We see colours. Colours are mental phenomena, perhaps reducible to activity in the primary visual cortex, often caused by light interacting with the eyes (although not always given the cases of dreams and hallucinations). That's indirect realism.

Direct realism claims that colours are mind-independent properties of distal objects à la the naive realist theory of colour.

These are quite clearly different positions and at least one of them is wrong. I say that the scientific evidence supports the former and contradicts the latter, e.g. from here:
A stimulus produces an effect on the different sensory receptors, which is being transmitted to the sensory cortex, inducing sensation (De Ridder et al., 2011). Further processing of this sensory stimulation by other brain networks such as the default mode, salience network and frontoparietal control network generates an internal representation of the outer and inner world called a percept (De Ridder et al., 2011). Perception can thus be defined as the act of interpreting and organizing a sensory stimulus to produce a meaningful experience of the world and of oneself (De Ridder et al., 2011). — Michael

This "evidence" sounds like a description from a naive realist, or someone who is describing the nature of perception from a naive realist perspective.

Where is the evidence for how neural activity interacts with the colors your experience? How does that happen? Is that a direct interaction? Neurologists talk as if they have a naive realist view of the brain as a physical object which creates the dualist dichotomy of the mind-body problem.

Indirect interactions are really accumulated direct interactions. It's possible that both indirect and direct realism are incorrect on their own, but true when understood that they are different parts of the same coin.

Indirect realism is dependent upon space and time having some objective existence where it takes time and space for the accumulated causes and their effects to happen. But what if space and time are like colors and are only mental phenomena? That would mean that the universe is happening all at once in the same place and everything is directly connected all at once. So your "scientific evidence" is based on a lot of assumptions.

Arguing over the grammar of "I experience X" leads to confusion and misses the substance of the dispute entirely. See here. — Michael

I can't argue with you about something you have been vague and evasive about. If I don't know what you mean by your use of certain words, then I can't make any coherent argument about anything you've said.

The whole point of asking where "I" is in relation to the things that are being perceived is to show that distal objects are only distal based on where "I" is. Mental phenomena are distal in the same way that your neural activity is, in that I can't directly observe them, I only use them as explanations for your behaviors. Like you said,:

Different parts of me directly interact with different parts of the world. My eyes directly interact with light, the neurons in my brain directly interact with each other, etc. — Michael

It depends on the parts we are talking about to then say that something is "distal" or not, or which parts are direct or not.

The question is whether or not I directly perceive some distal object. That I directly perceive some aspect of the world (i.e. my mental phenomena) isn't that I directly perceive the particular aspect of the world that direct realists claim we directly perceive (i.e. the distal object). — Michael

I don't see how using "direct" and "indirect" is useful here. We perceive objects. If there is no difference in the information acquired, then there is no useful distinction between "direct" and "indirect".

No, the hard problem of consciousness hasn't been resolved. Some believe that it is reducible to brain activity (e.g. pain just is the firing of c fibres), and some believe that it is some mental phenomenon that supervenes on such brain activity. Either way, few (if any) believe that conscious experience extends beyond the body such that distal objects and their properties are literally present in conscious experience. — Michael

The observer effect does not assume that objects are present in conscious experience, rather that act of observing distal objects has an effect on those distal objects and how they are perceived.

Different parts of me directly interact with different parts of the world. My eyes directly interact with light, the neurons in my brain directly interact with each other, etc. — Michael

Then "direct" realism is the case? Again, if we can directly interact with certain parts of the world and a direct interaction is a necessary component of an indirect perception, then "direct" and "indirect" is a false dichotomy. It's not either or. It's both.

No it doesn't. "I feel pain" doesn't entail a homunculus. "I see shapes and colours when I hallucinate" doesn't entail a homunculus." Saying that these very same mental percepts occur when awake and not hallucinate doesn't entail a homunculus. You're just reading far too much into the grammar of "I experience X". — Michael

How can I be reading to much into the grammar when I'm just trying to get some clarification of your use of the word, "I".

But as it stands the science of perception supports indirect realism and so a direct realist must reject the science of perception, although I don't know how he can justify that rejection. — Michael

Have scientists been able to explain how a physical, colorless brain causes visual experiences, like visual depth and colors? How do colors come from something colorless?

What role does the observer effect in QM play here?

If a color is directly perceived and the wavelength is indirectly perceived, and your mind with all of it's colors and sounds and feelings, are part of reality, then isn't it safe to say that you directly experience part of the world? If so, then doesn't the distinction between indirect vs direct realism become irrelevant?

What part of you directly interacts with the world? What is "you" or "I" in this sense? If you define "you" and "I" as our bodies, then isn't your body directly interacting with objects by holding them and with light by opening your eyes? Indirect realism only makes sense if you define "you" and "I" as homunculus in your head.

I think that the indirect/direct distinction is a false dichotomy.

An apple reflects light with a wavelength of 700nm. When our eyes respond to light with a wavelength of 700nm we see a particular colour. We name this colour "red". We then describe an object that reflects light with a wavelength of 700nm as "being red". — Michael

If we know that the wavelength is 700nm and that the apple is reflecting this wavelength of light while absorbing others, then what is different in the knowledge that an indirect realist has vs a direct one?

