Chomsky is not questioning naturalism.

In which case so much for the failure of mechanism to imply anything - literally anything - about our cognitive abilities. — StreetlightX

I’d say a notion of the material world in the early scientific evolution being abandoned, one based on common sense notions — and which hasn’t been replaced to this day — certainly tells us something about our cognitive abilities. It shows us that yet again our intuitions, everyday experiences, folk source, and common sense notions simply don’t work. We have to find other ways of grasping the world — and we have.

Have you opened a philosophy journal recently? There are a blossoming of theories all over the place. — StreetlightX

I’m talking about science, and I’m talking matter, physical, material, “body,” etc. If a new technical notion has been proposed, I’m happy to take a look.

In fact he’s offered plenty of ideas about it over the years. It happened, obviously, through generic changes. Chomsky just doesn’t think it happened through gradual steps.
— Xtrix

Lol, Chomsky literally says that his shitty conception of language cannot be accounted for by natural selection — StreetlightX

Not once does he say this. Not once.

I suppose if your starting assumption is that Chomsky is an idiot, the above sounds reasonable. But what he says is that there’s little evidence to suggest that gradualism explains language. That’s not saying it’s God-created, that it’s a mystery, that it’s beyond science, that it didn’t evolve, or that natural selection doesn’t apply (of course it does).

True, language could be magic. But that’s the opposite of what Chomsky had said for 70 years or so.

Everything about Chomsky's understanding of language is pseudo-scientific, — StreetlightX

Funny you say this. I recall you cited Daniel Everett a while back in support of your claims — who’s shown to be a borderline fraud, and whose conclusions of the piraha language being thoroughly and repeatedly debunked.

He's a closet creationist — StreetlightX

Okay! :up:

:100:

There is nothing - nothing - about object permanence that makes physicalism or mechanism 'common-sense based technical notions'. — StreetlightX

Contact action, like object permanence, is a “common sense” notion. Same with the moon illusion or any other optical illusion— it’s simply how we see and experience things.

That doesn’t mean the mechanical philosophy is common sense. It means the 17th century notion of understanding was based on contact action. Turns out that’s completely wrong — fine. But importantly, nothing has been proposed since to replace that notion.

I don’t see anything chauvinistic about any of this. You’re simply misreading it.

because Chomsky lacks any terms other than 'the physical' or the mechanical to grasp the world, the failure of his pet vocabulary must imply the failure of human understanding and vice versa. — StreetlightX

Theory.

Physical and mechanical are hardly his “pet vocabulary” — he’s in fact arguing that they fail, but we have other ways of understanding the world. Ways that aren’t based on “common sense.” Namely, our explanatory theories — which are revised in time.

Yeah it "evolved", but exactly how is just one of those mysterious things that we'll never know, because his vision of language is Platonic and basically theological. — StreetlightX

His view of language is biological. Never once has he said the evolution of language is a mystery we’ll “never know.” In fact he’s offered plenty of ideas about it over the years. It happened, obviously, through generic changes. Chomsky just doesn’t think it happened through gradual steps.

You’ve now made a number of things up. Platonist, chauvinist, priest, arrogant, etc. Not sure why. But it has nothing to do with Chomsky. It’s fabrication. But that’s your business.

This is going to be a bit long-winded, but hopefully valuable in getting on the same wavelength.

Capitalism is only one system among others throughout history, defined by private ownership and the relationship between masters owners (employers) and slaves workers (employees). It has its roots in the middle ages and accelerated in the industrial revolution. It's largely replaced slavery and feudalism.

There are many variants of capitalism. Saudi Arabia is capitalist. China is capitalist. Sweden is capitalist. Most nations are "mixed economies." The United States is a state-capitalist system, and around 40 years ago, in the 70s and early 80s, began shifting from an era of "regimented capitalism" (managerialism) which existed from roughly the 1940s, to a neoliberal program. "Government is the problem."

If you agree that what I've just described above is correct, then you have your answer: yes, during the 1950s and 60s, there was a more egalitarian distribution of wealth and a larger "middle class." Is that preferable to the neoliberal era we've been subjected to? Yes. Does that mean we're happy with capitalism? No.

