that it stays constant in time needs time in the first place. — Cornwell1

But why is that relevant?

O is at x,y,z,t=(1,1,1,1) and at x,y,z,t=(2,1,1,2). A change in time coordinate here from t=1 to t=2 results in a change in the x,y,z coordinates here from (1,1,1) to (2,1,1). So that is a change in x,y,z coordinates (position) over a change in t coordinate.

Banno's image has colors like r,g,b,x=(253,216,182,850) and r,g,b,x=(253,204,155,900). A change in x coordinate here from x=850 to x=900 results in a change in r,g,b values from (253,216,182) to (253,204,155). So this is a change in r,g,b coordinates (color) over a change in x coordinates.

But Banno's image doesn't change over time. Right now (t=0), we have r,g,b,x,t=(253,216,182,850,0). 999 time units from now, it will be (253,216,182,850,999). Here we have a change in time coordinates from t=0 to t=999. But that results in the same r,g,b coordinate: (253,216,182) versus (253,216,182). So we have an equivalence of color over a change in time, not a change in color over a change in time.

How on Earth you wanna keep t constant? — Cornwell1

t is irrelevant; it doesn't matter if you "keep it constant" or not. Banno's image doesn't change over time.

Which means time is involved in the change in color. — Cornwell1

What gave you the idea that it means that? O changes location over changes in time. The color change in Banno's image is over a change in x coordinate.

There's a lot of repetition here so I'm going to cull my responses down to focus.

Surely the statement refers to a change in the degree of difference of the color at a given x coordinate? — Luke

No, it refers to a change in degree of difference of the color over different x coordinates.

This is also true about motion. When O moves from (1,1,1) to (2,1,1), that does not refer to a change in O's location at a given t coordinate. Nay, O cannot possibly be said to move from (1,1,1) to (2,1,1) unless O is at (1,1,1) at some t coordinate t1, and then finds itself at (2,1,1) at some different t coordinate t2, with the further requirement (due to the use of move from...to) that t2 is in the future direction of t1.

You are simultaneously asserting that nothing changes place while relying on a change of place (change of x-coordinate) in your calculation. — Luke

As opposed to what? You're just misconceiving change. When O moves from A=(1,1,1,1) to D=(2,1,1,2), nothing is changing time. O moves because O is at A and is at D, D and A are at different times, and D and A are at different places (and more reasons which I'll ignore here for now). O never stops being at (1,1,1) at t=1. There's no such thing as a thing that moves from (1,1,1) at t=1 to (2,1,1) at t=2:

In Banno's static image, the colour (at each x-coordinate) is a fixed distance from the colour (at the x-coordinate) on the right. — Luke

And? In model of motion, O (at each point in time) is also at a fixed location. We say O moves because O finds itself at different places at different times.

That's great, except that (until now) you have been talking about a change in distance, not merely distance. — Luke

I have not used that phrase in this thread.

Reading through your post, the only match I get to what you might be referring to is the fact that I said this:

there is a gradual change in degree of difference as you move from left to right that approaches the color on the right — InPitzotl

...and that I plotted the difference four posts later as a Euclidean distance. Is this what you're referring to? I'll go with that for now.

I think you're confused. This statement refers to the degree of difference of the color at a given x coordinate in Banno's image to "the color on the right": RGB(252,176,65) (the color at coordinate 1106). "Euclidean distance" here is simply a metric... it just means we're going to measure a color (r,g,b)'s difference to (252,176,65) like this:
$\sqrt{(r-252)^2+(g-176)^2+(b-65)^2}$

The value here is abstract; the units AFAIK don't even have a name (not feet; not pixels; something more like "1/256 of the available value space of an RGB coordinate"). This is just a number that gets smaller as a color approaches (252,176,65) and larger as a color diverges from it. As an example, in Banno's image, at x coordinate 881, the color is (253,208,165). The color distance at this point is 105..

Now here's the plot again:

...the x coordinate of this graph correspond to an x coordinate in Banno's image. The y coordinate in this graph corresponds to a difference between the color at that x coordinate in Banno's image and the color on the right, as measured using Euclidean distance in the RGB color space, as described above.

Once again, what is it that changes distance? — Luke

The colors are changing their distance to (252,176,65). The claim is equivalent to saying the color at an x coordinate approaches the color at the right as the x coordinate increases. That is equivalent to saying the color-distance of the color to the color at the right approaches 0. You can see exactly what I described in this graph; as x increases, the trace of color distance of that color to the color at the right approaches 0.

This would imply that it is the hill that changes its distance. — Luke

Why would it imply such a thing?

Or is it only part of the hill? — Luke

Is what only part of the hill?

Which one does 'O' represent? — Luke

O has a x-y-z coordinate of 1,1,1 at the time t=1. The same O has a x-y-z coordinate of 1,1,2 at the time t=2.

H has a height of 1 at the place x,y=2,1. The same H has a height of 2 at the place x,y=2,2.

Analogs side by side:

...so to answer your question, "O" is analogous to "H".

One says "place" and one says "time". I invite you to also consider the idea of change-over-place (without time). — Luke

Sure. Using x,y,z,t coordinates, A=(1,1,1,1), B=(2,1,1,1), C=(1,1,1,2), D=(2,1,1,2). A to B is a change in place. A to C is a change in time. A to D is a change in place and time.

In such a scenario, there is no change at any spatial location; nothing changes or moves at (or from) any spatial coordinate. — Luke

You're mixing change and motion here (second time you did that). But let's talk motion. Let's say an object O moves from A to D. The problem is, facts at points in time don't change. So if O moves from A to D, O is always at A and always at D. In fact, we can talk about O-at-A and O-at-D separately; change (and motion) requires us to do so. O-at-A is what is at x,y,z coordinate (1,1,1). O-at-D is what is at (2,1,1). We don't really consider O to have moved in this case unless O-at-A and O-at-D are "the same O".

So O-at-A is "the same O" as O-at-D, "just in different points in time". There is a change in O's x-coordinate from O-at-A to O-at-D for the same O.

