my asking what information is there in the extra-empirical? — Vera Mont

Concepts are crucial to cognition and to understanding of that perceived, but are in themselves extra-empirical. One for example does not perceive the concepts of "animal" or of "world" or of "number" but simply understands them - this when perceiving signs, for example - and any perception we might have of an animal or a world or a number (be it of the imagination or not) will necessarily exclude many if not most elements which the concept itself encompasses.

Nice exposition of Zeno!

Abstract space (as opposed to physical space) cannot be discrete because any minimum unit you propose can be halved. — keystone

[...]

The discreteness that ↪Metaphysician Undercover
↪Michael
are looking for is not in space but in measurement/observation. — keystone

Yes, I’m in agreement with you as to the non-discreteness of space.

Good thoughts! Suppose an evil genius (or maybe an evil non-genius :sweat:) rigs up a scenario where he will murder one of two people given a decision you make. As you are standing still, he tells you, "If you begin walking with your left foot I will kill person A, and if you begin walking with your right foot I will kill person B." You know nothing about either person beyond these simple facts. According to your argument, "because there is no discernible morally best alternative - for both alternatives are to be deemed equally good or bad - irrespective of the choice made the volitional act can nevertheless be deemed amoral."

What are your thoughts about this? I don't think this alternative scenario necessarily undermines your reasoning, but I am curious what you would say. — Leontiskos

Thanks!

Tricky counterexample. My current best thoughts:

Unless the individual will then walk with the explicit intention (and pleasure) of killing some stranger, I wouldn’t term it “murder”. All the same, in this scenario, unlike the first, irrespective of which choice we make we know that we will be committing a wrong beforehand. This will then be a crucial difference.

Because we are committing a wrong, we then will most likely not walk without care but, instead, search for additional alternatives prior to walking: maybe choosing to skip on two legs to where we need to go, or maybe choosing to not move but debate with the evil genius/daemon in hopes of tricking it into stopping its imposition.

If, however, no other conceivable choice were to be available, then we’d literally have no choice but to knowingly commit the wrong of killing some unfortunate stranger via our actions. In which case, because a) we hold no choice in the matter of so doing despite the two alternatives available to us and b) the two alternatives are morally identical in impact to the best of our knowledge—were we to not then so step with the explicit intent and pleasure of killing a stranger—I’d then conclude that our walking either via a first left step or a first right step would be amoral. We would be attributively responsible for (i.e., we’d be a/the primary cause for) the killing of a stranger but we’d not be morally responsible for it.

To me this so far makes ethical sense.

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Apropos, as to the evil genius being not so genius: It is interesting to me that in Romanian there are two adjectives for the English word “bad” (with no adjective for “evil”); one is rău, which can just as well mean either “sick” or “mean spirited”; the second is prost, which can just as well mean “stupid” or “idiotic”. (The only relatively close proximity to the term “evil” is the noun form of rău, but, again, it doesn't occur as an adjective). Which when literally translated into English to me at least presents the connotative understanding that the property of badness could be interpreted as “the stupidity of being mean spirited and, thereby, psychologically sick”. Your expression somehow reminded me of this. :grin: Though, of course, so understood the concept can only apply to agents.

I think this may be a helpful way to reframe my debate with Bob Ross. — Leontiskos

I neglected to give @Bob Ross a mention in my previous post, but yes, the primary focus was the debate between the two of you.

On second thought, scratch the example I just gave of Achilles and the tortoise in finite quanta of space. While I still see deeper problems with such interpretation of motion, I've realized it can be addressed mathematically via ratios - and I don't want to get into debates regarding the nature of time and space. It was a case of me talking before thinking. I won't delete my previous post, though.

If movement is continuous then an object in motion passes through every 1nm marker in sequential order, but there is no first 1nm marker, so this is a contradiction. — Michael

To the best of my understanding, not within process philosophy.

I’ll first try to better explain my own current stance:

It's the the very marker you address that I take to be the conceptual measurement imposed: In process theory, there is no beginning nor any permanent thinghood, only continuous becoming. Like with quantum mechanics, wherein everything is a wave till measured. Whenever we measure, we quantify (and vice versa): one given, quantitative parts of that one given, multiple whole givens, and so forth. But the movement of whatever we quantify remains purely continuous, wave-like in this very limited sense.

We thereby quantify there being one arrow that is being projected. Likewise we quantify there being one target it is going to penetrate. Yet, as per process theory, both are otherwise merely processes of becoming themselves, that are forever in flux in manners devoid of any absolute beginning. We furthermore empirically know (this by imposing measurement/quantity) when the quantified arrow first starts its motion toward the target, we know that if travels through air via certain placements in space, and that it eventually hits the target whereupon the arrow stops its motion. But when we then try to quantify this very (here, by analogy, wave like) process of the arrows motion what we end up with are quanta of space that appear to be infinite in number. These, in turn, then facilitate Zeno’s paradox of the arrow.

I don’t know how to address this properly with the arrow paradox, so I’ll use Achillies and the tortoise instead:

Here suppose motion occurring in a finitely divisible (hence quantized) space. For the sake of argument, say this finitely divisible space from point A to point B has only ten divisions. The tortoise is at the fifth division of this space while Achilles is at the second division of this space—both moving toward the tenth division of space. How would conceiving of space in such finitely quantized manner change Zeno’s paradox so as to allow Achilles to catch up to the tortoise?

----

I so far can’t apprehend a coherent way demonstrating logically (non-empirically) that Achillies can catch up with the tortoise in such a scenario.

And this because at the very least physical motion (if not also any psychological change) seems to me to be completely continuous in its ontological nature. This again, as per core concepts of process theory. A continuous change which we measure/quantize and thereby impose upon the notion of fixed beginnings and fixed thinghood—which, in an ontology of flux, don’t in fact occur.

I acknowledge this train of thought deviates from the thread’s intent. But, to cut things short, I don’t yet understand how a finite quantization of space or of motion is interpreted as resolving Zeno’s paradoxes (as per my example above)—this given what we empirically know to be (Achilles can catch up with the tortoise).

The solution, similar to my proposed solution above, is that movement is not infinitely divisible (either because space is discrete or because movement within continuous space is discrete). — Michael

I'm not yet comprehending this to my liking. To my current understanding, an infinite series is the very thing which makes something otherwise perfectly continuous discrete. It's, for one example, the difference between a perfect circle and an apeirogon with equal sides: the first is perfectly continuous, the second discrete.