FDR and the New Deal was fine, but didn't go nearly far enough. Capitalism should have simply been abolished.

There was also a violent (but forgotten) fight against the New Deal policies, and right away there was a backlash. The owners of this country always resented it, but couldn't do much about it. The late 60s was the last straw for them -- that "excess of democracy" of some black people getting rights and students protesting and so on. Too much to bear.

You see the thought process laid out clearly in the 1970 Milton Friedman NY Times article about corporate governance, and the 1971 Powell memo to the US Chamber of Commerce (and, later, the Trilateral Commission's Crisis of Democracy). The OAPEC oil embargo of '73 and the "stagflation" of the mid 70s provided enough of an opening to start a push for what was always wanted: dismantling the New Deal, shrinking government (tax cuts, deregulation, privatization), and crushing unions. I assume you're aware of most of this.

So -- giiven all this, the question:

I am just wondering what about capitalism is the more important enemy.. the inequality/instability of income or the power differential? — schopenhauer1

is a false one. The power differential between owners and their employees is not just an unequal one, it's also a morally illegitimate one. Just as in the the system of slavery and the system of feudalism.

Sure, there were some nice masters and lords. There are some nice employers today. So what? Ditto for a more "equitable" distribution. The very system is unjust and illegitimate.

Capitalism also stems from a very strange concept of "liberty" and "individuality" that is, at bottom, anti-social (not simply anti-socialist). It has its roots in ideas about human nature -- elevating "self-interest," "selfishness," and "greed" as primary motives. It's more of a psychological sickness than a philosophy. In my opinion. It all reeks of both intense social phobia and anti-social personality disorder.

People are actually voting that an infinite past is more "far-fetched" than something coming from nothing?

Jesus...

Chomsky's not very hidden agenda: innate ideas. — bongo fury

That the human capacity for language is genetically determined, yes. Is that really still "controversial"? He's looking at human beings like we look at any other biological organism. We have a genetic structure. That's basically a truism.

an apologia for his effective creationism about language — StreetlightX

"Effective"? Chomsky has never once, in my reading, questioned whether language evolved. That it came about rapidly instead of gradually, as some propose, yes. That's "effective creationism"?

It’s just really odd to say we can’t refer to the word physical because Newton’s contemporaries once associated the word to mean things in the world worked like wheels and clocks. — Saphsin

It's not that -- it's that no alternative has been proposed since. As a technical notion. Common-sense notions in everyday discourse is a different matter. Of course I know what you mean when you say "physical." I know what you mean when you say I'm going to "work." When it comes to science, however, that no longer applies. So the argument Chomsky is making is that there hasn't been a replacement.

The common sense-based notion of contact action, as a basis for "understanding" the world in terms of mechanics (mechanical philosophy), was abandoned and nothing has been proposed since.

And what, if we can't square our most advanced concepts of understading to the intellectual standards of literal infants this is supposed to be a comment on our understanding other than the fact that infants are literally the stupidest variety of human on the planet? — StreetlightX

You've missed the point entirely. It's not trying to square our technical notions in science with an infant. It's merely pointing out that, much like the moon illusion, or the stick in water that appears broken, this is simply how human beings see things. As adults we realize the moon isn't that big, that the stick isn't really broken, etc., and perhaps infants and children don't -- but we still see the world this way regardless.

These are "common sense" notions. Chomsky is arguing that common sense notions don't help when it comes to science, and in fact "physical" (in terms of contact action) was one of these common-sense based technical notions that was abandoned. Crucially, another technical notion to replace it has never been given. We just have new ways of understanding the world. But we go on seeing broken sticks and making assumptions about contact action nevertheless. That's why magicians can fool us so easily with slights of hand.