How does the hill "change" its height? — Luke

Definitionally. You have a hill only if there is a change in height of a terrain such that some place in the terrain is higher than surrounding areas. A terrain H like this could be a hill: A1=(1,1,1), A2=(1,2,1), A3=(1,3,1), A4=(2,1,1), A5=(2,2,2), A6=(2,3,1), A7=(3,1,1), A8=(3,2,1), A9=(3,3,1). The height changes at A5 versus the surrounding specified areas from 1 to 2. A5 is "the same hill" as A1, "just in a different point in space" (cf above). There is a change in H's z coordinate from H-at-A1 to H-at-A5 for the same H.

I asked this question in response to your statement that "there is a gradual change in degree of difference as you move from left to right". — Luke

Sure. But:

You have since backpedalled, at first claiming this motion is only "metaphorical", and now pretending as though you never said anything at all about motion. — Luke

...this is just narrative. The problem is that there's no way to take this narrative seriously, as there's no sane reading of "there is a gradual change in degree of difference as you move from left to right" in a non-metaphorical sense.

Why don't you tell me what is moving, given that it appears to be part of your calculation. — Luke

Sure. Nothing is moving. The distance from my head to the wall is about four feet. The direction from my head to the wall is west. Neither of these statements require a thing to move from my head to the wall. If they "appear" to be about motion to you, that is simply because you're choosing to imagine it that way.

But there is a hill at A4, and the same hill at A5. The height change from A4 to A5 is one unit. That is a height change of the hill (nothing moved), from one place on the hill (A4) to another place on the hill (A5).

If something changes distance, then doesn't it move? — Luke

Well first let's fix your question. "Distance" here refers to horizontal distance from a peek. The hill is changing height over distance analogous to how O changes position over time. So you should analogously be asking if something changes height over distance, does it move? And the answer is no, it doesn't. Motion is a time relative change; a change in position over a change in time.

I'll ask again: what changes distanceheight in these examples? — Luke

Answered above, repeated here. The hill is changing height. The-same-hill is at a different height at A4 as it is at A5; i.e., 0 units from peek it is at a height of 2, 1 unit a height of 1.

Change in color over change in x coordinate is not motion (i.e., it is not change in position over change in time). — InPitzotl

Yes, a change in position requires time. That's my point. — Luke

Now you're outright conflating change with motion. If a change in color over a change in x coordinate is not motion, that does not mean it is not a change; in fact, it kind of presumes it is a change.

I'm objecting to Banno's claim that there can be change-over-place irrespective of time. — Luke

Yes. Contrast change-over-place now with change-over-time. Forget the concept for a moment and look at those those two phrases. In the phrases, what's different?

Let's talk about a change over time. I jog on the road... in 10 seconds I cover 150 feet. So I am moving 150 feet (unit-of-distance) over ten seconds (unit-of-time). My average speed then is 15 feet per second. I change my location by 150 feet in 10 seconds.

Contrast this with a hill. In 150 feet (unit-of-distance), the hill rises 50 feet (unit-of-distance). So the hill has a gradient of 50 feet over 150 feet. The units cancel and we're left with a gradient of 1/3. The hill changes its height by 50 feet over a run of 150 feet.

My question has everything to do with the claim I'm objecting to and is completely valid. — Luke

Wrong... and I'll repeat this:

The problem here isn't in what I'm saying. The problem here is only that you're insisting what I mean by change isn't what you think change means. — InPitzotl

...so here is your question again:

How can you “move from left to right” irrespective of time? — Luke

You are asking how something ("you") moves irrespective of time. That question presumes something is moving in the first place. But nothing moves when a hill changes its height by 50 feet over a run of 150 feet. You're the one insisting it's a valid question... you're the one insisting something must move for a hill to change its height by 50 feet over a run of 150 feet, so you tell me what it is that is moving.

The claim you're objecting to:

I'm objecting to Banno's claim that there can be change-over-place irrespective of time. — Luke

...doesn't say anything at all about anything moving. Luke is the only one insisting something must be moving. Motion by the way is change in position over change in time. Change in height over change in position (the hill) is not motion. Change in color over change in position (the image) is not motion.

Then you're either insane or you're lost. — InPitzotl
Nice. — Luke

Hint: You're just lost.

Nothing needs to move for something to change its spatial coordinates (or for what is at a spatial coordinate to change)? — Luke

The graph is just a representation. It's spatial because graphs are spatial things. The x coordinate on the graph corresponds to an x coordinate in Banno's image, but the y coordinate on the graph corresponds to a difference in color. We could talk about the RGB space as "spatial", but it's obviously just an abstraction. On this graph, only one coordinate is spatial (in the sense of physical space; and even this requires us to "play the game" of talking about the image the way we're supposed to).

And exactly what is changing coordinates here? — Luke

More "moving" questions? Banno's claim is not about something moving (change-in-place over change-in-time; speed; feet per second). Banno's claim is about something changing over place (change in color over change in x coordinate; color gradient; color-distance per pixel). Change in color over change in x coordinate is not motion (i.e., it is not change in position over change in time).

It's a different example, so I don't see how my question is invalid. — Luke

Because it has nothing to do with the claim you're objecting to.

Why must something move? — InPitzotl
Because you said there was metaphorical motion. — Luke

Metaphorical motion is not motion; literal motion is motion. I repeat the question... why must things move?

Unless you actually move "place to place" and change "where you are on the road", then it makes no sense to say that "the height of the hill changes (change) as a function of where you are on the road (place to place)". — Luke

Nonsense (see below).

It has different heights at different parts. — Luke

Yes. And if it has different heights at different parts, then it must have different heights in different places. Therefore a change in place can correspond to a change in height. So what's the problem?

I still don't see support for your stronger claim that the height of the hill not only has different parts with different heights, but that its height changes (at any give time) — Luke

Then you're either insane or you're lost. Let's zoom in.

A and B are different points, right? Well, this curve "has different heights at different parts". But more specifically, A to B represents a change in place of dx1 (along the x coordinate), and a change in color of dy1. I remind you the claim is that there can be a change from place to place. Well, there's a change in place with a change in color. Likewise, B to C represents a change in place of dx2, and a change in color of dy2. So there's another change (dy2) with respect to a change in place (dx2).

Nothing has to actually move from A to B for that change to be a change of dx1 in x coordinates or a change of dy1 in color. And nothing has to move from B to C for that change to be a change of dx2 in x coordinates or a change of dy2 in color.