Due to this, I've so far always assumed the resolution to Zeno's paradoxes is that movement is not infinitely divisible precisely because it is perfectly continuous while it occurs. Such that it's our imposed conceptualizations of measurement upon an otherwise immeasurable process which makes Zeno's paradoxes possible.

Either way, one ought not use the same brush. — Fooloso4

Funny, I previously assumed that to be self-explanatory. But now that you've pointed that out, yes, sure, of course.

You could, of course, expand the moral sphere by eliminating space for such amoral acts and judgements, but they could never be fully eliminated, I think. — ToothyMaw

Here's a concrete example that might help out: In one's morning routine, ought one brush one's teeth before brushing one's hair or, otherwise, brush one's hair before brushing one's teeth? Whichever alternative one chooses, the action one will engage in will in this example be a fully conscious volitional act (in contrast, for example, to haphazardly touching one's beard in unthinking manners). Yet, because there is no discernible morally best alternative - for both alternatives are to be deemed equally good or bad - irrespective of the choice made the volitional act can nevertheless be deemed amoral.

Nice thread and OP!

The difference lies in whether their cause is a responsible agent—something that can be held responsible for producing the evil effect. — Leontiskos

Nah, I don't think I have conflated this once in the entire thread. For traditional language-users "moral" has only two basic meanings, and both are closely related: 1) capable of moral or immoral acts, and 2) moral or immoral (and in both of these cases the term "moral" is meant in the sense of praiseworthy or morally good). This is standard language, where a cause can be named according to its effect (see, for example, my "corollary" above). — Leontiskos

I myself find the issue of blameworthiness/praiseworthiness to basically reduce down to the issue of causation—as in, what cause is to blame/praise for a given effect/consequence.

I first want to mention that, as with all others, the English language has its own idiosyncrasies via which possible conceptualizations find themselves limited to certain linguistic expressions. There is no one word in the English language with addresses this generalized state of blameworthiness/praiseworthiness in impartial manners. I think the closest English comes to it is in the word “responsibility”—this in the strict sense of being the primary cause for an effect/consequence (rather than, for example, in the sense of being accountable, or answerable, for an effect/consequence). As is also the case with at least the Romanian language (which I also speak fluently), existent words also overwhelmingly tend to emphasize the wrongness of effects/consequences: e.g., what or who is at fault for, what or who is to blame for, or culpable for, etc.

That said, when considering the goodness or badness of an effect or else consequence—via what I will here specify as “responsibility for” in the strict sense just mentioned of being the primary cause—the responsible cause can either be in any way accountable, or answerable, for the given effect or not. If the primary cause is deemed answerable for its responsibility in having brought about the effect, then we likewise deem the same given cause’s future effects to be alterable (or else reinforceable) via rewards or punishments. This first broad category of cause-types then subsumes that category the thread addresses as moral evils.

Other primary causes which we deem incapable of being in any way answerable for their responsibility in having brought about a certain effect, we then deem fully unalterable via the (yet possible) administration of rewards or punishments—with tornadoes being one example of such latter types of causes. In this second generalized category of cause-types we then place all natural evils. Here, though the wind is responsible for the tree’s leaves movements, we neither blame nor praise the wind in an attempt to either alter or reinforce its doings (this because the wind as primary cause is incapable of in any way answering, or taking responsibility, for what it does).

This outlook I then find can be itself reduced to a dichotomy between (a) agent-caused effects (with individual agents being, as I believe you’ve previously mentioned, in at least some ways causa sui originators of the effects they willfully produce) and b) effects caused by non-agential causes (which are then basically deemed fully deterministic in their nature). [edit: just as I take your own arguments to generally be]

For one example, while people will blame and praise their dog’s doings with the intention of altering (else reinforcing) their dog’s behaviors, tmk most will not blame or praise an AI’s doings in their interactions with the AI program with the intention of altering (else reinforcing) the AI program’s behaviors. The first is deemed an agent whereas the second is not. (If dogs are too controversial in terms of moral doings, then one can just as well replace their example with the example of fellow humans.)

Not sure if this is of significant benefit to the discussion, but to me at least it does serve to further illustrate the divide between moral evils and natural evils.

:blush: Cheers!

But he seems completely unaware that his polemics, as distinct from his science writing, are aimed at methodically destroying any idea of there being a higher purpose or higher life. — Wayfarer

Having read much, if not most, of Darwin’s works, I judge that just as Darwin was opposed to the notion of what become known as Social Darwinism, he would have also been staunchly opposed to the notion of the selfish gene. I’ve mentioned this before on the forum: there are very well argued (both empirically and rationally) opposing views, with The Genial Gene being one such example.

As to “a higher purpose or higher life”—to fan the flames a bit—we all live by this credo as undoubtedly as we all know in our heart of hearts that solipsism is frigging joke (if it even warrants laughing at). All evolutionary biologists know that, when objectively addressed, all life without exception is equally evolved from predecessors. But no evolutionary biologist thereby holds that the eating of lesser lifeforms somehow equates to a form of cannibalism, or that the killing of weeds equates to the killing of humans. We all (sanely speaking) know that the value of a human life far exceeds the value of chickens’ life, to not even mention that of grass as a lifeform. We all sanely know that humans are more evolved than chickens, which are more evolved than weeds or grass. And we thereby hold more compassion for chickens than we hold for grass. Yet, unlike in the first sense of evolution wherein all coexisting life’s intrinsic value is identical, in the second here mentioned sense of evolution—wherein some lifeforms are more evolved than others—we as a sapient species appraise the value of a chicken’s life to be of greater worth than that of a weed’s. Not because we dislike weeds per se, but because we recognize that the chicken’s degree of awareness is far more advanced than that of the weed’s. This second sense of evolution—without which we might starve to death or else might become more depraved than any lesser lifeform has ever been—directly speaks of an evolution toward greater sapience.

This evolution toward greater sapience, then, to me directly speaks of the “chain of being” you are making mention of. Something we, again, innately acknowledge in our day to day living of life but which physicalism/materialism cannot easily, if at all, account for—other than, maybe, by the proclaiming of absolute relativity when it comes to values … the very same values by which physicalism/materialism is upheld … making the physicalist’s position sort’a self-defeating. Something like the notion of "the Good", on the other hand, can account for this very type of evolution toward greater sapience.