What is useful in knowing that the wavelength if light being reflected in our eyes is 700nm? What is useful in knowing that the apple is red? What is useful is knowing that the apple is either ripe or rotten and the color of the apple informs us which is the case. If knowing the apple is ripe because it is red is knowing something about the apple instead of the light, what is different between what the direct realist knows vs the indirect one?

What is the difference between direct knowledge and indirect knowledge of something if you both end up knowing the same thing?

The indirect realist recognises that this colour I see is a mental phenomenon and that this colour is the intermediary through which I am made indirectly aware of an object with a surface layer of atoms with a disposition to reflect light with a wavelength of 700nm (assuming that this is a "veridical" experience and not a dream or hallucination). — Michael

What is the "I" that is made indirectly aware via mental phenomenon? How is it separate from the colours, mental phenomenon and other objects to say that the mental phenomenon is an "intermediary through which I am made indirectly aware..."

Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language. — Wittgenstein

The misuse of language induces evil in the soul. — Plato

There is only one good, knowledge, and one evil, ignorance. — Socrates

Understanding that misuses of language creates philosophical problems goes all the way back to the Greeks. Plato is not only warning us about misusing language in the sense of bad grammar or syntax. Speaking badly also includes saying untruths, telling lies, creating a conflict between speech and reality - between what is said and what is. To misuse language in this sense is to sound a false note in the music of creation - to put yourself out of tune with the way things are.

In his book, "Abuse of Language, Abuse of Power", the German philosopher Josef Pieper observes that we use language for two purposes: to describe reality and to communicate with other people. Each function implies the other. When we describe how things are, we describe them to or for somebody else. And when we communicate with others, we try to tell them something about reality: what else could we talk about?

The liar violates both of these purposes of speech. The liar withholds some part of reality from the listener, preventing them from participating in something by knowing it. Talk that fails to communicate becomes monologue, or worse, manipulation. Those who weave a web of contradictions never say anything at all.

The background for these observations about language and reality is Plato’s critique of his rivals, the sophists. Sophists were teachers who travelled around ancient Greece, getting rich by claiming to sell wisdom. Of course, what they sold was not wisdom at all, but only skill with words. The sophists sold success: for the right price, they said, you can learn how to use words to gain power and money in the political assembly. You can convince the courts to give you a share of your neighbor’s property, whether you deserve it or not. Socrates and Plato fought to define philosophy against this brazen quest for success at all costs.

The Greek sophists were the first nihilists, teaching that there is no such thing as truth. Or better: teaching that we can and should speak without regard to truth. The sophist is interested in reality only as a topic for impressive speeches. What you say does not matter; the only important thing is how you say it, which seems to be what many members of this forum think, by the way the write. By severing speech from reality, the sophist makes truth an optional add-in. "I will teach you how to speak well," they might say, "and you can decide whether to speak truths or lies." The difficulty here is that attempting to speak as though reality has no claim on me corrupts my relationships with the world and with other people. It degrades my humanity and damages my soul, as Plato would say.

Much of philosophy relies on deliberate misuse of language. Because literary skill is the rigorous use of language in the pursuit of truth, the habit of literature, of serious reading, is the best defense against believing the half-truths of ideologues and the lies of demagogues. The abusers of language are our modern sophists: unscrupulous marketers, lawyers, politicians, philosophers that believe language is a game, those who push content-free slogans in place of genuine communication about the world.

Sophistical speech always has an ulterior motive: when it does not aim at communicating the truth of something to another person, speech must be directed to some other goal, a goal of the speaker’s choosing. When it abandons communication, speech becomes manipulation, and the relationship of solidarity between speaker and audience, as co-seekers of truth, is fundamentally compromised.

No. You again showed that you are a fool. Stay safe. — Banno

Why so emotional, Banno? I'm not the one contradicting themselves. Are you in love with Witt, too?

Sure, when you keep committing logical fallacies, I'll keep saying you've made a logical fallacy. Just admit that your are emotionally attached to Witt and what he wrote.

I agree, language needs both description and acquaintance. Neither is sufficient by itself.

The Rosetta Stone couldn't be deciphered without there being something external to it. As Wittgenstein wrote 5.61 Logic fills the world: the limits of the world are also its limits, We cannot say in logic: This and this there is in the world, that there is not. For that would apparently presuppose that we exclude certain possibilities, and this cannot be the case since otherwise logic must get outside the limits of the world: that is, if it could consider these limits from the other side also. — RussellA

I really can't understand the need assert language as being external or distinct from the world or what it references. We can translate another language because it refers to the same world as the language we're translating to. It's a lame attempt to reject meaning as reference - a causal relation. Meaning is a causal relation. Language-use requires a medium and that medium is the world. Those the decipher languages exist in the world. The ideas that generate language use are in the world. You can't have it both ways. Language can't be part of the world AND external to it.

As part of our evolution, humans learned that causes lead to certain effects (tool-making, harnessing the power of fire, agriculture, etc.). We learned to harness that with language. All we are doing is participating in the same causal relations that are the world. Going from understanding that someone's behavior informs an observer of their inner thoughts to understanding that scribbles can inform a reader of the writer's inner thoughts seems like a logical/natural conclusion to reach. Effects inform us of their causes. The problem is in interpreting those relations as such, but our interpretation is subject to the same causal relations as everything else. How we interpret some observation is dependent upon prior observations.

3.12 The sign through which we express the thought I call the propositional sign. And the proposition is the propositional sign in its projective relation to the world.