Chomsky is arguing precisely that "bodies" and "the physical" does not really have a place in today's science.
— Xtrix

Right, and from this he wants to draw the conclusion that there are some things in the world that will always escape us. — StreetlightX

Maybe not "always," but yes -- he argues, as you know, over and over again that human beings have a scope and limit to their capacities. Again I think the rats in the prime number maze is a good example -- it's not easy to understand why they can't do it, perhaps, but they can't. Human beings also have their cognitive limits, and we learn something about what they are. Common sense ways of seeing the world and talking about the world -- some of which is just psychologically pre-determined -- fall apart when we study things scientifically. I mentioned the moon illusion, but there are many others. Likewise for our words -- common words like "work" mean something entirely different in everyday life compared to their use in physics.

Again, the latter stands as a perfectly reasonable position (that things will always escape us), but movement from A to C simply doesn't follow. If bodies and the physical don't have a place in today's science then they were always insignificant from the beginning other than as conceptual holding-patterns whose time is done. We owe them nothing and they speak to nothing. — StreetlightX

I think Chomsky is going from C to A, not A to C. In other words, he's not saying, as you put it, that because a 17th century notion of "physical" was abandoned (A), that this proves human beings have limits (C). Rather, he takes it as a truism that human beings have limits (C) and that this is a crucial example of our limits. Hence the claim that Newton inadvertently made a contribution to the "philosophy of mind."

So if you find the initial position a reasonable one, you're simply disagreeing that this a very good example. But I think that's partly because you've missed the point about infants and contact action mentioned above.

The point is that these ideas are throughly historical - they had a date of birth and they will have a date of death. The idea that these senses of causality are deeply held eternal metaphysical notions is just rear-guard parochialism. — StreetlightX

Are optical illusions "eternal metaphysical notions"? You're mixing categories here I think. On the one hand we, as human beings, have common-sense experiences and notions about contact action; on the other, we have the mechanical philosophy which tried to describe the world in terms of a causality based in this common experience.

Because the latter was abandoned says nothing about the former. It doesn't make the former go away, nor does it make it some eternal notion.

Even if infants develop certain ideas along a relatively stable developmental path, this might speak to nothing other than the fact, of, I dunno, the necessity of avoiding being eaten by lions. Which is, shall we say, a regional issue at best. — StreetlightX

Maybe object permanence is regional at best as well. Is this really an argument?

Everyone was making a decent enough salary to live in a house, buy some entertainment goods, a car, had all their daily living met.. — schopenhauer1

Imagine using this argument in defense of the system of slavery. Would this satisfy you regarding slavery?

The idea of contact action, which was the common sense basis for mechanical philosophy, is a human property.
— Xtrix

But this is simply not true. — StreetlightX

That contact action is a human property, or that it was the common sense basis for the mechanical philosophy?

Your citation seems to be addressing the latter case. That physical flux was the "least popular" explanation of causality around Leibniz's time is interesting, but I don't see the relevance here. In other words, I don't see how it falsifies the claim that it (contact action) was the basis for the mechanical philosophy.

Like, our intuitions are useless. Forget them. They're trash and philosophically uninteresting other than a good historical and cultural tale. If you want to read how absolutely bonkers our (by which I only mean Western) schemes of causality really have been, check out Steven Nadler's editied collection on "Causation in Early Modern Philosophy" (you can find it on Libgen). — StreetlightX

Sure. But I don't understand why you apparently think I'm arguing the opposite of this. That's in fact the point about contact action being a "common sense" basis for the mechanical philosophy -- namely that intuition simply falls apart when trying to explain, for example, the force of gravity. Which is why Chomsky talks about Newton inadvertently making contributions to the philosophy of mind, since it (arguably) demonstrates an example of cognitive limits.

Like, maybe bodies and 'the physical' have a place, but that would have to be argued, and not taken for granted - certainly not in the way that Chomsky does. — StreetlightX

Again I don't quite understand this remark. Chomsky is arguing precisely that "bodies" and "the physical" does not really have a place in today's science. I think the following will be helpful to clear away any misunderstanding (this is from Chomsky's lecture in Oslo, which I posted above and which I transcribed -- so any error is mine):

I don't think we can leave materialism behind until someone tells us what materialism is. There was a concept of materialism right through the early scientific revolution, right through Newton -- Newton still accepted it. In fact the great scientists of the next century still accepted it, LaGrange and others still tried to develop a material, mechanistic concept of the universe that went right through the 19th century -- ether theories and so on. It was finally given up in the 20th century. Finally recognized that 'we're never gonna get it.' And totally different ways of looking at things were developed, which have no relation to traditional materialism, if Friedrich Lange is correct -- and nobody has ever suggested another notion.