Incidentally, in this post I mentioned the color at x=615 and another color at x=984. Here, we can clearly see the change in x is 984-615=369; and here the change in color using this metric is 152.44. This was calculated without "going from x=615 to 984" even in any metaphorical sense. So, what I'm talking about is definitely not restricted by what you claim it has to be restricted by (I have described the precise amount of change of color in terms of change in place here without relying on any well defined movement, even metaphorical).

The problem here isn't in what I'm saying. The problem here is only that you're insisting what I mean by change isn't what you think change means.

It’s your responsibility to clarify what you meant by “as you move from left to right”, not mine. — Luke

And likewise it's your responsibility to ask a sensible question, not mine. The question you asked is invalid:

How can you “move from left to right” irrespective of time? — Luke

I live on a hill. There is a neighbor down the road; he is lower than me. There's a neighbor further down that is lower still. The statement "If I walk down from here to the first and then the second neighbor, I will get lower and lower on the hill" describes a shape... it describes how the altitude of locations changes as you progress in the direction down the road. The hill might look something like this:

...but that statement doesn't mean that the second neighbor is only lower in the future, or that the second neighbor is only lower if you walk to him. The hill is there at T=0. Your question has nothing to do with the substance of the claim (that there is a change in height on the hill that varies according to place); it only has to do with some irrelevant dead end fork you took by taking a metaphor too seriously.

I could suggest a better question... "how can you explain the change without a metaphorical walk"? And incidentally I've answered that question (even here; there's a change in height as a function of where you are on the road (place to place). But that's not necessarily the question you want to ask. The question you asked, though, is simply invalid. The metaphorical walk is simply a description of what changes as a function of place, as my description of the shape of the hill.

You explained it as a “metaphorical motion”, which is not any actual motion or change, is it? — Luke

You're begging the question. There's hypothetical motion down the hill here, but there's a real gradient. The change in values per change in location (which is what a gradient is) is real.

You still haven’t told me what moves — Luke

Why must something move? The claim is that change can occur place to place as well as time to time. The height of the hill changes (change in value) as a function of the distance along the road (change in place) without involving any movement.

It sounds like a conditional — Luke

You're focused too much on the conditional; the graph above is literally a graph of the distance to the color RGB(252,176,65) as a function of the x coordinate in Banno's image up to x=1106 (that bump at x=800 is the anomaly I discussed several posts ago). IF I move left to right, THEN I will go lower. But I don't have to move left to right for that function to be lower at higher values of x. The motion is entirely unnecessary; it can be discarded. It's a factual matter that the curve on the right has lower values than the curve on the left. Even if I start that walk, the points on the right would have the values they have at T=0.

What’s the right question? — Luke

Depends on what you want to ask, but it certainly isn't the question of how I can do what I do not actually do. I'm certainly not literally walking left to right on the image.

If the motion is metaphorical then the change is also metaphorical (i.e. not actual). — Luke

Nonsense (at least in the manner intended). Insofar as "the image" is such a thing (according to the canon rules of the game we're supposed to play when we treat this fictional object having been posted yesterday as the same object someone else displays on their screen today), it is a matter of fact that at x coordinates 123, 246, 369, and 492, the RGB value is (255,255,255). And at 615, it is (255,252,251). And at 738, it is (254,239,227). And at 984, it is (252,188,111). And at 861, it is (253,213,176). And at 1106, it is (252,176,65). This demonstrates a change in color as the x coordinates increase in value. Incidentally, I reported 984's RGB value before 861 just to drive the point home; it's the x coordinate that this gradient varies on, not the order in which we look at it or the order in which I report the coordinates.

The metaphor simply seems to indicate change-of-place in the image along a particular direction. — Luke

That's not what is being described here:

there is a gradual change in degree of difference as you move from left to right that approaches the color on the right — InPitzotl

From the samples above, the transition from the RGB value at x-coordinate 492 to that at x-coordinate 615 changes towards the color RGB (252,176,65). From 615 to 738, it changes again towards the color RGB (252,176,65). The color at 615 is closer to RGB(252,176,65) than the color at 492 was, and the color at 738 is even closer still.

That seems to be different from what Banno is saying. — Pierre-Normand

Best I can tell that's illusory. I'm just calling the entire array the image, and referring to the colors of pixels at specific locations in the image. Banno's referring to parts of the array as the image (the parts on the left versus the right). We're saying the same thing, just using slightly different dictionaries.

What you qualify as "change" just is a functional dependency of the color the image has at some location as a function of this location. — Pierre-Normand

Yes.

But Banno further insists that it is "the image" that changes, which you just acknowledged it doesn't. — Pierre-Normand

But that's nuanced too:

The sense in which it's the same image as yesterday is non-trivial. — InPitzotl

Luke says the image is the same as the one he saw yesterday. But that itself requires us to play a kind of game equating now-image with yesterday-image. By saying "the image is the same", we're making claims like "location x-y on yesterday's image has the same color value as location x-y on today's image". Incidentally, it's still a fictional object, sometimes off my screen and sometimes on it, not necessarily being defined as what's on my screen, I can speak of "pixels" partially because it's a PNG image, etc.

How can you “move from left to right” irrespective of time? — Luke

That's the wrong question. Certainly you don't think when I "move from left to right", I'm actually walking on my monitor along that path, right? I don't "move from left to right" in the first place. This is metaphorical motion.

The metaphor specifically conveys degree-of-change-in-place in the image along a particular direction; namely, to the right. We can use other metaphors. The image is 1110 pixels wide. The x-coordinate (in classic computer graphics labeling) ranges from 0 to 1109; or 0 to 1106 if we ignore the 3-pixel gray area. Using this labeling, we can say that the color changes towards yellow with respect to a change in the x coordinate.

The metaphorical motion here is to the right, but nobody is actually moving right here (you could attend to points and move your attention to the right, but you aren't changing the image by doing so; you're just noting that change).

Not to mention you are saying that it is “you” that moves or changes, not the image. — Luke

So? What's being claimed is that change can be applied place to place. Your notion of "change in image" here is a red herring. There's a change from place to place on this image that does not change. In fact, the fact that there is a change being described despite the image not changing kind of counters your very point (if change only applied to time, and the image doesn't change, how could there be a change in it?)

There are road signs BTW that say strange things like "Road narrows". Nobody is removing road ahead of this sign, and they aren't talking about the roads shrinking due to the cold weather. The narrowing is a change with respect to place.

