The content of his belief included a particular broken clock. He believed that that particular broken clock was working, and hence used it to form the subsequent belief that it was 3PM. — creativesoul

No, the content of his belief didn't include the concept 'the broken clock.' The content of his belief is captured by what he thought, not what was true or can be inferred from what he thought.

For the sake of getting clear on this point, I'll just pretend he actually had this thought, but I don't concede that he actually thought this: "This clock is working." How you can you object to this analysis? He looked at the clock and thought, "This clock is working." The clock's not working is a fact about the clock. You can't include this fact as part of his belief, because he never thought that the clock wasn't working. So, you can't say that his thought was "This broken clock is working."

The following comments are an aside. You should really get clear on the above first.

As someone has already pointed out, doesn't the fact that you're attributing to him a self-contradictory belief give you pause? Furthermore, the fact that it's obviously self-contradictory should suggest to you that he can't believe it.

How do you decide whether a belief is justified? — Janus

That depends on which conception of knowledge you're talking about. For JTB, you're justified if you use one of the prescribed methods (or sanctioned methods) for acquiring true beliefs. For our example, visual observation of a clock's minute and hour hands, provided you know how to read a clock, is a sanctioned method by which to form a true belief about the time. This is what the man does in the Russell example, so he is justified, according to JTB.

For my intuitions of knowledge, that's not enough. The clock would also have to be working and keeping the correct time. So, for my intuitions, he's not justified, as there are two parts to justification under this conception: the method and the source.

Can a belief be justified and yet untrue?

For JTB, yes, but it wouldn't count as knowledge.
For my intuitions, I'm not sure. Let me think about it.

Does 'justified' mean, to you, merely something like understandable (given the circumstances or context)?

For JTB, justified simply means that you used one of the prescribed (or sanctioned) methods for acquiring true beliefs. It doesn't guarantee you truth, though, which is why you can be justified and have a false belief.

For me, it involves using a very reliable method for acquiring true beliefs (pretty much like in JTB) and satisfying certain criteria with regard to the source of your belief. In the Russell example, the man's source was a broken clock, which fails to satisfy the source criteria, however that gets spelled out.

If so, then knowledge would be understandable true belief.

Well, I didn't agree that "justified" means something like "understandable," so this doesn't apply to me.

He believes that it's 3 PM. And he came to believe that it's 3 PM by looking at a particular clock, a particular broken clock.

I think you are missing the fact that if the clock has stopped working then the belief, although true, is not justified. — Janus

You're repeating my own position to me. I said he's not justified under my conception of knowledge. I said he is justified under JTB. If you think he isn't justified under JTB, then you don't understand JTB.

You might want to say that he is justified in believing that his belief is justified,

Well, I personally would never want to say that. I was characterizing creativesoul's position.

but that belief is not true, since the clock is not, contrary to his perfectly natural expectation, working.

This tells me you don't understand either JTB or our intuitions of knowledge. Whether he's justified or not has nothing to do with whether his belief is true or not.

Also, earlier you mentioned "Warranted True Belief" as an alternative to JTB. I'm not seeing any significant differences, on the face of it, between the two terms.

Warranted True Belief is supposed to take into consideration the source of the belief. So, while under JTB, the man in the Russell example has justification, under WTB he would not.

Yeah, just step away from it for a while. You'll see the difference later.

The clock is broken. He believes it's working. He believes that a broken clock is working. — creativesoul

No. That's not right. He falsely believes that the clock is working. You must capture the content of his belief, which is 'the clock is working'. The fact that it's not working is not part of his belief, so you can't include it in the content, or in the that-clause (which states the content of his belief).

What you're doing is leading you to confusion and mistakes.

Neither of which properly accounts for his belief that a broken clock is working. — creativesoul

First of all, he doesn't believe that a broken clock is working. He believes falsely that the clock is working. Those two statements are different. But nevermind the difference. Why think he falsely believes that the clock is working? Do we need to attribute to him a belief here?

I don't think it does when the failure was a result of false belief that goes unaccounted for. — creativesoul

Yes, but why insist on the existence of this belief? If we take away this alleged belief in the clock's working, then we still explain the justification failure by saying broken clocks don't lend epistemic justification for knowledge. Then what philosophical work is the belief you're attributing to him doing to explain the epistemic failure? Ostensibly, no philosophical work, so it looks not just unnecessary but wrong.

I'm still struggling to understand how you ground the claim that the person does not believe that a broken clock is working. — creativesoul

Of course, we should be clear about the difference between (A) "He doesn't have a belief about the clock's working or not" and (B) "He believes the clock is not working." Sometimes (B) is stated as "He doesn't believe the clock is working," which sounds like (A) -- but it's not.

I'm saying he doesn't have a belief about the reliability of the clock he's looking at. You're saying that he must have a belief that it's working, or that it's not working. This is what I disagree with.

Why must we attribute to him a belief? Isn't there a difference between having a hunch, an opinion, and a belief? Does taking something for granted constitute having a belief?

I think we are all rejecting that the man in the Russell scenario has actual knowledge. The only possible exception might be Sam, but it's hard to pin down his view because, I think, he's been unclear about it.

You and I agree that the justification failure is due to using a broken clock to ascertain the belief. Bartricks doesn't agree with this assessment. He first said that the justification failure could be explained with the notion of luck. After I pointed out that luck can only explain the truth of the belief, he has been suspiciously silent.

Frankly, almost everyone agrees that the problem is the source of the belief, namely the broken clock. Well, everyone but Bartricks, but that's only because he's committed to some other silly view that's inconsistent with this obvious analysis. Talk about dogmatist.

What I don't understand about your position is that after you say that the broken clock can't lend epistemic justification, why the need to say more? I mean, doesn't that fully explain the justification failure? You're wanting to do some logical deduction based on having a belief about the reliability of the source and whatnot, but to me it's extraneous and puts you on dubious philosophical grounds.

