I think you’ve got that backwards. I think meaningless distraction is where boredom stems from. — ”I like sushi”

I was using the term “meaningless distraction” to refer to something else. I agree that boredom (and ultimately depression) result when a person engages in tasks that they themselves consider to be “meaningless”. I don’t dispute that. I was reacting to Schopenhauer’s claim that any task (indeed, life itself) is ultimately meaningless because it all stems from the avoidance of boredom, and boredom is the essence of life. For Schopenhauer, then, our compulsion to engage in tasks simply reveals our latent antipathy toward life itself. At least, that was my interpretation of his claim, which may have been inaccurate, I don’t know. Anyway, my point was to contrast Schopenhauer’s view of life (i.e. the essence of life is boredom) with an alternative (i.e. the essence of life is the pursuit of meaning, in which boredom plays a role). Perhaps I just didn’t word it very well.

Freedom is also something to consider. All too often people believe they want more freedom when the real reason they feel bound is that they have too much choice and freedom and so get stuck in perpetual states of distraction. It is extremely common (in my life experience) for the remedy to any given situation to be the exact opposite of what you’d think it would be.
Lack of honesty with oneself creates ‘boredom’ and sometimes such states of ‘boredom’ are defence mechanisms that are there to balance our ‘mental wellbeing’. — ”I like sushi”

I agree.

I can say with age that boredom seems to fade? I’ve not done a survey on this but it has been my observation for those around me. There may be more of a lull in middle age perhaps but generally I believe boredom declines with greater age. — ”I like sushi”

It would be interesting to see statistics on this. Perhaps elderly people do not commonly self-identify as being “bored” because life actually gets harder (i.e. more challenging) as you age. I look at my 87 year old Grandfather and it’s a challenge for him just to make it to the breakfast table every morning. After breakfast he spends the rest of the day in front of the TV before beginning the arduous process of going to bed. Twenty years ago he would have described this life as “hell”, but he has reset his expectations due to the physical limitations that prevent him from being more active in the world. His threshold for boredom has changed significantly over the last 10 years as his nervous system has adapted to his circumstances.

Sure, but, to the degree one makes an emotional decision, one makes a harmful decision that goes against one furthering their life. — Garrett Travers

This is where I get tripped up.

Suppose we have two people, one of whom makes all of their decisions "emotionally", and one who makes all of their decisions "rationally". Now suppose that, as a matter of pure dumb luck, they just happen to make all of the same decisions on issues of significant import (e.g. they both decide not to get vaccinated, they both decide to become vegetarians, they both decide to vote for the same candidate in each election, they both decide to support the same social causes, etc., etc.).

The means are different, but the ends are the same. In terms of observable outcomes, their lives are morally equivalent. So how can we say that the one has made "harmful" decisions while the other has made "beneficial" decisions?

Which still doesn't change that you started out as bored. — baker

I already addressed this.

Won how? — baker

Through meaningful engagement with the world - namely, the voluntary identification and pursuit of goals derived from one's highest ideals (and the intentional cultivation of such ideals), assuming you've had your basic physical needs met.

If life—the craving for which is the very essence of our being—were possessed of any positive intrinsic value, there would be no such thing as boredom at all: mere existence would satisfy us in itself, and we should want for nothing. — schopenhauer

That’s a great quote.

While I agree with Schopenhauer that boredom is a fundamental aspect of life, it seems to me that he is elevating it to the very essence of life itself. This is where I disagree. I see boredom as being on par with (and mutually dependent upon) at least two others aspects of life: “anxiety” and “flow”.

Boredom, anxiety and flow are all related to the encounter (or lack thereof) with novelty. In essence, boredom is what occurs when you don’t have enough novelty in your life, whereas anxiety occurs when you get too much, and flow occurs when you get just the right amount. Looking at it through this lens, I’d say that both boredom and anxiety exist to push us toward flow. All three are constituent elements of a largely unconscious process that attempts (with variable success) to optimize our experience of meaning. In my view, this process is the fundamental form of life, and boredom is just one constituent element of it.

So, I can’t agree with Schopenhauer when he says that the mere existence of boredom proves that life does not possess any positive intrinsic value. That would only be true if boredom were life’s most fundamental expression. But as I explained above, I don’t think that’s true. The fact that there is boredom (and anxiety) proves only that life’s intrinsic positive value is not guaranteed to us, but that it has to be “won”.