It's the same image I saw yesterday. — Luke

Non-sequitur. The pixels on the left of "the image" are not the same pixels as the pixels on the right of "the image". But there's not just a difference here... there is a gradual change in degree of difference as you move from left to right that approaches the color on the right (and change is the right word to use here)... except for that one odd place where the transition leaves a much whiter color than should be there (the fact that I can talk about that place at all kind of tends to prove the point).

Incidentally, I have "the image" here in quotes because this entire forum is a fictional place and "the image" is a fictional object with a fictional location in this fictional place. The sense in which it's the same image as yesterday is non-trivial.

Why not A? — Tobias

Some mugs(Ayes) are copper(Bees).
All pennies(Seas) are copper(Bees).

[Pennies] and [Copper] are equivalent at least in their aspect of all [Pennies] being [copper]. If all [pennies] are [Copper] and if some [mugs] are [copper] as well than some [mugs] must also be [pennies] since they are equivalent to [copper]. — Tobias

Nope. Can't drink mead from a penny.

Yeah, this is the point I thought you were making. — Isaac

You don't even understand the point (I can say that with the hindsight of reading your entire post... oh boy, is it broken). The point was an extension of this post:

Again, we're talking about an actual word here that people use in real language games. — Isaac
Regarding that, Dr. Richard Kimble did not murder his wife — InPitzotl

...your claim here is about how people use "an actual word" in real language games (referring to 3, the T condition of JTB). Here I'm offering rules of fiction as examples of how people use actual words in language games. By the way, this is the third indicator of such I've given in these interchanges.

If I agreed with it, I wouldn't bf making the point I'm making would I? — Isaac

But you said this: "What you've said doesn't seem related to what I'm arguing in the slightest"

they are more critically points being made, with said points challenging some previously made point — InPitzotl
...
But there's no challenge. — Isaac

Nope, not going to even start debating the meaning of the word "challenge" here. Just pretend I invented a shade of meaning of "challenge" relevant to your charge: "What you've said doesn't seem related to what I'm arguing in the slightest". Pretend it means related to what you're arguing in the slightest in just the right way such that if you agreed to it, you wouldn't be making the point you're making.

You're just repeating a basic correspodence theory of truth. — Isaac

Nope (see below).

I don't hold to such a theory. — Isaac

That's irrelevant to your claim: "we're talking about an actual word here that people use in real language games".

or discuss the reasons why you hold to a correspondence theory — Isaac

Why I hold to this (but see below) theory is irrelevant here, because it's not the topic here. The topic here is "we're talking about an actual word here that people use in real language games".

but as yet, all you've done is simply declare it to be the case — Isaac

No, I have offered here as an indicator of how people use the actual word in real language games how they use the word in fictive language games. Also, this is the third indicator I have offered for how people use the word.

as if I might have somehow missed the concept. — Isaac

Well, you are missing any support for something you keep claiming outside of 100% horse grade pretense, and any semblance whatsoever for any sort of falsibiability condition.

Again, this simply assumes a theory of truth — Isaac

As advertised, all it's doing is addressing a particular non-trivial reading of this:

I'm arguing that both 'know' and 'true' have different meanings in different contexts and as such JTB has no special claim to be a definition of 'knowledge'. — Isaac

...and that's still ambiguous out the wazoo (and I directly invited you to rephrase it). The reading it addresses is one where your "This table is solid" being true in one sense and false in another "as such" suggests anything at all about the JTB theory of knowledge. Assuming JTB for this purpose is not problematic.

Incidentally:

or discuss the reasons why you hold to a correspondence theory — Isaac

here a coherentist theory it seems — Isaac

In terms of what I've described, there's no difference between these two views. So why do you think it's a correspondence theory in the first quote and then suddenly a coherentist theory in another?

If math is discovered (knowledge), the B (belief) in the JTB definition of knowledge is an error. — Agent Smith

If math is invented (knowledge), the T (true) in the JTB definition of knowledge loses significance. — Agent Smith

I don't see how either of those things follow.

If I discover a new route to work, I believe it to be a new route to work. Not even remotely a contradiction there, by any stretch I can imagine.

If I invent a new way to clean the snow off my roof, then it can certainly be true that that method can clean the snow off my roof. Again, not even remotely a contradiction there, by any stretch I can imagine.

Revision:

In the ordinary sense (of folk language games, of the type we would play when we say "the table is solid"), "R murdered W" can only be true if the state of affairs is such that R murdered killed W, regardless of what a community of peers agrees on.

This was the intended point; a murder versus a killing is partially socially determined and thus is not a matter of state of affairs (in the relevant sense), though a murder requires a killing.

Either find some common ground — Isaac

Good idea. I'll start attempting to do that multiple posts ago. However, finding common grounds is strictly not in my control; it critically requires your cooperation.

See just repeating an assertion about what you believe to be the case doesn't constitute a counter — Isaac

You're losing focus. You replied to a post of mine that explicitly quoted this:

Well then I'm afraid I have no idea what point you're making. What you've said doesn't seem related to what I'm arguing in the slightest. — Isaac

Counters are not just arguments... they are more critically points being made, with said points challenging some previously made point; without these two aspects the argument isn't even relevant. It is precisely these more critical factors that were in question in the quote above.

So, assuming you are cooperative in finding common ground, it is premature to discuss the argument... we must first establish that this is making a point ("I have no idea what point you're making") and that it is challenging what you're arguing ("What you've said doesn't seem related to what I'm arguing in the slightest").

The first was a long exchange following on from the example of using tarot cards, — Isaac

That would be this?:

I believe that it rained last night because the cars and road are wet. ...
If in another scenario I believe what I do because it’s my interpretation of a Tarot card reading then my belief would be true but unjustified, and so not knowledge. — Michael

the second was about warning a companion about the weather. — Isaac

This is too vague; I have a possible match but you could be referring to other things, so I'm going to ask for specificity here.

Two different contexts. — Isaac

Sure.

Of course the criteria for sufficiency are going to be different in each. — Isaac

Okay. But I've heard nothing here challenging the notion of sufficient to warrant belief.

I'm arguing that both 'know' and 'true' have different meanings in different contexts and as such JTB has no special claim to be a definition of 'knowledge'. — Isaac

It's up to you, but you may want to clarify this; there are readings where this is trivially true, readings where it is trivially false, and readings where you just got something wrong, and possibly other readings. I can only do my best to interpret what I think you mean by what you actually write. I don't think the trivially true or trivially false readings are consistent with what you have been arguing here, so I'm just going to take a stab at it based on what you previously wrote.