Perhaps you should, because that's what happened, and you granted that that knowledge claim was justified. — creativesoul

I think you are confused here. Recall that we're working with two different conceptions of knowledge in the Russell scenario. One conception is JTB. The other conception is our vague intuition of knowledge.

I have consistently said that the man in the Russell scenario has satisfied the JTB conception of knowledge, because JTB doesn't care about the source of the belief. That's why I've been holding Sam's feet to the fire on this issue. He says he believes JTB and our intuition of knowledge are one and the same (at least that's what I think he's been saying), so he cannot object about the justification -- because, again, the man has met the justification requirement per JTB.

However, I've also consistently said that the man doesn't in fact have a justified belief given our intuition of knowledge. My intuition of knowledge dictates that a broken clock cannot lend epistemic justification for knowledge, because my intuition is more demanding than JTB -- it cares about the source of the belief.

So, I granted that the man has knowledge as conceived as JTB, but that he in fact doesn't have knowledge per our intuition of knowledge.

If one believes a clock is working then they are not skeptical about whether or not it is a reliable means to know what time it is. — creativesoul

Sounds right, provided he believes working clocks keep the correct time.

If one is skeptical about whether or not a clock is working, then they do not believe it is a reliable means to know what time it is.

Sounds right.

Such people would perhaps check to see, but that doesn't happen in Russell's case.

In the Russell case, there is no thought paid to the working of the clock. It is simply assumed to be working. The man is neither skeptical nor not skeptical. He takes it for granted that it's working. You want to say that he must have some epistemic attitude towards the working of the clock, but I don't think 'taking X for granted' implies (or means) that you have an epistemic attitude towards it.

Again, I'm just speculating right now. I'm not committing myself to much of anything in this post or in the previous post, as I indicated.

So, I find that claiming the person could be skeptical and not believe that the clock is reliable to be quite a stretch, and an unnecessary one at that.

I'm not sure I follow this. Who claimed that the man is skeptical that the clock is reliable and that he does not believe it is reliable? And isn't this consistent?

There are times when we are thinking about thought and belief. In such situations, we can say something like... "for the sake of argument, let's assume X", where that means we are going to assume that X is true(grant the truth of X), solely as a means to follow the consequences. — creativesoul

That's not the only type of assumption. And in this scenario, the truth or justification is not in consideration. It's simply a stipulation.

Our considerations are about whether or not looking at a broken clock is a justified means to know what time it is.

That's not what I've been considering. I have flatly rejected the view that a broken clock can lend epistemic justification for knowledge.

I do not believe that this clock is a reliable means of telling time, but I'm going to look at it anyway in order to know what time it is. — creativesoul

Well, you're stating it far worse than it is. You're saying that you do not believe the clock is reliable, so that alone would discount that you have justification. Then you're adding that you believe it can give you justification, in saying that you'll be able to "know" the time. I'm not saying anything so blatantly wrong.

I'm saying that I'm not comfortable with the idea that we form beliefs (justified ones) on the basis of assumptions about the source of those beliefs. But, that's not to say that this doesn't happen all the time. I think it obviously does. The question, then, is whether we want to count those beliefs as justified such that they can be knowledge. That's the question I'm thinking about, but what you've stated is not that -- it's much worse and obviously wrong.

The difference between assuming that the clock we're looking at is working and believing it's working is what... exactly? — creativesoul

I think the difference is about the attitude you take towards a proposition. I say this because Person A and Person B might take different attitudes, one of assumption and one of belief, respectively, with respect to the same proposition given the same evidence and given the same background knowledge.

For example, if I see you leisurely walking in the park holding hands with a girl of about your age, which we'll say is 16 years of age, then I might assume that she's your new girlfriend. In this example, I have the assumption that she's your new girlfriend, but I haven't the belief, because for belief I hold myself to a higher standard of evidence.

But now let's take Johnny, our mutual friend, and he also sees the same scenario. He might form the belief that the girl is your new girlfriend, because Johnny forms beliefs with much less evidence than I do. He might say to me, "Oh wow, I can't believe CreativeSoul has a new girlfriend already. He just broke up with Sally a week ago." And I might respond skeptically, "Maybe." Johnny might reply, "Come on, of course that's his girlfriend. Didn't you see them holding hands at the park?"

So, in this example, Johnny seems to believe that you have a new girlfriend, while I remain skeptical enough to not assent, but of course I recognize that there's some evidence in favor of this opinion.

In the Russell scenario, the man might assume that the clock is working without believing that the clock is working.

Hmmm...I think this is a somewhat unsatisfying answer because then we'd be committed to the view that you can form beliefs based off assumptions, which I'm not exactly happy with, but let me say no more for now. I'm also not so sure the analysis is correct. So, let this post stand as a tentative response until I can think through it more.

But I hope to have at least given you an intuitive account of the difference between an assumption and a belief, which of course might be a wrong account and, more importantly, one which still leaves open your objection.

Are we to say that when we look at a clock to see what time it is that we do not believe that the clock is working? — creativesoul

Yes, that's what I want to say. I think we can assume that it's working. I don't think assumptions count as beliefs. After all, if you look at a clock to form a belief about the time, are you really checking to see if the clock is working? Don't we check it because we expect it to be working?
And how about its accuracy? Do we check its accuracy? How do we do that? Do we check with a verifying source -- another clock? And, then, I may ask, what source you used to verify the accuracy of the first verifying source -- and so on ad infinitum.

No, we don't do that when we check the time. We simply glance at our cell phones or watches or clocks and form our beliefs.

We need not wonder to ourselves at the moment of looking in order to believe that we're looking at a working clock. If we did not believe that it was working, we would not have looked at it.

But, as I said, I simply assume that it's working because clocks generally work and keep time accurately. Are you saying assumptions are beliefs? If assumptions are beliefs, then do correct assumptions satisfy JTB?

