BrandonMcDade Hey there.
I am not sure if your post is intended to address my quote, but if it is, I must admit I don't understand anything you are saying. Sorry bro. Perhaps it could be a bit more concise? — Samuel Lacrampe

the original question was can I be eternal, im making note of the difference in how youre describing the mind, you state that the mind is non physical due to its intrinsic properties being that of abstract spatio temporal plane, where it could exist outside of the physical one. Im taking a different direction and stating that I is a perception of different cognitive events.
-The mind is over the event, and in doing so cant be classified inside the event.
-The mind is eternal due to the processes in which the mind operates- being that of a "symbolic representation" to the external/ physical plane.
-the mind is not the same as cognition and thought.
-perceptions go along with thought.
-perceptions are bias, and the human instinct is to think about ones own survival.
-the concept of I is merely a perception of ones state of progressive interpretation of their own cognition.
-if the mind cotains the essence or substances outside of the event, the brain will have to participate in said event.
-if the brain stops functioning, the body ceases to operate
-there is no representational abstract proof of the mind living on after death, only changing states or properties, which would constitute it not being an "I" or "mind" after it has stopped working, which brains do stop working.

Let me see if this correlates to the mind-body problem. We believe that each individual hurricane is nothing but a collection of physical atoms behaving in a certain way: one need have no more than the physical atoms, with their normal physical properties, following normal physical laws, for there to be a hurricane. One might say that we need more than the language of physics to describe and explain the weather, but we do not need more than its ontology. There is token identity between each individual hurricane and a mass of atoms, even if there is no type identity between hurricanes as kinds and some particular structure of atoms as a kind. Genuine property dualism occurs when, even at the individual level, the ontology of physics is not sufficient to constitute what is there. The irreducible language is not just another way of describing what there is, it requires that there be something more there than was allowed for in the initial ontology. Until the early part of the twentieth century, it was common to think that biological phenomena (‘life’) required property dualism (an irreducible ‘vital force’), but nowadays the special physical sciences other than psychology are generally thought to involve only predicate dualism. In the case of mind, property dualism is defended by those who argue that the qualitative nature of consciousness is not merely another way of categorizing states of the brain or of behaviour, but a genuinely emergent phenomenon.

The human body can be defined as "all the physical parts of a person".
- Thus if the mind is not the body, then it it follows that it is non-physical.
- Since death is, as far as we know, only a physical event, then it does not affect non-physical things, and thus the mind must survive death. — Samuel Lacrampe

I think what youre referring to is a type of proprietary dualistic phenomenon.
one could claim that knowing a lot about sparrows may influence the way one visually experiences sparrows so that one can be put in phenomenal states for which no wholly sensory states suffice. One´s knowledge does not merely cause one to attend to sparrows in a particular way. Rather, one´s knowledge puts one in a phenomenal state that one could not have been put in by wholly sensory states. In such a case, cognitive states can make a constitutive contribution to one´s perceptual experience by, for example, structuring the experience, without thereby producing a phenomenal state that is non-sensory in kind (see Levine 2011, Nes 2011). However, most philosophers hold that cognitive states can cause one to be in certain sensory states by influencing attention. Carruthers and Veillet (2011) argue that it is not clear that the sparrow expert´s experience involves irreducible cognitive phenomenology, since it is possible that her knowledge simply causes her to attend to sparrows in a different way compared with a novice. She will notice certain properties of the sparrows that the novice fails to notice, but the phenomenal state she is in is a state that wholly sensory states suffice to put her in. How should we decide between these views?

If cognitive phenomenology is proprietary, it should in principle also be possible to pick it out via introspection. Holding that cognitive phenomenology is proprietary allows one to appeal to introspection in cases where there is a dispute about whether cognitive phenomenology is involved or not. This may serve as a motivation for holding that cognitive phenomenology is proprietary, and not merely irreducible.

Therefore, not all causation is by events. Some of what is caused to occur must be caused to occur not by any event, but by objects - substances. — Bartricks

These substances that youre talking about have anything to do with, the gaps in cause and effect possibilties?
Absences: The main argument for transcendence is that absences can be involved in causal relations. Absences are said to be transcendent entities. They are nothings, non-occurrences, and hence are not in the world. Thus Mellor says, “For the ‘C’ and ‘E’ in a true causal ‘E because C’ need not assert the existence of particulars. They may deny it… They are negative existential statements, made true by the non-existence of such particulars,… Here Mellor is arguing that, in the case where rock-climbing Don does not die because he does not fall, Don's non-falling and non-dying are causally related, without there being any events or other immanent entities to relate.

The issue is to do with causation, not time. There's event causation - that's the familiar kind in which one event causes another event. But we know - know - that not all causation can be of this kind. It has nothing to do with 'time', but everything to do with the impossibility of there being actual infinities.

If all causation is by events (whether prior or concurrent) then we would have to have an actual infinity of events.

There cannot be any actual infinities of anything.

Therefore, not all causation is by events. Some of what is caused to occur must be caused to occur not by any event, but by objects - substances.

Not, note, by the object undergoing some change - that would be an event. No, 'directly'. The substance causes the event, not by means of another event, but 'directly'.