In particular, you brought up an example of two contexts applied to the proposition P="This table is solid"; an ordinary context, and a scientific one. By the reading I'm guessing at, you're arguing that P can be judged in these two contexts; by one, P is true. By the other, P is false. Since the truth of P differs in these contexts, you argue, there can be no T for P in the JTB model, and therefore, the JTB model fails. Does that sound right?

If so, it does not follow. You have a P in the ordinary sense, PO; and you have a P in the scientific sense, PS. PO is true. PS is false. Those are different truth values. But if PO and PS have different truth values, they cannot possibly be applying the same truth criteria. Since they have different truth criteria, they cannot possibly be the same proposition. So all that really follows is that a particular sentence can express different propositions in different senses/contexts.

Further, that issues like Gettier problems are best resolved by other definitions of knowledge. — Isaac

I'm sure the nod to bringing this back in line with the thread is appreciated, but it's a bit of a stretch. The issues that Gettier problems bring up related to the JTB model of knowledge are far removed from what you're arguing here.

Well then I'm afraid I have no idea what point you're making. What you've said doesn't seem related to what I'm arguing in the slightest. — Isaac

Argument:

Again, we're talking about an actual word here that people use in real language games. So "this table is solid" - well, it's apparently not, if you test it with techniques of advanced scientific understanding, but that's not the meaning of the claim. The meaning is something entirely more mundane than the 'true' solidity of the table. The claim is about solidity in the ordinary sense. — Isaac

Counter: In the ordinary sense (of folk language games, of the type we would play when we say "the table is solid"), "R murdered W" can only be true if the state of affairs is such that R murdered W, regardless of what a community of peers agrees on.

regarding the question of how individuals should form beliefs, it is you, sir, who is kicking the can; because according to your theory of truth, it is categorically impossible. — InPitzotl

I'm not sure you understand what you're arguing. Here was your claim:

To say X's justification is 'sufficient' but X's belief is false is a contradiction. — Isaac

...and this is what you just said:

Two justifications for a belief "it's raining"...

1) My head's wet.
2) My epistemic peers have done some exhaustive testing and agree that water is falling from clouds.

Both are of the form "I believe that...", I don't have unfiltered, infallible access to either. (1) is good enough for most purposes, but with (2) the speaker might say "I know that it's raining - their justification is sufficient to use the term. — Isaac

The underlined already concedes the point as far as JTB is concerned; "good enough for most purposes" and "sufficient to warrant belief" mean the same thing. So what, then, are you arguing Isaac?

It's obvious that thinking is involved. Can you describe, in detail if possible, the actual ratiocination involved? — Agent Smith

I'm not sure I understand your question. When you claim that it's obvious that thinking is involved, to what are you referring? If you're referring to "...in the formation of truth", this is contradicted by the presumption of realism (which would hold that the states of affairs that we talk about have a nature that is independent of whether humans are thinking of them). P="It's raining" would just exemplify this; and the previous post just elaborated on the view. The weather, not humans thinking about the weather, makes P true.

I don't know what a community belief could be if not the aggregation of individual beliefs. — Isaac

As above, this just kicks the can, doesn't answer the question of what 'sufficient' means here. — Isaac

I think you have this backwards. According to Isaacian theory of truth, truth is determined by community beliefs. If truth is determined by community beliefs, and community beliefs are an aggregation of individual beliefs, then truth has as a prerequisite individual beliefs. So regarding the question of how individuals should form beliefs, it is you, sir, who is kicking the can; because according to your theory of truth, it is categorically impossible.

If I recall he was exonerated. The community carried out one of their conceivable tests (assuming you're talking about Sam Sheppard in reality - otherwise, your point is not at all clear) — Isaac

No, I'm not talking about Sam Sheppard in real life; fiction uses language as well. One of the key differences actually makes fictive works more relevant--fictive works can establish in-universe truths canonically. Our eponymous fugitive is such precisely because a community of epistemic peers formally declared him such... a fact that conflicts with his canonical innocence. IOW, I'm directly challenging your notion that you're correctly describing folk theories of truth. It is indeed the case that Dr. Richard Kimble was eventually exonerated, but that was not a fictive guarantee. The folk concept is that people can be in such situations, be formally fugitives, and yet be innocent, if the state of affairs is such that they did not in fact commit the murder... the peers don't define the truth, the state of affairs does (R murdered W is impossible if the state of affairs is such that R did not kill W, regardless of what a community of peers says).

S knows P IFF

1. P is true
2. P is justified
3. S believes P — Agent Smith

How do we know P is true? — Agent Smith

That's a (B) question, so it has a (B) answer.

I know you've tried to explain your position on the matter but what I'm having difficulty with is the implicit assumption in stating 1 separately that there's another (not justification, 2) method to decide whether a proposition is true/not. — Agent Smith

JTB makes no such assumption, even implicitly.

In the case of P="It's raining", it is rain clouds that do the raining, not us; that is, we do not establish P's truth, the weather does. The T condition of JTB, which can be phrased that S does not know P if ~P, is simply saying that S cannot know it's raining if the weather isn't doing that. In the JTB model, the T condition is met independently from what humans believe; this is allowed given the presumption of realism.

Deciding whether P is true or not is what humans do. The method by which humans do that in the JTB model is by applying justification.

So to summarize these two points, P being true is independent of what humans might believe. P's truth is established meteorologically, not that the weather cares about whether it's raining, but rather that it's only the weather's raining that makes P true or lack of raining that makes P false. Discerning whether P is true or not is a human affair; and that is done through J. The T condition of JTB is simply stating that we cannot claim S knows it's raining if the weather isn't doing what we mean by raining.

Well then the fact that I can lie and show you a fake ID makes your having taken my word and examined my ID insufficient. Otherwise what could 'sufficient' possibly mean? Sufficient for what? — Isaac

Sufficient to warrant Michael's belief. Michael, btw, is not a community.

It's obviously not sufficient for the job at hand (establishing the truth), so what is it you're claiming it's sufficient at? — Isaac

That is not the task at hand; it cannot be. Michael can't establish Isaacian truth, because Michael is not a community of epistemic peers. Michael is just an individual in a community. Furthermore, what is a community belief in the first place, if not the aggregation of individual beliefs?

