, "The only thing I can think of is that the concept of a particular 'ordinary object' might not include what's really going on to make the ordinary object as it is from a typical phenomenal standpoint, but ordinary object concepts are not usually claims in that regard anyway." — Terrapin Station

So there are two important things here. The first is that our concept of ordinary objects may not reflect what makes an ordinary object, which leaves the door open to the possibility that there are no ordinary objects.

The second is more along the lines that language is being taken out of context. I disagree here, because I've always understand ordinary objects to be an implicit claim to existence, thus everyone's shock when someone says they don't exist. Or laughter after passing the pipe.

It's not a problem. — Terrapin Station

So you're saying professional philosophers agree it's not a problem and don't discuss it? Or that you have just solved it now?

That would be a misunderstanding of what science is doing/saying. There's no conflict. — Terrapin Station

If you say so. But I'm telling you it is problem discussed in contemporary metaphysics. Of course not everyone agrees it's a problem

Ordinary object concepts aren't about molecules, are they? — Terrapin Station

They are not, which is a problem when doing ontology, since science says they're made up of molecules.

Are they? IF ne of them says, "sure, it's not a forgery - but it's not real..." what do we say? — Banno

We seek clarification, because it doesn't make sense without proper context.

Science isn't saying anything at all like "chairs aren't real" lol — Terrapin Station

Yeah, but you're missing the philosophical argument here. The problem arises because philosophers noticed conflicts between our notion of everyday objects and what science says they're made up of.

You'd have to give an example. The only thing I can think of is that the concept of a particular "ordinary object" might not include what's really going on to make the ordinary object as it is from a typical phenomenal standpoint, but ordinary object concepts are not usually claims in that regard anyway. — Terrapin Station

I updated my response as you were posting. Go back and read the extra part about boundaries, particle collections and vagueness. I can also link you to an article on the problem of many.

So, if someone insists the painting is real, what do they mean? — Banno

In context of art, they're disagreeing over whether it's a forgery. In general, they're being pandantic about the painting existing.

Is the chair real? — Banno

Not if we take science seriously, in my opinion. Is there some other context you have in mind when we ask that question?

The "scientific versions" aren't different than the "ordinary versions." They're other ways of looking at the ordinary versions, they're the ordinary versions from other reference points, at least different explanatory reference points. — Terrapin Station

The problem is that this leads to paradoxes because the scientific version raises issues for our concept of ordinary objects.

For example, How do you decide exactly which collection of particles is the chair? Note that if you give an imprecise answer here, this conflicts with our notion of chairs having precise boundaries.

Chairs aren't vague objects with imprecise boundaries such that we can give a rough answer to which collection of particles count as the chair. This is the problem of many.

If you like; the point being that context is all. It's a real paining as opposed to an illusion, but it's not a real McCubbin. The frame is real wood, not plastic. — Banno

Okay, so the context is wanting to know whether the world is populated by ordinary objects in addition to their scientific versions (particles and empty space). Or whether they are the same thing, or don't exist (the scientific version is exclusive).

What we mean by "it's real!" is decided by what we are opposing it to.

How's that? — Banno

Ehhh, wouldn't it be the other way around? What we suppose is fake, an illusion, fictional, etc. is decided by being opposed to what we have reason to believe is real.

IS the issue there that we see chairs as solid, manipulable items in our world, but scientists tell us they are particles and space - something quite different? — Banno

Yes, realism about ordinary objects given what science has to say.

Sure. Do you want to have this discussion here? — Banno

I suppose we should just focus on Wittgenstein's approach and whether it works.

Even better, how we would know whether it works. When can we say a long standing philosophical problem has been properly dissolved?

42. — Banno

I thought that was the answer? Are you playing a different language game?

But I hope you see the thrust of this very powerful approach to doing philosophy. — Banno

I see the potential yet remain skeptical. Sure, it probably works on some problems. But as a universal acid? Is all metaphysics merely an abuse of language?

f red is not the name of a thing, then there is no need for there to be a thing that is red. That is, we can make sense of talk of red in dreams; and that's all there is. We do not need to invoke red dream-things. — Banno

Red is the name of an experience, and is the experience of red that Chalmers thinks raises a hard problem.

But that does not bear directly on the case in hand: that he whole philosophical exercise of explaining universals is based on a certain picture of how words work, and dissipates when that picture is dropped. — Banno

If it does indeed dissipate. If so, then we have an iconic example of this kind of therapeutic philosophy working. Which raises the question of how many philosophical problems can be dissipated.

But first i would need more arguments to believe in the dissipation of universals. Does this problem not come up in languages which don't make nouns of all words? Do we not see a parallel of the problem in Indian, Arabic or Chinese philosophy?

