Comments

  • The Moral Argument for the Existence of God

    I argue against premise 2 in your argument by claiming that objective moral values and duties do not exist, and are in fact subjective. I think it is false to claim that there are objective moral values and duties that exist in our world because morals are all based on perspective. If I can show that objective morals and duties do not exist, then that will defeat the conclusion that God exists.
    One person's “good” and “Evil” might be completely different from another person's good and evil elsewhere in the world. You claim that there are objective moral values and duties that exist in our world, but I would like to see just one example of an objective moral or duty that cannot be refuted. I don't think one exist. For every evil action one could claim is objectively wrong, there could be a whole bunch of reasons and ways to spin it as not objective but simply subjective. Perhaps someone might say that murder/ death is always wrong, I agree with this but for arguements sake we can show that this is not objective. Murder seems wrong, yet we practice putting criminals to death when someone does something that we percieve as needing the death penalty. Is this wrong? Some might say that murder and death is always wrong but we have evidence that others say death is the only just and right thing to do in some situations. When looking at duties and if they exist, some might say that one objective duty is to do good or live a good life. I think that this can be refuted by claiming that there are people that don't share the action of wanting to live a good life or do good. I believe that this is evident in certain cases of psychopathy.
  • Plantinga's response to Hume's argument regarding the problem of evil

    I agree with most of your thoughts, but I would question why a perfect being/ God would not allow for imperfections. I would argue that a perfect being/ God would allow for imperfections, which is actually necessary if this God is omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent. If God has the ability to create good and perfect things then doesn't God have the ability to create things that are imperfect or evil? If God doesn't have the power to create evil, then he is not all powerful and there are things or actions that God cannot do which doesn't line up with the definition of God. However, if we are sticking to the same definition then an all powerful God can create things that are imperfect and evil which would mean that both evil and God are compatible. I think this claim, shows that both God and Evil are compatible but another way to look at this would be to see Evil as a testament to God's power. I would claim that the presence of evil is not contradicted by the concept of a perfect being. If something is conceivable of being created, then wouldn't God creating it be good, even if that thing is evil in itself. Creating evil is like a testament to God's power and strength to create anything at all. I think that the concept of evil leading to a greater good helps with this idea, because it allows for God to create Evil in order for a greater good to be achieved. Evil and God are not contradicting each other, the presence of Evil could be seen as leading to a greater good or as a testament to God's power.
  • Design, No design. How to tell the difference?
    Your argument is focused on the possibility of order an objection to the watchmaker analogy. You create the example of their being two rooms; one in disarray (Room A) and one the other in order (Room B), and when asking which one was designed/ lived in, the obvious answer is Room A. I agree with this example but I think it misses the point of the original objection because it only has two rooms and is not considering the chances of life existing/ the universe being finely tuned.
    For this example to work I think there would need to be as many rooms as there are chances, however minuscule, for life to exist. Only having two rooms to choose from fails to address the main claim in the counter-argument. In the objection to the design argument one could claim that the chances of life and the universe existing are very improbable and we just happen by chance to live here where we can contemplate it.
    For argument's sake let's say the probability of humans existing is one in one million. Similarly, when tweaking the room example, instead of their being two rooms, there would need to be one million rooms. If all these different rooms had arrangements in no particular order, seemingly at random, and I happen to come across one that is in a perceived discernable pattern, i'm not sure I would conclude that it was designed. If most people had the time to go through all these rooms, I think they would conclude that even though improbable, the neat room just happen by chance to be neat. I might claim that it seems suspicious, but I think it would be false to conclude that the room was designed.
  • The Problem of Evil & Freewill
    I think your argument against the POE goes like this; You can't use free will in the problem of evil because it doesn't exist. Free will doesn't exist because how could it? If the consequences of hell and the eternal joy of heaven are so great, then we don't even have an option, we must do good to avoid hell.

    Firstly, I think id question your use of the word mandatory, because in reference to God and this problem it seems like the act of evil would be impossible. The word mandatory in the sense that in not being good you are doing the impossible and acting in an evil way? If that's the case then we could just point to evils in everyday life to see that doing good is not mandatory. Maybe by the word mandatory you mean that one should be good and if someone is bad then there would be a punishment. If this is the case then I think that heaven and hell would actually work in defense of the POE. If someone should be good but acts evil then that person would be sent to hell because they went against what is mandatory. I think that this would make heaven and hell incentives, and I know you said this doesn't work, but I think it is the only thing that makes sense.

    Secondly, I think that if freewill doesn't exist and humans don't have a choice in choosing good or bad because of the magnitude of heaven and hell we could just look and see that humans choose evil quite a bit to prove that even though it might be mandatory to choose good people still choose evil. I think that this proves that freewill exists and can still work for the problem of evil
  • The idea that we have free will is an irrational idea
    I think for this argument I would try to push back on the idea that God and Free will can not exist together. You claim that freewill and God's existence coexisting do not make sense because God would have created something that he can't know, and because God is all knowing, it wouldn't make sense that he would make something he doesn't know. I would posit the claim that it is absolutely possible for an all knowing God to exist and for us humans to still have and practice freewill. I think I would also push back on your definition of freewill being completely God induced randomness.

    I'm not quite sure how sound this argument is so please let me know if it needs work, but I believe randomness is unpredictability but that doesn't mean that I don't know what the outcome is. If I put two numbers (1 and 2) into a random number generator that will randomly spit out the numbers that got put into it, isn't it safe to say that I know im either going to get 1 or 2? I think that even though this is random and i don't know which number ill get its safe to say that i know its either going to be one or the other.

