I believe an anti-realist can also be pragmatic. Our power is limited in this world whether it’s real or not. — Michael McMahon

This is a fascinating claim, "Our power is limited in this world whether it's real or not". From an anti-realist perspective, this claim does not make much sense. If there is not "a world out there", what sense can we make of the idea that we can have shared agreement about this world's content?

But let us assume for a moment that there is a world we conceptualize together, what is being articulated when we question whether it is "real or not"? This distinction has no meaning when applied to the world as a whole. Think how we come to use this concept of "real". Usually after contrasting two different situations or objects, we find it useful to make a distinction in calling it "real" or "not real". In the case of the "world as a whole", what am I contrasting? I have no experienced of two different worlds, there is just one. What about looking at it it from a scientific perspective? How would a scientist go about determining if this world is "real" or "not real"? Or, take the hypothesis that this "world is not real", what experience(s) could falsify such an idea?

What if I said that the world is one of three possibilities: real, not real, and null. You may ask, "what is null?" and I replied, "the world is exactly as we perceived it if it was real or not, but it is neither, it is null." Have I really described three possibilities here? Maybe there is not three possibilities, but only one actual.

“If you look at a photograph of people, houses and trees, you do not feel the lack of the third dimension in it . We should not find it easy to describe a photograph as a collection of color patches on a flat surface; but what we see in a stereoscope looks three- dimensional in a different way.

((It is anything but a matter of course that we see ‘three-dimensionally’ with two eyes. If the two visual images are amalgamated, we might expect a blurred one as a result)” Wittgenstein, PI

“The colour of the visual impression corresponds to the colour of the object (this blotting paper looks ponk to me, and is pink) - the shape of the visual impression to the shape of the object (it looks rectangular to me , and is rectangular) but what I perceive in the dawning of an aspect is not a property of the object, but an internal relation between it and other objects.” Wittgenstein, PI

“ We can describe our thoughts through language but some of the experience of emotions are not readily describable.” The first part of the sentence sounds like I have thoughts and once I have a language then by some inner observation can describe them. I think what you mean is “through language we express our thoughts”, which is quite different. The second part of this sentence is equally confusing. As children, we have many emotions that we can not articulate with words. However, when we react similarly to the adults around us in similar circumstances those adults will try to train us to express this nonverbal behavior into words. So to say that something internal to yourself that is not readily describable leaves one wondering what you are talking about at all. However, if you would like to add that sometimes we react to situation unlike those adults who have trained us to express ourselves in particular ways, then I believe we start to have a situation where we just can’t relate to that person.

What are these kind of paradoxes suppose show us?

1. That something is dubious about reality because the logic is sound.

2. That something is dubious about our logic because reality is not problematic as it appears in the argument

3. That logic analysis is sometimes a fruitless tool that does not reflect or describe the world we live in.

I am incline to say #3 when it comes to these kind of paradoxes.

“It seems to me that they can if beliefs or the forming of beliefs take the form of brain states or changes in the structure of the brain, but I’m not sure.”

First, let me recommend a book that presents the conceptual difficulties in developing this notion that beliefs correspond to brain states. The book is “Memory and Mind” by Norman Malcolm.

I will try to summarize these difficulties as follows:

1. First, we seek a natural correlation between the elements of the two domains, and not a stipulated correlation. For example, like the relation between tides and phases of the moon vs the relation between the english language and morse code. So, the isomorphism between experiences and brain states is one by nature not by convention. To determine if there is a natural isomorphism, we propose a hypothesis and thru observation see if it holds in the world.

2. Problem of defining the elements in the “Experience” domain. - Take the desire “wanting to catch a bus” and designate it as an element, call it “E” . The problems start to arise when one begins to think of all the different circumstance one would call “wanting to catch a bus”. We find there is not one common factor among all the cases. So, what brain state element is to connect to what “Experience” element?