I think that you're right that boredom sits at the heart of the human condition. I'm less convinced that this is a pessimistic insight. Boredom drives us to seek pointless distraction. Boredom drives us to create meaning. You can look at it either way.

A false premise makes an argument invalid, meaning it can be dismissed — Garrett Travers

Right, and I didn't say otherwise. What I said is that a true premise doesn't become false just because it's part of an invalid argument.

Here you are saying that we can most certainly dismiss what is invalid. — Garrett Travers

Correct. We can dismiss the invalid argument but should retain the true premise(s).

My original point was not that anything Nazi-Warpig said was true or not, but that his philosophy can be dismissed as invalid, and exctract that which can be shown to not be compatible with the destruction of human life. — Garrett Travers

I don't see where you clearly stated or even implied any of this additional nuance in your original post, but I think we're on the same page now.

This completely contradicts your above expressed understanding. — Garrett Travers

No, it doesn't. But feel free to demonstrate how if you disagree.

A singular philosophical insight within an ethical framework is negated by the implementation of the framework — Garrett Travers

No it isn't, any more than a true premise is made false by its inclusion in an invalid argument.

unless it is the intent of any who interact with it to extract such a concept and diviorce from the framework entirely. — Garrett Travers

Correct. We take what's true and leave the rest.

Inconsistency isn't the issue. — Garrett Travers

It's precisely the issue because it leaves open the possibility that even a moral degenerate could expound profound philosophical insights despite their own repugnant behavior. Heidegger may (or may not) be one such person.

No, I would ignore the methods by which he justified such a discovery as dispicably evil, and to be ridiculed, ostracized, and reasoned into the dust bin of history where it belongs — Garrett Travers

Presumably it would have been his use of the scientific method that justified his discovery. Beyond that, I'm not sure what methods you have in mind.

But, we aren't talking about discoveries of objective nature, are we? Because objective standards could never be used to justify the genoiced of the Human Consciousness. — Garrett Travers

A philosophical insight is a philosophical insight, regardless of who conceived it. Do you think that none of your favorite philosophers ever acted in a way that was inconsistent with their own philosophical insights?

Didn't disagree with this. I said care and relate them to philosophy, no not happening. — Garrett Travers

I don't see where you said this, but it's moot if we're in agreement.

No, they can't. — Garrett Travers

I'm assuming that you wouldn't ignore a scientific discovery because it was made by a Nazi scientist or reject a revolutionary engineering technique because it was invented by a Nazi engineer.

Nobody should give a shit what a Nazi said. — Garrett Travers

On the contrary. We should be incredibly curious about what the Nazis had to say, if for no other reason than to understand one's own enemy.

That's exactly what it sounds like to ethical philosophers when someone entertains the theories of people whose ethical framework allows for complicity in genocidal violations against the Human Consciousness, through imperial statism, as if they deserve to ever be brought into the same league as philosophers. — Garrett Travers

This is short-sighted and simplistic. People who do horrible things can still have deep philosophical, ethical and/or scientific insights. It would make things a lot simpler if this weren't true, but it is true.

Quite. In my youth, I believed that such a piercing insight was obtainable, that it would penetrate the problems of existence and render religions obsolete. Now I’m not so sure. — Wayfarer

I likewise doubt that religion will ever become obsolete, at least for the vast majority of us. We'd have to eradicate ignorance, prejudice, poverty, disease and death. In other words, we'd have to cease being human as we currently understand it. Perhaps trans-humanism will be the last religion?

If you don't understand that, you do not have a place in this discussion. — Garrett Travers

You mean the one-sided discussion you're having with yourself? Oh shucks, what a loss!

Who's not up for punching a Nazi! — Isaac

The vast majority of people, it turns out. Anyone who's witnessed a schoolyard bully terrorize an entire playground knows this.

That is particularly accentuated by Protestantism with its emphasis on salvation by faith (which is close to, or actually amounts to, fideism, which was not accepted in the Catholic Church). — Wayfarer

That is true, although I think it's important to recognize that the Catholic church still very explicitly insists that its dogmas be accepted on the basis of faith. The act of such faith, they argue, is a rational act insofar as (they believe) reason can demonstrate both the existence of God and the legitimacy of the Church as God's vessel of revelation to mankind. But it's still faith nonetheless.

