So you think the wisdom of modern maths is that infinity is just another number? And not something more that that? — apokrisis

Every middle school student, who pay attention to math, know that 'any length is equal to the sum of its infinite number of shorter segments.
However I am not sure if my judgment (I am a layman) about Aristotle' response is 'way out of the chart', resulted from misunderstanding of Aristotle, or could be considered as plausible.

Aristotle to an extent. He deserves credit for being so (relatively) systematic, prolific and comprehensive, but his conclusions are mostly wrong and his writing is very awkward. — Terrapin Station

I am troubled with iconic image of Aristotle, especially with the wisdom of his “whole before its parts”.
It started with a famous paradox put forward by Zeno in which he states that a distance of any length could be divided into an infinite number of shorter segments and therefore traversing an infinite amount of segments would take an infinite amount of time.
Aristotle, reflecting the thinking of that time didn’t have coherent understanding of infinity and thought that the infinite is imperfect, unfinished and unthinkable rejecting infinite numbers as unnecessary nonsense. Apparently Aristotle’s didn’t have a good answer to Zeno and responded (as I am concerned) with unintelligible response like - "a length was first and foremost a whole. True, this whole might be divided into an infinite number of parts—nevertheless, the whole was fundamentally irreducible to those parts. In fact, it was only because a distance was a 'whole before its parts' that it could be traversed."

Would be an accurate assessment that this response was just a blunder and not an example of wisdom?

This is Panpsychism's essential problem. Matter and mind can't be shown to be the two halves of one whole, the two aspects of the one symmetry breaking. — apokrisis

I would like to make clear that the panpsychism I advocated is not about 'mater' and 'mind'. It is about 'some entities' which behavior could be described in terms of physical matter or mind. The difference is that description in terms of physical matter is simplified and incomplete (because it can't describe mind related phenomena) and only the description in terms of mind could describe all phenomena, including what we call physical.

Information theory describes entropy as both epistemic uncertainty and as ontic degrees of freedom. The two sides of the deal are now mathematically joined at the hip. Their essential complementarity has been recognized as a quantifiable quality - the holy bit — apokrisis

According to some source, when von Neumann asked Shannon how he was getting on with his information theory, Shannon replied: "The theory was in excellent shape, except that he needed a good name for "missing information". "Why don’t you call it entropy", von Neumann suggested. "In the first place, a mathematical development very much like yours already exists in Boltzmann's statistical mechanics, and in the second place, no one understands entropy very well, so in any discussion you will be in a position of advantage.

I wonder if Shannon theory of information has a wrong name. It is not about information, but about data (storage, transmission, etc.). Shannon freely admitted that his definition of information was limited in scope and was never envisioned as being universal. Shannon deliberately avoided the "murkier" aspects of human communication in framing his definitions; problematic themes such as knowledge, semantics, motivations and intentions of the sender and/or receiver, etc., were avoided altogether.

Of course the play of signs, the play of symbols, still has to obey the second law. It takes work to run a computer or brain. Both must produce a lot of waste heat. But from the point of view of the play of symbols, the entropic cost of every bit, every operation (like executing a program or uttering a thought) is effectively the same. There is always a cost, but it is immaterial in not making a difference to the computation or the brain activity. — apokrisis

On entropy I agree with von Neumann that no one understands it.

Pansemiosis, on the other hand, has become science's new dominant paradigm - even if cashing out all that which is implied is still a work in progress across the span of the sciences — apokrisis

I am not up to speed with this new dominant paradigm, but Wiki also not aware about it. However I found a short clip about Pansemiosis on YouTube.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X5tLBa-Q-SY

I like it too. ;)

However, I think that this downward causation is still reducible to the properties of parts. I may try to demonstrate this on any example you will choose. — miosim

Great. Start with consciousness. — apokrisis

I expected you will offer an example where emergence shows advantage compare to reductionism. I don't think this is a case. The holistic approach, as I understand, contributed nothing in understanding consciousness, but just flooded discussion with new fancy terminology.