3. Problem of duration - where mental states and brain states employ different concepts of duration. For example, Wittgenstein put forward the following example, “Indeed one scarcely ever says that one has believed, understood or intended something “uninterrupted” since yesterday. An interruption of belief would be a period of unbelief, not for example the withdrawing of attention from what one believes - e.g. as in sleep.” This would be unlike the duration of many physical events, say the motion of a ball across the floor could be observed and clocked. Thus, how could we ever determine if one element was simultaneous with other element when the one kind of duration is specific and the other duration is quite vague.

“when you look at a star, you are actually seeing what it looked like years ago. It is entirely possible that some of the stars you see tonight do not actually exist anymore.”

Yeah, like if I watch a movie tonight and see a group of actors. It is entirely possible that some of the actors I watch in a movie tonight do not actually exist anymore.


“One world is enough
For all of us

It may seem a million miles away
But it gets a little closer everyday

One world”

The Police

“The starlight we see are light years away. This means we’re not seeing the real stars as such but a perception of them as they were years ago.”

This is a bizarre “anti-realist” way of putting.

Let me put it like a typical scientist would “The starlight we see is light years away. This means we see these stars as they were years ago.” “Real” and “Perception” is drop out because they are superfluous.

“The third world breathes our air tomorrow
We live on the time we borrow
In our world there's no time for sorrow
In their world there is no tomorrow
One world is enough
For all of us
One world is enough
For all of us
Lines are drawn upon the world
Before we get our flags unfurled
Whichever one we pick
It's just a self deluding trick” The Police

The choice between “realism” and “anti-realism” should be decided based on ethical and/or practical consideration rather than some decision of the veracity of a metaphysical picture. If my fellowing human being is just a mere projection, would making them suffer carry any consequence in ones mind. If the charging lion is attacking me, would or should the mind care about the inevitability of the pending doom?

If you say, the mind would react as if real, this distinction then seems useless: thus let us commit it to the large pile of useless ideas that have littered humanity’s long intellectual history.

Wittgenstein wrote this in his last section Philosophical Investigations “The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by calling it a “young science”; its state is not comparable with that of physics, for instance, in its beginnings. (Rather with that of certain branches of mathematics. Set Theory). For in psychology there are experimental methods and conceptual confusion. (As in the other case conceptual confusion and methods of proof.)

The existence of the experimental method makes us think we have the means of solving the problems which trouble us; though problem and method pass one another by.”

“Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a “beetle”. No one can look into anyone else’s box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. But suppose the word ‘beetle” had a use in these people’s language? If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language game at all; not even as a something: for the box might even be empty. No, one can “divide through” by thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is.

That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of ‘object and designation’ the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant” Wittgenstein , PI

“I don't want to bring a sour note
Remember this before you vote
We can all sink or we all float
'Cos we're all in the same big boat” The Police

“It's a subject we rarely mention
But when we do we have this little invention
By pretending they're a different world from me
I show my responsibility” The Police

Some thoughts:

Words like “God”, “Space”, or “Time” are concepts that have some use for people. They can accept the use and go along with its implications. Or not accept the use, and go on with their lives. If accepted, they may start saying “God exists”, “Space exists”, or “Time exists”. But this is very different than talking about everyday common material objects. But coming to use such concepts need not be started with some logical proof or reasoning, just a simply act of accepting and seeing where it takes them in their lives. They are concepts that help bring some sort of understanding to this world we live in. Then, in what sense do they “exist”? Obviously this is not something you point at and see, but experience in the stream of life.

I would recommend John R. Searle
“Seeing Things as They Are: A Theory of Perception”. This book will provide an alternative view that it is not all in the mind.

Enjoy.

“One world is a enough for all of us”, The Police

"God talk is a Platonic discussion, interesting but useless."

Similar to how some Mathematicians talk about the existence of abstract object and the beauty of the equation, interesting but useless. However, that said, their mathematical inventions/concepts may have some use for us in the real world. So could this ontological argument have some use for someone? Maybe so.

2. “There is a possible world in which god does not exist.”

But this contradicts the concept of God: “a necessary being who exist in ever possible world”

So 2 must be false.