Materialism is just like anything we more or less understand -- it includes thinking, reasoning, etc. So we can't leave it behind until someone explains what it is. But there's no reason we can't study it. We can study what the human capacity of understanding is. We know some negative things. Like we can't understand how the world works, for example. Because our concept of understanding is too limited to incorporate what Newton described as an absurdity. Newton and Hume and Lock weren't idiots -- we should take them seriously. They regarded it as an absurdity for very good reasons, and modern cognitive science (which somehow tries to recapitulate some of this) finds pretty much that. For example, as I mentioned, an infant, presented with presentations which indicate that there's some kind of causality -- like when the ball rolls this way a light turns red or something -- they will invent a mechanical cause, and they don't care if it's not visible, because infants understand that most of what goes on is invisible but there's got to be some mechanical cause otherwise there's no way to influence anything else. So that does seem to be the way our minds work, and that tells us something about the limits of our understanding; in fact a classical, crucial case -- and it can go on to other cases.

At 1:02:00 on the video.

I think there will be war eventually between the United States and China. — frank

Nuclear war?

Nevermind.

Why what’s wrong?

The implication being that China doing more in fighting climate change will result in a nuclear war?

I didn’t make any claim about whether science works or not.

The idea of contact action, which was the common sense basis for mechanical philosophy, is a human property. It’s not culturally conditioned any more than the moon illusion is culturally conditioned, or object permanence is culturally conditioned.

Pointing out, as Chomsky does, that we can’t understand the world in this way — as was shown by Newton and others — is perhaps one example of the limits of human intelligibility. The claim that humans have scope and limits is essentially a truism.

I don’t see the relevance of “retrofitting.” No one is trying to retrofit our current understanding, concepts and knowledge to that of 18th century England.

China's approach is significant because of the way that it contrasts with the Western approach which is neoliberal.

This contrast will provide future generations with empirical data about which approach works best; central planning or free markets. — frank

Neoliberalism is hardly the same as free markets — which don’t exist, anywhere.

I have no doubt China will handle this better than the US, which is a failed state.

What claim do 'bodies' or 'material' have which make them anything other than a limited European set of ideas that have been in vogue for some time? — StreetlightX

I suppose we can argue that science is just a Western invention— and there’s something to that. But I’d argue it’s a better example of possible human limits than any of the many examples one could use.

But again, I don’t think the claim is that because one 17th century European conception is obsolete, that all of human intelligibility is lost. It’s that this is one example of something that may demonstrate limits — and a particularly interesting one. You’re saying it’s not particularly interesting — no more so than qi or karma or corpuscles or alchemy. Here again I’d simply say that I do think there’s something sui generis about science. But perhaps that’s another conversation.

But the parochialism lies in the idea that it follows even minimally from the failure of the mechanic philosophy — StreetlightX

When it comes to the mind/body problem, he argues that there hasn’t been a conception of “body” since this time. So ideas about the “physical world” isn’t formulable. That’s one point. But in terms of what’s understood — plenty is understood. Knowledge isn’t impossible. We just have a different conception of “understanding” — one rooted more in theoretical formulation than contact action.

So what about mysteries? Chomsky has made the point, for decades, that human beings have a scope and limits to their cognitive capacities. The same applies here. Perhaps issues like will, the creative use of language, and understanding the world in “physical” terms demonstrate those limits. Maybe. Maybe it will be resurrected — but as of yet, that’s not the case. We still don’t have a conception of “material.”

I think the points are obvious. Of course we have limits. What’s interesting in this particular case — with Descartes, Newton, and the mind/body problem — is that what’s traditionally (and still to this day) been taken as a “scientific” understanding of the world was actually abandoned long ago, and was never resurrected. Thus, there can’t be a mind/body problem — we still have no sense of “body.”