However the reduction approach to conscience also have a problem. The problem is not in the reductionism original formulation as 'The complex things are always reducible to the nature of the sum of underlying constituents and their causes, where the sum is any mathematical or logical procedure that evaluates a resultant of multiple causes', but in its stripped-down interpretation that 'the system behavior could be described in terms of parts' properties studying in isolation'.
This striped down interpretation is profoundly wrong, because it fails to recognize that isolated parts, in absent of interaction, will not exhibit any properties at all. For example, an electron possesses an electrical charge, but we cannot observe this property unless electron interacts with another charged particle. We do not declare that the charge of an electron emerges during interaction. Instead we agree that the electron always posses the charge (whether we observe it or not) and reveals this property only during interactions. While electron interacts with external magnetic field it reveals its spin properties, while accelerating an electron in the force field it reveals its mass, while interacting with atomic nuclear an electron reveals so many other of its properties not observable and not expected while we just stare at electron in isolation. These 'hidden' properties that are revealed only during interactions in the system causes the perception of emergence that is 'a holy grail' and fertile ground of emergentism.
When parts in the system are subjected to the new interactions that may reveal their 'hidden' properties. A system acts as a ‘magnifying glass’ and a ‘litmus test’ that reveal properties of the parts not observable otherwise.

To investigate life and mind phenomena I used this approach in the paper published more than a year ago. This is the badly written paper published in the online journal that you probably would avoid. However this paper has my answer to question about conscience. The paper is accessible using link below

http://www.hrpub.org/download/20151231/UJP3-19405044.pdf

I was talking about self-organisation and not merely emergence. And I gave evidence. I said parts "emerge" via holistic constraint in hierarchically organised systems. — apokrisis

You are explaining one puzzle (emergence) using another puzzle (self-organization)

The spontaneous self organization, including hierarchically organized systems, is a puzzle that is waiting for an explanation. We often think about self-organization in terms of 'spontaneous', free-energy reduction driven processes. It is important to keep in mind that the term ‘spontaneous’ doesn’t explain the complex molecular behavior and instead just conceals a gap between our understanding of physical forces acting in a linear manner, and the complex mechanism of molecular self-assembly. It is why a 'spontaneous' self-assembly is often described in the metaphysical terms of a so called goal directed processes.

So it is not just emergence in the usual sense of new global properties popping out of collective behavior. Instead it is the argument that global forms and purposes act downwards to limit material possibility in fruitful fashion. The whole simplifies messy reality to shape the very parts that compose it. — apokrisis

I know what you mean. However, I think that this downward causation is still reducible to the properties of parts. I may try to demonstrate this on any example you will choose.

without co-ordination the 5 would make a poorly performing team i.e. the whole is less than its parts — TheMadFool

First, I just want to remind that co-ordination is not an external factor, but the property of each individual player, so the quality of the team, as a whole, is fully reducible to the properties of individual players.

Second, by continue using the 'whole is more/less/equal to sum of its parts' as characterization of whole/parts relationship we are substituting the analysis of this relationship with misconstrued 'pop-cultural formula' that is using mathematical like notations 'sum/more/less/equal', etc. This gives an impression that this 'formula' is based on the solid ground of the most trusted science - mathematics .

In mathematics, the sum - is about the total amount of things, and not about their relationship. Therefore comparing the total amount of things with the whole , which is about relationships, is a nonsense.

Therefore we should better stop using this 'formula' as a scientific argument if we want ever understand the part/whole relationship, including complex system.

This iconic 'formula' is often used to justify Emergence. There is an understandable temptation to invoke emergence for the phenomena that seem impossible to explain in terms of their underlying mechanisms. However, after almost a century of development, emergentism has not demonstrated that it is a viable alternative to reductionism either. It is actually made things even worse by contaminating a scientific discussion with incomprehensive scientifically sound jargon.