Science has no inherent moral orientation, it is concerned with facts, not oughts (as per Hume and the is/ought division.) — Wayfarer

Here addressing pure empirical science--rather than scientism: I find that science and scientists in general are at times voraciously interested in discovering the ever-truer nature of reality and that, just as with the best of philosophy and philosophers, this interest is deemed to be a good in itself, i.e. of intrinsic value. As such, it is not facts per se that are of concern but greater and deeper understanding regarding the nature of reality, maybe ultimately of being itself ... which to me again speaks to an evolution toward greater sapience, this via desire to so become.

Wolves and groundhogs have rules of behaviour - they just don't make a big verbose fuss about it: if somebody misbehaves, they snarl or snap at him; they don't put him on the rack or cut out his tongue. — Vera Mont

Right! They're not moral, nor immoral. — Wayfarer

I'll try no to belabor this issue much. We humans are on average far more familiar with domesticated animals than with wild ones. As such, anyone who has had a dog will know that dogs give good enough indications of experiencing shame and guilt at things they know they ought not have done (according to their owners). And some dogs have been known to be quite altruistic. This isn't any proof of lesser animals having some awareness of right and wrong (and, hence, a far less evolved sense of moral judgment by comparison to the average human) ... but then, neither is there any definitive proof of lesser animals being anything else but automata. :wink:

Looks like misrepresentation to me. Citations? — wonderer1

“We are survival machines – robot vehicles blindly programmed to preserve the selfish molecules known as genes. This is a truth which still fills me with astonishment.”
― Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene

“I’m a robot, and you’re a robot, but that doesn’t make us any less dignified or wonderful or lovable or responsible for our actions,” Daniel Dennett said. “Why does our dignity depend on our being scientifically inexplicable?”

Examples could be multiplied indefinitely. — Wayfarer

Yes, per Dawkins, chickens are literally nothing more than an egg’s way of replicating itself. Hence, all phenotypes (both physical and psychological) are utterly unimportant biologically other than for their capacity to replicate genotypes—more specifically, the immortal selfish genes from which genotypes are constituted.

And this, then, seems to me too to essentially result in an exceedingly biased valuing of the four “Fs” addressed in terms of biology. Which, btw, I often hear echoed in many a layperson who proclaims that the sole purpose to human sexual intercourse can only be that of reproduction (to me utter BS, but this would be a different topic).

That said, it is however to be acknowledged that Dawkins also tells us:

“We, alone on earth, can rebel against the tyranny of the selfish replicators.”
― Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene

… Which to me, sure as the earth I walk on, directly entails there occurring some form of Cartesian dualism between biology and the biology-resultant human … ego(?). This being something that no monist would accept.

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Personally, while I fully acknowledge the exceedingly large gulf between humanity and all other, hence, “lesser” lifeforms, biological evolution necessitates that all life is constituted of the same stuff but in different ways and in different measures (here specifically thinking of humans' capacity for sapience)—this irrespective of whether this stuff of life is understood to be in any way spiritual (such as Buddhism and Hinduism can, for example, uphold) or else strictly material. Hence, if our highly evolved consciousness is contingent on the workings of our complex CNS, then animals with less complex CNSs would necessarily be endowed with less evolved forms of consciousness. … For example, such that dogs are more sapient than are ants.

Doesn't the effectiveness of classical computers contradict your perspective? — keystone

To be laconic about things: no. But then many an ontological perspective would need to be addressed to back this up - perspectives that would amount either to an objective idealism or, else interpreted, to a neutral monism.

As it is, as previously attempted, I'll try to bow out of this thread's discussion. But it was good discussing with you.

The real question isn't whether quantum mechanics is fictional (an idea that seems absurd), but rather if quantum mechanics employs the infinite-rooted objects themselves or merely the finite descriptions of — keystone

Interesting perspective! My own slant is that in physical reality there can be no absolutely integral physical being as is symbolized by the number one/1 when the issue is addressed more objectively: all individual objects are integral physical things only in relativistic terms, always permeated (by quanta, for one example) and hence entwined with what (we perceive and conceive to be) other and always in flux. Hence, our very understanding of mathematics in full is grounded in conceptual idealizations, rather than physical realities - starting with the idealizations of 0 and 1.

As regards infinities, if you happen to not be familiar with them, you may get a kick out of surreal numbers. They incorporate both infinite and infinitesimal numbers as well as real numbers. (While I'm no mathematician that can properly describe or implement them in mathematical formulations, surreal numbers have always held a rather aesthetic appeal to me.)

[...] it could just as easily have been described purely as a mathematical problem within the realm of abstract mathematical thought. Indeed, when you questioned the feasibility of constructing such a die, it seemed you were addressing the narrative element of the paradox, leaving the core mathematical issue untouched. — keystone

Well, the issue to me was and remains the conflux of pure mathematical thought and empirical reality. There often (although not always) is no tidy cohesion between the two—as exemplified by an infinite-sided die whose individual sides need to be looked at to be discerned. One can simplify the very same issue by addressing the purely mathematical concept of a perfect circle and its nonexistence in empirical reality.

As an aside, I am aware that without the concept of a perfect circle no such thing as quantum mechanics could obtain, for the latter’s uncertainty principle is necessarily dependent on pi, which can only obtain in a perfect circle (that, again, can only be non-empirical). But the basic discrepancy between pure mathematical thought of a perfect circle and its nonexistence in physical, empirical reality remains. This and related subjects, btw, being why I’m on the fence regarding purely mathematical objects of thought being of themselves existents: e.g., if a perfect circle does not exist, then this directly entails that so too is quantum mechanics a fiction … and, yet, QM works rather well to explain what physically, and hence empirically, is. I acknowledge this is a deviation from Cantor, but to me it speaks to the same issue: the relation, if any, between pure mathematics and the empirically perceivable physical world.

Cool. Thanks.

If you believe that infinite sets cannot exist, then I am preaching to the choir. — keystone

Just to be clear: when it comes to the realm of pure mathematical thought, I can see it both ways and so remain on the fence; but when it comes to empirical reality as in the form of a die, a member of the just stated choir I am. :grin:

Interesting way of expressing the issue, btw.

