The possibility of (2) only depends on the possibility of a brain living in a vat and the possibility of a cortical visual prosthesis being able to stimulate the visual cortex in the same way that an eye's neurotransmitters do. I don't have to assume anything about what I am. (2) is no less a problem for direct realists than it is for indirect realists.
If you're still allowed to say "I see apples" then so is the indirect realist. If the indirect realist is only allowed to say "I see sense-data" then you're only allowed to say "I see light".
No it doesn't.
Then I'll respond a different way: you should use language consistent with your theory; for instance, instead of saying that you see an apple you ought maintain that you see light.
You're implying that direct realism avoids scepticism, but that simply begs the question. It's entirely possible that both of these are true:
1. If we are bipedal organisms with eyes and if there are apples that reflect light into our eyes then we have direct visual perception of apples
2. We are brains in a vat and a cortical visual prosthesis causes us to have "false" experiences of us being bipedal organisms with eyes living in a world with apples
There's no "instead of". This is like saying that if I watch a football match on TV then instead of saying that I watched a football match I ought say that I watched moving images on a TV screen.
Yes
We have direct perception of X iff our sense organs are in direct physical contact with X
You don't even know what you're saying, let alone what the dispute is. You think your intuitions are arguments and deal with complex empirical issues that humans are not disposed to solve. Craziness.
They are the good guys.
It's indirect visual perception of apples and trees and everything other than light, which is a very significant asterisk to your "direct visual perception of a mind-independent world".
It straddles the line because traditional direct realism rejects (1) and (2), you accept (1) and reject (2), and the sense datum theory accepts (1) and (2). I would even say that if you accept (1) then you are an indirect realist with respect to seeing apples even if you're not a sense datum theorist with respect to seeing apples.
1. We do not have direct visual perception of apples, only indirect visual perception of apples
2. We have direct visual perception of mental phenomena
Yes, and this is indirect perception of the object reflecting the light even according to your account of direct perception.
Your brand of "direct" realism agrees with (1) even if it doesn't agree with (2). I am simply pointing out that direct realism as almost everyone else understands it doesn't agree with (1), and so you theory straddles the line between traditional direct realism and the sense datum theory.
I don't understand what you're trying to say.
Most direct realists say that we have direct visual perception of apples and trees and everything else that emits or reflects light into our eyes, whereas your account is that we only have direct visual perception of light. Yours is a strange kind of direct realism.
Obviously you disagree with all the talk about "mental re-creations" and "images" and "percepts", but there's nothing objectionable about the use of "distal object" to refer to the object that reflects the light and "proximal stimulus" to refer to the light absorbed by the photoreceptors in the eye.
Of course there's light beyond the proximal stimulus, but according to your theory it isn't directly perceived because it isn't in physical contact with our sense organs.
According to your theory something is directly perceived only when it's in physical contact with our sense organs, in which case it is no longer a distal object but a proximal stimulus.
No, it's a proximal stimulus. Distal objects are things like apples that reflect the light.
Spaniards want to live in a country with affordable houses and better salaries. Our history cannot fix this.
Then what you mean by "direct perception" isn't what most other direct realists mean by it.
A.D. Smith claims that what most authors have in mind in talking about the Problem of Perception is the “question of whether we can ever directly perceive the physical world”, where “the physical world” is understood in a realist way: as having “an existence that is not in any way dependent upon its being... perceived or thought about” (2002: 1). The arguments at the heart of the Problem of Perception challenge this direct realist perspective on perceptual experience.
Relax... leave my country alone.
We don't have law enforcement agencies which shoot people in the streets or folks who jump from the balcony every bloody summer. We are not perfect, but at least we are not like you.