Yep. You gotta stick to what you believe and avoid all evidence to the contrary in this life. — apokrisis

Indeed my last post sounds like my conviction is based on my believe regardless of evidence. My fault.
Instead I am open to discus any evidences that support ontological emergence.
In the past I was very enthusiastic about, new at the time, system sciences (especially complexity science) that had promised the new paradigm - the shift from the narrow-minded mechanistic way of thinking to the holistic views on reality. First, it felt like a fresh air leading to the new horizons for explanation of life phenomenon.
However the more I learned the more my hopes have been replacing with growing suspicion that the horizons open by complexity science led to desert filled with mirages.

So what are you evidences in favor of emergence?

So what is "self-organisation"? — apokrisis

Per wiki, self-organization is a process where order arises from local interactions between parts of an initially disordered system.

In systems theory, it is the limitations that wholes can impose to turn chaos into order, noise into signal. And that is why there is a metaphysical-strength contrast with the parts.

The parts can only construct a state of organization. The whole has the opposite kind of causality in that it can constrain the state of organization. — apokrisis

As I understand, the definition you used is based on the notion of ontological emergence. I am strongly oppose the ontological emergence and believe that any theory based on emergence is wrong. Therefore I don't see much sense to accept or even discuss the definitions provided by such theory.

So say we have you, and then standing next to you, a small vat of chemicals - a vat of carbon, water, nitrogen, phosphorous, etc - that is absolutely identical in atomic composition.

What is missing that is present In one but not the other? — apokrisis

'I' is the result of very specific complex interactions between self-organized chemical components forming the living system, while the same chemical components without interaction among each other are just a quantity of things.

This is the same as a car and its parts. The only difference is that the car is put together by human, while 'I' am the self organized system.

Something similar shows up in all kinds of places.
Say, hydrogen and oxygen atoms (the parts) can combine to water molecules (the whole).
In turn, atomic hydrogen and oxygen has protons and electrons and neutrons, ... — jorndoe

The example of water is often used to justify the emergence phenomenon. The mistake in this example is that the water (the way we experience it) is not a single molecule, but gazillions of them interacting among themselves, and with the wall of vessel containing it, and with other external factors. Therefore comparing the water with an abstract physical model of atoms in terms what is "more" or "less" is a nonsense self-deceiving exercise. Instead we need to grow up and start talking about reducibility of the properties of water to the properties of its atoms that in most cases is fully reducible and therefore no need to talk about emergence.
At the same time there the complex phenomena like bifurcations etc., which have not satisfactory reduction explanation, but they deserves a separate consideration. For now I will state only that the gap in our understanding of these complex phenomena is not a proof for the ontological emergence.

Depends on what counts as emergence I guess.
The car (the whole) can be used for transportation, but the pile (the parts) can't. — jorndoe

The car used for transportation is a concept conceived by human who design and put it together. The pile of car's parts, say in the junk yard, cannot be used for transportation, because they are discarded by human for a different reason/purpose. Therefore talking about car as a whole without including human in this "figurative equitation" is "mathematically" illiterate.

Are the water phases/states emergent? The nifty-looking, symmetrical, hexagonal ice-crystals?
The parts on their own can't be water steam/gas, liquid or ice/solid (which also depending on pressure and temperature). — jorndoe

Each part on their own can't, but the parts interacting among themselves and with other surrounded parts (environment conditions that are non-disclosed parts in your examples of whole) - can.
There some aspects of the complex system phenomena (like bifurcation, etc.) that are not fully understood. I prefer don't discuss them now because they deserve a separate consideration. However the fact that they are not understood, is not a proof or even a good evidence of ontological emergence; at best they are symptoms only

Keep at it, philosophy is great fun, useful too. If you ever can't get to sleep at night (being anxious, stressed out, or just too high), pick up some Aristotle - problem solved! — Metaphysician Undercover

I am a layman trying to understand Aristotle's ideas about "whole and parts". By reading his original text I didn't feel like I am reading a great philosopher. Instead I feel like I am reading works of a proliferate demagogue and wondered if Goethe’s quote “When ideas fail, words come in very handy” is applicable to Aristotle’s metaphysics.
Do I have this impression because I don't’ have a background in philosophy, or it is a bad translation or Aristotle was indeed a 'fool' wearing a mask of a philosopher?