All that's left is a little divine magic to ensure it rolls fairly, and extraordinary vision for the players to discern the minuscule markings on those higher rolls. — keystone

In that case, I’ll let this thread be. But I confess, to me, this conflux of mathematical thought with “magic” and “extraordinary vision” not bound by empirical sight so far equates to the question of: What defined result obtains when one divides three and a quarter invisible unicorns by zero? Just saying.

Is this truly a paradox? If not, why not? [...] This scenario seems to indicate a problem with the concept of an infinite-sided die, possibly even suggesting that such a die cannot exist. What are your thoughts? — keystone

Just as a polygon with infinite sides of equal length would be empirically indiscernible form a perfect circle—this irrespective of how close one observes it, say with a quantum microscope—so too would a die with infinite sides of equal length be empirically indiscernible from a perfect sphere, even when analyzed with a quantum microscope.

Hence, having the numeral “42”, or any other, viewable on any one of the die's infinite sides would be a logical impossibility considering the nature of empirical reality—an empirical reality which both the serpent and Adam utilize to look at the die.

So no, no paradox.

OK. Thanks again.

Right. What you say could make sense to me, as in the two truths are not separate in the world as is but are instead maybe even indiscernibly entwined. But they nevertheless remain two truths or else only one. I'll rephrase things this way:

If Nirvana without remainder (also termed parinirvana) is something that can be obtained, I so far take it to be the obtainment of ultimate reality/truth sans any remainder of conventional reality/truth. I'm currently thinking this is about right - but correct me if I'm wrong. But what you've previously stated implies that upon its obtainment the conventional truth of phenomena (such as of phenomena-dependent pains and pleasures together the our apprehension of selfhood) will also persist in this state of ultimate being - for the two truths were roughly stated to be one and the same. Yet, as expressed, I can currently only presume this to be wrong, for it is contrary to what Nirvana without remainder is described to be. From my readings at least.

Yes, the two truths are understood to be intimately entwined - but if they are not two truths all the same, then Nirvana without remainder could not be obtained within Buddhist doctrines.

... saying this as someone who's enlightened in comparison to ants and such but not enlightened in comparison to many a wiser being (supernal deities/Buddhas included, if such were to occur). :razz:

Thanks for the feedback. I find myself agreeing with much of what you state, but do find currently grave difficulties with what I boldface here:

In the Madhyamaka of Nāgārjuna, there is 'the doctrine of two truths', the domain of conventional reality, Saṃvṛtisatya, in which all sentient beings are situated, but then the domain of ultimate reality, Paramārthasatya which is the higher truth perceived by the Buddhas. But part of this doctrine is that (1) these are not ultimately two — Wayfarer

There of course are multiple interpretations of the original Buddha's teaching, and various interpretations of the many Buddhist works that followed. But - again, this via a typical Western mindset interested in the reasoning rather than any poetic appeal - the affirmation that there is an ultimate reality and a conventional reality which from the vantage of ultimate reality are one and the same reality can be fairly easily interpreted as a logical contradiction (from the vantage of ultimate reality, at the same time and in the same respect there both a) are two realities and b) there are no two realities but only one). If it is and if this contradiction is to be assumed true, then dialetheism is be accepted as valid. This being something I'm in no way in favor of.

Not sure where you stand in this respect, but if you have further clarification of this one part of the doctrine here addressed, it would be greatly appreciated.

You might find this a useful resource: Nonduality, David Loy, a .pdf copy of his book by that name, based on his PhD. — Wayfarer

Thanks for the reference. I’ll add it to my library. Though I’ve yet to read the entire work, to quote from page 17:

The following types of nonduality are discussed here: the negation of dualistic thinking, the nonplurality of the world, and the non-difference of subject and object. In subsequent chapters, our attention focuses primarily on the last of these three, although there will be occasion to consider two other nondualities which are also closely related: first, what has been called the identity of phenomenon and Absolute, of the Mahayana equation of samsara and nirvana, which can also be expressed as “the nonduality of duality and nonduality”; […] — David Loy

My last post was strictly addressing the ontology of this very “nonduality of duality and nonduality” which, as expressed in English, and as processed through Western filters of philosophical concepts, to my ear can only present an at best incomprehensibility of meaning (and, at worst, utter BS).

What I’m suggesting via English expression which utilizes Western philosophical concepts and reasoning is that, where a non-dualistic ontology to be real, it would then necessarily consist of a duality (rather than of a "nonduality", this as expressed in the quote above) between an ultimately real essence of being (be this understood as Brahman, as Nirvana, or via a different terminology/concept) and the ultimately illusory essence of phenomenal being ... which partitions, or ratios, the first ultimately real essence of being into parts via, for one example, the production of I-ness (which can only be phenomena-relative).

I gather this affirmation of a necessary duality of fundamental essences within a non-dual reality would be a non-Eastern perspective/expression of non-dualism ontology—and in my limited reading I have never come across non-dualism being expressed via a quite literal duality of fundamental essences, this by those who uphold the given ontology.

That mentioned, what I was fishing for here is any rational criticism of the presented necessity that non-dualism, this regarding the world as it’s known, entails a duality between a) a real (or ultimately real) and non-dual fundamental essence and b) a contingent fundamental essence of phenomena (etc.) which brings about duality in the world and which is ultimately illusory in full.

What is non-dualism ?

Non-dualism represents the absence of a distinction that seperates reality into subject-object, appearance-thing in itself, becoming-being, nothingness-somethingness, necessity-contingency etc. In short, binary distinctions created by our langauges and thoughts dissappear.

Who are we from the non-dual perspective ?

Brahman, who is pure consciousness. — Sirius

I'm wanting to explore a technicality and see how, or if, it resonates. (FYI, this correlates with parts of something I'm currently working on.)

In any such non-dualistic ontology, there is a subtlety to reality when philosophically addressed: In the world as is, because there are dualities we as conscious beings are aware of - to include that between any I-ness / ego and what is relative to it other - there will then necessarily occur a duality between a) the non-duality which is real (else, the ultimate reality) and which is in the OP termed Brahman and b) (what in the same sense of ultimate reality would be) illusions of duality, hence illusions of separateness, of a subject-object dichotomy, and so forth (what in Hinduism is specified as Maya). In ultimate reality, this being what is real from the vantage of Brahman, then all I-ness is an aspect of Maya. Yet in what might be termed mundane, or profane, reality, the occurrence of I-ness as other than that which it is not is about as stable a concrete fact as they come.

