I'm really unclear what your views are now, since you seem to be simultaneously:
[A] morally defending the status quo capitalist account of who owns what and why and what kinds of powers to contract people have,
[if A then B] saying that hierarchical and authoritarian social organization is an inescapable consequence of that, and
[not-B] that that hierarchicy and authoritarianism is morally bad.
Maybe your point in this thread is to highlight that as some sort of paradox? If so, the resolution to the paradox is to reject one of those: either that account of moral assignment of ownership and powers to contract is wrong because it leads to a bad situation, or it doesn't lead to that bad situation, or that situation isn't actually bad. I reject the first part.
But for clarity, note that I do not
reject private property rights. I am
hinting at the common socialist rejection of them in favor of "possession" rights, but I'm not directly endorsing that myself (except as the criteria by which the convention of who owns what is rightly established in the beginning). I am instead suggesting that if the distribution of ownership of private property (which I support) differs greatly from the use of that property, that's a warning sign that something wrong is happening somewhere.
The general reason for that is that there's no incentive to own things you're not using yourself -- they're literally useless
to you -- unless owning them gives you some kind of power over other people; and people morally shouldn't have power over other people in general, so it shouldn't be the case that owning stuff gives you power over other people; so the apparent fact that people have incentive to own more than they can use themselves indicates that something wrong is happening somewhere.
That then raises the question of what exactly is happening such that owning more than you can use gives you power over others. The obvious answer is that you can trade people your excess capital for their labor, but that's a self-correcting problem: if you do that you end up with less capital and they end up with more and pretty soon you're equals again. That's what naive capitalists assume would happen in a free market; but it observably doesn't. Why not?
My answer is that certain kinds of contracts -- which NB are deontologically akin to legislation, they're exercises of deontological power that create obligations where they didn't exist before -- allow the creation of self-reinforcing practical power structures, such as where the people who are getting paid for their labor also owe for the use of capital that they don't get ownership of, so what gets paid to them comes right back to the ownership class and the worker class never accrue capital in exchange for their labor. If such contract were not enforceable, then instead of them we would see the simple trades of capital for labor, which would
have that equalizing effect that naive capitalists expect from a free market.
So we'd end up with a distribution of private property ownership that closely resembles the patterns of use, not because whoever uses something automatically becomes its new owner, but because nobody has any incentive to own anything they're not using, because ownership doesn't give you any power over anybody else, except in a way that then diminishes your ownership and consequently that power itself.