Who cares? Well, I see plenty of threads on this very forum endlessly debating the mind/body issue, discussing the “physical” world, trying to bridge the gap between consciousness and the material world, etc. So I think it’s worth listening to someone claiming that’s all pretty much a waste of time.

As if the whole of the intelligible was at stake in the mechanic philosophy, — StreetlightX

That would be ridiculous, yeah. But I don’t see that being the claim. That mechanical philosophy is just one example— but an important one.

Chomsky is probably right about two things: (1) the mechanical philosophy has exhausted itself; (2) We probably won't end up knowing everything. But that these things have anything whatsoever to do with each other is incredibly silly. — StreetlightX

We may not know everything, and perhaps one example is understanding the world in terms of bodies, material, and physical.

That’s the claim, and I still don’t see how it’s silly. In fact if it’s true I think more should pay attention, as I mentioned above.

then have the gall to suggest that the world is incomprehensible because of that. — StreetlightX

Where does Chomsky say the world is incomprehensible?

He's saying we have a much different understanding today, one not confined solely to mechanistic processes -- like contact action, which was what was once meant by "understanding."

And I'm at a place in my life where I desire having a clean clear mind more then anything and so if I take something that alters my state of being i actually get frustrated — MAYAEL

It really depends on what we deem "good" or "bad." What many may call "clean and clear" is actually an amalgam of unquestioned beliefs, values, and habits that embody themselves in "normal" behavior. Being briefly jarred from what we consider ordinary, "normal," etc., can be very beneficial indeed.

The line between "drugs" and "medicine" is a very thin one, too. I doubt very much you'd be against medicines.

In any case, I'd be careful about extrapolating from your own experiences to such a general degree.

Interesting stuff. Thanks for the reference.

For anyone not willing to read:



See in particular the question and answer section.

What part of
cite where Chomsky clearly states what he Chomsky means by "understanding" and "mystery" and where he soundly demonstrates how he/we can understand whatever it is he/we "will never understand".
— 180 Proof
do you not understand, Xtrix? :roll: — 180 Proof

What part of the article don't you understand?

It's not offering "new" definitions for the words "understanding" or "mystery" -- and asking for such is, as I've said before, missing the entire point. Which you would know if you read it. He does talk at length about aspects of the world that appear to be incomprehensible to the human mind, in the same way that rat's can't run prime number mazes.

So take your rolling eyes and stop wasting time on a thread you never intended on engaging with. Go assign meaningless homework assignments elsewhere.

You kibbitz a lot, Xtrix, without staying on topic or addressing my explicit requests — 180 Proof

I, and others, have addressed your issues. But your requests are based on misunderstandings and arrogant presumptions.

cite where Chomsky clearly states what he Chomsky means by "understanding" and "mystery" and where he soundly demonstrates how he/we can understand whatever it is he/we "will never understand". — 180 Proof

Human beings have scope and limit in their cognitive capacities. That’s obvious. What was once thought as “understanding” — a mechanical view — is no longer the case. Ditto physical and material. This is the claim.

There are things we understand — within the scope of our cognitive abilities — and there are some things we don’t (and perhaps can’t) understand. He talks about rats and the prime number maze — that’s a mystery to them, just as will and the creative use of language is to us today.

If you’re looking for a technical definition of “understanding” or “mystery,” you’ve completely missed the point.

Again, best to start by reading the text rather than coming into a discussion with motivated reasoning, launching accusations which are demonstrably untrue.

t I need to know whether or not Chomsky says anything new on this topic — 180 Proof

It’s important to understand what the topic is first. If you’re unwilling to do this, that’s OK. But perhaps not waste others’ time on a thread you have no real interest in.

Anyway, so Chomsky's sense of "understanding" – by extension explicability and therefore inexplicability (i.e. "mysterious, mystery") – is anachronistic and related to / derived from an out-dated, surpassed, methodological paradigm? – okay, got it. — 180 Proof

No, that's not his sense. What Newton believed isn't what Chomsky believes. The passage you cite is a description of what Newton meant. Chomsky is not advocating "understanding" in the sense of the mechanical philosophy, i.e., contact action. This is very clear, if one deigns to read.