This seems correct and well expressed. This JTB & clock example is new to me and illuminating. — softwhere

Thank you. I find the Russell scenario illuminating, too. I am grateful to Bartricks for the thread -- even though we have become mortal enemies!

You're granting Russell's clock as qualifying for a justified true belief. — creativesoul

I'm granting that the man has a justified true belief, yes.

Do you find that false belief counts as adequate justificatory ground for a knowledge claim based upon that belief?

This question strikes me as odd for two reasons. One, the man in the Russell example has a true belief, so I'm wondering what motivates the question about a false belief. Two, the truth of the belief and the justification for the belief are separate things, so I'm not sure I know what is meant in asking if a false belief counts as adequate justificatory ground for a knowledge claim. But in case you're simply asking if a false belief ever counts as knowledge, then the answer is no.

In Russell's example, the person believed that a broken clock was working. On my view, false belief never counts as adequate justificatory ground from which to deduce/infer knowledge.

I'm not sure this is something we need to consider. Nobody is asking you to verify whether the clock you used to ascertain the time is actually a working clock, nor whether it's keeping track of time accurately, so I don't think you have to have a belief about either of those two circumstances. I can simply say that I looked at a clock, which is on the list of sanctioned methods for acquiring epistemic justification, because clocks generally work and work properly. So I can just deny that I had a false belief that the clock was working on the grounds that I had no belief on the matter.

By the way, a couple days back I answered your request for a one page summary regarding Gettier's paper. I'm of keen interest to get your take on it.

Yes, I saw it. I had to do a refresher on Gettier Case I, and I remembered why I don't like talking about it: I don't think it's a case of knowledge. I think I'm the wrong person to discuss the case, as I don't think it has much of anything to teach us about knowledge. I could be wrong, a distinct possibility, so I try to keep quiet about it. But from what I read of your response, which is basically the point you're making in this post, I've answered it: I needn't concern myself with this false belief you want to attribute to me or to the man in the Russell scenario.

The Reference is the actual thing which the Designation(word) refers to — marcolobo8

Is God not an actual thing? Must God be physical to fit into Frege's terminological system?

How do i apply Freges model on the word “God”?

The designation "God" refers to the referent God, and the senses are numerous: e.g. the almighty creator of the universe, an omniscient being, etc.

I don't think indefeasible and infallible are synonymous, but I get your objection.

Well, of course I have discovered many times that what I thought I knew was not in fact knowledge. That's just to say I didn't really know back then, so of course it wasn't knowledge that got defeated.

Are you trying to say that I'm the last Correspondence Theory of Truth dinosaur left on Earth?

Is this to say that everything you know is indefeasible? As an example pertinent to the discussion: Your knowledge that the last clock or watch you looked at was working properly and thereby gave the correct time will be indefeasible on what grounds? — javra

Yes, everything I know is indefeasible.

My KNOWLEDGE that the last clock I looked at was working properly and gave me the correct time is indefeasible, mainly, because the last clock I looked at was working properly and gave me the correct time.

The question is: "Do I have the right, i.e., within reason, to believe that I'm justified when looking at clocks to presume that a clock is giving me the correct time? — Sam26

Well, no, Sam, I don't think that is the question at all. The difference is this:

(A) Are we justified in believing we are justified in believing it's 3 PM?
(B) Are we justified in believing it's 3 PM?

You are asking Question A, but that's not the question in determining whether we have knowledge or not. That would be Question B.

To be justified in believing you're justified simply requires that you are aware of the sanctioned methods for acquiring beliefs (with regard to having knowledge) and aware that you're using one of those methods.

It goes like this: You ask yourself, "What method am I using?" Answer: method 3. You then check the list of sanctioned methods: "Oh, I see method 3 is on the list of justified ways to acquire true beliefs with regard to knowledge." Conclusion: "I'm using a justified method." In other words, because you know the list and you know which method you're using, provided it's one on the list, you are now justified in believing you're employing a sanctioned method, which is just to say that you're justified in believing you're justified. Of course all of this is unnecessary and outside the realm of knowledge.

The answer, and I believe most of us agree, is yes.

Everyone should disagree.

We know based on our experiences with clocks that generally clocks (fiveredapples pointed this out too) give us the correct time.

That's why "looking at clockfaces" is a sanctioned method. Note that you have now switched to Question B. I don't know if you realize it or not.

However, we also know based on experience that sometimes clock fail, and thus sometimes (say 3% of the time) they don't give us the correct time.

Yes, in such cases, despite having applied one of the sanctioned methods, you will not have knowledge. This is in line with our intuitions of knowledge. Again, though, you are now discussing Question B.

In fact, if you asked the person in Russell's example, "Is it possible you're wrong about the time?" they would probably say yes.

Yes, because sanctioned methods don't guarantee true beliefs. Again, this is in line with our intuitions of knowledge. But the limitation of these sanctioned methods doesn't affect justification, it affects truth.

So, most of us know that there is a chance that we could be wrong, however small, i.e., the justification is probability based. It's rarely the case that I'm justified with 100% certainty.

Invoking the notion of certainty is only going to make the assessment worse, not better. I've already noted that I think you've turned your analysis into a certainty requirement. Certainty and knowledge have nothing to do with each other.

Now the problem is the following: How can you not have knowledge (JTB) if you've followed the correct reasoning process in this example?

This is a strange way to phrase it. It seems like you are misunderstanding the Russell scenario. The man has successfully satisfied JTB. He has a belief. The belief is true. And the belief is justified. If you think knowledge is JTB, then you must conclude that the man has knowledge. You seem not to appreciate this fact. You're wanting to object that he doesn't have knowledge because he was looking at a broken clock. But you can't make that objection if you subscribe to JTB.