Again, we're talking about an actual word here that people use in real language games. — Isaac

Regarding that, Dr. Richard Kimble did not murder his wife.

So are you arguing that deflationary, coherence, and pragmatic positions on truth are wrong, of that they just don't even exist? — Isaac

All I'm arguing is that your notion that T is just more J fails to describe what T is in regards to JTB. How you apply that to your understanding of deflationary, coherence, and pragmatic positions of truth is a separate matter.

I don't quite get what you're saying. — Agent Smith

(A) What is the criterion for truth, if not justification? — Agent Smith

(B) How do we find out a proposition is true? — Agent Smith

(A) and (B) are different questions. (A) is asking what the criteria for truth is. (B) is asking how we find out a proposition is true.

The answer to (A) is that proposition A1 is true if A1 describes the state of affairs. That is the case if and only if the computer program placed the carrier over the A1 square.

The answer to (B) is different because it is a different question. (B) is asking how a person is to know that the computer program placed the carrier over the A1 square. That is through justification. If I (a person) fire at A1, at A2, at A3, and at A4; and if the result is that I (a person) get confirmation that each of those is a hit; and the result is also that I (a person) do not get confirmation that any of those sinks a ship, then I (a person) have obtained sufficient information for me (a person) to conclude that the computer placed the carrier over square A1 (aka, I have obtained justification for believing proposition A1). The reason this information is sufficient for me (a person) to reach the conclusion that proposition A1 is true is precisely because only the state of affairs being as described by proposition A1 can explain these observations (given my priors).

Hence, the 'truth' part of JTB is not distinct from the justification part. It's just a particular type of justification. — Isaac

But "truth" does not (generally) describe justification in the first place. It describes a state of affairs. I can describe what must the case (i.e., what configuration a state of affairs must have) in order for a proposition to be true without knowing if it is indeed the case (i.e., if the state of affairs is in fact in that configuration).

ETA:

true 1 c : being that which is the case rather than what is manifest or assumed. — Merriam Webster

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/true

There is no point arguing fellow forum members. The JTB definition is such that justification doesn't imply truth. — Agent Smith

Correct.

What is the criterion for truth, if not justification? — Agent Smith

The criteria for truth (for claims such as the ones being discussed) is that some state of affairs is as described by the proposition. Consider for example proposition A1 ("The carrier is under A1") before my first strike, from my battleship example here. A1 is true if the computer placed the carrier on A1 in its game representation. That truth is independent of justifications.

How do we know that a given proposition is true? — Agent Smith

Each time I make a play and receive "hit" or "miss" information, I gain some information for which of the 100 propositions are true. I may or may not eventually be able to use this information to form a true belief about where the carrier is in that game. But the carrier being in a certain place on the game board does not depend on my figuring out where that place is.

It can't be justification of course; why mention truth separately? — Agent Smith

Well, yeah, it is justification. Keep in mind though that justification is about knowledge, and knowledge is person-relative (each person has their own perspective and knowledge). Truth (of these sorts of claims) by contrast is ontic; it is person-independent.

You're describing a state of affairs — Isaac

Yes. T is a description of a state of affairs.

I'm arguing that the state of affairs is not as you claim they are in the basis of coherence with other states of affairs I thought we might agree on. — Isaac

I'm having severe problems parsing what you mean here (a positive declaration, that you're arguing the state of affairs isn't something; that thing being as I claim they are "in" the basis of coherence of other state of affairs... that you thought we might agree on?)

If you think I can't mean what I say I mean (on the basis, as above, of incoherence with some state of affairs we already agree on), then we'd have an equivalence. — Isaac

I think you can't coherently phrase the objection; briefly, you cannot put the window in the skull. If you put the window in the skull, you must put the skull in the skull as well. And if you erase the window outside the skull, you must erase the skull containing the window. The entire exercise basically just leaves you with a window outside a skull again, with two dangling objects you can't talk about and yet just did. It's fundamentally incoherent, and I don't see a way to rescue it. Nevertheless, I humored you quite a bit on this point.

As it stands you've presented no reasons other than that you don't agree. — Isaac

It's incoherent, and you failed to rescue it from incoherency. I need not prove an incoherent objection wrong. And I'm not obliged to play guess-what-Isaac-means. It's your job to formulate a coherent argument, should you choose to.

As I said, response seems pointless if my responses are simply going to be assumed to be the misguided product of a bias. — Isaac

Assumed is the wrong word; concluded is more correct. I didn't read between the lines here; I read the very lines you wrote. Your connotative implication had nothing to do with the argument given. Your magical-justification-type had nothing to do with the argument given. Your observations-lead-to-beliefs response had nothing to do with the argument given. I'll present the given argument here again in different terms.

Rewind again... you were arguing this:

So
"'it's raining' does indeed talk about what's 'outside my window'," — InPitzotl
It cannot. It attempts to talk about what's happening outside of your window, it intends to talk about what's happening outside of your window. It cannot actually do so directly because you do not have direct access to what's going on outside your window. — Isaac

So, you yourself said you didn't believe it rains in my skull; in fact, you took great offense at the suggestion that you believe it rains in my skull. So we're agreed. It does not rain in my skull.

But I believe things with my mind, which is a function of my brain, which is in my skull. So my belief that it is raining is indeed in my skull, and I have direct access to my belief (presumably).

So, since I have direct access to my beliefs (in my skull), but do not have direct access to the rain (outside my skull), I claim that "it's raining" cannot be about my belief that it's raining (it does not rain in my skull). The only way I can discern whether it's raining or not is through indirect means, such as using my muscles to look outside the window and using my senses to judge what's happening outside my skull (where it rains). Simply relying on what I have direct access to (e.g., my beliefs) cannot help.

How can "it's raining" be about something I don't have direct access to? Easy. By being about what I have indirect access to. But it can't be about what's in my skull, since it doesn't rain there.

Well then there's little point in continuing. — Isaac

There would be if you responded to the points rather than dredging up drama.

I'm not here to act as straw man for you to interpret what I'm saying — Isaac

The "what I'm saying" being this?:

I'm saying that the 'actual weather' you're referring to is inside your skull ie what you claim is the 'actual weather' in that sentence is, in fact, a belief about it inside your skull. — Isaac

Look at the writing in bold — Isaac

...that bold being yours?