I got a concept that tells me something exist is every possible world. What exist in every possible world? Answer, a being who exist in every possible world.

That clear things up.

See if God did not exist in every possible world, God would be thought of as “limited”.

OK, I see, so God exist in every possible world, so God exist in this world because this actual world is a possible world?

So this is how a mere conceptualization becomes instantiated in the actual world?

Wow that is clever.

First let us assume determinism is correct, consider the following:

1. Individual A says “I have free will.”

2. Individual B says “We don't have free will but we are determined”

All determinism can say in both cases is that they were determined to say this due to some prior cause. And to say that the cause was some enlightening rational argument is not understanding determinism. So the very arguments to support determinism are undermined by the very idea of determinism since it is an idea that is arational by nature.

“4. Therefore you don't know that you are now sitting at a computer/phone screen.”

I learned how to sit, recognize a computer, and type out these words. Thus, I know now I am sitting at the computer typing. I am not dreaming such an event because I am not recalling something after I just woke up from sleep.

Good Night

“ Scientists have developed a way to scan the brain and investigate the brain states. They have performed an experiment where a person is asked to choose between different options. They have found that the computer can detect the choice about 30 seconds (let's be generous) before the participant of the experiment becomes aware of the choice. According to Harris, this shows that we don't have free will. It is our subconscious brain states making our choice for us way before we do. We think we have control over the choice but we don't.”

There are two fundamental problems with the above paragraph, the awareness of the participant and “brain states” making choices. First lets discuss awareness of the participant. How do I decide when I become aware of a choice? Am I taught to how to do this like when someone teaching me how to recognize a colored object. The is answer is no. If I tell someone to pick an red object out of a variety of colored objects, timing the answer from question to selection is easy to imagine and easy to understand what we are measuring. But what am I asking a subject to do when I say, now press a button when you are aware of a choice. I cant offer any training on what seems to be a rather private affair. If we allow the subject to just figure it out, how could we ever believe a different person is carrying out the same activity. Better yet, how could we ever know if a subject was doing the same activity ever time they make a choice at all. If the subject presses a button, is this an indication of being aware of a choice or just making a choice? I would say the latter. Second, lets discuss the apparent nonsense of saying “brain states” make our choices. I ask human beings, “How did you make that choice, what went into that decision, or what other things did you consider?” Typically, I will receive a response to these questions from a human being. I am pretty convince that a “brain state” would have a hard articulating answers to such inquiry.

Would not Wittgenstein say that when you hit “bedrock” we are not talking about evidence and fact but acceptance and trust on what is presented.

At some point doubt becomes nonsensical, not because we excluded the possibility of mistake but understanding the first steps of acquiring a language is trust and acceptance.

“The mythology may change back into a state of flux, the river-bed of thoughts may shift. But I distinguish between the movement of the waters on the river-bed and the shift of the bed itself; though there is not a sharp division of the one from the other”

This proposition is certain and that proposition is uncertain. This degree of sharpness of this distinction can wax and wane. A concept of “spirit” could demand a lack of this state of flux, so maybe one should leave this world a transcendence if one is to philosophizes about language.

“We never encounter physical reality outside of our observations of it.” AF, MG and ET

I have experience reality and I have made observations of this reality. When we engage in discussions about this reality we can point to objects and understand such concepts. However, in the quote above, have we not used the word “outside” and stretched its meaning beyond recognition?

Son, “Daddy I went into the woods and this animal that had big claws....”

Dad, “Son, you had encountered a wolf”

Son “Dad, like me clarify what you said, I observed a wolf like object, but I never encountered the actual wolf”

Language goes on a Holiday.

I encountered things in this world, I learned the word “encounter” by interacting with things in this world. I learned how to use this word “outside” in this world, by observing things in this world.

Try to leave out the language learned from the “observable” world and see if “un-observable” world can be articulated. This language game may have a very different feel.

What is interesting is even “purified” water is not 100%. And this is due to our limitations of purification and testing.

Again, this shows the challenges of science trying to determine the true “nature of water”.