You of all people cannot say the man made a mistake, because it's irrelevant if you subscribe to JTB, as the man has satisfied the requirements. You must say that he has knowledge. I don't know, have I missed something about your views? Frankly, I'm not sure what you're committed to, which tells me you haven't been all that clear, as I possess immaculate reading skills.

May I recommend finding a professional philosopher whom to emulate. One of my favorite philosophers, when it comes to writing, is Jaegwon Kim.

My advice is to eschew philosophical jargon. I would even avoid somewhat sophisticated words (like "eschew". So, better would be: "I try to avoid philosophical jargon."). I try to write so a 10-year-old would understand everything I'm trying to get across, even the most sophisticated or nuanced ideas, which usually makes me rather verbose, but that's better than unclear. And, almost always, good writing requires editing after you've stepped away from what you've written for a day or two. You'd be surprised how quickly you'll dislike the way you've phrased things after you come back to it 24 hours later.

I don't know about any of you, but I've found some of the discussion in this thread fruitful, mainly the stuff I've been writing, but of course I've learned too. So, in order to help keep us all on track, I'm going to lay out the important developments -- ahem, just the back and forth between Bartricks and me -- as they've unfolded.

It started with the Russell's Broken Clock scenario, which Bartricks lays out nicely, so I'll just use his words:

In Russell's case, a clock has stopped and is reporting a time of 3pm. Someone ignorant of the fact the clock has stopped but desirous to know the time looks at the clock and forms the belief that it is 3pm. By pure coincidence it is, in fact, 3pm.

Bartricks states his intuition of knowledge on the matter:

However, though they have a justified true belief that it is 3pm, it seems equally clear to our reason (the reason of most of us, anyway) that they do not 'know' that it is 3pm.

Let's ignore the whole “to our reason” talk. It's unnecessary. In simpler terms, in less technically loaded terms, most of us probably agree with Bartricks that the man does not have knowledge. Now, the million dollar question is, “Why doesn't he have knowledge despite having a justified true belief, which technically satisfies the definition of knowledge as JTB (Justified True Belief)? Again, I believe most us would be drawn directly to the obvious answer: namely, the man lacks the proper epistemic justification because the broken clock doesn't lend him the epistemic justification needed for knowledge. Let's call this the “Broken Clock Explanation.”

Now, if the Broken Clock Explanation is right, there are two problems for anyone – ahem, Bartricks – who wants to offer a different explanation. Heck, even if the Broken Clock Explanation is wrong, it still presents two problems in virtue of being so intuitive to most of us.

(1) The first problem is that you're going to need a different explanation for the justification failure in the Russell scenario.

(2) The second problem is that you're going to have to offer an even more intuitive explanation than the Broken Clock Explanation; otherwise, why would we abandon the more intuitive and equally explanatory Broken Clock Explanation? Or, you're going to have to show us why the Broken Clock Explanation can't be right, which isn't the same as offering a different explanation for the justification failure.

Bartrick's attempt to tackle the first problem failed miserably. He suggested that the notion of luck helps explain the justification problem in the Russell scenario. (I'm being generous, here, as he didn't know what he was talking about.) But I pointed out that luck only affects the truth of the belief, not its justification. Basically, because the man luckily checked the time at precisely 3 PM, which happened to be the time on the broken clock, he was able to form a true belief that it was 3 PM. If you can't understand this point, then open up your coloring books and forget philosophy. The result of my devastating critique is that it leaves Bartricks without an explanation for the justification failure, meaning he owes us an explanation still. Meanwhile, the rest of us have an intuitive explanation: the Broken Clock Explanation.

Bartricks whimpered that the Broken Clock Explanation can't be right because broken clocks, according to him, can lend epistemic justification to beliefs about the time. Notice that even if we're wrong about the Broken Clock Explanation, which is highly unlikely, Bartricks will still not have given an explanation for the justification failure in the Russell scenario, because his one weak attempt was thoroughly refuted.

Anyway, at this point, Bartricks says he has an example that refutes the premise that broken clocks can't lend epistemic justification to beliefs about the time. He says he has a scenario – let's call it the “Broken Clock 2” scenario – in which it will be intuitive to most people that the man in the scenario has knowledge that it's 3 PM despite having acquired his belief by looking at a broken clock. So, what is this scenario? Again, I let Bartricks speak for himself:

For example, imagine the clock has broken, but it has literally just broken - that is, it has broken at the point at which its hands reach 3 o clock. It was working fine up to that point. The agent then looks at the clock. Now, the agent is looking at a broken clock and, on the basis of its report, he forms the belief that it is 3 o clock (which it is).

My intuition is that the man doesn't have knowledge. So, the same explanation applies here as in the Russell scenario: the broken clock doesn't lend him the epistemic justification he needs for knowledge. In both instances, the clock is broken, so what is different in this scenario? Well, in this scenario, the clock just stopped working a moment ago. Okay, but why is that different than the clock stopped working 100 years ago just as it turned to 3 PM? He's still ascertaining the time based off a broken clock, so what philosophical work is “but it just stopped working a moment ago” supposed to be doing for Bartricks? He doesn't know. My answer is that it's doing no philosophical work at all, so of course the original analysis holds – because, in essence, it's the very same scenario.

And, again, I remind everyone. Even if Bartricks is correct that we can have knowledge that it's 3 PM based off looking at a broken clock, he will still not have explained the justification failure in the Russell scenario. And we've already seen how his “luck analysis” fails miserably, so he offers no insights on the Russell scenario.

So, as I see it, both scenarios are essentially the same. If you can explain to me what is added philosophically by stipulating that “the clock broke only a moment ago,” then I'm all ears. Personally, I've grown tired of doing all the philosophical heavy lifting for every scenario Bartricks conjures but can't explain.

So are we now cool with the claim that justification requires coherency of beliefs? — javra

Yes. But I'm now suspiciously cautious that my answers are going to walk me into being a coherentist.