However some forms of religious culture are grounded more in attainment of insight, which is where the philosophical and religious tend to converge somewhat — Wayfarer

Yes, agreed. "Insight" is an excellent choice of words here. I think that this is precisely what gets lost when people come to view philosophy as a purely critical or negative enterprise. In my opinion, the world's great philosophers and mystics have, first-and-foremost, been the world's great visionaries. When insight ossifies into dogma, you get "religion" (in the pejorative sense of the word).

I've no idea what you're talking about on either account. — 180 Proof

It's amazing that someone who writes all the cryptic claptrap you write can't understand a couple relatively straightforward comments.

Oh well. Have a nice life.

No "false dichotomy" on my part as I've not made an argument (re: systems of control) with an "either-or" premise. :roll: — 180 Proof

No, I meant it literally. You're proposing a dichotomy where none exists.

By "system of control", Aaron, I mean the (socio-political) 'extrinsic constraints on populations which constitute – regulate – participation in a dominance hierrarchy'. — 180 Proof

Yeah, I know. You really think philosophy and politics are completely orthogonal?

this is a false dichotomy. What you have called "communal systems of irrational control" govern all human activities including both science and philosophy. Furthermore, so-called "irrational" processes within the individual human mind (e.g. intuition, imagination, etc.) are likewise indispensable for both.

It's also worth noting that "religions" often form around the philosophies of various thinkers. One may be a Thomist, a Kantian, a Hegelian, a Marxist, etc. And one may find themselves excommunicated from the group if they stray too far from orthodoxy.

Yes, I’d say that’s a fair (if simplistic) way of framing the distinction. Religions typically insist on the acceptance of a set of dogmas among its adherents. Persistent failure to accept and enact such dogma is often grounds for excommunication. It’s important to note, however, that some religions such as Hinduism and Buddhism allow for a much greater degree of autonomy in this regard. For instance, some of the canonical holy books of Hinduism acknowledge that ultimate truth can be reached via many paths and expressed through many diverse images, stories and doctrines. Whether or not this tolerance is always achieved in practice is another story.

I believe that we should reject the idea of moral relativism for several reasons. All of these reasons can be summed up in the overly generalized, not really accurate, statement: No one actually believes it. — Fides Quaerens Intellectum

Well, moral relativism could still be true even if no one believed it.

Most moral relativists, as stated above, are really absolutists who have just chosen another maxim to live their lives by than that of the current status quo — Fides Quaerens Intellectum

Not necessarily. A moral relativist may be conservative by nature, and may have simply come to the conclusion (upon reflection) that no moral claims are absolutely true.

Moral relativism claims that morality is merely a whim of ours — Fides Quaerens Intellectum

You should really try to site some sources on this. Some moral relativists might claim this, but I am guessing that most sophisticated relativists would not. A sophisticated relativist may believe that morality has deep evolutionary/biological roots, but that specific moral claims are neither true nor false in any absolute sense.

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There are many more similar comments that could made in response to your post. I feel that you should spend some time studying up on the subject in order to aim your critique at more sophisticated versions of the theory.

I think the question is poorly posed because it does not take into the account the extent to which mathematics is grounded in human sensory-motor schemata. I think that mathematics can be said to be "objective" to the degree to which the sensory-motor schemata from which it is ultimately abstracted can be said to be objective. That is, I think that mathematics definitely has some purchase on reality, although it's also easy to see that this purchase is always "approximate", much in the same that way that the contents of sensation and cognition in general are also approximate.

I do not think that mathematical entities exist independently of the mind. That said, I don't doubt that the relational structures embedded in mathematical theories mirror the vastly more complex relational structures existing "out there" in mind-independent reality. Regarding aliens, it would not surprise me in the least if an intelligent alien culture with a significantly divergent anatomy and physiology developed a mathematics that is all but incomprehensible to us (and vice versa).