How do you get from "the proposition is the propositional sign" to "propositional signs are distinct from propositions"? — Harry Hindu

This is why you have so much difficulty, Harry. A proposition is distinct from a propositional sign in that a proposition projects out into the world — Banno

:roll: Did I hit a nerve? So you're saying that Witt is contradicting himself? I wouldn't have so much difficulty if you weren't just pulling your assertions out of your nether regions.

So you remain stuck at "meaning is reference". — Banno

You certainly haven't been any help in freeing me from this position because you can't adequately answer questions you should be asking yourself, so you'll remain stuck at "meaning is scribble games".
.

That it is written is a condition for me to comment not a cause that leads necessarily to me commenting. — Fooloso4

That I was born is by change. The ability to comment is a necessary condition for me to do so, but my being born is not the cause of me commenting. — Fooloso4

Intellectual dishonesty and cherry-picking. All of this ignores what I said in the same post you are replying to:

You seem to think that a single distant cause must necessarily determine a single effect in the future. The further back in time you go from some effect, the more causes become necessary for that effect to occur, not just one. If you want to talk about the cause that directly precedes you leaving a comment on this forum, then we'd be pointing to the last step in the process which would be something like the software the forum is running on working correctly in displaying your comment after you clicked the submit button. — Harry Hindu

So you are arguing with a straw-man.

I am not commenting because of what my parents did or their parents or what the first human did or because of life itself or that out of which life emerged. — Fooloso4

:rofl: You aren't even aware that you keep contradicting yourself. If causes are not necessary, then what your parents or their parents did or what the first humans did would have no necessary causal relation with your birth, but here you assumed that it does, or else why would you have mentioned these causes (which was not part of my list of causes) if they don't necessarily cause your birth? And you want to lecture me on logical necessity? :brow:

Right. We can in some grossly inadequate way trace what happened back to other things that happened. That is as far as we can go. That things did happen this way is not the same as claiming they necessarily had to happen this way. — Fooloso4

And if they didn't happen this way then we would find different reasons or causes as to why it happened differently.

Because those causes do not lead to a single necessary outcome. It is only after the fact that we can say what that outcome was. Again, the same conditions might have led to a different outcome. What happens is only one of the possibilities of what might have happened. — Fooloso4

And you have yet to show an example of the same event that follows different causes. The problem is that every event is unique and so are their causes, but that isn't to say that events and their causes cannot be similar and it is the similarity that allows us to make predictions in the first place.

The conclusion follows from the premises, the premises do not cause a certain conclusion. — Fooloso4

What does it mean to follow, if not to be caused?

Cause:
The producer of an effect, result, or consequence.
The one, such as a person, event, or condition, that is responsible for an action or result.
A basis for an action or response; a reason.

So it sounds like we're saying the same thing, but using different terms.

It is tautological that something must be written in order for that writing to be commented on. That is an example of logical necessity. — Fooloso4

Which is the same as saying that something must be written (cause) for that writing to be commented on (effect). What reason do you have to think that something must be written for it to be commented on? Logical necessity is a type of causal necessity. Certain premises necessarily cause a certain conclusion to be true or false.

There is no necessity that I would comment. Since it is not by necessity, and the only necessity he recognizes is logical necessity, that I interpret his work is Zufall, "a sort of accident" (2.0121). The German term also means 'chance'. Now if you believe that nothing happens by chance then we have a fundamental disagreement. — Fooloso4

But you did comment and Witt writing something is ONE of the many causes that led to your commenting. You had to be born, read Witt and become enamored by his writings, create an account on this forum, and intend to comment on it. If none of this happened, would we see your comments on this screen? Wouldn't all of those be necessary for us to see your comments on this screen? If we don't see comments of yours on this screen, then we assume that there was another necessary cause as to why we don't see any more comments of yours on the screen. Either you got bored with the conversation, real-life happened, etc.

2. an event that happens by chance or that is without apparent or deliberate cause.
b :lack of intention or necessity : chance — Fooloso4

Now, if what you're saying were the case, then comments of yours would just appear on this screen even though you were never born.

If you accept Laplace's demon then it is only by ignorance that we cannot determine a future that is determinate. This, however, is an assumption not an established fact. — Fooloso4

As I pointed out, the issue only applies to future events. We don't have this problem in laying out prior causes for present events. As you pointed out, it is logically (causally) necessary that Witt write something for you to comment on it. Why is that? Why are we ignorant of the future effects of present causes but not so with present effects of prior causes?

If the necessary conditions underlie both A and B, then A is no more or less the necessary outcome than B. It is necessary that I know how to read and write and have a device I can use to respond to you on TPF, but whether or not I do respond and what I will say if I do respond is not determined by necessity. — Fooloso4

But as we have shown different necessary conditions underlie both A and B. Witt writing something is a necessary condition, as well as all of the other conditions are necessary, for you to comment on it (A). Different necessary conditions would lead to B - you not commenting. Even though Witt wrote something, saying that doesn't necessarily mean you will comment on what he wrote is being disingenuous to the fact that there would be necessary conditions for you not doing so, such as you never being born.

You seem to think that a single distant cause must necessarily determine a single effect in the future. The further back in time you go from some effect, the more causes become necessary for that effect to occur, not just one. If you want to talk about the cause that directly precedes you leaving a comment on this forum, then we'd be pointing to the last step in the process which would be something like the software the forum is running on working correctly in displaying your comment after you clicked the submit button.