Hm, I can understand your logic for so affirming, but it doesn't so far strike me as in accord to the term's common usage. — javra

Heck, if your intuitions of knowledge are different from mine, I'm okay with that. I would point out that this commits you to knowledge that is defeasible, but you seem to be okay with this too. I am not okay with it.

To not beat around the bush, your reply doesn’t address the heart of the matter in relation to the one principle discrepancy you pointed out: coherentism (which I've just now seen you've amended in your first post to me). Cohrentism comes in two varieties: the coherence theory of truth, which I disagree with, and the coherence theory of justification, which I agree with. My question to you was whether or not it makes sense to you that justifications which are not coherent are to be deemed well grounded, acceptable, and/or correct (since you don’t like the colloquial use of “valid”). — javra

To be fair to me, I wasn't trying to address your original question. I was simply trying to analyze and understand the scenario you put forth.

I don't know what the full meaning of "well grounded" is in this context, so I'm reluctant to agree or disagree. And, let me remind you, I found both scenarios to be cases of justifications that are coherent.

Maybe coherentism is too complex for me. I'm asking myself "acceptable for what?" and I can't come up with a good answer.

Can the knowledge that platen Earth is approximately spherical be to any measure justified by the two facts that a) pyramids are not square and that b) oranges have an orange color? — javra

Okay, now this is more my speed. My answer here is no, not on the face of that justification alone.

Would you say that one does not know whether a rock that is to be thrown up into the air at some point in the future will fall back to down to earth? — javra

Yes, that's what I'm saying.

Its the colloquial use. Tell me of your preferred term for claimed justification that doesn't amount to a squat of beans, and I'll use it in our debates. — javra

Oh, I wasn't suggesting I knew the appropriate terminology. I just hope it's not "valid" and "invalid," so choose whatever you like.

But more importantly, this asking me to enlighten you is to me a little irksome – maybe because of the day I’ve had. If you ever happen to seek some form of enlightenment, I’d recommend that you don’t ask other people for it. Simply because there are a lot of charlatans out there, as I’m certain Bartricks would agree, and they all claim wisdom. From a song by Leonard Cohen called Teachers that I happen to greatly like: “’Follow me’ the wise man said, but he walked behind.” — javra

But it was a genuine request. I don't know the terminology.

No, not nonsense. Your reply is as inept as insisting that in Russell or Gettier's original they were just 'insisting' that the agent lacks knowledge. — Bartricks

Gettier and Russell put forth examples which they figured most people would agree with in terms of whether the person had knowledge or not. They relied on this general consensus to make objections of JTB.

Then you've just said "everyone's entitled to their opinion". Er, yes. That's not in dispute. That's what someone says when they've lost the argument.

Oh brother. You don't even understand your own posts. You have no argument for knowledge. You've never put forth an argument. All you're doing is putting forth scenarios with different circumstances and fishing for a general consensus. "Hey, guys, in this scenario, does the guy have knowledge? What, no? How about in this other scenario?" That's all your posts amount to. In other words, genius, you just are asking for everyone's intuitions on the matter, so when I say that "everyone's entitled to his own opinion," it's because that's all your posts ask for.

In the original clock case it is clear to the reason of virtually everyone that the agent lacks knowledge despite also clearly possessing a justified true belief.

Oh! "it is clear" -- LMAO. Okay, dude. That's so compelling. Are you forgetting that I said the person in the Russell example -- "the original clock case" -- doesn't have knowledge? Yes, he has a justified true belief on the JTB conception of knowledge. Then, again, I've already said as much.

Now, you - you - have insisted that any true belief based on the report of a broken clock does not count as knowledge.

Insisted? I've stated my view based on my intuition of knowledge. And, might I remind you, that is the putative take-away from the Russell example: he didn't have knowledge because he used a broken clock to ascertain the time, which we can generalize to "broken clocks do not lend the right type of epistemic justification needed for knowledge." You've tried to run away from that inference by invoking the ridiculous idea that luck explained why he didn't have knowledge. I explained why your notion of luck doesn't explain anything. So, without this magical notion of luck, what explains why the man in the Russell example doesn't have knowledge?....Yeah, that's right, you still have to explain why the man doesn't have knowledge, as you've agreed, except now you can't help yourself to the silly notion of luck in your analysis. I'm waiting for the arguments you owe us. Until then, my analysis at least exists and is commonsensical, so you're absolutely getting destroyed in this argument.

I provided a clear counterexample. I'll describe it again in case you just didn't bother reading it.

A "clear counterexample" -- but I'm insisting! And, no, you didn't provide a counter-example of someone having knowledge based on looking at a broken clock.

There's a clock that's been working fine until 3pm, when it breaks. Tom looks at that clock at 3pm - the moment it breaks - and forms the belief that it is 3pm. Now, does he know that it is 3pm?

Yes. Doesn't your reason tell you the same? Seriously, what does your reason say about the case?

CLEARLY NO. There is no meaningful difference between the Russell example and this example. I've asked you TWICE NOW to explain what the difference is. I've asked you to explain the philosophical work you think "a broken clock that's been working fine until a moment ago" is doing for you. You still haven't explained it. You want to know a secret? You can't. Why can't you? Because it does NOTHING FOR YOU. This is so preposterous. You're giving the same argument without realizing it, but I'm the dogmatist!

Note, if you just reject such intuitions on the grounds that respecting them would require abandoning your thesis, then you're the dogmatist. You've now got an unfalsifiable thesis.

My intuitions say he doesn't have knowledge.

Now explain the philosophical force of "the broken clock was working up to a moment ago." And then explain why the take-away from the Russell example shouldn't be "the man lacked knowledge because he ascertained the time from a broken clock." We've already seen your "luck analysis" fail, so try something new.