I've been to a few public lectures he'd given in the 80's & 90's and have read most of his books published before the turn of the millenium. — 180 Proof

An odd remark. What’s the relevance? That you’ve read a lot of Chomsky? That’s great— but what about the text in question?

finished reading the article thoroughly) I don't see any reason to adopt the vocabulary of what those in the 17th century thought was the criterion of scientific knowledge, that physical explanations equated to "common sense" and what counts as common sense were people's experience with engineered machines. Of course the world isn't a machine, the world is the world. The modern version of this nonsense is asking whether "if the universe is a simulation" now that we're familiar with video games. There's no reason the world has to comport with our everyday experience, but that doesn't mean increased knowledge of counterintuitive things isn't actual knowledge of how the world works. — Saphsin

Chomsky isn’t saying we don’t have knowledge about how the world works. He’s saying, at least in my reading, that our ideas of intelligibility have changed, and that words like “physical” and “material” are basically honorific. There can’t be a mind-body problem if we don’t know what “body” is, and there hasn’t been a conception since the mechanistic philosophy, which was destroyed with Newton. That’s basically the thesis.

Science of course did not end with the collapse of the notion of body (material, physical, and so on). Rather, it was reconstituted in a radically new way, with questions of conceivability and intelligibility dismissed as demonstrating nothing except about human cognitive capacities, though that conclusion has taken a long time to become firmly established. Later stages of science introduced more “absurdi- ties.” The legitimacy of the steps is determined by criteria of depth of explanation and empirical support, not conceivability and intelligibil- ity of the world that is depicted.

[my emphasis]

but I start from an understanding of scientific explanation in terms of conceptualizing what we know from the sciences today, so it doesn't matter to me if Newton's discoveries betrayed some old promise. — Saphsin

That’s the point: there hasn’t been a new conception of “physical” since Newton.

Well, there's no reason to take mechanical philosophy or its corollary seriously now that we have completely new notions, we know what Newton and his contemporaries did not know. The piece is one-sided, a long list of historical roadblocks of when we figured out how much we don't know as science progressed without mentioning any progressive changes of our picture in reality that science has given us. — Saphsin

What are these “completely new notions”? Chomsky is well aware of relativity and quantum mechanics. I’m not sure what you’re claiming he’s “conspicuously leaving out.” What is the new notion of physical/material?

Strange that you go around resurrecting all my old threads. But thanks!

I'm not a mysterian — 180 Proof

Neither is Chomsky. Try engaging with texts instead of labeling with an “ism.” Or send him an e-mail about his “ramblings” and teach him a thing or two — I for one would be very interested to see it.

Just wanted to say that I think you’ve understood Chomsky very well. That’s pretty rare, in my experience, despite him usually pointing out fairy straightforward things.

The mischievious thought that occurs to me is that perhaps what's being shown here is that matter is basically unintelligible. — Wayfarer

Exactly right. It’s perfectly fine to use in normal everyday discourse, but it has no technical notion.

Not mysticism, but he does include himself in mysterianism — Tom Storm

Really? I’ve never heard him say so, so I welcome the correction if I’m mistaken.

Human beings have a scope and limit. I don’t think that’s “mysterianism.” He uses the example of rats failing at a prime number made as an example. Their cognitive capacities are limited. Ours are clearly limited as well. We know this in terms of senses (we don’t have echolocation or the olfactory capability of dogs), perception (the moon illusion), and in terms of basic biology (we can’t fly like birds). I consider this just truism. Shouldn’t be controversial.

So maybe we can’t “understand” the world in the way understanding was once meant.

An important essay indeed. Chomsky's been saying this for years, and too few listen. He demonstrates, quite clearly, how there is no mind/body problem without the concept of "body," which was long ago destroyed as a technical notion -- and hasn't been replaced since.

I don't think he's advocating for "mysterianism" or mysticism. He's simply saying we have limits in our capacities to understand the world, and while we may not know exactly what they are, there are many hints. We seem to progress in some domains and hit brick walls in others, historically.