Are you sure the story you want to tell of this is that I'm treating you unfairly and building straw men? That's a bit of a hard sell, given that bolded part is you literally telling me what I mean!

Regardless:

Either respond to what I'm saying or don't bother, — Isaac

I did. You didn't (in this reply).

In my reply, I explicitly conceded your point (which I consider trivial) that observations lead to beliefs, and explained why this was not the argument. I proceeded to reiterate my position, and contrast what you said in the response with what the argument actually was. I referenced the early regions of the visual cortex and frontal lobe specifically to reiterate the irrelevance of this to the actual position.

You did not respond to that.

In my reply, I continued my critique that your "telling me what I meant" was incoherent, taking into response your rebolding defense. I suggested if you meant something else, it's just not apparent from a rebolding.

You did not respond to that.

In my reply, I explained why T was different than "more J". I gave the example of a Battleship game to explain when T was established and contrasted that with what J does, which is to help reveal what the T is. I explicitly pointed out that the J doesn't make the T to rebut your point that T was just more J.

You did not respond to that.

Not that I know where you're going with it, but in your reply, I responded to your point about what happens when the part of the world does not exist, while also clarifying that you didn't have the concept of "the part of the world" quite correct (if it's worth it I could go into more detail). This was simply a reiteration with slightly more detail of what was said previously.

You did not respond to that.

In my reply, I also quoted you about states of affairs causing sensations and related T to that.

You did not respond to that.

FYI, you are under no obligation to respond to anything. It is always your choice to respond. But should you respond, I do not have actual malice against you, despite what you might think. But I engaged you to challenge particular criticisms of yours about JTB, and you're still wrong about T wrt JTB theory of knowledge. I still think you're wrong because you're too focused on beliefs; the T in JTB isn't (typically) in the brain, and you keep confusing it for something that is (JB perchance?)

insisting that I simply must have meant the thing you think I meant is pointless — Isaac

I did quite the opposite to that:

On the off chance I'm not reading this properly, I simply don't get what you're putting down... in which case, random bolding probably isn't going to help you much. — InPitzotl

I find no rational interpretation of what you said where "actual weather" gets to be used by you to refer to something that is not a belief but not by me. But I opened this up to you to explain, if you can, despite the very subject matter being your telling me that I mean something completely different than what I say I mean.

Otherwise we could just charitably assume each other to be genuine and relatively unbiased. — Isaac

The principle of charity only calls for a reading of a speaker's statement in the most rational way possible; it does not call for fantasizing. What you replied to so strongly was a direct response containing direct quotes from you... you are not entitled to demand charitable misrepresentations of my position. A charitable interpretation of my accusation of your bias distracting you would be that I perceived your bias to distract you. And it appears that I indeed did:

OK, so there's some aspect of neuroscience that I've missed because everything I've been studying for the last decade or so absolutely necessitate that observations form beliefs in order to be used for judgements. — Isaac

...because you completely missed the argument.

Of course an observation must result in a belief in order to be used for judgements. But an observation nevertheless, exactly as I said, is not in itself a belief. Looking outside requires initiating motor programs to direct my senses towards the stuff happening four feet in front of my skull (charitably interpreted as being four feet in front of my skull, as it says on the tin). The percepts that result from such direction of the senses highly correlate to what the senses were directed to, which is four feet in front of the skull. Lacking that, not even the early regions of the visual cortex can process relevant information about what the weather is like.

Look at the writing in bold... — Isaac

It's not lost on me that a possible interpretation is that you're special pleading... that you are applying special rules for what I can talk about specifically to me that you don't think apply to you. It's just that this interpretation is a bit pretentiously absurd:

or alternatively, continue flogging the notion thatI do actually believe the weather is just a belief, but am now denying it out of, what? Capriciousness. No reason at all? — Isaac

...to me it sounds more reasonable than the pretentious absurdity. You may have just not noticed that to present a real issue, you must step outside your own rules (the whole weird use of the adjective "actual" suggests an "attempt to bypass directness" via adjective).

But if you insist on the pretentious absurdity, then okay. But I think you have a lot more explaining to do. Now you have to explain why you divined (because you certainly didn't ask anything from which you could evidentially conclude it, even though it's absurd enough on its own) my lack of the ability to refer to the same actual weather you refer to when you use the phrase... in addition to what rule allows you to refer to it and not me. I'm all eyes. I'm fine either way though; either you explain one thing, or you explain two things.

On the off chance I'm not reading this properly, I simply don't get what you're putting down... in which case, random bolding probably isn't going to help you much. Charitably speaking I already used the English I was natively raised to speak to interpret that phrase. You might want to try explaining yourself more clearly in that case.

Which is exactly, and only, what I'm arguing. T is just more J, not something different. — Isaac

No, T is still different.

Suppose I'm playing the classic game Battleship... against a computer opponent. Before my first strike, I can write 100 statements of the form: "The carrier is under A1. The carrier is under A2." ...and so on. At this point in time, all 100 statements have a truth value; 5 of them are true; 95 are false. The truth value of the 5 true statements will not change over the entire course of the game. At the beginning of the game, I have minimal justification for which 5 of those statements are true. As I play, I gain more justification for which 5 are true. That justification may at some point lead to a belief about which 5 statements are true. But the justification doesn't make those 5 statements true (i.e., T is not just more J). It's possible at some point I'll gain knowledge of where the carrier is, but the justification isn't what put the carrier in the location requisite to make those 5 statements true; it's just revealing which 5 statements are true to me (more J may lead to B, but not T). I could also have a lot of justification without forming a belief about where the carrier is (more J doesn't even necessarily lead to B). B forms from sufficient J; but the T is there in every game, regardless of whether or not a B is even formed. The T is caused by the computer program, prior to any information I got from any play.

But I'm talking about expressions where it later turns out that that part of the world doesn't exist - the flower, the alien... — Isaac

We've been over this; depends on the expression, but "the flower" and "the aliens" are false examples of this. "There are no green swans" is presumably just true. "The green swan in Elbonia teleported" is undefined (no such place). "The green swan outside my window teleported" is undefined, but the statement refers to a part of a world (outside the window), just one that doesn't have a referent to the green swan in it. "The green swan in the last sentence does not exist" is true. We can also play games of potential existential import and make the truth value dependent on the game ("All green swans outside my house teleported").