Point being, in any non-dualistic ontology, there is an almost but not quite paradox: there necessarily occurs a duality between two fundamental essences (so termed to avoid all connotations associated with the term "substance"): one ultimately real - here, the Brahman, aka pure consciousness per se - and one ultimately illusory: all that is not the Brahman, to include both the mind and matter which consciousness apprehends, or witnesses, and is constrained by.

Such an ontology, by my current reckoning, could then be properly classified either as a) a form of idealism, for all that occurs, both pure consciousness and all that it is conscious of (this being both mind and matter), can here be deemed psychical in nature or, else, as b) a form of neutral monism, for here both mind and matter equally pertain to that fundamental essence which is non-Brahman, thereby posing no ontological dualism between apprehended mind and apprehended matter but, instead, only a property dualism of the very same essence (which, again, would in a non-dualistic ontology be ultimately illusory in whole ... although nevertheless quite real in a mundane sense of what is real); an illusory essence of both mind and matter which, as essence, is itself dependent on the non-illusory essence, hence, in the OP's terminology, on the Brahman.

To summarize, unless I'm getting something wrong here, any non-dualistic ontology regarding the world as is will then necessarily consist of a duality between two fundamental essences: one ultimately real and non-dualistic that is neither mind nor matter but the pure consciousness aware of both, and one ultimately illusory that is itself via different properties both mental stuff (thoughts, ideas, imaginings, etc) and material stuff (physicality).

To be even more laconic about things: a non-dualistic ontology, in order to be valid within the world as it is currently known, can only consist of a duality of fundamental essences: one real, and one illusory.

It seems that for AGI to join us, not only does it require some form of "reiterative automaticity" - that is to say, to spontaneously rewrite, live/in the present moment, its own predictive algorithms independent of us, but that such algorithms must be further compressed until they no longer require googols of data but the same or less data than a typical human in order to reason. — Benj96

Seems reasonable.

The second thing is how do we give it both "an objective" but also "free auto-self-augementation" in order to reason. — Benj96

The “free auto-self-augmentation” to me so far translates into a literal free will to pursue closer proximity to whatever objective it, the AGI, might choose to progress toward. So, AGIs would then need to be programed with different objectives, i.e. goals to actualize, which the AGI would then be metaphysically free to choose among—this in terms of which objective to attempt to actualize and, thereby, which heuristics pertaining to itself to augment in its attempts.

That said, we as a humanity still don’t agree on whether free will is a real possibility.

Yet, given that I uphold the reality of freely willed choices, while AGI gaining a free will capacity is to me not impossibility, how an AGI might be made into a freely willing agency that can thereby autonomously choose between objectives is, to at least me, currently incomprehensible. And if there were to be no free will, then I don’t get how a “free auto-self-augmentation” in AI can ever be implemented. In this case, the AGI’s choices would all be fully predetermined by the developed programing.

And curiously, could that be the difference between something that feels/experiences and something that is lifeless, programmed and instructed? — Benj96

I take this to be the general case (here granting different magnitudes of free will capacity; e.g., an adult chimp’s capacity of free will being far less than that of the average adult human’s).

p.s., While I don't mean to turn the thread into yet another discussion regarding the possibility of free will, I honestly don't find any other way of frankly addressing the issue in the OP.

My question came about because of the use of the word 'confidence', which I had laid out in a different context earlier, as an alternative to faith. — Tom Storm

Sorry. I missed that connection.

The only time I use the word faith in conversation is to describe someone's religious views. — Tom Storm

OK, but, as you well know, you are not the only English user of that word. Other people do use it in wider contexts than just the religious, even if you might consider such usage “inaccurate”.

I try to avoid using this word to describe quotidian matters. — Tom Storm

I don't know. Religious matters can well be quotidian (i.e., commonplace and everyday) in certain populaces, which seems to fully sidestep the distinction you're trying to make. For instance:

Especially in relation to all the radical relativism discussions that have been going about, that 1 + 1 + 1 = 1 is upheld by some as sometimes being valid and true—everyday/commonplace and so quotidian though this issue of the Trinity might be for many—seems nevertheless significant to this discussion regarding types of faith. Namely, is the presented summation valid and true on account of it being socially constructed by those who have faith in its so being—this as radical relativism would have it—thereby making this arithmetic justifiable? Or would this be an article of religious faith that is reason-impervious regarding matters of fact and thereby wrongheaded—quotidian though it is in most aspects of western cultures?

So faith is absolute confidence? But confidence need not be absolute? — TiredThinker

How did you arrive at that? Isn't faith certainty? — Tom Storm

If @TiredThinker had something else in mind, he can of course provide a different answer. For my part, though:

Certainty comes in different degrees of strength—e.g., from being fairly certain to being extremely certain—and so it need not be absolute, by which I here understand “unshakable” and “complete”.

Faith, however, is unshakable and complete, and so it is more than mere psychological certainty. It is unshakable psychological certainty. Via the dichotomy I’ve just expressed in my last post, this either because one’s logically consistent justifications upon which one’s faith rests do not warrant one’s questioning one’s own faith, or, otherwise, because one is dogmatic about one’s faith in manners impervious to any reasoning evidencing it erroneous.

As an example of the first, I personally have full-fledged faith that solipsism is false precisely because this a) is an unshakable belief/certainty which I hold despite not having any infallible proof for it and b) because it is fully in-line with the body of all justified beliefs which I hold such that no contradictions unfold by my holding this unshakable belief/certainty. Here, the stated faith remains for me unshakable until the time contradictions in my holding this faith arise.

As an example of the second, were someone to have faith that the pink elephant they saw in their own house when they were drunk actually exists (rather than being a figment of their imagination) despite all reasoned arguments to the contrary (e.g., the house doorways needing to be damaged were an elephant to walk through the house from room to room), then this would be one example of a logic-impervious unshakable belief/certainty. Here, this faith remains unshakable regardless of the contradictions that might or else do arise.

But both will be faith in that they are unshakable and complete certainties regarding facts for which no proof exists.

So faith is absolute confidence? But confidence need not be absolute?

I understand confidence in plausible things happening, but religion asks people to have confidence in things that quite possibly never happened before. — TiredThinker

Here's what will likely be a controversial post for many regarding the issue of faith.