Below is a typical example of his writing:


Book I

"... When there are parts of a whole-the one that in which a thing is, the other the thing which is in
it-the whole will be described as being in itself. For a thing is described in terms of its parts, as well
as in terms of the thing as a whole, e.g. a man is said to be white because the visible surface of him
is white, or to be scientific because his thinking faculty has been trained. The jar then will not be in
itself and the wine will not be in itself. But the jar of wine will: for the contents and the container
are both parts of the same whole.
In this sense then, but not primarily, a thing can be in itself, namely, as 'white' is in body (for the
visible surface is in body), and science is in the mind.
It is from these, which are 'parts' (in the sense at least of being 'in' the man), that the man is
called white, &c. But the jar and the wine in separation are not parts of a whole, though together
they are. So when there are parts, a thing will be in itself, as 'white' is in man because it is in body,
and in body because it resides in the visible surface. We cannot go further and say that it is in surface in virtue of something other than itself. (Yet it is not in itself: though these are in a way the
same thing,) they differ in essence, each having a special nature and capacity, 'surface' and 'white'..."

Experientially it feels right to me that the whole is at least other than the sum of the parts. If you ever make music you will recognise this. I sing in a choir and the collective feeling when things go right is of a different order from when one is singing individually, or from the notion of a bunch of individuals who happen to be singing with each other. People who play instruments tell me the same. — mcdoodle

I have no problem with using "the whole is other than the sum of the parts" in your example, because it belong to a figurative speech and subjective experience.
My problem only if the same "formula" and the same mistakes are applied to a scientific understanding of relationship between whole and parts.

The other ontological issue can come up even in 'realism'. (To generalize a point Wayfarer is making) Are for instance abstractions in biology 'reducible' to chemistry or physics? Is 'the economy' reducible to some set of naturalistic terms? Or are there - as I would see it - different levels of abstraction appropriate to different forms of analysis, without the supposed component parts being in some way 'superior' or 'more fundamental'? — mcdoodle

The reducibility of biology to chemistry and chemistry to physic is exactly what I going to discuss next. This discussion would also affect the reduction of social and economic phenomena.

Indeed if some want to express the relationship between parts and whole in mathematical terms the processes need to be included in the "equation".

At the same time it is important to remember that such "mathematical" description is symbolic Therefore arguing about its meaning is the same as arguing about "how many angels can dance on the head of a pin."

To have a meaningful discussion about whole and parts it need to be in terms of properties. The real question is: "Can the properties of whole be explained in terms of parts' properties (that includes interactions enable by these properties)"?

Indeed

It seems "the whole" has additional structure (and interaction) that the collection of "the parts" does not.
I suppose some emergence may be a result of the difference. — jorndoe

Indeed, the whole, say a car, is an assembly of interacting parts. These parts weren't assembled by themselves, but were put together by human, who also conceive the the property, interactions, forms, and the structure of the car.
However the same parts that wasn't put together by human remains a pile.

Do we need to invoke emergence to understand this?

The phrase "the whole is more than the sum of its parts" is not a bumpersticker slogan. Its an accurate assessment of a world in which many phenomena (including us) are emergent, always exceeding the sum of our parts. — Bitter Crank

The claim for ontological emergence is my prime target. As you pointed correctly the phrase "the whole is more than the sum of its parts" is an essence and roots of the theory of emergence. It is why to defeat this theory I need to start with its roots.

Another example. A rich delicious soup has a fixed list of ingredients. Eat the raw ingredients ground up together and it won't taste very good. Simmered in a pot for several hours, and it's heavenly. Flavors emerge in the soup that weren't there in the "un-stewed" parts. — Bitter Crank

You are right that taste of delicious soup is better (more) than taste of its ingredients. However you are right for the wrong reason, because you just forgot to include in your "equation" SOMEONE who tastes the soup. By adding this SOMEONE to your "equation" you may find the whole is now could be "more", "equal", or "less" that the "sum" of its parts, depending on the subjective taste of this SOMEONE. For example, I personally don't like Cesar salad (whole), but prefer its components (fresh vegetable) instead.