You obviously do not agree and assume some hidden causal nexus that can only lead to a single outcome that is already determined by conditions that extend back to some state of initial conditions of the universe. — Fooloso4

What is the nexus of logical necessity? What makes it hidden when it comes to causal necessity, but obvious when it comes to logical necessity?

We're directly aware of the effects and through that indirectly aware of their cause. — Michael

Then both direct and indirect realism are the case?

I would need to know what "we" is and it's relation with an experience. Is access to the we, or the I, direct or indirect?

Yes. But it doesn't follow from this that I am directly aware of the cause of my experience. The part of the world that is my experience isn't the part of the world that is the apple. I'm directly aware of the former, and through that indirectly aware of the latter. — Michael

The part of the world that is the table is not the part of the world that is the apple. When the apple sits on top of the table, is it directly or indirectly accessing the table?

Is the "we" a different part of the world than the experience? If so, then "we" indirectly access our experience, but then what would the medium be by which the "we" access the experience to say that it is indirect? If not, then is the "we" and "experience" the same thing and it wouldn't make sense to say that we are directly aware of the effects (experience). We are the experience. Then we must ask, how does the experience access the body? If the experience is not the body, then by what medium does the experience access the body? Indirect realism seems to create an infinite regress where there must always be a medium between the perceiver and the perceived and in turn requires another medium for the perceiver to access the medium, the medium of the medium, etc. which ends up creating an infinite chasm between the perceiver and what is perceived.

What does it mean to be "aware"? Is the apple aware of the table in sitting on it? What does it mean for the "we", or "I", to directly be aware of the effects? Isn't the "effects" awareness of their causes? Does it make sense to say that "we", or "I", is directly aware of the awareness of the causes?

It seems to me that both direct and indirect realism are nonsensical.

Hmmmm... Atman = Brahman?

"Look up a word in the dictionary to find its meaning. You get more words. Look up the meaning of those words. You get more words. Since the dictionary is finite, and since word is defined in terms of other words, the definitions must be circular". — RussellA

If you apply this to the word, "word", then it makes the whole argument nonsensical.

Words are used for communicating what is the case to someone that lacks the knowledge of what is the case (which could be knowing that it is raining or what some scribble or utterance means)- meaning that words refer to things that are not necessarily other words.

If I am aware that it is raining outside, then me hearing you say it is raining outside would be redundant and not useful. That useless redundancy shows that words do not refer to other words, but what is the case that isn't necessarily another use of words.

If I hear you say it is raining outside, and I don't know what "raining" means, I might look it up in the dictionary. I would find something like this:
Water condensed from atmospheric vapor and falling in drops.

I would only continue to look up words if I didn't already know what they referred to. If I know what "Water condensed from atmospheric vapor and falling in drops" refers to and it's not just another use of scribbles or utterances, then I don't need to look up any more words. I would then know what you are saying is the case, which isn't you using more words, but would be about the weather conditions outside.

Facts and states of affairs are much the same. Relations, not so much. Nor are "proposition" and "relation" interchangeable. Further, propositional signs are distinct from propositions (3.12) — Banno

3.12 The sign through which we express the thought I call the propositional sign. And the proposition is the propositional sign in its projective relation to the world.

How do you get from "the proposition is the propositional sign" to "propositional signs are distinct from propositions"?

What is a proposition without the sign? Where is this projective relation if not part of the totality of the world as a fact?

Have a look a 3.1 and thereafter. What you call a "scribble" may be what Wittgenstein calls a "propositional sign". — Banno

Probably. But then is he saying we think in scribbles and sounds? How is that any different than a language-less entity that thinks in colors, shapes, and sounds? A scribble is a colored shape.

Harry, despite this sentence being marks on a screen, you are aware that it is addressed to you. How is that? — Banno

Because some of the marks on the screen refer to me and the marks I remember having made earlier.

You accuse me of being intellectually dishonest and yet expect me to help you understand what you clearly do not. — Fooloso4

No. It's more like, I'm accusing you of being intellectually dishonest due to your inconsistency and hypocrisy. Contradictions and hypocrisy do not allow an understanding of your interpretation. You're right. I don't understand an interpretation that is contradictory.

Here is what you said, emphasis added:

The accidental only makes sense in light of the determined or predicted. Saying that something is accidental implies that there is a way things are supposed to be but something unintended happened that made things different. Accidents only come about when something was predicted to happen but didn't. If you dont make a prediction then there can be no accidents.
— Harry Hindu


I am not going to point out the ways in which this differs from what you say now. — Fooloso4

I gave an example of what I was saying in using you interpreting Witt's writings requires that Witt wrote something down. If it is necessary that Witt write something down for you to later interpret it then this example is a problem for your interpretation. You seem to be focused on future events that you have no knowledge of (hence my point that you are talking about your ignorance of what is necessary), while I am pointing out that present events (you interpreting Witt's writings) are necessarily dependent on prior events (Witt writing something). So if I have shown that present events are necessarily dependent on specific causes (prior events), then why would it be a different relation between present events and future events?