For my part, I remain unconvinced that there is a useable distinction to be made between phenomenal red and plain ordinary red. — Banno

It's a lot trickier with perception, since other issues such as direct and color realism come into play, but Chalmers point can be more easily made with dream red. How does neuroscience account for an experience of red when you're not seeing a red object?

↪Marchesk see https://www.gondwana-collection.com/blog/how-do-namibian-himbas-see-colour/ — Banno

That's a very interesting experiment, and I did hear about the lack of blue references in Homer's works on a RadioLab episode, but it's also quite a controversial claim.

Can we apply this to a hot button contemporary issue, like say, phenomenal red? Is Chalmers making a language mistake when he says that the experience of red is not captured by the scientific description of perceiving a red object?

perhaps this discussion will help you to see why someone such as I would come to the conclusion that the problem of universals dissipates if one deals with it as a language issue. — Banno

Yes, but then does this mean the problem arose because philosophers took universal concepts out of context?

You and I presumably do agree on what is green and what is red, in the main; is it because we have learned to identify some essence of red that permeates certain things, or is it just simply that we have learned how to use the word "red" in our English speaking community? — Banno

At the very least, we have learned to use red for a range of color shades. And these shades can be given numbers based on a three-value primary color scale, which corresponds to the three kinds of cones we have in our eyes.

It is interesting that some cultures may have differences in color concepts. Does that imply something about language's effect on the brain?

Could it be that what red things have in common is just that we have learned to use the word "red" when talking about them? That what they have in common is our use of a certain word? — Banno

What does this mean exactly? Because it sounds like our use of red and green are arbitrary, and we could have divided up color space differently, and it would have been just as useful.

Sometimes we don't. At the edges, we do differ as to our opinions of which colour word is appropriate. — Banno

This is a good point. Boundary conditions are important to take into consideration.

Sure we can wonder, but if there is nothing in common among reds, how are we able to discriminate them from greens?

Fine. WHat I am trying to establish is, is the example a suitable one for the problem of universals? — Banno

I guess we can just focus on a color property, and notice that we use the universal term "red" for all the particular instances of reds.

In which case, is this a question about what it is that certain sports cars and sunsets have in common, or is it a question about hw we use the word "red"? — Banno

I would say we use the word red the way we do because lots of things have reddish hue.

Is the problem that of working out what a universal refers to? What sort of thing? — Banno

The problem is working out how universals are useful. They may or not point to a particular thing (a universal object) in the world, but it would be fair to assume there is something about individual things which allows us to universalize.

At which point we look at the similarity among individual things and debate what that entails. Or alternatively, the similarity reflects an organizational feature of our minds.

Let's take another example. Do ordinary objects like tables and chairs exist? This is a bit different from external world skepticism. The problem arises by noticing that the scientific explanation of ordinary objects leads to contradictions with our notions of what ordinary objects are supposed to be. The problem of many is one such contradiction. Science says that a table is a collection of particles bound together by the electromagnetic force. But the surface of an object is not well defined on a molecular level. This leads to the realization that we can't say for sure which exact collection of particles is the table, meaning that there could be many tables where we conceive of one.

But if we look at how ordinary objects are used in everyday language, then we can dismiss the problem as misunderstanding the role ordinary objects play. Tables and chairs are meaningful and useful for us.

However, what if I want to know whether our understanding of ordinary objects is backed up by science? Then I'm back to the same problem. Because then I'm not asking about the usefulness of tables and chairs, I'm asking whether they exist as we think of them. I'm asking a question about the world and our commonsense understanding of it. My conclusion is that our ordinary language is simply mistaken. The problem is with our everyday concepts, not the philosophical inquiry.

Ordinary objects are a good example of the loose fit between language (or mind) and world (or science).

That's the sense in which Wittgenstein's philosophy is more like Protestant than Catholic mysticism, but it still has that mystical side to it. — Wayfarer

Or like Zen Buddhism. It's interesting that Witty said concerning consciousness and the beetle in a box not that it's nothing, only that we can't speak about it. Which is something Dennett noted and disagreed with Witty about, because obviously it must be eliminated!

Which makes me wonder, is language under Wittgenstein's understanding equivalent to a p-zombie? I'm digressing from universals here, but I heard on a recent panpsychist podcast discussing Wittgenstein where the philosopher guest stated that there was no hard problem because Witty showed us mind is public because language is public.

Anyway, the point of this discussion is whether philosophical problems such as universals, free will or consciousness can be dismissed by analyzing their use in language games and subsequent misuse by philosophers. But in the case of universals, if you're right that meaning is grounded by them, then we can't so easily dismiss them, since it goes deeper than playing language games. Universals make language games possible, if I understand you correctly.