All which follows will assume that “faith” is here interpreted to signify “one’s firm, or else complete, belief in something for which one has no proof”:

To my mind there is first and foremost an umbrella dichotomy between these two types of faith: a) faith in that which directly contradicts the basic logical reasoning which one otherwise upholds and a) faith in that which doesn’t do this.

An example of (a): in certain cases, 1 + 1 + 1 = 1 is valid and true, i.e. conforms to that which is real (this being the typical interpretation of the Christian Trinity)

Firm belief in a plethora of common sense tenets for which there is no proof will be a vivid example of the second type of faith: from faith that what we experience as time and change is not fully illusory, to faith that the sun will once again rise tomorrow (rather than the planet being destroyed by a meteor or an alien laser beam in the meantime), to faith in what is technically termed free will and the praise and blame this allows for, to faith that everyone else is not a p-zombie, to faith that the goodness which humanity has so far imperfectly exhibited with not all go down the drain in the blink of an eye, and so on and so forth (examples could get far more outrageous in terms of things which typical common sense denounces but for which one holds no proof of so being erroneous).

For a good number of people, questioning (b) type faith will be just as reflexively taboo as questioning (a) type faith.

Also, those who proclaim to not live their lives via any faith whatsoever—this as faith is defined above—will, for example, either not hold firm belief in others not being p-zombies (this being commonly considered a sigh of less than optimal mental health) or, otherwise, will profess to hold proof that others are not p-zombies (this being bullshit, or else the proof could be readily shared with all others upon request).

Going by the just expressed, all sane people will to some extent live their lives via faith (irrespective of whether it is consciously recognized or else strictly unconsciously maintained), faith which is often enough required to engage in life-sustaining actions and reactions. The principal difference, again, being that some live their lives by reason supported, and thereby justifiable, faith (this being faith-type (b)) while others will uphold their faith in manners contradicted by the very reasoning they otherwise support (this being faith-type (a)).

Though a controversial stipulation for some, to my mind, none of this should be in any way surprising to any fallibilist out there. (For one thing, in honest fallibilism, there is no definitive proof for anything, for nothing epistemological is infallible. But this does not preclude firm, or else complete, belief in fallible conclusions—conclusion for which there thereby is no proof—this just in case these conclusions are consistently justified by reasoning such that they cohere into one’s total body of justifications without any contradictions.)

Quantity only exists in Nature because we displace Nature with quantity, etc. Think of quantity without reference to any form of representation, but on its own, in its allegedly pure and essential form as it supposedly inhabits Reality. You can't, that's absurd, right? The very thinking utilizes representations. Then why do we shy away from acknowledging that our uniquely human Conscious experiences are structured by representations and as such, they are not ultimately Real? — ENOAH

I should start with the observation that we don't share the same ontological models of reality. That mentioned, I think of it this way when I put my ontological/metaphysical cap on:

If there happens to be two or more coexistent psyches, then quantity necessarily is existentially in the cosmos in an objective manner: for here there factually co-occur a plurality of psyches (if absolutely nothing else). If, on the other hand, there is no quantity in reality, then this will entail the fact that there is no plurality of coexistent psyches: with this directly resulting in solipsism - wherein the one solipsist by unexplained means "fictionalizes" everything, quantity very much included. I in no way uphold the possibility of solipsism - though I'm not here to argue this out. Because I don't, I then conclude that it is logically impossible for quantity to be illusory, or fictional - again, this because at the bare minimum a plurality of psyches co-occur.

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I'll also add that, as I so far interpret them at least, representations are such precisely because they re-present that which is present. Without that which is present, no representations could obtain.

Getting back to the thread's topic, our representations of present quantities might well be deemed mental constructs, but the quantities themselves (which our representations re-present) are not (unless one starts entertaining notions such as that of objective idealism wherein everything is mind stuff, but even here quantity would yet be a staple aspect of the universal effete mind ... which is not the fully localized and active minds that you and I are, individual active minds which represent portions of this same universal effete mind which all coexistent active minds share).

How many gods, or deities are there on the head of a pin. — Punshhh

My late night answer: This will in large part depend on whether these incorporeal beings are zero dimensional; and to a far lesser extent, on the size of the pin ... of course.

:razz:

If you replaced the word math, with symbols, or representations, would the above also hold true for you? — ENOAH

As I tried to explain, to my thinking quantity can only be represented via math - such that at the very least rudimentary math is a representation of quantity (I should add, and its relations). Because of this, my answer will be "yes".

But more questions follow: "is math only in us? If so, where does it come from? What causes it?"

I guess this would probably depend on your views on perception. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Hmm, I find the issue more intimately entwined with whether or not quantity in fact occurs within the cosmos. I find the stipulation that it does not hard to even fathom, much less entertain. But if quantity does occur within the cosmos, then the means of addressing this quantity in the cosmos is, and can only be, what we term maths. Maths is a language with quantity as its referent. No quantity, no maths.

It is only when we humans get into axiomatized maths that maths can be deemed to become fully relative to the axioms we humans concoct.

No lesser animal has a clue about axiomatized maths, but some lesser animals can and do engage in rudimentary maths just fine; again, with quantity as their referent.

Hence, to my mind, the only way of appraising all maths as strictly within us and thus as having nothing to do with the quote unquote "real world" is by appraising the "real world" to be fully devoid of quantity.

While writing this post I was touching my body in order to stimulate — not in a weird way — thoughts about the topic. — Lionino

:grin: Yes, OK. Understandable.

BTW. not that I’m saying this is what you were getting at but, I had a hunch this topic might inadvertently awaken thoughts of touching oneself in sexually sensual manners for some out there … just want to mention that, in itself, there’s nothing weird about it :razz: … it’s been evidenced healthy even.

Let's say our mind is indeed immaterial, being immaterial, it does not extend in space, so we can metaphorically say it has 0 dimensions. As soon as we reflect upon the experience of touch, it seems that experience is spatially extended. Being experience an attribute of the substance we call mind, it would be reasonable to conclude the initial assumption is wrong, and that the mind does extend in space (even if it is still immaterial perhaps). — Lionino

As to mind and perception, I find myself agreeing with the latter sentence. You’re focusing on physiological perceptions via the physiological senses; still, the same issue of spatial extensions will also be found in imaginations which incorporate imagined senses of perception: imagined sights via the mind’s eyes, imagined sounds via the mind’s ears, imagined tactile feels via the mind’s skin, if not all other senses as well. I get that not everyone can easily imagine things, but some are quite apt at it. All these imaginings will require spatial distances of delimitation to that which is being imagined. And since imaginings are purely mental, this then points to mind necessarily being extensional when in any way engaging in, at the very least, willful imaginings.