All you have been able to do is show that there are many possible future events based on current conditions, but you're talking about your ignorance, not what is necessary. Possibilities stem from our ignorance of the conditions between now and a particular future event. You are simply pointing out that we are ignorant of other necessary factors that would lead to a different future event than what we predicted. All you did was point out necessary causes for alternate futures, thereby undermining your own argument.

I have even asked you twice (now is my third) what reason do you reject that there is a reason why things happen as they do, and you haven't answered.
— Harry Hindu

And in return I asked you why you think they do. — Fooloso4

Intellectual dishonesty. I provided an answer to why I think they do but you ignored it just like you ignored my question and didn't answer it. If you are unable to answer my question and you are not satisfied with mine, then where does that leave us? To think that you hold the higher ground in this instance when you weren't even able to attempt to answer my question just shows that you are unwilling to be intellectually honest.

Let me ask you a few related questions:

Do you think that things could have turned out differently? — Fooloso4

Only as a result of other necessary conditions, which you seem to agree with because you pointed out other necessary conditions for it to turn out differently.

Is there some necessity that things can only turn out as they do? — Fooloso4

Yes. Prior conditions determine subsequent events which you seemed to agree with because you pointed out other necessary conditions for it to turn out differently than was predicted.

Can the same conditions support different outcomes? — Fooloso4

No, which you seemed to agree with because you never were able to point out an outcome that didn't have a necessary cause. All you did was point out that there could be other outcomes but ignored the fact that for there to be other outcomes there would need to be other necessary causes.

and in which I responded here.

What does scientific realism and [in]direct realism say about the [visual or auditory] experience itself and access to it?

Another question: is there a fundamental difference between sight and echolocation? Obviously sight involves light and a visual experience whereas echolocation involves sound and an auditory experience, but in both cases it is just a case of some "foreign" force (light or sound) interacting with and being changed by some other object (a wall) and then this affected force stimulating some organism's sense receptors and producing the associated experience.

Does echolocation involve the "direct" perception of a wall? Are the features of the auditory experience mind-independent features of the wall? Presumably echolocation involves the experience of such things as pitch and tone and pace? Does the wall have a pitch, a tone, and a pace? I don't think this at all sensible. So why would sight be any different?

As I said in the other thread, I think people are just bewitched by the complexity of visual experiences. It confuses them into adopting the naive view of perception which modern science has shown to be wrong. — Michael

But that's the thing - how did scientists show it to be wrong if they can only indirectly experience the environment? If you can show something to be wrong regardless of whether or not you have direct or indirect access, then what is the problem? It seems to me that you must directly experience something and by that direct experience you logically work your way back to the original cause which is an object reflecting light. What is missing with indirect access because either way you have access to accurate information? And if you can show what you're missing with indirect access when you only have indirect access, then again you are still able to show what is the case without anything missing.

You want to participate in a discussion of Wittgenstein but refuse to read what he said. Read him and see if my interpretation follows from what he said, and then you might have a better chance of following my interpretation. — Fooloso4

No. I have read what he said, as well as what you are saying. I am then going on to ask questions about what both you and he said and you are unable to be consistent with your explanation, or refuse to address the points I am making. I have even asked you twice (now is my third) what reason do you reject that there is a reason why things happen as they do, and you haven't answered. When you are inconsistent and intellectually dishonest then that is my reason to not trust your interpretation. These are not "gotcha" questions. These are questions that I am asking to better understand your interpretation. Contradictions and hypocrisy leads to more confusion, not a better understanding of what Witt, or you said.

Common usage also includes:

2. an event that happensby chance or that is without apparent or deliberate cause.
b :lack of intention or necessity : chance — Fooloso4

How is that any different than how I've been using it, or the definition I provided here:

An unforeseen event that is not the result of intention or has no apparent cause. — Harry Hindu

I have pointed out several times now that in trying to show that we cannot predict some outcome, you provide different reasons as to why there would be a different outcome, thereby defeating your own argument. If we understand this particular definition the same way, then we would both realize that there would not be a reason for anything - that reasons would be meaningless. The problem is that I don't think you are thinking about the implications of what you and Witt are saying. You just say them and expect others to sit in awe of what you said. It seems that you have emotionally invested yourself in the things Witt has said, and that Witt (and by association you) can never be wrong about anything.

Once you start declaring some interpretation right or wrong, you prove my point that what makes some interpretation necessarily right or wrong is what is the case prior to interpreting it.
— Harry Hindu

What is the case prior to interpreting a text, is the text itself. The irony is that you have declared my interpretation wrong without even looking at the text itself. In addition, you declare Wittgenstein wrong based on claims of what he said that you pulled out of who knows where. — Fooloso4

I pulled it out of the dictionary.

I haven't declared anything wrong - just incoherent.

For you to read some text, the text has to already be available, no? - meaning someone had to write it down, right?

That is a lot of potential for accidents ...
— Harry Hindu

Yes, Wite-Out was a much used product. It is still sold but not used as much since we can easily fix typos with a word processor. — Fooloso4

You're still missing (or ignoring) the point and committing the same error that undermines your own argument. Here you have just provided reasons as to why we use White-Out, why it's not used as much now, etc. Not to mention that you ignore all the times we don't need to use White-Out, or the backspace key on the keyboard. My point was that every case was an accident, then there would be no consistency between typing a letter on the keyboard and seeing the letter you typed. The fact that the right letter appears on the screen MOST (99%) of the time poses a problem to your position.