Your example with taste is a typical rhetorical example of emergence and is usually goes like that:
"Taste of sugar, a system phenomenon, could not be found in the carbon, hydrogen, and oxygen atoms that constitute components of sugar molecules". This example, limits the whole to sugar only while the another crucial element of the system is missing; SOMEONE who tastes the sugar and declares its taste vs. the taste of its component. Indeed for this SOMEONE taste of sugar and its purified components causes a very different taste (sensation perceived in the mouth and throat on contact with a substance). However to answer why it is different we don't need to invoke emergence; biochemistry and biology should be enough.

In the majority of examples, upon which the system approach is based, there is an exclusion of the invisible SOMEONE who designs, put together, tastes, or observes. Without this SOMEONE, the system property, like the taste, would not exist at all.

Omitting the creator or user of the system is the far most common mistake in emergentism. For example, a complex computer is built from the simple semiconductor components and it seems that the ‘computational intelligence’ of the computer is a new emerging phenomenon, because it cannot be found in its parts. However, the complexity of the computer is also due to the property (complexity) of human intelligence, which is not seen while we are observing the computer. Therefore, human intelligence is also one of the system’s causal powers and his or her properties determine the complexity of the semiconductor components, the complex wiring of the logic diagram, and sophisticated algorithms. In other words, there are no emerging properties in this example and
the properties of a computer could be reduced to the properties of its elements, including the creators of this computer.

The problem with that is that I disagree that relations and processes aren't parts. — Terrapin Station

Agree

"Theoretically, we could take your brain apart and lay out the neurons, vessels, white matter, etc. side by side on a very large table. Which would be greater? Your disassembled brain (parts) or your whole brain?
Clearly, the whole is greater than the sum of its parts, because as part of the whole, nerve cells, flower petals, and so on can do things that they can't do alone. Actually, as parts, nerve cells can't do much of anything"


I own you the response for these examples as well.
Regarding the brain and its neurons and other components conceder the following analogy:

Lets have a manufacture and take apart all its building and equipment. Then let force all its employers to lay down on the ground face down.

We understand that under these condition employer cannot do much. Do we need to ask why? Do we need to ask what is "more" or "less", the striving manufacture or its ruins and horrified employers.

The "whole is more than sum of its part" means nothing. It is a just a bumper sticker, a symbol of our ignorance to understand complex phenomena like brain.

I know that Koffka did not like the translation and firmly corrected students who replaced "other" with "greater". Does it mean that the wisdom of "Whole is greater than the sum of its parts" is (at least partially) originated of incorrect translation?

Bitter Crank
The "sum" is mathematical notation, sort of tool, that could be useful or deceptive, depending how we use it. For example what is the "sum" of one "dog" and one "steak"? If you could ask this question Aristotle, he may respond with long incomprehensive metaphysical talk, say ... if dog will eat the steak the result is "1", otherwise it is "2" etc. However If you ask this question a middle school child he/she may respond that the question is mathematically wrong.
Regarding example of bouquet and its part, the notion of "sum" or "greater" are mathematically or logically inappropriate.

In the example with bouquet the SOMEONE assembles the individual pieces into bouquet. So if you still want to use the mathematical notation as a figurative speech, you should ask the following question:

Is "various parts of bucket" + "someone who put them together" = "bouquet" ?

What is your answear to this question?

I need to clarify my question. I am curious if Aristotle really said that “whole is greater than the sum of its parts”. If he didn't, who first said this? Does any body know any reputable philosopher who defends this claim?
Personally I believed that it is OK to use "the whole ... its parts" as a figurative speech, but philosophically and especially scientifically it is FUNDOMENTELY wrong.