So any accusation that Chomsky, who's a scientist though and through, is simply becoming a mystic is unfounded. Rather, he's reiterating what Newton pointed out, and using this to demonstrate how little we really know about what's "physical" and "material."

For my money, Chomsky is likely to be better informed and smarter than possibly everyone on this forum. — Tom Storm

About nearly everything, yes. Philosophy, history, politics, and most of the sciences. But we could mop the floor with him if it came to popular culture.

Not sure if anyone saw this, but worth a read, and interested in reactions:

https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-the-american-polity-is-cracked-and-might-collapse-canada-must-prepare/

Religion →
→
Philosophy →
→
Science. — Agent Smith

I think this is exactly right, chronologically— with one important caveat: that the words themselves are being used in modern terms. Otherwise, all three share the common feature of dealing with basic human questions — they all begin and end with the human mind.

In the modern sense, I think science (as natural philosophy) is the most narrow. Its object is nature. Science, then, from one perspective is simply physics — and physics studies how the natural world works mostly using mathematics. Mathematics is a very unique activity, and calls upon different human mental capacities — what one might call logical capacities (and which is often meant by “reason,” “rational,” and even “thinking” — all potential translations or derivatives from the word “logos.”)

It’s also important to recall that both words, nature and physics, stem from the same Greek word: phusis, which was the early Greek word for “being.” Its more limited sense— nature (natura in Latin) — became predominant shortly thereafter.

So the lines between religion and philosophy aren’t as rigid as one might think. I sense the push of scientism has reinterpreted history as a story of overcoming myth and superstition through the powers of the scientific method — and so there’s endless debate about religion and science, faith and reason, etc. But this can be misleading. I myself for too long took this line of thinking.

But as in the case with Buddhism, ordinary conceptions of religion tend to break down. It’s better and easier, in my view, to see all of these words as referring simply to an activity of humans; specifically the activity of “deep thinking” (to distinguish from other kinds of everyday thought) in terms of fundamental questioning.

The Epic of Gilgamesh is a great example of what I mean.

I don't think there is much evidence for a general "discomfort associated with stopping.' If you try not to stop or sleep for long enough you will simply collapse. — universeness

There is a lot of evidence about it, actually. It's not a matter of not sleeping -- of course we all sleep. But the quality of sleep and the length of sleep has changed, largely due to cell phone usage. You can see it with prescriptions for sleep medications as well.

Go scientific! — Agent Smith

I have no idea what that is supposed to mean.

Is going to sleep routinely kind of like an acceptance of death? Of the unknown? — TiredThinker

I think so, yes. It's similar to fear of the dark, in kids and adults. But it's even more superficial than that: it's the discomfort associated with stopping. This is why problems around sleep are so common -- it's cultural. We're overworked and overstimulated, and now technology has conditioned our brains to be constantly moving.

I think assigning some days to having no inputs, walking in the woods more often, and meditation can all help with this.

Assume R = Time is real — Agent Smith

"Real" is meaningless until it's explained, so the rest is also pointless.

I couldn't open the article for some reason, but this is the same thing:

No, although that is an interesting point. My point was that generally our thoughts aren't ours in a philosophical debate, which may or may not lead to an absence of "thought". The chess analogy was to demonstrate that the master is good because he's practiced recognizing specific solutions to a variety of situations, not necessarily because he's good at "chess". — john27

But isn't that like saying that everything we say is also not ours?

Regarding chess: I see mastery a little differently. I think the chess master is a master precisely because he's not theoretical, as perhaps a beginner might start out being. Like a musician, in fact. Anyone who's learned piano knows that you start with simple steps and basic theory (scales, etc) -- but the expert piano player no longer has to remember any of this. Both he and the chess master simply know what to do without thinking.

I think the question ought to be, what is rational thinking, because by introducing reason you have at least some common ground to start with. Otherwise it's so broad as to not be meaningful, 'thinking' in the loose sense being simply all of the spontaneous activities of any mind. — Wayfarer

I think there's a meaningful difference between more abstract thought and what's going on generally when we're talking to ourselves. To me, general thought is somewhat akin to action that is simply automatic, habitual, and not consciously directed.