So, from where I stand, yes, the Cartesian notion of res cogitans can often be, if it is not always also, res extensa. This to my mind makes the Cartesian distinction between mind and matter fruitless, to say the least.

That addressed, I would however express that I nevertheless find it reasonable to affirm that consciousness (the first-person point of awareness which we all are and which apprehends givens: understandings, concepts, physiological percepts, and imaginings, among other things) could be of itself construed as zero-dimensional. This though the mind (of which it is consciously aware of and also those portions which remain unconscious relative to itself) by which consciousness can be said to be enveloped can at times be extensional, if not always so being.

So if an argument is to be made for 0D, I so far don't find it possible that it is the mind which is 0D (the mind again consisting of things such as percepts, concepts, etc.; in short, of cogitations one is aware of) but I do find it possible to interpret the consciousness/awareness which is aware of both its own mind/cogitations and of the external world as being, of itself, zero dimensional.

It can be upheld that whereas passions in themselves always addressed ends (passions always being in some way wants and that wanted being the end pursued - javra

I am not sure about this. The "passions" are generally associated with emotion, and I am not sure these always have "ends". Consider being depressed or angry; is there necessarily an "end" here? Oftentimes the passions seem so problematic precisely because we cannot identify ends that would relieve/gratify them. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Here evidencing that this is always true would be difficult at best. So I wont engage in such arguments. That said, it is however not impossible or inconsistent that all passions, or emotions, are contingent on agencies of mind such that some of these passions are unconsciously produced by unconscious agencies of mind; this so that these either consciously or unconsciously produced emotions are all intentional, hence purposive, and hence goal oriented—this even if one is not consciously aware of their particular goals. As with most other emotions, both depression (though I’m not clear if depression qualifies as an emotion) and anger are broad and imprecisely defined umbrella terms for a wide enough range of possible experiences. Here speculatively addressed, some depressions might be one’s unconsciousness’s way of telling one that there is something fundamentally wrong with the way one is operating, such that their possible aim is a fundamental change in one's modus operandi. On the other hand, some forms of anger which consist of animosity and an urge to harm will then hold as their aim the intent that that which one holds animosity toward is to be harmed. But I grant these presented possibilities in no way evidences the goals here speculated upon, much less that it is always true that passions are goal-oriented.

[reason] will always strictly be a means toward the ends pursued—including potentially those ends of discerning what is true - javra

Again, I am not sure if this is always true. Is intuiting or understanding something we have not set out to understand an end or desire? It seems like understanding and knowledge sometimes come upon us "out of the blue," not as the end of some process, and yet these seem bound up in reason. — Count Timothy von Icarus

These too (intuitions and eureka understandings) can be suggested to be resultant from unconscious agencies of mind—which, again, would here unconsciously reason so as to optimally arrive at the goals unconsciously pursued. But again, arguing that this is the case is a difficult challenge, and so I will not here engage in it.

That the desire for what is truly good and true is different from the desire for other ends is precisely Plato's point. No other desire is capable of shaping the other desires in the same way. No other end might be seen as "the end of ends." The distinction is a key point for our anthropology. Are all things with ends the same "sort of thing," or is this a bad way to classify them? I would tend to agree with the latter. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I fully agree with this statement and that not all desires are of the same kind. I would go so far as to express that some subordinate desires are wrong/incorrect in that they are unable to satisfy one’s predominant desire(s) or else right/correct in that they are so able to satisfy. That, in Platonic terms, wrong desires (given their context, etc.) prevent one from approaching the Good whereas right desires (given their context, etc.) facilitate one’s approaching the Good. And that it is only via reasoning one can thereby differentiate between good and bad desires.

But I do have difficulties with this:

So, the desires of reason don't seem to be "just another desire" that persons have, but rather key to the definition of persons, making it play an entirely different role in philosophical anthropology. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Did you by the bolded text intend “desires for reason”? If not, what do you intend by saying that reason per se holds its own desires (i.e., the desires of reason)? I ask because this is so far unintelligible to me: to me it so far seems to entail that reasoning per se holds its own agency of being ... such that, for one example, reasoning can choose between the desires it holds.

the simple fact that we can tell where we are being touched just by feeling it hints that our mind has extensionality (it is not a substance without dimensions, 0D). It is not just that the mind has the idea of extension within it and that some interaction with our organs causes some idea of spatial localisation¹, but that experience itself can be located with coordinates x,y,z — we can isolate sight and smell and hearing to operations or projections of our 0D mind, but we can't do that with touch. — Lionino

But I think that touch goes even beyond. When we hear something at our left or our right, we simply hear it, and that sound invokes the idea of left or right, the experience does feel like it is happening within your brain; but when it comes to touch, we can tell the actual experience is not in our brain but all over our body. Maybe that makes sense. — Lionino

I think it makes a lot of sense. I’ll complement what you’ve written by adding that via vision, for example, our body is other relative to us as first-person points of view (i.e., as conscious minds) that seem to be affixed to this perceptual other via the location of our eyes. It is only via touch that we as first-person points of view—i.e. as consciously aware beings—permeate throughout and are, as such, fully unified with our own bodies in an indisputable manner: such that we are here defined as that awareness which touches and anything we touch becomes other relative to us, thereby delimitating us as bodies (yes, this does get complicated by the touching of one’s own body, but the relation between subject of awareness being that which touches and its objects of awareness being that which is touched remains unchanged).

Point being, only via touch do we hold immediate awareness of us conscious minds being unified with our physiological bodies via which we then experience otherness; in all other exteroceptive senses—sight, smell, and sound, included—we as conscious minds experience our own bodies as an object of awareness, i.e. as other, that then is automatically inferred to be perceptual experiences of one own physiological self.

I’m not certain we could isolate sight, smell, sound, as occurring within a 0D mind as I interpret you describing (e.g., if sight is deemed to be a strictly mental occurrence, then the mind cannot be of zero dimensions, for it consists of sight which itself cannot be of zero dimensions ... or so it seems to me). That said, I too find touch to be a unique and highly underrated physiological sense—this, at the very least, in philosophies addressing the subject of perception.