Suppose I affirm knowledge that it will rain today. You ask me why. I then reply by justifying this belief to true with the following: there’s a satellite up in the sky and my cat is next to a plant out in the backyard – with this being the full scope of my justification. The two givens, even if true, do not cohere in any intelligible manner to my belief. — javra

Thank you. My brain is no longer capable of abstraction, so examples almost always help.

Well, I would assume that that satellite is providing information for the basis of your belief. I would assume that your cat's position next to the plant provided similar information. Of course I would dismiss the cat basis as superstition, probably, but there might be some science behind it: maybe cats are especially prescient of upcoming rain storms. Either way, without knowing what type of information the satellite is providing, without knowing the reliability of satellites in forecasting rain on Earth, or rain in your town (more specifically), it wouldn't strike me as a case of knowledge for two reasons: (1) I don't think you can have knowledge of the future. Well, that pretty much ends the discussion for me, but (2), in case knowledge of the future is something others subscribe to, I don't know of the reliability of your methods for acquiring your belief to say whether you have knowledge. But your reasons cohere with your belief.

As an aside, or maybe not so aside, I have always considered beliefs about the future outside the realm of knowledge -- for the simple fact that they could be defeated by things not turning out as you predict. If we allow beliefs about the future to count as knowledge claims, then we must allow that knowledge is defeasible. My intuitions about knowledge say otherwise. This, btw, is why the Gettier Case I scenario doesn't strike me as helpful in any way. But, back to your post.

Here, I’d consider that my justification was invalid.

Is validity used to talk about justification? Having studied a little logic, it has always bothered me when people use the colloquial use of 'valid' in philosophical discussions. Sorry, just a pet peeve. But do enlighten me, not that it matters to our discussion (as I understand you) if I'm wrong about validity as a term for justification.

Now suppose that I explain things in a coherent manner as such: the satellite up in the sky has given a weather forecast of 80% chance of rain and my cat has always had a weird habit of sitting next to a plant in my backyard a few hours before it rains, next to which he is now sitting. The same basic truths are presented, but now the explanation provided makes them cohere with my belief that it will rain today.

Like I said, they already cohered, in my opinion, but now I might be swayed into thinking you have enough for epistemic justification for knowledge. I don't, of course, as 80% reliability, even coupled with your prescient cat, is not enough, in my opinion. And, again, it's a claim about the future, so I wouldn't care if satellite reports were 100% reliable to date. To me, you wouldn't have knowledge even then.

Here, I’d consider that my justifications were valid – even if less than perfect.

Yes, I'd say that you have perfectly good reason to believe that it's going to rain later today.

In case it does rain – thereby evidencing my belief-that to be true – I can then maintain my claim of having had JTB in the latter case, but I can't claim JTB in the former case.

I don't subscribe to this formula of saying someone had knowledge after all because their belief about the future turned out to be correct or true. So, to me, in neither case you had knowledge, and in neither case you had JTB either.

No, we're not talking past each other. I refuted your view. How? I outlined a case in which a person forms a belief about the time based on a broken clock's report - and it was clear that the person's belief qualified as knowledge. Your analysis would insist it would not qualify as knowledge. It does - clearly it does - therefore your analysis is false. — Bartricks

What nonsense. You're just insisting that your scenario shows what you say it does. Everyone is perfectly in his own right to say whether it strikes him as a case of knowledge or not. You proved nothing. It's absurd to think your scenario is anything other than a study case for everyone to decide for himself whether the man in the scenario has knowledge. I weighed in that he doesn't, and I explained why he doesn't. You've done nothing more than say otherwise. You haven't even bothered to explain -- because you don't know how -- why this new example is in any meaningful way different from the Russell example. You think "the clock just stopped working moments prior" is doing philosophical work for you. It's not. Yet somehow, magically, inclusion of this provides a case of someone having knowledge about the time based on looking at a broken clock? That's laughably bad.

Hi Javra,

Sorry, I cannot wrap my head around this question. It's probably not complicated, but it doesn't make full sense to me, so I don't want to commit to an answer yet. Let me refresh my understanding later and possibly get back to you tomorrow. For now, it's off to work for me. Thanks for the responses.

Coherency of beliefs applies, in part, to justifications - not to truth. Do you find that justifications for beliefs can be incoherent and yet valid? — javra

Do you mean...Can I reasonably hold two beliefs which don't cohere? I think maybe I'm not understanding what you're asking.

I will not repeat what I said in my previous posts, but this clearly did not take what I said in context. — javra

Am I wrong that you're a Coherentist? Aren't you saying that as long as all his beliefs cohere -- don't contradict any other beliefs he has -- then he has knowledge that it's 3 PM?

Via the Russel example, I was addressing the understanding that the man can only know its 3 o'clock if his beliefs conform to reality. — javra

No, that's not enough. If that were enough, then he could simply guess the correct time and he'd have knowledge, according to your definition. This is an even weaker conception of knowledge than JTB.

At least JTB attempts to tie the belief to reality by way of a reliable source of truth.

To those who are aware that the clock is not working, the man does not hold knowledge of what time it is - this because the primary belief upon which his second belief is founded is untrue, thereby making the second belief factually unjustified, despite if happening to be correct by mere luck. — javra

People are not the ultimate determiners of whether someone has knowledge. I feel like you're speaking as Coherentist, but I reject Coherentism, so I accept none of your premises. I pretty much know what Coherentism entails. If you want to argue for Coherentism, I'm all ears.

If you'll accept my premise that I'm omniscient, then know that you're wrong. See, it's not very compelling.

Gettier's cases have different issues, which I've explained at length beginning on page six, and again on the last couple pages. I've only touched on Case I, but II suffers the exact same flaw... conflation of proposition(conjunction that time) and belief. — creativesoul

Would it be too much to have it all in one post? Reading someone's theory piecemeal is way too taxing for a sluggard like me.