So when I say not all thinking is philosophy, I'm getting at the distinction you're also making. But that spontaneous activity that isn't philosophy is still meaningful.

Thinking is generalizing, abstractive, associative, contextualizing, reflective,,logical, analogical, dialogical, dialectical, imaginative, conjectural, speculative. rational, irrational. — Janus

Wrong.

(kidding)

such that to think is, with sufficient grounds, to question (categorical) questions and/or to problematize (hypothetical) problems. — 180 Proof

Philosophy does seem inseparable from its questions. I think this is a distinguishing feature, along with the reflective aspect which separates it from other kinds of thought.

I would disagree on the fact that all philosophy involves thinking, so long as we attribute thinking to be an individual endeavour. — john27

A little like a chess master vs someone naturally talented at chess: one is recognizing patterns/arguments and resolving them with tried and true logical pathways, the other is relying on his gifted logical capacities to guide him. — john27

I don't think I'm fully understanding this point. Are you suggesting some philosophy takes place as a kind of instinctual activity?

As for "philosophy", this becomes terminological more than factual, and we tend to say that certain types of thoughts pertain to issues continuing to the beginning of humanity: what is a self, what is the will, what is an object, what is the right thing to do, what is experience, and so on. — Manuel

:up:

Thought is cognition by means of conceptions. — Mww

I think that's too narrow. I'm not always thinking conceptually. Seems more that this is one kind of thought, not thought itself.

take a stab at what thinking is: it’s allowing thoughts to occur, to come to me. — Srap Tasmaner

Is this like saying that thinking is thoughts? Which of course the next question is: "What are thoughts?"

I wouldn't say not all thinking is philosophy.

How would we know unless we do the appropriate analysis? — Agent Smith

Well I would say we're doing philosophy right now, in asking and analyzing "What is thinking?" But that doesn't mean that when we're not analyzing, we're not thinking. That would be like saying that all language is writing. I talk to myself all the time, and not all of it is philosophical -- in the sense of being reflective or asking basic questions.



The Stooges. Underrated philosophers.

The fact that the vaccine is safe and effective is not a policy. — Isaac

I'm not advocating a policy. The article I cited was advocating a policy of incentives, which I was examining.

The question here is whether vaccine avoidance is, in fact, irrational, not whether irrationality is a bad thing. — Isaac

I think I've made it quite clear that I'm referring to irrationality, and thus irrationality surrounding vaccine avoidance, of which there is plenty. Not all, of course, because there are always exceptions. But yes, when people refuse to get vaccinated because they think they'll be magnetized, or lose ability to have kids, or be implanted with a chip, etc., that's completely irrational -- and fueled by social media.

You're quite right that there's no point arguing over truisms. Yet this is what I've stated from the beginning, and here we are.

If you're truly interested in worker freedom, how about dedicating more time to unions instead of railing on about vaccines?
— Xtrix

How do you know what I spend my time doing? — Isaac

I see only what you post on the forum. Seems like you spend a lot of time on this topic.

No one is seriously talking about vaccines achieving herd immunity. — Isaac

Not now, no. But they were.

trusted in the experts (including my doctor) well before many people were vaccinated.
— Xtrix

Good. Other people trust in experts too. Experts who disagree. — Isaac

Disagree about what?

Your sycophancy has reached a new low. — Isaac

Yes, I hear this from 9/11 truthers as well. They're equally correct.

Really? You're saying that we can't choose which mathematicians to listen to either? Why in earth not? — Isaac


I didn't say mathematician, I said math.
— Xtrix

Then what's your point? That no one disagrees in mathematics? That's not the case. — Isaac

:rofl:

And this is exactly what conversations like this typically reduce to.

Yeah, maybe 2 + 2 will equal 5 one day -- who knows? Some people disagree. Some people disagree with the sphericity of earth.

There's no such thing as truth or fact, so anything goes. Pick your favorite experts, your favorite math, etc., and be happy.

I'll skip reading the rest of your posts. I'm no longer interested. Stick with your "experts" and be well.