Physicalism is the idea that nothing exists except for concrete objects in the material world — Dusty of Sky

This is not accurate. Physicalism refers to a spectrum of positions, but it is most commonly formulated as a commitment to the claim that everything that exists supervenes (or in some way depends) on the physical, where "the physical" is defined in terms of the ontological commitments required by the physical sciences (whether future or current). Again, there are many nuances on this general theme - perhaps as many nuances as there are physicalists!

But physics is the study of the mathematic principles which determine the behavior of these material objects. And these abstract principles (e.g. F=G(m1m2)/r^2) surely don't exist in the material world. You can't locate them under a microscope. So acknowledging that the laws of physics exist seems to contradict the theory of physicalism — Dusty of Sky

Mathematics is a tool used to model relations that obtain within the physical universe, so I'm guessing that an appeal to mathematics is not likely to persuade physicalists who are willing to admit relations into their ontology.

I believe that Aquinas would say that individual things achieve their uniqueness through efficient causation, which also finds it's ultimate grounding in the act of God.

We are only talking about the mode of final causality here. I was not saying that God's knowledge is restricted to knowledge of universal essences, I was simply saying that it is through God's knowledge of universal essences that he acts as the final cause of all things.

Today, saying there are mysteries...and then gratuitously suggesting those mysteries demand a "creator" "prime mover" "reason for ends"...is inappropriate. — Frank Apisa

Except that is not what Aquinas is doing. He has a metaphysics, and he's deducing a conclusion from it. There's no doubt that he's looking for ways to rationally justify his faith. But that's a different thing to what you are describing.

To call the some other way" "god" is purely gratuitous — Frank Apisa

I do not agree. Assuming, of course, that Aquinas has successfully argued his point, then there must exist an infinite mind that acts as the final cause of all that exists. In saying "this we call God", he's simply acknowledging what was widely considered to be an attribute of God within his milieu.

Can you guys clear up in more detail why exactly rationality isn't everything in relation to judgements like that of religion. Why is there room for the irrational? Especially when it isn't necessary to live with meaning and purpose or even enjoy life. — intrapersona

I agree with your professor in one respect and disagree in another. There's clearly more to life than just reason. There's pleasure, affection, hope, faith, love, etc. However, I don't think that these should be considered to be opposed to reason. Ideally, your hope, faith and love should be ordered and directed by the use of reason.

No, I don't know of anywhere that Aquinas argues these points explicitly.

I believe that Aquinas would say that final cause interacts with the inanimate thing through the form as essence. In other words, essences within the mind of God act as the final causes of all things. Insofar as a particular thing has a substantial form, this is possible only because there is a corresponding universal essence existing eternally within the mind of God.

f an inanimate thing is determined by God to act toward God's end, then there is no freedom of choice, and the thing is not acting according to its own end, it is acting toward God's end. — Metaphysician Undercover

For Aquinas, it is both. Aquinas understands final cause as the "cause of causes". This means that formal cause cannot operate independently of final cause and, in fact, final cause is the cause of formal causation. Things act towards ends by their nature and, yet, it is because of those ends that things have the natures that they have.

And there's the question of, if you suppose that the being of a thing is a kind of action, then who says that action must be toward anything. Why not just action in accord with being? Do you begin to discern the presuppositions of Thomas's argument? — tim wood

How is "action in accord with being" different from what Thomas is claiming?

What makes you think there is any "tendency"? A rock simply is, unless something comes along and changes it. It itself doesn't tend toward anything; it's not involved with outcomes. — tim wood

In one sense, it's true that a rock simply is, but a rock is also always changing. This is because it is subject to a constant bombardment from wind, sand, heat, water and other agents of erosion. Generally speaking, rocks don't spontaneously explode, or burst into flames, or melt into puddles, or grow into acorn trees when subjected to these agents. Instead, the rock slowly, but surely, erodes. That is the outcome toward which it is directed through the action of the various efficient causes that bombard it.

The other alternative is that they do not exist. — tim wood

But, Aquinas will argue, if they didn't exist, then regularity would not be possible, and we should expect to experience pure chaos (or, really, to not exist at all). But we don't experience pure chaos, and we do exist. Therefore, ends must exist.