Abstractly, we can talk about 100% H2O, but the world is a messy place, technologically we have limits, and human are fallible machines.

Using the word “necessary” in this case seems very precarious.

Although I do not know what is intended when one says “Nothing is necessary truth”

Did not Quine suggest or say even logic could be revisable if our web of belief changes enough starting at the periphery of experience.

Are there an practical consequences accepting “solipsism” is true vs it is not. I would venture to guess no one would do anything different in this world other than go around say “Solipsism is true”

My refutation of this idea is simple. Conceptual it is no different, practically, than utilizing the concepts in this world minus “solipsism” . But like any concept, maybe some future experience would make me reconsider.

I am merely providing a pragmatist approach to the concept of causality. If I place my hand near the fire and I get burned. I am going to use this idea of causality that if I do it again, it will not be beneficial. And the same with the concept of “God”. The idea that something was the cause of this universe give me a sense of meaning in my life, I am going to use it.

Let us analyze this a bit.

“1) You cannot apply our notions of causality beyond physical reality.”

We don’t figure this out by experience. I don’t go “beyond physical reality and apply this notion and see it does not work. So, it is a concept and provides great use in the physical world and serves as a talking point for much theological debate.

“2) We only know our experience inside time and space, so how could we know this “God” beyond everything we know ?”

Or do we defined are experience with notions of space and time? Can’t we do the same with a concept of “God”?

“
3) We cannot know the noumena behind phenomena.

“

Than why bring up noumena at all? Stick to phenomena, and infer the rest if you like.

The community drinks, takes a baths, and swims in each “water” even though there are minor boiling point differences, etc

My Mom was named “Mary” from birth to death. Did we name one object here. If I took a picture of “Mary” when she was 1 day old, 20 years old, and 100 years old. These would look like different objects. What if I gave each object a different name. Would it not be reasonable to call these different objects by different names since they are so different? Is my mom three objects or three people? Does reference really matter here as long as no misunderstanding takes place.

“Go get me a cup of water” He gets a cup, turns the faucet on, and fills the cup with water. He seems confused and says to me “which is the water and which is the cup”? I point to the liquid in the cup and say “that is water.”

I ask someone “what does “H2O” refer to” and he goes over to a glass of water and points to the liquid. I say “No you misunderstood me, I mean all that elemental stuff” He looks at me puzzled and points at the liquid again.

In both cases, “water” and “H2O” mean the same. They are the same concept used to refer to the same thing.

What if you ask me “what does water refer to in general”? I am not sure how to respond to this. Maybe I will point at different things that have water.

Maybe we can get help from the chemist and ask “Can you tell me what “H2O” refers to?” We don’t want him to go over to a bottle water. Would it help for the chemist to go to tank of hydrogen and oxygen, turn the tank on and listen to the gas coming out and say “hear that gas coming out, those are the elements that combine to give us “water”. Is that what we are referring to? Maybe the chemist injects some water into a elemental analysis instrument, analyzes the data and concludes it is “H2O”. Does “H2O” refer to all of this? Or maybe the better question is “what does all of this mean?” At this point, lets start talking about atomic theory, periodic table, physics, etc.

In my previous post, I described an imagined community of language users remarking to someone defending Kripke’s view in the following:

“The communities found this information interesting, and said to me “Thank you very much, I guess some water was not “H2O” but “D2O”. I try to correct them by saying “Obviously you are not aware of Mr. Kripke’s metaphysics, you should be calling one “water”, and the other “fool’s water” or, better yet, “heavy water”. “Oh no”, they said, “Let us correct you! We do not find any practical differences between this water and that water; therefore, maybe Mr. Kripke should come up with a better metaphysics that actually describes how we use our language.”

To further clarify may concern of such identity statements as “water is H2O”and saying “if such an identity statement is true, it is true in all possible worlds - a necessity” is as follows:

Could we ever arrive that this kind of identity statement is true since it will aways be open to refutation from some future experience? If this is the case, then it could never be a necessity. This is a fact based on our experiences and history of science.

