To put it another way, I don't see it as having anything to do with "reality"; I think that term is altogether too overblown. "The most plausible" is just what seems to be the best explanation; the one that fits best within a general network of perspectives that I find explanatorily workable. — Janus
I guess the example is unclear because it lacks specificity. The unknown critter is referred to as both an experience-based prediction and also an inference. — praxis
Believing something is "holding it to be true". That is not what I'm talking about; I'm talking about entertaining the idea that seem most plausible, not holding ideas to be true. — Janus
You asked: “If one then moves away from one’s position so as to avoid the possibility of contact with a small animal, how can this activity be accounted for in the absence of belief (to whatever extent conscious and/or subconscious) that the movement was likely produced by a small animal (rather than, for example, by wind-blown leaves)?”
If a mind accurately predicts the presence of a rat then moving away from it, assuming the rat is rabid or whatever, is a good and adaptive prediction. Otherwise it’s a prediction error. — praxis
Prediction, to put it succinctly. This happens whether we like it or not. Our minds are constantly looking for patterns and making predictions. — praxis
You say:" I do get the often grave problem of unjustified belief treated as incontrovertible knowledge. But I so far take it that such isn’t equivalent to belief per se.)
I think that beleif per se would also apply to Justified belief. — Ken Edwards
Anything that is not known but seems reasonable can be accepted and entertained provisionally for pragmatic reasons; no believing needed. — Janus
I did give one.. one where preferences CAN NEVER be met, by default of things like the law of non-contradiction. But we can use other standards. For example, a world in which harm is entailed to survive can be considered morally disqualifying. — schopenhauer1
I don't see how it has to be "platonically real Good" for there to be some sort of morality. One can keep it at a level of "treat people with dignity" or "don't treat them as a means to an ends". — schopenhauer1
But then here we have your preference for what is good winning out perhaps...thus starting the cycle. — schopenhauer1
So I think we have to parse out the structure of the system versus various attempts at morality within it. — schopenhauer1
That is to say, within this system, it can certainly be said that there could be a case that one can do good or do "better" towards someone and one can do bad or "worse" towards someone. Perhaps good here is something like helping a friend when they are sick or visiting them in the hospital. Bad here would be picking on someone who is already down.. Just giving various examples. None of these "truths" of INTRA-WORLDLY ethics can justify or make up for the fact that perhaps the world where these intra-worldly ethics takes place is ITSELF a morally disqualified world for aforementioned reasons. — schopenhauer1
We still run into the same problems though. It's just a "dynamic" SOME rather than a static. — schopenhauer1
With the idea of only SOME people's preferences satisfied, and those preferences entailing the infringement of other people's preferences, this makes this existence morally disqualifying. — schopenhauer1
That's not quite what I'm talking about. [...]
So a world whereby we have to do X, Y, Z to survive may be thought as being "acceptable' to one group but "not acceptable" to the other. Just because the "acceptable" group conforms with current realities of what is needed to survive and have accepted harms like illness and disasters, does not mean that thus it is moral. It simply is what needs to happen if one does not want to die.. Either way, this still makes this "real world"/existence morally disqualifying because whilst some people don't mind/like the terms of this reality, THEY get to have their way above and lording over those who would not have wanted this reality. — schopenhauer1
"This square is not a square" is seen as a self-contradiction on its face, and its truth value is falsehood, and there is no contradiction in saying its truth value is falsehood.
"This sentence is false" also implies a self-contradiction, but it is not so easy to say its truth value is falsehood, since if its truth value is falsehood then its truth value is truth and if its truth value is truth then its truth value is falsehood. — TonesInDeepFreeze
A square is a circle — javra
That's not paradoxical. — TonesInDeepFreeze
No arithmetically adequate and consistent theory can define a truth predicate by which to then formulate a predicate 'is a liar'.
Keep in mind that Tarski's theorem is a claim only about certain kinds of theories (arithmetically adequate and consistent) formulated in classical logic. — TonesInDeepFreeze
Rather than get bogged down in whatever vagaries there might be in the Epimenides paradox, I would suggest the clearer, simpler, mathematically "translatable" simpler and more starkly problematic "This sentence is false". — TonesInDeepFreeze
In the sense you mention a 'truth predicate' we actually say a 'truth function'. Meanwhile, (Tarksi) for an adequately arithmetic theory, there is no truth predicate definable in the theory.
For a language, per a model for that language, in a meta-theory (not in any object theory in the language) a function is induced that maps sentences to truth values. It's a function, so it maps a statement to only one truth value, and the domain of the function is the set of sentences, so any sentence is mapped to a truth value.