The way you expressed it makes it seem as if these outcomes just come about. Which, in turn, make it seem as If Thomas believes that order could be a product of chance. But I think that the words that I've put in bold leave little doubt that outcomes don't just come about, they are achieved. — Πετροκότσυφας

I agree with you. The reason I expressed it as I did was to clarify the fact that these outcomes are not understood by Thomas to be the purposes or goals of the inanimate thing itself. You are right to say that Thomas thinks there must be something that pushes inanimate things toward some ends rather than others, and that this something cannot be chance. Nor could it be anything in material nature, nor could it be something in the minds of finite creatures.

Wouldn't perfect chaos be a type of order? My point being, no reality can be conceived that does not include some type of order. Why would I then assume intention? — ZhouBoTong

Hi ZhouBoTong, I realize this question was directed at Metaphysician Undiscovered, but I'll jump in as well to see if I can help clarify.

To say that things are directed to ends is not to say that are driven by a goal or a purpose, but that they are directed to certain outcomes. A simple example would be that a match, when struck against an appropriate surface, will tend to light on fire, rather than freeze. This will happen pretty much without fail unless hampered by some other condition.

Chaos is, by stipulation, the absence of order, so, no, it is not just another type of order. It may be the case that pure chaos is unimaginable, but I'm not sure I'd agree that it's inconceivable.

In any event, the reason why the mind of God is invoked is because these "ends" or "outcomes" are understood by Aquinas to be the final causes of inanimate objects, and in order for something to act as a cause it must exist with respect whatever it affects.

For Aquinas, these cannot exist in material nature because then they would have to exist in the future, which is, according to him, absurd (Aquinas is a presentist). They can't exist in the finite minds of creatures of any kind (material or immaterial), because that would imply that all the outcomes of events taking place across the entire universe somehow exist in the minds of finite creatures, which seems implausible. So they must exist in some other mind that is vast enough to conceive of the (potentially infinite) number of causal outcomes within the entire universe.

It seems possible to be directed towards an end that does not exist. Firemen heading towards a non-existent fire for example. — Devans99

I think Aquinas would reply the in the case of firemen heading towards a non-existent fire, the content of their belief in the existence of the fire provides the end toward which their behavior is directed. But I think Aquinas specifically chose to focus his argument on inanimate things because he wanted to avoid the whole question of intentionality.

I have the goal of keeping safe and that goal most definitely exists in my mind. — Devans99

Yes. Aquinas would not deny that. But I think he would say that in the case of arbitrary physical events involving inanimate objects occurring at remote locations throughout the universe, you (or any other finite being) certainly don’t have their ends in your mind. That claim seems absurd.

Also, he has missed the possibility that ends exist in material minds (of finite creatures). No need for an infinite mind at all... — Devans99

Yes. But again, I think this is why Aquinas was focused specifically on inanimate things. His claim is that their behavior has ends as well, and it seems absurd to say that all of those ends exist in the minds of animals and humans as noted above.

What is the proof of 1)? — tim wood

I think Aquinas would say that if inanimate things did not act towards ends, then the we would observe pure chaos. But we don’t, so things must act towards ends.

What exactly, does it mean to say,"directed towards ends"? — tim wood

I believe that being “directed toward an end” means something like “tends to do some things rather than others with consistent regularity”. The “ends” refer to those “things” or “outcomes” that the inanimate object’s behavior tend toward.

3) Who says? — tim wood

I think Aquinas would argue that the ends of inanimate objects don’t exist in material nature because this would require those ends to exist in the future. This was a common criticism of Aristotle’s account of final causality with respect to inanimate objects.

Likewise, they couldn’t exist in human or animal minds because that would require that the outcome of every instance of physical causation within the universe exist in some human or animal mind, which Aquinas thinks is absurd.

4) False alternative. — tim wood

What is the other alternative?

Things act in an orderly way, as if they are ordered towards an end. — Metaphysician Undercover

Agreed. This is my interpretation of what Aquinas is claiming.

I wouldn't say that Sellars was trying to "definitively" justify anything. I think he was trying to illuminate and untangle the conceptual confusions he saw lurking at the heart of the empiricist epistemologies of his day, while offering novel alternative framings that preserved the good ideas in those epistemologies while jettisoning the bad. I don't think he was under the illusion that his work constituted some kind of a definitive refutation of idealism. At the end of the day, we all fabricate the conceptual resources necessary to believe or doubt whatever we want to our own satisfaction.