Why, or how, does the man know that it’s 3 o’clock? Only because he looked at the clock which, to his mind, was working properly. The obtainment of truth that it is 3 o’clock is thus here directly determined solely by the reality of there being a working clock. — javra

Hi Javra,

May I ask which scenario you are referring to: the Russell example or the counter-example? In the Russell example the clock is not working, which leads me to think you're talking about the counter-example, as that's the one in which the clock is working, but you also say things which suggest the clock isn't working.

What you describe after your initial comment is Coherentism. I don't find much appealing about this counter-intuitive theory, so I'm not sure I need to take it seriously. If you're a Coherentist, it doesn't matter whether the clock is working or not, so I don't understand the emphasis on the working clock.

And I appreciate the head nod about my posts.

It doesn't matter if the believer doesn't realize the clock is not working. It's not working. They believe that it is working. That is false belief. False belief does not make good ground for knowledge. Luck? Sure. So, that case is not a case of well grounded true belief even if it is a case of being lucky. — creativesoul

I've read a little of what you say on the topic prior to the post where this quote comes from, but I cannot claim to have read everything you say in the thread. So, I might have an incomplete understanding of what you're claiming. That said, I have some comments.

You are making more work for yourself than necessary. You claim that false premises cannot lead to a true conclusion. Frankly, I don't know what to make of this claim, but I see that Bartricks has beaten you over the head with an obvious counter-example. Again, I'm not sure how your claim pertains to the Gettier examples, but I don't think you need to make this argument. You have, I believe, the correct intuition that broken clocks cannot lend the proper justification for knowledge claims. This is actually the main point of contention between you and Bartricks.

He believes the contrary, that broken clocks can lend the proper justification for knowledge claims. I think he's wrong, but we might have to chalk this up to contending intuitions. You don't seem satisfied with that and want, instead, to make a stronger argument against him. It's in this stronger argument -- this argument about 'false beliefs not supporting a true conclusion' -- where you are faltering.

He's right to say that the man (in the Russell example) in justified in believing that the clock is working and keeping the correct time. He thinks that's enough to get him the epistemic justification he needs for knowledge claims. After all, he says, if the man is justified in believing the clock is working (which he is), then that's all the justification needed. Here, I think he's wrong. Once we hash out how clocks lend epistemic justification -- namely, by working and keeping the correct time -- we see that this particular clock cannot lend such justification. He believes that because there is justification for this presumption -- that clocks work and keep the correct time -- he doesn't need to concern himself with whether that particular clock works or not. That's why he thinks, or is consistent with why he thinks, that a broken clock can sometimes provide the proper justification for knowledge claims. He is, in my opinion, simply not digging deep enough.

Bartricks,

Before we spend more sweat and tears on responses to each other, I want to highlight a very important disagreement we have, which might be the source of most of our disagreements. You believe that a broken clock can lend epistemic justification to beliefs about the time. I believe that a broken clock cannot lend such justification. Unless we address this disagreement, we're going to be talking past each other quite a bit. We might simply have different intuitions about knowledge.

The best we might hope for, then, is to let others say what their intuitions are on the matter. So, the question to others is, can a broken clock lend epistemic justification to beliefs about the time? Or, in simpler English, if you come to believe that it's 3 PM based on your looking at a broken clock, do you have the right kind of justification for your true belief -- by sheer coincidence, the time actually is 3 PM ---- to count as knowledge?

Sam,

You seem to think that fallibility helps you defend JTB from the objection that it fails as a definition of knowledge. I've tried to explain why fallibility cannot help you defend JTB from the objections we're making against it. The one point of disagreement which we have to settle is that you think that the man doesn't have epistemic justification in the Russell example, but I think (as does Bartricks) that he does have justification. Although I believe Bartricks thinks he does because he thinks the broken clock lends epistemic justification. Nevertheless, the man in the Russell example satisfied the JTB definition. If you disagree with that point, then we too are going to talk past each other.

I want to separate the definition from it's actual application, i.e., the definition works, but it's application is fallible. — Sam26

I don't think anybody would disagree that we sometimes make mistakes. So, yes, sometimes when we think we've satisfied the definition of JTB, we actually haven't. So far, however, you haven't addressed the objection we are making against JTB.

The application of the definition, due to a number of human fallibility factors, is never infallible.

.
Now you're introducing the idea of infallibility, which no human is, but that doesn't mitigate against the objection that JTB fails as a definition. Your defense of the definition can't simply be that every time it fails, it's because of human error. That's way too strong a defense, which should be a red flag to you.

We are always updating and changing what we think we know.

Okay, but not always about everything. We are advancing and making new discoveries, creating new methods, improving old methods, etc., but that doesn't imply that everything we've known in the past gets revised in the future in light of the "updating and changing" that we do. No, many things remain forever the same, maintain the same status as always, and do not change in light of human advancement. You're taking a common phenomenon and making sweeping generalizations so that it applies to the one case you want it to apply to.

So, built into the application of the definition (we could in a sense call it a kind of formula) is the understanding that for various reasons/causes it could turn out that my justification wasn't correct, thereby nullifying my reasons for thinking I was justified.

Yes, but this simply says what you've already said: namely, that we're not infallible, so we might, on occasion, be mistaken about having attained proper justification. Infallibility, however, isn't a defense against the objection that JTB fails as a definition. After all, the objections come from hypothetical situations in which we simply stipulate the conditions. So, we can't be wrong about those conditions, as they are stipulations. In other words, the objections to JTB are theoretical objections, so your defense that we are infallible is actually a non-sequitur.

In the Russell example Bartricks gives, the man has justification under the JTB conception of knowledge. If he didn't, it would pose no problem for the JTB conception of knowledge. The problem is that our intuitions about knowledge tell us that something is awry. We don't think he has knowledge, pace JTB, and we pinpoint the problem to the source of his belief: namely, the broken clock. There is no human fallibility at play here. To think fallibility is at work here -- to respond that the man made a mistake in thinking the broken clock was a working clock -- is to not realize that the justification criterion, per JTB, has actually been satisfied in the example.