And, (same Tarksi result said another way) for a semantic paradox such as the liar paradox, the statement can't be asserted in any arithmetically adequate consistent theory, so it is not mapped to any truth value. — TonesInDeepFreeze
If a train of logical reasoning ends on a contradiction (paradox), the following possibilities must be considered
1. Fallacies (mistakes in applying the rules of natural deduction)
and/or
2. One/more false premises (axioms/postulates)
If not 1 and/or 2 then and only then
3. The LNC needs to be scrapped + a version of paraconsistent logic needs to be adopted — Agent Smith
Even if the supernatural is true this does not mean that every claim is true. People can still have hallucinations, mental illness, drug induced episodes, be hypnotised, mistaken or in some other way mistaken. — Tom Storm
Right. So what is the epistemological difference (the "in part" aspect) between claims of the supernatural and claims of extraterrestrial intelligence? — javra
Are we debating this? Probably none. — Tom Storm
I'm saying that they're epistemologically indistinguishable from supernatural claims. Belief in neither can be definitely evidenced either true or false given the tools we currently have at out disposal. — javra
In part. Would you not think that if a UFO arrived on earth, (say on top of the capitol building) with aliens pouring out of it we would very quickly have sufficient warrant? Would not replicability and testability be superfluous? — Tom Storm
In part. Would you not think that if a UFO arrived on earth, (say on top of the capitol building) with aliens pouring out of it we would very quickly have sufficient warrant? Would not replicability and testability be superfluous? — Tom Storm
Are UFO's supernatural claims? — Tom Storm
If a faith healer were to raise the dead and restore amputated limbs in good numbers, I would say we would have warrant to believe that something supernatural has taken place. — Tom Storm
Maybe that's what happens when all hope for redeeming this world is lost. — Tate
The only way for the world to be made right is to destroy it all and make it over. — Tate
... there can be no (universally recognizable) proof either for or against the reality of supernatural claims as we know them. — javra
Thus, they are indistinguishable from fictions. — 180 Proof
I haven't said they 'can't occur' (how could that be demonstrated?) just that we can't say they have occurred. — Tom Storm
That was a cool discussion. Thanks. — Tom Storm
If I can say "I understand X" and can at the same time say "X is incoherent," how does that play out? — ZzzoneiroCosm
In order for me to be happy you have to beunrestricted. The things that make me happy, means you must be restricted. QED. It is immoral to be happy. — schopenhauer1
We are social animals. We like to hang around with our friends and family. It's unavoidable. It's been in our DNA for millions of years. This entails restrictions on our, and their, freedom, which we all accept. Morality is the deal we make so that the whole thing will work. It's all about restrictions. In essence, you are saying morality is immoral. — T Clark
Victim or Victimizer; choose! — Agent Smith
And one can't do otherwise. Hence morally disqualifying system/existence. — schopenhauer1
Good evidence for me would be something like my dad's thumb being brought back (he lost it 60 years ago). Or my mum coming back to life. Not repeatable or rigorous, scientific evidence, but it would do me. — Tom Storm
But the question for any such event is what precisely does it establish, apart from the extraordinary nature of the event? — Tom Storm
We can attribute remarkable events to religion or some occult cosmology but there is no necessary connection. — Tom Storm
I ask, "can you provide a viable test for anything supernatural?" — javra
You tell me. If you want to discuss science methods with someone I'm not your guy. — Tom Storm
Wrong question. — 180 Proof
I’m not hung up on science, just good evidence. If something can’t be explained I am not afraid of 'don’t know', which seems better than ‘because magic or god/s.’
Yep - your 'clairvoyance' story has too many missing pieces to investigate. It’s an anecdote. — Tom Storm
What is hard to explain is the growing back of a limb. It is interesting to note that no miracle healers ever seem to be able to do this one. And it would be fairly easy to demonstrate, right? — Tom Storm
Sure, I can't prove anyone else – or myself – is conscious (or that the Sun's core is not a great dragon), but I also don't have any non-trivial grounds (yet) to doubt our manifest 'theory of mind'. I suspect, whether or not we humans are 'conscious', deluding ourselves that we are 'conscious' (i.e. not zombies) has had evolutionary adaptive advantages. Nothing "supernatural" about that — 180 Proof
Don't think I agree. If we stop talking about generalities and deal with specific claims, then we can look at evidence and assess it. — Tom Storm
Mind reading, spiritual healing, levitation, raising the dead, fortune telling - are all examples of supernatural claims that directly impact upon the physical world and therefore can be tested. — Tom Storm
It is also interesting that while god seems to allow people to 'walk again' for a minute or two, where are the examples of an amputated leg or arm which has regrown? — Tom Storm
Any "X" which completely lacks evident, or (directly / indirectly) observable, properties is indistinguishable from "X" which is not real in any discernible or intelligible sense, ergo impossible. — 180 Proof
And what would those "grounds" be? — 180 Proof
By "supernatural" I understand imaginary and impossible; e.g. Woo-of-the-gaps ... — 180 Proof
Care to show how your question is not a non sequitur? — 180 Proof
I do not trivialize imaginary, except where what is imagined (e.g. "the supernatural") is also impossible (rather than merely "implausible"). — 180 Proof