I think your argument entails some inconsistencies and false dichotomies.
To demonstrate this, I will attempt to restructure your argument into a common argument form to show that a couple of its premises are not sound, or are at least objectionable.

To begin, I will assess your first two antecedents:

1. The Biblical Yahweh is only known from manmade scriptures
2. Yahweh has not authorized Christians to speak on His behalf

While it can be argued that the nature of the Biblical scriptures are more nuanced than a simple "manmade" designation (i.e., Spirit-inspired or similarly authoritative), I will grant, for the sake of ease, the position that the scriptures are basically manmade.

Concerning (2), there needs to be more clarification on the meaning of "authorization" in this statement. For example, a strong and clear case can be made from the Bible that Yahweh as indeed authorized Christians to speak on his behalf regarding the reiteration of the gospel. Consider the famous "great commission" from Matthew 28:19-20: "Go therefore and make disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, teaching them to observe all that I have commanded you." Special attention should be given to Jesus' command to "teach" in this passage.

The type of prohibition that it seems you are more likely referring to is one of additional or overriding revelation. The Bible does seem clear that, after the New Testament revelation, none can be officially added. Consider this stark passage from Revelation 22:18: "I warn everyone who hears the words of the prophecy of this book: if anyone adds to them, God will add to him the plagues described in this book." Thus, based on these passages and the many others that they represent, it seems reasonable to redefine your statement (2) as follows:

2. Yahweh has not authorized anyone to effectively change the current state of Biblical revelation; the canon is closed.

Now, to assess your premises, I will do some slight organizing for ease of discussion and address your first suggestion - that "everyone would" know God if he so desired. I think the following is a charitable reformulation of your argument into modus tollens:

3. If Yahweh wanted everyone to know Him (and the truth of Him in particular), then everyone would.

4. It's not the case that everyone knows Him (there were/are devout adherents claiming to know different deities instead, people never having heard of Yahweh, and nonresistant nonbelievers)

5. Therefore, it stands to reason that Yahweh does not want everyone to know Him. (3,4, MT).

Concerning premise (3), there seems to be a variety of assumptions packed into the conclusion that "everyone would" know God. Clarifying questions arise regarding the nature of knowing; what does it mean that "God wants everyone to know him", and how would this divine desire logically play out? Philosophical debates regarding free will and omniscience come to mind. The concept of "God" normatively entails the other "omni's" as well, including omnibenevolence and omnipotence. Thus, if God is omniscient, is free will possible? If so, can God be perfectly good and violate our free will? Does our ability to "know" him fall within our willpower? If this is the case, then perhaps it is possible for God (entailing all of the "omni's") to desire that all know him while only some succeed in doing so. All of these philosophical questions aside, there still remains the need to qualify "knowing."

Distinctions are made within the Bible that speak to the nuances of human knowing in light of God's desire.
Consider the following passages:

Romans 1:20: "For his invisible attributes, namely, his eternal power and divine nature, have been clearly perceived, ever since the creation of the world, in the things that have been made. So [all] are without excuse."

Psalm 19:1-4:
The heavens declare the glory of God,
and the sky above[a] proclaims his handiwork.
Day to day pours out speech,
and night to night reveals knowledge.
There is no speech, nor are there words,
whose voice is not heard.
Their voice goes out through all the earth,
and their words to the end of the world.

1 Timothy 2:4: "[God] desires all people to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth."

John 12:48: "There is a judge for the one who rejects me and does not accept my words; the very words I have spoken will condemn them at the last day."

From these passages, a case can be made that God has indeed provided all with some semblance of guaranteed knowledge of him, be it explicit or secondary. However, even while establishing God's desire for all to "come to the knowledge of the truth", it appears that some will remain unknowing - perhaps by nature of free will.

While debates about God's compatibility with free will are beyond the scope of this post, I will simply hint at the reasonable possibility of free will and posit an objection to your premise (3) based on the Biblical evidence above for the reasonable compatibility of God's desire with a qualified sense of knowing.