    Another way to look at it; could it be possible that we have options and free will to choose between any number of choices and god still is aware of what the outcome is? If I present a child with a banana split hot fudge sundae covered in sprinkles and also present to them a bowl of steamed radishes and mushrooms i think it's fair to say that i know which bowl the child is going to choose even though the child has the free will and choice to choose either. Couldn't the God and human relationship work in this same way? We are presented with any number of options and even though we have the freewill to choose any, God can know which one we choose just like how we know which bowl the child is going to choose.
  • Morality of the existence of a God
    I think you say that God credits himself with your creation and also decides to give himself the ultimate authority over you which seems immoral to you. You say that God is in ultimate authority of your life because he gave it to you and that it's immoral because you didn't have a say in your existence. I think that yes, even though you didn't have a say in your existence, if God created you and has authority then your existence then you would serve a purpose and even a greater good. If this is the case then I think existence would be good and in turn better than non-existence. If existence is better than non-existing, then just the fact that God created you is good and morally good. If God is the essence of moral authority and is all good then to say that the existence of him is immoral doesn't make sense. It seems like your definition of God being the ultimate authority and him also being immoral is contradictory. I can understand an authority not being moral but if God is all good then every action would have to be morally just and right.

    Secondly, You posit “I can compare the God-to-human relation to a parent-to-child relationship. According to most societies, children are under their parents authority for the first 18 years (ordinarily) of the child's life.” First off it is not the case that children are under the authority for the first 18 years of their life and are then have freedom over themselves in most societies. I think that this idea of the parent and child relationship seems like the morally right thing but I believe that this is a western point of view and wrong to believe that this applies to the world.
  • Would there be a God-like "sensation" in the absence of God or religion? How is this to be explained
    I think this argument makes sense and I can see where your coming from with this logic. however, I might have to disagree and question certain points in this argument. I believe that it is fully correct to claim that perhaps the first humans to feel the god sensation probably ascribed it to there being a god and not to the fact that it is a natural human experience.
    However i would object to the premise that “God is likely only defined by religion”. I don't think it follows from your other premises in the argument. I agree with the first premise, In a time before religion, there was no God to speak of, however I don't think it follows that God's definition is defined by religion. I think its wrong to say that because religion began to exist, then God began to exist. I think “God” and the human concept of “God” are two different things. Perhaps the human concept of a god only began to exist when religion began, but that isn't to say that God exists only within religion. God is not defined by religion and religion is not defined by God.
  • Purpose of humans is to create God on Earth
    Hi! I dig this thought! But a couple things came up when reading this post.

    Firstly, I think I would question your definition of “God”. It seems like the only definition you give is “creating something (technological God?) much more powerful than humans”. If this is the only definition to go off of, then this has already been created many times. We have many things more powerful than humans on earth; computers, cars, AI just to name a few. But I really dont think this is what you meant by a technological God. Perhaps a technological God is one that can create art, music, and perhaps even a “being”. To fully understand this way of thinking we would have to have a clear definition of a technological God and what it entails to be one.

    Second, I think my main objection to this post comes from, if humans were placed on earth to begin a chain reaction that eventually leads to the creation of a technological God, then it would follow that as humans, we wouldn't be able to find “good” outside of the actions and goals that would eventually lead to this technological God. Let me try to explain a little more clearly. If humans purpose on earth is for the creation of a technological god then it would be impossible to find “good” or a purpose to anything other than that of the creation of this God. However, we find purpose and good in many many other things, rather than just the things that will eventually lead to this creation. Now perhaps we just don't understand that each action we make will eventually lead to the creation of a technological god, but if our purpose is for the creation then i think it follows that we would make every effort to the creation of this god. If we were truly put here to begin a chain of events leading to this end, then that would be our main focus and drive. I think this logic works even if we didn't have knowledge that our purpose is to create god on earth because our drive would only consist of creating technologies that lead to this end.
  • The Goal of Art
    I agree with most of what was posited in this argument, however id find fault in your claim that art not being paraphrasable is only the effect of “great art”. Does this mean that bad art or any type of art can also not be paraphrasable?

    Your argument claims that great works of art exert power that has not diminished over time and that they hold objective truths that cannot be avoided because they generate new or deeper thoughts. I wonder if this is always the case for “great art”. Can bad art or just not “great” art still have power that doesn't diminish over time? Can bad art hold objective truths that when you revisit works of art they still generate new and deeper thoughts?

    I object to this definition of “great art”. Do not all works of art exert some sort of power that hold object truths? Even a simple finger painting of a tree done by a child holds power, objective truths and meaning that generates thought. This art is not necessarily “great”, not in the sense of a Picasso painting or a Shakespeare play, but it still exerts some power and objective truths that cannot be avoided. When I take a trip down memory lane and revisit finger paintings ive done as a child, these works of art still have the same power they had when they were first created and they also generate new thoughts and or deeper thoughts then when I last visited these works. Even though these works of art are not great they still fit in your definition of “great art”.

    If bad art can contain all of these definitions of “great art” couldn't we then claim that a simple drawing of a circle contains all the definitions of great art as well? From this then, we could also claim that a perfect circle does not exist and therefore paraphrasing the drawing of a circle by saying a shape in which all points are equidistant from a fixed center is a fully paraphrased work of art. I think it follows that great art can be paraphrased, certain abstract pieces in museums of simple (approximated) circles are considered great art however it can be fully paraphrased. One can fully paraphrase great art because great art is subjective.

    If bad art fits in your definition of great art and you can fully paraphrase bad art, ie example of the drawing of a circle then you can also paraphrase great works of art because great works of art are all subjective.