States of affairs are causes of our sensations (and recipients of our actions). Statements are constituents of language - a tool we use for communication etc. — Isaac

The 5 true statements in my game of Battleship describe humanly meaningful states of affairs of the computer. The ontic nature of this would be particular states that could in principle be traced to voltages in certain computer parts, translated in very specific ways according to the program, which in itself is implementing the particular abstraction we call "Battleship", from which we derive the meaning of "carrier" and the locations. But nevertheless, those 5 true statements are true even if I didn't sense what any of those things are (per the realist presumption).

Where have I asserted that the actual weather is a belief? — Isaac

Here:

I'm saying that the 'actual weather' you're referring to is inside your skull ie what you claim is the 'actual weather' in that sentence is, in fact, a belief about it inside your skull. — Isaac

You were very explicit not only in saying this, but in specifically saying that you were saying it.

The underlined is exactly the claim I'm making. — Isaac

"The claim presumes x" is an anthropomorphic abstraction; what it means is that x is a prerequisite for the assertion. The prerequisite need not be believed for the claim to be true; so long as there's some way to identify the part of the world meant, and the condition does indeed hold, the claim is true. Hence, "Isaac's hat is a lovely shade of green today".

If we first 'assume the flower exists' and then describe it's properties, the properties we're describing are those of the assumed flower. — Isaac

Big "if". Even if I presume the flower exists, that does not compel you to agree it exists.

The assumption is a belief - "I believe there is a flower" — Isaac

No, the assumption is a prerequisite. It might be a belief; it's probably typically a belief (at least in the case of standalone claims); but the belief is optional for aboutness. Again, there's the hat on your head that's a lovely shade of green.

But your claim is that (for JTB purposes) "the grass is green" is not about a belief, but rather about the actual grass. — Isaac

In terms of JTB, this is just a matter of T.

Now you're saying we have to 'figure that out'. — Isaac

Yes. That the actual grass is green doesn't magically cause it to poof into our beliefs. We must find out what the T is through J. JTB per se abstracts this out, but sanely speaking, you look at the grass.

Do we do so first, or later? — Isaac

The question is ambiguous, but reasonably enumerable. Sanely speaking, assuming it's previously unexplored wild grass to ignore a detail and presuming realism, the grass is green (T) before anyone sees it, which implies it exists. If Joe knows it's green, then Joe has J that it is green which implies Joe has J that it exists. If someone wants to verify the T that it's green, whether or not that someone is Joe, before or after Joe knows it, they can test it by looking at said grass; on passing said test they have attained J that the grass is green. The test may also fail, in which case they (again, possibly being Joe) attain J that the grass is not green.

If later, then what was the statement about at the time? — Isaac

The statement is about a part of the world meeting a condition. The part of the world should be specified somehow at the time of the statement (it is not "grass"; there's grass outside my window that's green right now that likely has nothing to do with what the statement is about; rather it is what the definite article "the" refers to in the noun phrase "the grass", and that's generally always given by a context).

You keep coming back to 'just look' and then when pressed admit that we could still be wrong even after looking, so I don't know why you keep coming back to it. — Isaac

So "when pressed" and "admit" is just spin; narrative; dysphemism. The spin reflects your bias, which is severely interfering with your comprehension. I do not "admit" "when pressed" that we could still be wrong, I emphasize it. The reason I keep coming back to this is that you keep missing the same point. You demonstrate that yourself:

I believe the flower is green because John told me so
I believe the flower is green because all flowers I've ever seen are green
I believe the flower is green because I looked and it seemed green to me

These are all just justifications for believing the flower is green, — Isaac

Correct.

the last one isn't of some magically different sort which distinguishes the 'truth' of the matter. — Isaac

And this is precisely what I mean. You've used spin, narrative, and dysphemism to reformulate this into a red herring argument about certainty. It is, in fact, a direct response to and refutation of your pet theory that the claim is about a belief.

As a refutation of your pet theory that the claim is about belief, the significance of the third type of justification is that it is a test whose results are measured by observations, not beliefs. The fact that, when these observations conflict with beliefs, we update the beliefs to match the observations proves that it is the principle of reality that determines which result we would observe (aka truth), NOT the belief (as claimed), that the claims are about. The pet theory that the claims are about beliefs fails to account for why we defer to the observations as authoritative... i.e., why we bother becoming convinced that the flower is pink because we looked at it and it appeared pink, despite just believing it was green because John said so. But we do, therefore your pet theory is wrong.

Not sure how you're getting that out of what I wrote. — Isaac

Maybe you're being fuzzy with your concepts? Both "it's raining" and "the actual weather condition" are asserted to be beliefs. Presumably we have "direct access" to our beliefs. But the problem was supposed to be that "It's raining" can't be about "the actual weather" because we don't have direct access to "the actual weather".

I think you're confusing your "fix" with your problem statement. But the problem with your problem statement is that you have to find a way to simultaneously recognize that I can talk about "it's raining" (hocus) and not talk about "the actual weather condition" (pocus).

Even when there is no such part? — Isaac

Depends on the case. In the types of claims you're talking about, the claim presumes the part exists. That presumption is not part of the assertion; so if it fails, the truth value of the statement is undefined. There are other cases.

Really? Are you unfamiliar with thought experiments? — Isaac

That it's a thought experiment is not the problem. The problem is that there's a hole in the thought experiment. Abstracting away details that don't matter is one thing; leaving out details that do is another. You have an entire part of your thought experiment that seems to boil down into absolutely nothing when fixing the contradiction... what the heck happened at T0? But it sounds like the alien example works for you, so we could talk about that.

So statements are about things in the world, except when they're not. Got it. — Isaac

Yep; pretty much. It's not like there is a meaning fairy that's going to prevent us from talking about things that don't exist; we're the ones that have to figure that out.

Now, how do we tell which is which...? — Isaac

That's an open ended question, and there isn't always an answer. But in your flower case all we need do is look in the box; and in the hat case, look at your head. The salient point here is that neither of these things are belief inspections; they are world inspections.

One experimenter (x) observes the slits and another ( y ) observes x observing the double slit experiment? You know, a god's-eye-view! — Agent Smith

Just slipping in here. This was considered as a thought experiment in Everett's paper "The Theory of the Universal Wavefunction"; in particular the introduction. There, "the slits" abstracts into any experiment and is S. Your x is A. Your y is B.