Before I formulate this revision, however, I will briefly note that perhaps your use of "knowing" conveys a more salvific meaning rather than mere intellectual understanding? If this is the case - that your argument gravitates toward the idea that if God wanted everyone to know him (in a relational and salvific sense) then he would assure everyone's "salvation", then I will just say that this is an entirely different debate. However, this may not be your intention at all, and with that in mind, I will continue on with a discussion of "knowing" as understood in the more intellectual/evidential sense (pertaining more to debates regarding God's "hiddenness").

Returning to the discussion regarding premise (3), my reformulation works out as follows:

6. If Yahweh wanted everyone to know Him (and the truth of Him in particular), then he would provide enough universal knowledge for him to be known.

4. It is the case that Yahweh has provided enough universal knowledge for him to be known without an apparent violation of free will.

5. Therefore, it stands to reason that Yahweh does indeed want everyone to know Him. (3,4, MP).

How come religious people like God when these same qualities are disliked when in their comrades at an infinitely smaller scale? — TheMadFool

I think an answer to your question is because these qualities ascribed to God are diametrically different that you have proposed. I think you have made an error in assessing the nature of these qualities and thus, concluded with a false dichotomy between "comrades at an infinitely smaller scale" and God. Does an infinite level of something make it excessive, or perfect? I think this depends on the essential nature of the quality or virtue in question, and the intention behind it.

I will demonstrate my thoughts by constructing our positions in argument form. I think this would be an accurate display of your argument:

1. When the expression of love passes a certain threshold (i.e., infinity), then it is excessive sentimentality and unworthy of adoration.
2. When the capacity for power passes a certain threshold (i.e. infinity), then it is oppressive and unworthy of adoration.
3. When the capacity for knowledge passes a certain threshold (i.e. infinity), then it is pedantic and unworthy of adoration.
4. God is omnibenevolent, omniscient, and omnipotent.
5. Therefore, God is excessively sentimental, oppressive, pedantic, and unworthy of adoration. (1-4)

To preface my counter-perspective, I will qualify each virtue to demonstrate its neutrality or altruism in the context of God's character, and then show how the above argument fails when the clarified virtues are reformulated into the argument.

Firstly, take the concept of love. You have, I think, incorrectly associated the concept of love with emotion. Certainly, sentimentality often accompanies love, but it is not essential to it. At least as defined by God. This may not be true for all concepts of God, but for my argument, I will consider the Christian conception of God (which includes each "omni" as you've listed above). The God of the Bible clearly exhibits a delineation between love as emotion and love as action. The most obvious example is Jesus, "who for the joy set before Him endured the cross" (Hebrews 12:2). Joy is also considered a deep sort of settledness that can coexist with all kinds of emotions - even sadness. But to the point about love, Jesus exemplifies love as a chosen self-giving sacrifice. Love is willed, sacrificial, and intended for the best interest of another. According to John 15:13, "Greater love has no one than this, that he lay down his life for his friends." In this way, the God of the Bible defines the infinite standard of love and its qualities, which are in no way contingent upon emotion.
Now consider the implications of love in these terms. No one would consider someone who willingly suffered and died in their place "excessively sentimental." On the contrary, it seems that the only worthy response to this sort of love would be extreme adoration... or perhaps even worship.

Now let's consider power. I think money is a good analogy for analyzing the inherent nature of power. The question is, does power have some quality in and of itself that makes it corrupt after a certain threshold? I think not. Consider this passage about money form the Bible: "For the love of money is a root of all kinds of evils." (1 Timothy 6:10). It is the love of money that is the root of many evils, not money itself. That is because money is neutral; it is the force behind the money that infuses it with either merit or demerit. I posit that power is the same way. Great power for good is needed to overcome great evil; indeed, more power than all the power of evil. Thus, when infinite power is paired with infinite goodness (or self-giving sacrificial love, as noted above), then incredibly benevolent possibilities unfold. With these two qualities in tandem, one could conceivably not only die for the sake of one, but perhaps for the sake of all.

Lastly, I will discuss knowledge. Consider this scenario: you are critically ill with a curable disease; all of the tools and expertise needed to enact a successful operation are available; the only thing you need is an accurate diagnosis. The level of knowledge needed to assess the symptoms and to pinpoint the exact problem and cure are likely high levels of expertise. Of course, in this situation, you would not call the doctor with the applicable knowledge pedantic, or, a "know-it-all"; the storehouse of this knowledge was essential to your livelihood. In this way also, knowledge is understood as neutral. However, paired with infinite goodness and power, it becomes an infinite asset. Now, not only can such an omni-being have the love and power necessary to die for everyone, but it has the knowledge of how to do so.