I suspect that you're using our intuitive definition of knowledge, not JTB, to defend JTB. In essence, you're saying that had he looked at a working clock, he would have had the right type of justification. Again, though, he already has the right type of justification -- he hasn't made any mistake -- according to JTB. That's why JTB fails -- because it doesn't square with our intuitions of knowledge, and human fallibility cannot save JTB from the objections we're making against it.

If we later find out that the clock was broke, then we weren't justified - period.

But as I explained, we were and remain justified under JTB.

I don't want to rehash my same objection about your fallibility defense. I think I've made myself clear. I do want to add that you seem to be turning the fallibility defense into a certainty requirement. Something like, "We can never be certain that we've satisfied the JTB requirements because we are fallible." That is not an adequate defense of JTB.

Bartricks,

Let me respond to you first. I do want to address some of the other comments, too, though, but perhaps in subsequent posts.

Hmm, I do not think you're right, but it doesn't really affect my point, which I'll elaborate on shortly.

What a curious response. I showed why there was no need to invoke the notion of luck in your treatment of the two knowledge claim scenarios. Your only coherent response is to argue why my objection is somehow mistaken or insufficient. Instead, you want to move on to some other point without admitting your error. Okay, go ahead, but I didn't address that point, whatever it is. I addressed your characterization of the two knowledge claim scenarios, and those objections stand.

Several things: first, intuitively the agent 'is' justified.

No, intuitively he's not justified. Come one now, that just is the lesson to draw from our intuitions about knowledge. Yes, he is justified on the JTB definition, but the scenarios are meant to highlight how JTB fails as a definition. (I think Sam26 wants to argue that JTB doesn't fail as a definition, but that seems wrong -- unless we want to accept that knowledge is defeasible, which nobody wants to accept.) So, in both scenarios, there is something amiss with the justification. In other words, he's not justified. This is why people have moved from JTB to WTB (warranted true belief, where the "warrant" guarantees us that neither of the knowledge claims you described count as knowledge).

They could not reasonably have been expected to know that the clock was not working. So, they were justified in believing it was working, and so subsequently justified in believing it was the time that it represented it to be.

Hmm...maybe you didn't understand my post. I explain why you're conflating two separate ideas and, thus, equivocating on the term "justified." Yes, he can be pardoned for not knowing that the clock wasn't working. So, it's perfectly understandable that he believes it is a working clock and, of course, that working clocks keep the correct time. But broken clocks do not lend epistemic justification for beliefs about the time. That just is the intuition which informs our conclusion that he doesn't actually have knowledge. He used a broken clock to form his belief about the time; hence, he doesn't actually know it's 3 PM despite having a true belief that it's 3 PM. You seem to think, quite counter-intuitively, that a broken clock can provide the requisite justification for a belief about the time. Again, you need an argument or example to make it more palatable. You've yet to provide such an example, although you apparently think you have.

Second, for the sake of argument let's test your analysis.

Not "for the sake of argument" -- for the sake of avoiding admitting that you are wrong.

If it is correct, then any belief about the time based on a broken clock's report should fail to qualify as knowledge.

Correct.

But I can imagine a case in which a person bases a belief about the time on a broken clock and their belief 'does' qualify as knowledge.

No, you cannot.

For example, imagine the clock has broken, but it has literally just broken - that is, it has broken at the point at which its hands reach 3 o clock. It was working fine up to that point. The agent then looks at the clock. Now, the agent is looking at a broken clock and, on the basis of its report, he forms the belief that it is 3 o clock (which it is). This time it seems clear enough that the agent does have knowledge, yes?

No, he doesn't have knowledge. He still lacks justification, the right kind. This example is in no meaningful way different from the original example, so I don't know what you think you've added to the discussion. Why would it matter whether it stopped working a moment ago, 24 hours ago, or 24 years ago?

But anyway, I am not married to the 'luck' analysis either, for my point is not that this or that analysis is always and everywhere correct, but rather that whatever diagnosis we give of why the agent lacks knowledge in the relevant case, we will be able to construct another case in which that 'key' ingredient is present and the agent lacks knowledge (or absent, and the agent possesses knowledge)

To be fair, the luck analysis hasn't been correct once. Anyway, are you saying there's no indefeasible definition of knowledge? That seems like a rather strong position to take. I don't quite see the motivation for it, but I'm not saying you're wrong. I simply haven't put any serious thought to the matter.

That's not to say that the diagnosis of the original case was wrong.

I'm pretty sure I already proved it wrong.

It is just to note that there is no stability to what is, and is not doing the work of making it the case that the agent has knowledge (apart from possessing a true belief).

Why is that the conclusion? If there are clear intuitive cases of knowledge -- which there are -- then there would seem to be coherent criteria for knowledge. That's just the take-away, right? Are you saying that because nobody has been able to spell out this criteria, it can't exist? Or, more likely, are you saying that nobody can spell out criteria for knowledge that isn't susceptible to counter-examples? Again, I don't see why that conclusion would follow.

I get that you're entertaining the question of what makes 'knowledge' impossible to define in an indefeasible way. That is, why are all the criteria for knowledge susceptible, according to you, to counter-examples in which the criteria are satisfied but in which our intuition tells us the person doesn't have knowledge. I don't think you're right about this, but I leave you to theorize. I've only objected to the two knowledge scenarios you mis-characterized.

Thus it is reasonable to conclude that 'knowledge' is an attitude that a person is adopting towards true beliefs. Not, I emphasis, an attitude one of us is adopting towards true beliefs, but an attitude Reason is adopting towards them.

I disagree. I don't think you can have knowledge that it's 3 PM based on a belief you formed by looking at a broken clock. You've yet to provide such an example. Without giving us reason to doubt our intuitions about knowledge, then your argument never gets off the ground.