I don't know exactly which other squabble you're alluding to, but bear in mind that when someone opposes "world" to "language" they often mean the less encopassing "fact" and "proposition" respectively. — bongo fury

This doesn't explain the nature of the opposition or distinction. What does it even mean to say that the world is the totality of facts and not of things, if not that the world is a relation of facts? If facts don't stand in relation to other facts, then each fact would be separate from the world and not be part of the totality that is the world in the same way that the world is distinct from language. Language use requires a medium and that medium is the world.

What is a fact? Saying that a fact is what is the case or a state of affairs isn't saying anything about the nature of what a fact is. What is the case, and what is the state of affairs if not events, or relations between things?

It seems to be a vague use of terms. It's more meaningful to think of the world as the totality of information with information being the relation between causes and their effects. So the world is the totality of causes and their effects and their relation is a fact.

Hence relations do not cause changes to the facts. Relations are in the picture of the world, not in the facts. The relations form the picture of the facts. — Banno

So humans and their relations do not change the world as a result of those relations? Then I guess racism is not something that can change the facts of discrimination, nor could the relations Trump showed ever have changed the outcome of the election so there was never any reason to worry or waste time and taxpayer dollars with a committee to investigate what Trump showed and how it might cause a change in the facts.

If facts are not relations then how did anyone come to understand that the world is composed of facts, or even what a fact is, if we can only show relations with pictures and words?

You mistake what you take the terms 'accident' and 'necessity' to mean for what the terms mean in their various uses. — Fooloso4

All I've been doing is trying to follow your interpretation of Witt. You have been unable to make a sensible case of your own interpretation. It's not how I take the terms, but how most people take the terms:

accident
ăk′sĭ-dənt, -dĕnt″
noun
An unexpected and undesirable event, especially one resulting in damage or harm.
An unforeseen event that is not the result of intention or has no apparent cause.
An instance of involuntary urination or defecation.

necessary
nĕs′ĭ-sĕr″ē
adjective
Needed or required: synonym: indispensable.
Unavoidably determined by prior conditions or circumstances; inevitable.
Logically inevitable.

It is you that are taking the terms to mean something other than their various uses, so it is incumbent upon you and Witt to lay out the way you're using the terms when not using them the way most people use them.

Many scholars recognize the value of hermeneutics. — Fooloso4

Then you should be finding value in many different interpretations. Once you start declaring some interpretation right or wrong, you prove my point that what makes some interpretation necessarily right or wrong is what is the case prior to interpreting it. You keep making the same mistake and when I point it out, you ignore it.

For what reason?
— Harry Hindu

You assume there must be some reason why things happen as they do. Wittgenstein rejected this assumption. So do I. The issue is not as settled as you assume. This is not the thread to discuss it but see, for example: Sean Carroll:s On Determinism — Fooloso4

No. I was asking for what reason do you reject that there is a reason why things happen as they do. The reason why I accept the idea that there are reasons things happen as they do is by experience, like right now, when I'm typing this post my fingers are tapping the keyboard and scribbles appear on the screen. Look at all the letters on this screen and each one was typed prior to it appearing on the screen. That is a lot of potential for accidents, yet we all are able to type each letter in the correct sequence to form a word, sentence and paragraph without much of a problem. If what you are saying is the case, then one would expect that this page would be filled with blank posts, random scribbles, etc. but it isn't. Why?

Once again you want to stipulate the meaning of terms. Logical necessity has a very specific meaning in the Tractatus, and what it says is not what you claim. — Fooloso4

It is you and Witt that want to stipulate the meaning of terms too. The problem appears to be that we don't want to agree on the usage of the terms, so there ends up being no communication. I cannot picture your meaning if we are not agreeing on their usage. That is what I've been trying to do - just to find out where we differ in our usage and what you are actually saying if you don't mean "accident" and "necessity" in the same way most people do. You are free to use other words if they capture the meaning of what you are trying to convey. Use them.

The conditions may be there but those conditions might support both A and B or A and N, all of which may be possible under those conditions. — Fooloso4

Using the term, "possible" just shows that you are confusing what is the case with our ignorance of what is the case. How would you know what is possible if not by referring to what the prior conditions are?

Nonsense! That is not what he asserts. Read the book. Then we can discuss it. — Fooloso4

I have and it makes as much sense as the Bible does. It is open to personal interpretation, so anyone's interpretations is just as good as anyone else's. I prefer a good science book on language. Steve Pinker is a much better read than Witt.

Sure, the relation shows the state of affairs,
— Banno

Yes. Fact = state of affairs = relation. — bongo fury

and is it a fact that the relation shows the state of affairs, and as such is part of the world and not distinct from it?

But, as I explained before, relations are part of the picture, not of the world. The world consists of facts. It therefore does not consist of relations. — Banno

The picture is of the world, and hence in an important sense distinct from it. — Banno

Only in a warped sense. "Distict" and "of" are relations, so it seems that relations are primary and the world and pictures are part of a relation. If pictures only show relations, then what are you showing when you use the scribble, "facts", if not that facts are relations too? The attraction to Witt's ideas are similar to the attraction to the Bible or Koran's ideas - in that they show that humans are distinct from nature, hence in an important sense "special".

Wittgenstein says the following "Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a "beetle". No one can look into anyone else box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. But suppose the word "beetle" had a use in these people's language? — Richard B

The problem here is that Witt failed to apply his own arguement to the rules of language use, which would end up pulling the rug out from under his own arguement.