What I have attempted to do is sketch a perspective of love, power, and knowledge that fits coherently with the idea of a worship-worthy God.
Based on my discussion above, my formal counter-argument looks something like this:

6. If love is synonymous with emotion, then it can become excessive sentimentality.
7. love is not synonymous with emotion.
8. therefore, love cannot become excessive sentimentality. (6,7 MT)

9. If power and knowledge are neutral entities, then omnibenevolence makes them virtuous.
10. power and knowledge are neutral entities.
11. therefore, omnibenevolence makes them virtuous. (9,10 MP).

12. If God is omnibenevolent, omniscient, and omnipotent, then he is worthy of worship.
13. God is omnibenevolent, omniscient, and omnipotent.
14. therefore, God is worthy of worship. (12,13 MP).

https://www.flickr.com/photos/185405289@N06/49026515372/in/dateposted-public/

Based on the illustration you provided above and your opening comments, it sounds like your concern with adherents of religion (at least, those who seem to base their convictions on "faith"), is that their religious faith is ungrounded or irrational; i.e., not based on reason or evidence.

Certainly, an argument as you've demonstrated in the illustration above is circular and unfounded.
However, I would like to submit that this is not the sort of reasoning imbibed by all religious people, and in fact, the dichotomy between the sort of circular reasoning you've outlined above and evidential inference is not primarily between theists and non-theists, spiritualists and naturalists - however you want to delineate the line between those with religious "faith" and those without.

Circular reasoning is not exclusive to people who claim religious faith. Indeed, to illustrate a Christian perspective, the Bible itself lends itself to reasonable and evidential assessment. In other words, a strong case can be made that the Bible does not promote the kind of "leap" of faith that it is commonly stereotyped with.

Before I offer some examples, I will briefly touch on the notion implied by your illustration - that basic belief in God is predicated on "nothing." This stance is questionable, and there are strong philosophical arguments for the epistemological soundness of "warranted belief in God" (see, Alvin Plantinga's, Warranted Christian Belief). However, I will leave this debate aside for the purposes of this post and simply focus on delineating an evidential appeal to the particular faith of Christianity.

Consider the following passages:

1 Peter 3:15: "But in your hearts honor Christ the Lord as holy, always being prepared to make a defense to anyone who asks you for a reason for the hope that is in you; yet do it with gentleness and respect"

Luke 24:38-39: "And He said to them, 'Why are you troubled, and why do doubts arise in your hearts?
See My hands and My feet, that it is I Myself; touch Me and see, for a spirit does not have flesh and bones as you see that I have.'"

Acts 2:32: "God has raised this Jesus to life, and we are all witnesses of it."

Just on the basis of these two passages, you can see an appeal to reason and historical fact.
In the passage I listed from 1 Peter, the phrase, "make a defense" comes from the Greek, ἀπολογίαν (apologian), which basically means "a verbal defense (particularly in a law court); from the same as apologeomai; a plea."
In courts of law, appeals to reason and evidence are essential. Thus, according to this passage, it seems clear that the apostle Peter is urging followers of Jesus (or people of that particular "faith") to be prepared with a reasonable explanation for their faith.

Similarly, I list the passages from Luke and Acts to demonstrate the Biblical claim of a historical, falsifiable event. The claim is this: Jesus resurrected bodily from the dead, and there were many eye-witnesses to the account. If the New Testament Biblical writers would have asserted that Jesus rose spiritually from the dead, it seems there would have been no way to scrutinize the claim on the basis of evidence.

However, this is not the case, according to the Biblical testimony. Thus, the significant claims of Jesus and his followers are up for debate, but they are steeped in evidential appeals.
If, after considering the many sources of evidence, including the eye-witness scriptural accounts, I am convinced of there reliability, I can espouse a "reasonable faith."

In this way, it can also be suggested that most things we accept as fact are similarly based on a combination of evidence and "faith." I cannot say that I know for certain that George Washington existed and presided over the United States as its first president. But, I do take that to be a true, because I think the evidence is reasonable.