That argument establishes that there is substance causation and that such substances exist. Furthermore, as such substances cannot have been caused to exist by any prior event - for then the regress starts again - such substances must be self-existent. That is, they exist by their nature.

The only kind of object that exists by its very nature is a simple object.

Thus we can conclude that there exist some simple objects and that these simple objects are ultimately causally responsible for all else that exists.

Time doesn't come into it. We can get to that conclusion without invoking time.

But note that 'creating time' requires timeless causation - which is exactly what substance causation would be, given that it is 'events' that are essentially in time.

If God is a simple substance with the power of substance causation, then God can create time by 'substance causing' it to exist. As substance causation is not causation by an event - and it is events that are datable - this explains how God can create time. — Bartricks

I agree we should take phenomenological views out of the matter, because what everyone is stating is metaphysical. Another thing, let's clean up the semantics and terminology. The main standpoints that everyone is taking is too vague to be effective. t.

Immanence- Are the causal relata immanent, or transcendent? That is, are they concrete and located in spacetime, or abstract and non-spatiotemporal?

This question is connected to the question of category. If the relata are transcendent, then they are facts. If they are immanent, then they are events, or one of the other candidates such as features, tropes, or situations.

In practice, one finds two main arguments on the question of immanence. First, there is the argument from pushing, which maintains that the relata must be immanent so as to push things around. Second, there is the argument from absences, which maintains that the relata must be transcendent so that absences can figure in causal relations.

Pushing: The main argument for immanence is that only immanent entities can interact. This argument is nicely summarized by one of its opponents, Bennett: “Some people have objected that facts are not the sort of item that can cause anything. A fact is a true proposition (they say); it is not something in the world but is rather something about the world, which makes it categorically wrong for the role of a puller and shover and twister and bender.” (1988, p. 22; see also Hausman 1998) According to the pushing argument, only concrete spatiotemporal entities can be causes and effects.

Well both are fueled by the ego, and so the ego encompasses codependency, and dialect. Life isn’t what it seemed to be, when you’re 2-3, usually, when you start to come to terms with life, and death.
The ego doesn’t just show up after you got to see the world for a bit. It is forming and active even during infancy. Ego must be the origin of any valuations.

Apologies, of it seeming rushed, but codependency belongs to the same defense mechanism, it’s nothing more than a fantasy, fantasy’s start very young through the ego to stop the torment given to them by parents or neighbors.

Personally, I dub a philosopher to have an indifferent approach to opposition or values, given they’re from a different order of supposed knowledge. Why is it there valuations and dialect change once they’re isolated or come across opposing knowledge or opinions? Where does this defense mechanism come from, and why is the conscious not allowing the host to understand of its own arrogance or ignorance?—- I feel this relates to the origin of ethics in some way unclear to me. Though I do wish to point out the source of dialect- may come from one being attacked or something that pushed them into becoming cold, and seeking of truth to become a defender. A defender to what? Their ego? Species? Life? It seems when ones learns more, and they have a rendezvous with the tormentors of the past—- their dialect becomes even more protective of themselves( so, in better words cold, and indifferent) to the point it can be self evident of their (unknown to them) arrogance.

Would you like to touch upon dialect or mien? Or would you rather talk of codependency? Most ethics comes from the fact we will soon reach an inexorable demise. “The anxiety of death.”

It’s basically codependency, yet unequally shackled.

How could anything originate out of the opposite of truth? Truth out of error?
Or the will to truth out of the will to deception?
Or the generous deed out of selfishness?
Or the pure sun bright vision of the
wiseman out of covetousness?- Fredrick neitzche

I was stating origins of authoritative ethics, should I have mentioned Plato’s view of spirit? I apologize for my Tyron understanding of meta-ethics

I would believe whomever is your first teacher, potentially in daycare, to be the first figure of authority. I mean parents, yes—- if they were authoritative over you when you were 3-4 years old, not if they let you run a muck. I feel Kant really propounded many ethics of morals, and even Spinoza on the basis of ecclesiastical thinking, but I wouldn’t give them power, because any of a philosophers arguments are based on a multitude of pent up feelings of their past. I know Jordan Peterson has a Darwinian theory on truth and it is grounded in “good,” and “useful” moral values, but even this seems like trickery or a sense of something to be imperative, yet how can you trust a philosopher with an agenda? Lifting others up, can only be reached by oiling the broken cogs of imoral ethics? Why can’t a child argue with an adult? Because the adult would act as a superior judge based off divine wisdom and experience. So I don’t know if parents and teachers are the right way to find the right and wrong ethics.
Just my two sense.

I don’t know if utilitiarian is the source of morals, I would assume it comes from pragmatism, or experimentation of what could be useful; passed down through evolution—-or it’s how a fastidious fellow might look for errors he sees around him. I’m pretty sure Plato developed forms of moral understanding and Kant bypassed it to influence people into right or wrong.
Although the source of morals is truly immemorial to a time before the antiquity. People knew something was above the others. There had to be useful rules, and in doing so moral guidelines. Maybe women noticed Don’t spit on the floor, don’t smoke inside, don’t kill people. God could have a major role in morals. Morals are developed over time, so certain morals originate later than others.