I am awfully sorry, Marchesk, but in my favourite universe when someone introduces a topic, they describe the situation in their own words, and not simply insert a link to a (probably) very lengthy script. — god must be atheist

I did, and you responded by saying you didn't understand the well known positions in the example used, so I posted links for you to familiarize yourself. The problem of universals isn't the point of this topic, it's Wittgenstein's approach to dissolving philosophical problems by saying that language goes on holiday when philosophers fail to understand words in their proper language games. This is also well known in philosophy, but The NY Times article sums that up nicely, and it's not a long read.

That is, universals were an attempt to solve a problem that the ancient Greeks had with their understanding of nature. — tim wood

That's a good point. I could have used free will or skepticism, it's just they seemed harder to express simply in this conversation.

We could say that the problem of free will can be dissolved by looking at how free will is used in ordinary language, until we realize the free will is expressing a view of human agency that many people implicitly hold. And this isn't simply a language game. It's more of an experience people have of being able to make what seems like undetermined choices originating with the person. And that's why people can be held responsible for their actions.

Now that might be partially cultural, owing to Judea-Christian influence in the West. And maybe one would say the Jewish-Christian language games have come to predominate in certain cultures.

Buy I'm skeptical that casting philosophical problems as misunderstanding language games really gets at the issue those concepts are expressing in the language game. Free will wouldn't be part of a language game if we didn't experience some sort of freedom in making choices.

Philosophy is not language on a holiday; rather it is language put to the hardest possible work. — tim wood

I like that. Turns out that a lot of everyday notions are problematic, and don't stand up that well under inquiry. Science backs philosophy on this.

I don't care about the theological application of universals, only the philosophical problem, which goes back to Plato, and still exists today. It's just an example where it's easy to see how one might dismiss it on grounds that philosophers are abusing language, while failing to see what gave rise to it.

Here's maybe a better link to the problem: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nominalism-metaphysics/

but the functions exist prior to the language and that can be examined for philosophical analysis. — Forgottenticket

That's a good way of putting it.

A lot of times in philosophy, I stumble upon something I came up with before on my own but didn't know the communal terms to describe it. — Forgottenticket

Yeah, long before I read about p-zombies or even solipsism, I remember sitting in a busy dinner with a friend, and I started focusing on the clang of silverware and dishes with the buzz of conversation all around me, and the thought occurred to me that everyone else could just be acting as if they were experiencing the diner, yet I was the only one. For a few minutes, it actually seemed believable.

It is a very different approach from those who tell you where and when things went south. — Valentinus

Descartes seems to be the big bad of philosophy, but I think he's just rephrasing what arose in ancient philosophy. And I don't think it's unique to Western Philosophy. The context and language might be a bit different, but the general ideas are there. Debates over idealism, realism, materialism, skepticism can be found in Indian and Chinese philosophy.

What IS the problem? Shouldn't we spell out in plain, simple language, what the problem is, before attempting to solve it? — god must be atheist

The NY Times had a good article on this a few years ago: https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/03/was-wittgenstein-right/

I don't understand this. I frankly admit it. What's universalism? Nominalism? Conceptualism? Platonism? — god must be atheist

The problem of universals. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/universals-medieval/

I used it as an example, because it's easy to say how it might be stated as philosophers playing with feces while missing the deeper point it raises.

I think starting from the presumption of radical private-ness and separation is one of the less fruitful ways, since it's logic leads straight to epistemological solipsism. — Janus

Yes, just like indirect realism leads to a veil of perception and potentially radical skepticism. But maybe that's just our epistemic position as animals. And perhaps it's not quite so radical, but just enough that skepticism can get a foot hold.

We have the similar issues with memories, dreams and sanity.

e live in an inter-subjective world such that the mental lives of others are beyond doubt, — Janus

Do we really? It's not like I can read people's thoughts or have their experiences. What I think's happening is that inferring other people's minds is such a natural thing that it appears we live in an inter-subjective world. Just like it appears I'm looking out at the world through my eyes.

How good are we at detecting lying? How well do we really know other people? There have been cases of friends and families (including spouses) not knowing that someone was a serial killer.

If I'm day dreaming, you might be able to tell that I'm lost in my thoughts and not paying attention to my surroundings, but you don't experience what I'm imagining. Yes, I can tell you. But from your perspective, all you have to rely on is my word and behavior. You can lie. You can omit the embarrassing part. We often don't get the full truth from people about what they're thinking or feeling.

Also, this inter-subjectivity is not so natural for everyone. Some people, notably autistic folks and maybe sociopaths (lack of empathy), have a certain mind-blindness. This would indicate that mind-inferring is an ability. Some would say that we simulate other people's minds to try and predict their behavior.

I don't get this. We don't look at minds at all. — Janus

Right, but we experience a mental life for ourselves, and infer that in others based on behavior and similar biology. That's what's laid out with the start of the harder problem.