This view of the relationship between faith and reason encapsulates many paradigms commonly stereotyped as factual, including non-theistic propositions such as evolution and naturalism.

With these ideas in mind, I will attempt to demonstrate how your initial statement about faith can be reasonably countered. Within your argument, you include several denominations of Christianity; this is where I will focus my formulations. I think a charitable version of your argument would look something like this:

1. If faith in the Christian understanding of God ultimately has no evidential basis, then it is irrational and misleading.
2. faith in the Christian understanding of God has no evidential basis.
3. Therefore, it is irrational and misleading. (1,2 MP)

As I've demonstrated above, faith in God can have a strong basis in evidential reasoning. Thus, my counter to your argument is the following:

4. If faith in the Christian understanding of God ultimately has no evidential basis, then it is irrational and misleading.
5. faith in the Christian understanding of God has a strong evidential basis.
6. Therefore, faith in the Christian understanding of God is rational and evidentially sound. (4,5 MT).

I've noticed that you could make the argument that human history has been (in part) the process of creating something much more powerful than humans — bronson

Were we put here to begin a chain of reactions leading to a technological god emerging on Earth? — bronson

Your question intimates the plausibility of a convincing argument regarding a technological singularity as the ultimate goal and culmination of human proclivities.

I will try to extract and examine this sort of argument.

It is apparent that humanity in general has striven for progress throughout history; our modern world certainly reflects remarkable technologies. Indeed, controversies over an artificial intelligence singularity are currently high, debating its actualization as a potential reality.

But does this mean what it appears you have postulated above? Is humanity predisposed to essentially creating a superior entity?

Perhaps your argument would look something like this:


1. If human innovation is historically directed toward the transcendence of human capacity, then the ultimate human instinct is to establish an entity of intellectual singularity.

2. Human innovation is historically directed toward the transcendence of human capacity.

3. Therefore, the primary human instinct is to establish an entity of intellectual singularity. (1,2 MP)


This argument seems valid, however, I'm not so sure it is sound.
Premise (2), as I have extrapolated from your post, seems dubious. While human innovation certainly extends our human capacities, is its primary purpose to build toward the instigation of an intellectual supersession – some sort of superhuman entity?
I tend to think otherwise. While it is true that technology is leading toward the possibility of an artificial intelligence beyond human power (as referred to in the first quotation above), it does not necessarily follow that human innovation is culminating to this realization.

While “technology” by definition implies progression and betterment, many forms of technology are non-sequitur and do not actually culminate toward the realization of a superintelligence.
In fact, Artificial Intelligence has been called a science or a goal, rather than a specific technology. This is, at least in part, because it is an uncertain idea; much the same as terraforming. For example, scientific and technological advances in general are remarkable today and certainly lend themselves to intimations of terraforming in the future, but these advances do not necessarily provide practical progress to the idea, which in itself could very well be impossible.

Similarly, myriad examples of human innovations – while they demonstrate a certain level of capacity-expansion – are not “beyond human power” in the way that an AI super-entity is expected to be. Primitive stone wheels, microwaves, satellites and even self-driving cars all serve to expand human ability, but they do not exceed human cognition or even necessarily progress toward such a technology. Even loftier innovations like robots and supercomputers tend to fit a technological niche that does not necessarily portend AI singularity. While the study of supercomputers and AI is beyond the scope of this post, and much beyond my exposure as well, it suffices here to say that human innovation is not necessarily leading toward the establishment of a super-intelligent entity. Even disregarding AI singularity, historical innovation illustrates human extension rather than a practical progression toward “something much more powerful than humans.” Thus, such technological movements of "extension" and "expansion" can be seen as empowering human superiority rather than ultimately undermining it.

In this post, I have tried to extrapolate an argument from your post and examine its plausibility.
I have attempted to show that historical innovative progress does not necessarily converge on an impetus for a transcendent power.