I'm mainly antagonistic to the Cartesian take on "res extensa" being utterly severed from mind stuff due to the former having extension in space but not the latter. — javra


And do smells necessarily have extension in space? — Count Timothy von Icarus


The question raised here is an interesting one, and I also take trouble with the split of res extensa and res cogitans. — Lionino

Apropos to directional smell, turns out research does evidence directional, else stereo, smell in humans. Given that most other mammals have a keener sense of smell than we do, I by this then infer that smell is generally directional, and, hence, spatial, in most lifeforms that are equipped with this physiological sense.

To be free, one must overcome the shackles of instinct, desire, and circumstance. How is this accomplished? In The Phaedo and Book IV of The Republic, Plato argues that this can only be accomplished by having our soul unified and harmonized by our rationality. Why should our rationality be "in charge?" Why not have reason be a "slave to the passions," as Hume would have it? — Count Timothy von Icarus

A well written OP. You’ve touched upon passion vs. reason. Here only want to present the case that Hume’s stipulation that “reason is a slave to the passions” is not necessarily contrary to the overall gist of the OP, at least as I currently interpret the OP.

It can be upheld that whereas passions in themselves always addressed ends (passions always being in some way wants and that wanted being the end pursued), reasoning (even when human reasoning is construed to be a part of the universal logos) will always strictly be a means toward the ends pursued—including potentially those ends of discerning what is true or, else, the end of a maximal eudemonia.

Hence, without any held ends, reasoning is useless and thereby devoid of meaning. On the other hand, ends held and pursued without reasoning can be likened to a headless chicken’s moving to and fro (this metaphor here primarily addressing the inability of obtaining the ends pursued in the absence of any and all reasoning).

At which point lesser lifeform’s reasoning changes from reasoning that is in some way human-like in being consciously appraised to being purely that of the universal logos (which applies to rocks and to automata alike) is of course not something that can be definitively delimitated. That aside, were there to be a universal logos, it than stands to the reason here presented that it too would hold its own end toward which it only serves as a means. For example:

The OP references the Platonic notion of the Good. Here, a somewhat subtle but important change in focus can be found occurring between Platonism and Neoplatonism: wherein, tmk, the first addressed the Good as that upon which all else is contingent on (only implicitly at best upholding that the Good is to be pursued as an end), the latter furthers this by explicitly framing the Good as also being that which is to be pursued as end in the form of henosis with the One. In at least this latter conceptualization, then, the universal logos is not equivalent to the Good / the One but is that which emanates from it and which is reconciled in it—with logos being here considered the intermediary between soul, nous, and highest level of reality: the One. My point here being, in this case as example, the logos (universal reasoning) is still a means toward the One, with henosis (unification with the One) being of itself a passion: here again making reasoning subordinate to (end-driven) passion(s), albeit at a more universal level of contemplation.

Going back to Plato as you’ve mentioned in the quote, reasoning here is also only a means to the end of freedom and the related eudemonia that results from a unified and harmonized soul. The want for this end is then a passion, to which reasoning is then again subservient to.

I know its not a definitive argument and there are alternative ways of interpretation. All the same, that reason is subordinate to passion—either on an individual basis or on a global scale—seems to me an important observation, and one which in no way contradicts the authority of reasoning per se. Granted, to avoid radical relativism, these very observations would then need to be embedded within the very metaphysics here addressed: wherein “the Good” is an absolute end (and is absolute in so being).

I'll leave it there, but for now I think it's worth considering how much our society is driven by appetites (consider the electorate's response whenever consumption must decrease) and passions (consider the fractious, tribal political climate), as opposed to its rational part and how this constricts freedom of action on implementing ethically-minded policy. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This implicitly presumes that individuals are goal-driven and hence hold desires that they want satisfied. In which case, the question isn’t one of whether reasoning is subservient to passion but, instead, whether the reasoning being employed satisfies the very core passions addressed. Judging by the ever increasing rates and depression, suicide, and related issues, they give no indication of so doing.

p.s. This is a topic that gets complicated very easily by our having predominant passions to subordinate passions. But I find that it is precisely reasoning which facilitates all our subordinate passions optimally satisfying our predominant passion(s). Again, serving as a means toward (desired) ends.

What would you think if I told you I'd seen such things? — Janus

Since you asked: I'd think it a hallucination, or at the very least as not having anything to do with what can take place in the objective world, this due to my core metaphysical commitments. I'm certain I'd think this even if I myself were to "see" such things. Other's might not so interpret, but that would be due to their disparate core commitments.

I don't think any of this has much to do with metaphysics. — Janus

OK, thanks for sharing. But then we do disagree on what metaphysics is. My view being in general accord with this:

Metaphysics is the branch of philosophy that studies the fundamental nature of reality. This includes studies of the first principles of: being or existence, identity, change, consciousness, space and time, necessity, actuality, and possibility.[1] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metaphysics

... which to me fits in well enough with the answer I just provided to your question above regarding core metaphysical commitments (that, again, can be unconsciously held and thereby not be consciously analyzable worldviews but, instead, in part being - as you say - "habitual expectations based on what has been encountered and observed in the course of one's life"). I get it, you hold a different semantics and views and thereby find it important to assert that you disagree. But that, of itself, again doesn't warrant my view being egregious.

Got a few lightbulbs to change (metaphorically speaking) such that philosophizing right now will be a bit too distracting - so I'll be signing off for the time being.

While I’m here, getting back to the OP:

Metaphysics might be viewed as being in part comprised of discerning just how many philosophers it takes to change a light-bulb - tricky issue because many, if not all, will sit about endlessly debating the topic.

Else, it might be viewed as those aspects of ontology universal to all beings which facilitate both the possibility of the light-bulb being changed and the possibility of debating the issue without end - aspects that objectively are irrespective of one’s beliefs on the matter, if any.

I so far like this generalized appraisal; though, of course, other perspectives - some of which will disagree - are possible.

I don't find any of this surprising and I don't think professed worldviews tell us much. — Tom Storm

Yea, my point being about the same.

OK. Thanks.

As an example, though I do not uphold the claim of "no atheists in foxholes", I do have evidence that some atheists no longer act according to their atheistic principles in dire situations. Although of course disagreements can abound regarding this, to me this does illustrate that sometimes one's professed worldview - while in no way being a lie - can in some ways be self-deceptive when put the test, so to speak. But this is one example among potentially many.

Thanks again for your views, though.