Thank you for your reply!

May I take “knowledge as what can be known and how it can be known” as a form of capacity?

If I understand it correctly, Kant uses space and time as an example to demonstrate how is synthetic a priori knowledge possible. Take Kant’s space(his argument for time and space is seemingly parallel to each other) as an example, as Kant argues, 1)space is not empirical. Empirical concept derives from experience, yet the experiences from which we would deprive space already presuppose the latter. And, Space is a priori. Though we can imagine objects away, we can never do so for space. 2)Space is not a concept, but an intuition, and followed Kant listed two arguments to support his claim.

However, even for a priori analytic knowledge, which is the trivial, definitional truth(like what you have mentioned in the example: a bachelor is an unmarried one, which we can know from merely the concept itself with no empirical experience), it has to, as you said in the bracket, beyond knowing the meanings of the words.
I understand that Kant’s a priori, defined by necessity and universality, is in its nature independent of empirical knowledge, but it seems like there needs to be some “experience” involved in the phase of “knowing the meaning of the words” in the first place to trigger the capacity of “a priori”(I feel like I am possibly making mistake here).
Under such conditions, is the “a priori” knowledge still counts as “a priori”?
If such capacity is not innate, I fail to figure out how can it escape the involvement of experience in the first place.

I started to read Kant’s pure critique of metaphysics recently and only finished up to Transcendental Aesthetics so far. Therefore, my sincere apologies in advance for my ignorant on the subject.