To close, I will list what I think such an objection would look like.

a. If human innovation is historically directed toward the transcendence of human
capacity, then the ultimate human instinct is to establish an entity of intellectual singularity.

b. Human innovation is not historically directed toward the transcendence of human capacity; rather, a complex web of human improvement and extension.

c. Therefore, it is not likely that the primary human instinct is to establish an entity of intellectual singularity. (1,2 MT)

The problem is that although these two substances appear to interact, it does not seem possible that they can interact if interaction itself requires a physical location, while mind has no location — ModernPAS

I do not think that interaction itself requires a physical location, or that the mind has no location whatsoever. While you have paralleled the mind/body discussion with the Christology of Jesus's ontology, it seems you have assumed the implausibility of metaphysical connections to physical entities. Certainly, "if interaction itself requires a physical location" and the mind has no location or is a concept reducible to physical phenomena, then problems arise. The former appears to be a question of the metaphysical nature of the mind, while the latter is a materialist conclusion. Your comment then, seems to be a mix of paradigms; it seems to me that interaction only requires a purely physical location according to a materialist interpretation, and if the mind exists, then it has some sort of location, albeit non-physical.

However, whether one emphasizes low or high christology, the fact remains that Jesus is supposed to be both a purely material, spatio-temporal being on the one hand and a purely immaterial, non-temporal-non-spatial being on the other. — ModernPAS

The mind-body problem arises when we consider that mind and body are supposed to interact. — ModernPAS

While you acknowledge the field of Christology, it does appear that the central issue you are raising deals with the mind/body relationship. I will attempt to address this connection, while leaving the deeper theological discussions of "high/low" interpretations of Christ's divinity beyond the scope of this response.

It seems to me that if a convincing argument for the mind's existence is constructed, then the dilemma you have raised can be addressed. If one can reasonably posit a mind/self/soul, and establish this metaphysical entity as an integral interconnection with a physical entity (e.g., the body), then there remains only a theological debate of degrees within Christology. Jesus can be both man (physical) and God (metaphysical) just as you and I can be both homo sapien (physical) and self (metaphysical).

The problem is that although these two substances appear to interact, it does not seem possible that they can interact if interaction itself requires a physical location, while mind has no location. — ModernPAS

When you say "interaction itself requires a physical location", you imply physicalism. For, according to this view, all things can be reduced to material phenomena. Thus, "the mind has no location" because it is an illusion.

But how is it possible that he is both human and divine if we accept mind-body dualism? Do we simply appeal to faith in a God for whom there is allegedly no mind-body problem? — ModernPAS

Where you ask the above question, there seems to be no dilemma according to dualism. If one were to subscribe to physicalism as noted above, then faith in God is incoherent. However, assuming the existence of the mind and its integral connection to the body, then it follows logically that Jesus constitutes both a physical and metaphysical identity. The question of Jesus' divinity is not then a breach of reason; it is a question of theology.

I will briefly lay out my responses in argument forms; first, in terms of physicalism.

1. If physicalism is true, then minds have no location or existence.
2. Physicalism is true.
3. Minds do not exist, and therefore have no location. (1,2 MP)

Now, according to Dualism:

a. If dualism is true, then minds exist and have a metaphysical location.
b. Dualism is true.
c. Minds exist and have a metaphysical location. (1,2 MP)

I. If minds have a location, then they can be integrally connected to physical entities.
II. Minds have a location.
III. Minds can be integrally connected to physical entities. (1,2 MP)

A. If minds can be integrally connected to physical entities, then it is possible for Jesus to be physical and metaphysical.
B. Minds can be integrally connected to physical entities.
C. It is possible for Jesus to be physical and metaphysical. (1,2 MP)

From this point, you get into discussions of theism versus non-theism, which is beyond the scope of this response. However, you can see that clarifying the discussion according to the entailments of physicalism and dualism opens up the logical possibility for mind/body interconnection, and potentially, even the coherence of Jesus' human/divinity dynamic.

Hi Wayfarer, thanks for the book recommendation!

“doesn't it make it so much more likely / probable than man will choose in favour of "God"? It has this one big advantage that in being able to create Him in the way want to, we can create Him in such a way that our existence can be meaningful in a very fundamental sense?” - Daniel C

Hi Daniel C,

I think your reasoning makes sense based on the philosophical stage you’ve set.