Language is composed of scribbles and sounds. If everyone had a different "beetle in their box" when reading the scribbles on this screen then we would never be able to communicate, or play a game. The rules for playing the game would be different for each person, just like the "beetle in the box".

The world is the box and we, along with beetles, are all in the same box. People are similar enough that we experience the world similarly, or else we'd never be able to communicate or play the game using the same rules.

Since this is a thread on Wittgenstein, we need to be clear as to what he is saying about necessity and accident. — Fooloso4

Good luck with that. It's like trying to be clear on what the authors of the Bible are saying. I'm not really rejecting anything Witt is talking about. I'm taking issue with his improper use of language.

Your own view seems to be along the lines that whatever happens happens by necessity. This is something he rejected — Fooloso4

For what reason? And by giving a reason you end up proving my point that reasons are necessary to accept or reject any assertion of what the case is. Logical necessity is just as much a part of the world as any other causal relation.

5.135 There is no possible way of making an inference from the existence of one situation to
the existence of another, entirely different situation.
5.136 There is no causal nexus to justify such an inference.
5.1361 We cannot infer the events of the future from those of the present.
Belief in the causal nexus is superstition.

He is not simply denying that we can know what will happen, but that it is necessary that this rather than that will happen. If that rather then this it is not because the latter is the necessary outcome rather than the former. — Fooloso4

Yet all you did was infer that you'd either submit your posts or not based on what conditions existed prior to submitting your post or not. The same can be said of Witt having written his books. Witt disproves his own assertions by writing his books for others to read. Did he not infer that others would read his book only after he wrote it? Did he think that others could read his book if he never wrote it? Seems like you and Witt believe that others can read Witts book if he never wrote it.

Yet he is asserting a belief in the causal nexus of reasons and conclusions. Again the relationship between reasons and conclusions are as much a part of the world as any other causal relation. Everything is process, relations, or information. In this sense, there is no difference between reasons and conclusions (logical necessity) and any other causal relation. By rejecting one you reject all the other relations. By accepting one causal relation and rejecting all others youd be exhibiting a form of favoritism. There would be no reasons for any conclusions. As a matter of fact reasons are based on observations of what is the case and their conclusions are inferred based on prior observations. So I don't see how you could have any reasons to infer some conclusion if you didn't make any observation.

No one is saying that we can predict everything, or that knowledge has a monopoly of truth, or is even related to truth. Every event is unique, but that does not mean that they arent similar, or else we wouldn't be able to make any predictions at all. Also our predictions are tied to our goals. Much of the time, any prediction we have is tied to the goal at hand which isn't always necessary to know everything to make a successful prediction.

Much in the same way that Fitch’s paradox shows that the knowability and non-omniscience principles are incompatible, direct realism and scientific realism are incompatible: if the mind-independent world is as the Standard Model says it is then it isn’t as we ordinary perceive it to be and vice-versa.

So pick your poison: either indirect realism or scientific instrumentalism. — Michael

The distinction between direct vs. direct realism is non-sensical when you include the experience as part of the world your experiencing, and understand that effects carry information about their causes. The (right or wrong) interpretation of that causal relationship is what creates the distinction between direct and indirect. A mirage is exactly what you'd expect to experience given the nature of light and and it's interaction with an eye-brain system when you arrive at the correct interpretation and not the false one (interpreting it as a pool of water).

Direct realism doesn’t appear to work under any scenario. — Michael

Do you not have direct access to your experience and isn't your experience part of the world as much as what your experience is of?

You still seem to know what the case is even though your experience is indirect. So what's missing? What's the difference between indirect and direct if you are still able to know what the case is in either case if not the interpretation itself?

Why is it the words and not the events that inform us?" ?

Or "why are the words still about the events?" ?
— bongo fury

The former.

There seems to be chain of causality - events -> (various perception processes) -> (various executive process) -> writing words to convey the events -> looking at words conveying the event -> (various perception processes) -> (various linguistic process) -> (various executive processes) -> (working memory storage) -> (more executive functions and long term memory processes - collectively called 'learning').

There seems a lot of stages between words and learning, so if stages between is what leads to the charge of indirectness, then the we indirectly learn from the words too. — Isaac

Right. Reading words informs us as much as reading someone's behavior, or the color of an apple, or the sound of waves crashing, etc. Scribbles and utterances (can be) just as informative as any other visual and auditory experience. The "philosophers" on this forum tend to separate language from the world much like theists separate humans from the world. That is a mistake.

My experience doesn’t show me the nature of the world independent of experience, the Standard Model and other scientific theories do. — Michael

But how if all you have is your experience? How did we come to have scientific theories of how the world is independent of experience if not by some experience? You seem to be saying that you have knowledge of the world independent of experience. How is that possible unless you're omniscient?

Scientific realism isn’t a given, and even if it were true, the world as described by the Standard Model is very unlike the world as seen in everyday experience, — Michael

How do we know the difference between our experience of the world and the way the world is independent of our experience? You must have had some experience to even make this claim, so there must be some experience that has informed you how the world is independent if your experience. Or your experience is sufficient to know how the world is independent of your own experience. There must be something in your experience that informs you of how the world is unlike your experience, but how could that be if not by some experience?

Seems to me that you've misused language.