In the context of the existential crises you mentioned - the “cold indifference” of the external world; the “freedom imposition” of the seemingly endless burden of choice; and the “inevitable angst” of the unchosen birth and death we all face - it does seem that the most comfortable respite is a form of religion that supplies a relevant sense of hope and meaning.
This brings to mind Pascal’s Wager; a sort of formula that weighs the pros and cons of theism versus non-theism as a chosen lifestyle. Pascal argues that committing to theism - taking this “leap of faith” - always results in the greatest benefit.
Of course, in this sense, committing to theism and taking this step of faith entails a choice of assent to its truth claims (i.e. believing that said form of theism is true and not simply a construct of the imagination).

All that to say, I do want to respond to the paradigm of reality that you established above, and see if I can submit a different angle on these existential experiences.
It seems to me, the general sense of the world described above is one where atheism is the default paradigm. That is to say, humans are thrust into these existential realities, and - precisely because these realities are the way that they are (absurd, nullified, doomed, etc) - we assume the only logical starting place is atheism. In other words, if God truly existed, the world would look differently. Thus, God is a fabrication of man to deal with the chaos of the real world.

This paradigm that I’ve described, an atheistic default, is what I’d like to challenge; I think there are some very interesting interpretations of these existential crises from the Christian point of view.

To start, I will present Alvin Plantinga’s idea of Properly Basic Belief and Warranted Belief in God.
According to Plantinga, Properly Basic Beliefs are beliefs that are accepted as foundational - not on the basis of over beliefs. Although these beliefs are not inferred from other beliefs or accepted on the basis of other beliefs, they are not therefore, groundless. For, these beliefs follow from foundational experiences informed by reality. For example, the following claims:

(a) I see a tree
(b) that person is angry
(c) I had breakfast this morning

represent a basic sort of experience related to a reliable sense of perception, memory, and understanding.

Plantinga supports the idea of a Sensus divinitatis - an intrinsic sense of the transcendent nature of things, naturally activated by certain existential realities.

In other words, this human tendency to attribute parts of our experience to the divine is intrinsic, not extrinsic (i.e. man does not “create” God, man “finds” God).

For example, the natural sense of awe or gratitude at the sight of a beautiful sunset, a delicious and satisfying meal, or even the humbling experience of an illness or suffering. Even among non-theists, this experience is often exclaimed in terms of, “the universe”, or a generalized sense of “karma”. According to the Sensus divinitatis, these hints of the divine come from within as a predisposed understanding of a transcendent reality.

And so, according to Plantinga, there are existential realities that conform to a properly basic belief in God. He calls this, warranted belief in God; and these beliefs are “warranted” when produced by a sound mind, in an environment supportive of proper thought, and in accordance with a design plan successfully aimed at truth.

Now, I will try to sum this up. I explain all of these propositions from Alvin Plantinga to present the philosophical notion that existential realities can also validly promote theism; atheism is not the only option for a default understanding of our existence.

I will add a couple of small thoughts to this basic paradigm shift.
Consider C.S. Lewis’s observation about our existential reality:

“The Christian says, 'Creatures are not born with desires unless satisfaction for those desires exists. A baby feels hunger: well, there is such a thing as food. A duckling wants to swim: well, there is such a thing as water. Men feel sexual desire: well, there is such a thing as sex. If I find in myself a desire which no experience in this world can satisfy, the most probable explanation is that I was made for another world. If none of my earthly pleasures satisfy it, that does not prove that the universe is a fraud. Probably earthly pleasures were never meant to satisfy it, but only to arouse it, to suggest the real thing. If that is so, I must take care, on the one hand, never to despise, or to be unthankful for, these earthly blessings, and on the other, never to mistake them for the something else of which they are only a kind of copy, or echo, or mirage. I must keep alive in myself the desire for my true country, which I shall not find till after death; I must never let it get snowed under or turned aside; I must make it the main object of life to press on to that country and to help others to do the same.” - C.S. Lewis, Mere Christianity

Alvin Plantinga’s description of Warranted Christian Belief strikes a similar chord; according to this argument, the Sensus divinitatis (or, innate sense of the divine) logically follows if Christianity is indeed true.

A proverb from the Bible itself seems to hint of an intentional design to the apparent contrarieties of life:

“It is the glory of God to conceal things, but the glory of kings is to search things out.”
Proverbs 25:2 (ESV).
It seems from this proverb that the struggles of life are - at least to some degree - part of a benevolent and purposeful process of identity fulfilment.

Now, these thoughts I’ve pulled together mainly describe a Christian point of view, but I think the ideas presented above support the broader claim to theism’s validity.

It seems to me that this theistic paradigm, if indeed valid, shifts the entire foundation of existential perspective. Instead of entering into a cold and indifferent world where one must contrive one’s own meaning, morality, and destiny - to the absurdity of a hopeless mortality - one enters into a world with all of these metaphysical concepts pre-established in the fabric of reality. It is, indeed, the idea that “essence precedes existence”, rather than “existence precedes essence.”
Instead of straining toward a feigned delusion as a mode of subsistence, one is settling into benevolent design as a mode of true fulfillment.

This concept is intriguing, and even exhilarating. Not as wishful thinking or blissful ignorance, but as a philosophical and logical validity. Apparently, it is just as reasonable to presume theism as it is atheism. And, it seems to me, starting with theism can infuse significant hope into our perplexing existential realities.

Hi Daniel C,

According to your post,

“In the beginning man created "God". As far as ancient historians can go back into history they find indications of man being "religious" in some way or another. The only expanation for this phenomenon which makes sense to me is a psychological one. There must have been this overwhelmimg need in man, right from the "beginning" to find a Superior / Transcendental / Cosmic Being to enable him/her to bear the pain / suffering of being alive and to give meaning to their lives and also a sense of morality. Without finding such a Being the "inner chaos of human experience" would have destroyed everything with no survivors left to give continuity to the human race. Therefore, human beings created the concept of "God" which eventually led to many different conceptions of this concept which is today still in a process of evolution.” - Daniel C

it seems like your argument works out like this:

(1) If a concept related to psychological needs is ubiquitous and fundamentally diverse, then it cannot be objectively true.
(2) Humans have historically exhibited religious activity, and exhibit a psychological need to cope with questions of suffering, meaning, and morality
(3) Therefore, God is a construct of the imagination. (1,2, MP)

While I agree with you that we are faced with significant and unavoidable questions related to purpose, suffering, and morality, and that history provides us with consistent examples of religious expression, I do not think that your conclusion (3) follows based on premise (1).

The conclusion that God is a construct does not follow based on the observances of (2), and must be supported by a premise such as (1); which seems to me to be an accurate articulation of your argument.

Just because religion is a phenomenon that can be traced throughout history, and that it seems to satisfy a series of existential questions innate to the human condition does not immediately mean that it is a false construct.

For, there are many similar phenomena that, based on the criteria of (1), serve to promote the reality of a concept.

Take the concept of morality, for example. The concept of good and evil / right and wrong has been intrinsic throughout human history, and unique and diverse throughout time and cultural context.

One might argue that these very observances are cause to refute the existence of morality - that it is also a result of pragmatism or psychological need.

However, it seems apparent that the similarities within this common sense of morality actually exceed cultural differences - at least in a normative sense.

What I mean is, loyalty, generosity, altruism, kindness, respect, etc. all seem to be acknowledged as good things across cultural divides and historical eras. Likewise, things like theft, insolence, avarice, and adultery are seen as bad.

This human tendency toward morality is often cited as evidence for the existence of an objective morality, not against it. Despite differences in expression, it is the nature of the expression itself that causes many to assert its objective reality.

Opponents of this view who take a subjective approach fall into an awkward problem of self-defeat. For example, it becomes impossible for those with a subjective view of morality to renounce such acts as genocide, infanticide, and racism as objectively wrong.

Similarly, the fact that religion has existed throughout history and satisfies intrinsic psychological proclivities can actually serve to corroborate theism.
Further, though religions do take many forms, they are all fundamental acknowledgements of metaphysical presuppositions about purpose, morality, meaning, and destiny.
This is a dichotomy between atheism (God is a human construct) and any metaphysical or spiritual explanation.

Therefore, I would object to your premise (1) with the following:

(1) If a concept related to psychological needs is ubiquitous and fundamentally similar, then it has a high probability of objective truth.
(2) Humans have historically exhibited religious activity, and exhibit a psychological need to cope with questions of suffering, meaning, and morality
(3) Therefore, theism is a reasonable explanation. (1,2, MP)