There are two philosophical points here. The first is that, since the "unseen" world causes what we see, we can and have used those causes to grasp the nature of that unseen world. Science did what Kant imagined to be impossible. — Banno

Yup. Effects, like a visual experiences, carry information about their causes, like the object and the light reflected off the object and into your eye. Information is the relationship between cause and effect.

I might have a better offer. I might forget. I might change my mind and conclude that I am wasting my time. — Fooloso4

Which was my point that there would be other necessary, non-accidental conditions that led to different conditions. You're proving my point, not yours.

You're confusing what was, is, or will be the case with your ignorance of what was, is, or will be the case.

Wanting to does not mean I have to. Intending to does not mean I would necessarily end up doing what I intend to do. — Fooloso4

But what would it mean that you wouldn't necessarily end up doing what you intended if not that there was some other necessary condition that prevented you from doing it? If there were no other conditions preventing you from doing it, wouldn't you be doing it? If not, then you never intended to do it in the first place. Do any of your posts appear on this screen without you having intended to post them?

What is not the case exists in the logical space of what is possible. Logic is transcendental. It makes possible not only states of affairs but the possibility to think of states of affairs. We cannot think illogically — Fooloso4

How would you know what is possible if everything that is the case is an accident? What is not the case isn't necessarily possible. What is not the case is just as much probable as improbable, because you have no evidence to support the probability nor improbability. There is no evidence for what is not the case. So if what you mean by "logical space" is "imaginary" then I guess we agree.

Entities are patterns of properties.
— Harry Hindu

At a stretch. Ok. If mental entities include linguistic conventions, then no one counseled dispensing with them. — bongo fury

Not at all. You recognize entities, like your pet or your friend, by their pattern of properties - patterns of sensory properties - their color, shape, the sound of their voice, the feel of their touch, their smell, etc., just as you are able to distinguish between coffee and water, but the pattern of color, smell, taste, etc.

My question was simply what is left if we can dispense with mental entities, and you've ended up showing that we cannot dispense with mental entities. Linguistic conventions are patterns of scribbles and sounds - mental entities.

Note 'extraspatiotermporal' which in plain language means 'not in time and space'. So these kinds of 'objects' are not existent in the sense that phenomena are existent, as phenomena exist in time and space. — Wayfarer

but it does exist as a phenomena of your imagination and your imagination is just another fact of the world, or what is the case.

Ok, so in a limited (physicalist) sense you could say that extraspatiotemporal objects are not determinate, but in a general (mathematical) sense they are just as well-defined and hence determinate as spatiotemporal mathematical objects. — litewave

Like I said, they know what the edges are and what is fuzzy.

An indeterminate thing is a thing with no definition - not worthy of contemplating (even if you could), much less talk about - so a misuse of language.

Obviously it happened. It is not, however, necessary that this would happen thought. His notebooks might never have been published. It is not necessary that I quoted him or that I discuss him or post on this forum or that forum exist.

"Wanting to share" is, as you say, something I wanted to do. It is a choice not a necessity. — Fooloso4

I don't see how you could have shared it if you didn't want to, or intend to.

What about:
"The world is determined by the facts, and by these being all the
facts.

For the totality of facts determines both what is the case, and
also all that is not the case"

It appears that the world is necessarily determined by all the facts.

It's strange to say that all the facts determine what is both the case and not the case. What is not the case can only exist in a mind as imaginary. Imaginings and lies are what are not the case. All facts determine only what is the case. The totality of facts could only determine what isn't the case when minds evolved to imagine and lie.

What is the relation between language and real, nameable objects? This is the question of the basis of the concept of an object or category of objects. Doesn’t the mathematical determination follow upon the linguistic-semantic determination? Are you assuming that language is referential: we assign a semantic meaning and then associate it with a linguistic token? How do I know that my token means the same thing as your token? Is there a fact of the matter that will settle such disputes of meaning and sense? Do the empirical facts of the world ( or dictionary definitions) intervene to settle these matters? — Joshs

It seems to me that whenever anyone uses language they intend to convey information to others. The fact of the matter is the relation the speaker or writer has between the sounds and scribbles they make and the idea they intended to convey. What that might be is anyone's guess, but if you speak the same language as the speaker or writer, somehow, your chances of interpreting that relationship is substantially better than if you didn't speak their language. This must mean something, or else I can speak Italian and say that it's Vietnamese without any fact of the matter to stop me - if my intent was to cause confusion. If my intent was to communicate, then it would help to know the language of my audience.

lol, what did you mean by quoting Wittgenstein? For you to quote Witt, Witt had to write something that you found meaning in an wanted to share with us. So how did you come to quote Witt if the compulsion of Witt writing something, you finding meaning in it and you wanting to share, did not happen?

Not an entity, that's the thing. A linguistic regularity. A pattern. — bongo fury

Entities are patterns of properties.

No. It means that the way things are is not by necessity. — Fooloso4

"Accident" is not a synonym of unnecessary. "Accident" is not the correct term to convey what you actually mean. So it is necessary to use the appropriate terms if your goal is to communicate your ideas efficiently. It would also seem necessary to learn a language before you can use it. If those are necessary causes for communication to happen then why wouldn't other relations in the world not be causal in the same way? What's so special about language use when language use is simply another process in the world?

Convention? — bongo fury

...a mental entity