Rich

I think I could round up 10 people and you would think you were talking with a computer. Than the test is not whether a computer can think like a human but whether a human can think like a computer.

I think a better test may be if a computer could create something unaided by humans that humans could use or appreciate, then we got intelligence. Create a calculus, a trigonometry, propose the theory of general relativity, propose of philosophy of language, etc

Going back to Putnam’s support of Kripke from “The Meaning of Meaning” in which he says “In fact, once we have discovered the nature of water, nothing counts as a possible world in which water isn’t H2O.”

Waiting for the final determination on “Nature of water” never comes in science, only the next series of experiences that could undermine our theory lies in the wake. And this is the foundation in which Kripke “necessary” rest upon. This does not seem necessary at all.

Let me try another way to show the claim that “water is H2O” is a posteriori necessary truth is problematic. First, it seems to me, that if we learn to point to the glass if liquid and call it “water” one time and call it “H2O” another time, it is using the word the same same way to refer to the same thing. No problems here. The words mean the same so by definition it is necessary. Whether a prior or a posteriori, you pick.

We also learn the word “H2O” another away. And to learn how to use it appropriately within the scientific community may take a lot education. Such things as atomic theory, elemental analysis, particle physics to name a few. To learn this concept is not done by pointing to a glass of water, though some do per the first example. In first example, I am referring to the glass of liquid, in the second example I am not referring to the liquid, if anything I am tentatively referring to an elemental formula. The next step to establish the identity of the liquid is by conducting an experiment to determine the elemental formula. The scientist comes back with “H2O”. This was established by experience, a posteriori. However, this could have been wrong, the experiment was performed incorrectly or worse our scientific theory incomplete. This is contingent. How can the term which can potentially be revised to refer to other elements establish an identity as necessary in this particular case? If you say to me, it does not matter you were always referring to the same thing anyway, I would say maybe you are confusing the first example with the second.

The other issue I have with Kripke is the following:

In Naming and Necessity, Mr. Kripke says something interesting, “If there were a substance, even actually, which had a completely different atomic structure from that of water, but resembled water in these respects, would we say some water wasn’t H2O? I think not.”

Again, is Kripke attempting to say how we should use our language because it does not agree with his metaphysics? Again, we certainly can imagine a world where a group of language users do indeed say such a thing (see my first post).

Wittgenstein gave up looking for the underlying logic of our language and looked at how we use it. Not sure what Kripke’s intent is, but I will give him his narrow application to history of analytical philosophy. Just don't think that “necessary” means much in a larger context.

Kripke, N&N says the following “I have the table in my hands I can point to it, and when I ask whether it might have been in another room, I am talking, by definition, about it. I don't have to identify it after seeing it through a telescope.”

It is unclear to me if “picking out” something in a possible world is the same as “stipulating by definition” what one is talking about. But definitely I think we are in the realm of concepts and I do not want to dispute Kripke’s metaphysics. However, what I am disputing is if his theory is of any significance. Specifically, I want to judge this theory in terms of applicability to the way we use language and its use in the world we live in. Here I find it lacking.

Again what am I suppose to do with the notion that “water is H20” is a necessary posteriori truth? Lets say we keep learning the scientist got it wrong with the elements “water is CO” one time, “water is LO” another time, etc. What does Kripke say “ No matter what you say you were always referring and will always be referring to the same thing.”

And what was that Mr Kripke? I am not sure anymore, can I have a description now?

1. I agree with your “Mom” example in this respect: If I point to a glass of liquid and say “water”, “H2O”, “agua”, I may be showing I understand these names and I am referring to that object.

2. However, the use of “H20” in a scientific context is not learned by pointing to an object, and not used by pointing to objects. The term requires a great deal of understanding of scientific theory. Like any scientific theory, it can be shown to be false, incomplete, useless, etc...

3. The object I point to is called “Mom”. That is a “Macro” model. I provide a complete genetic or atomic description of “Mom”. That is a “Molecular” level. Lets say this object changes in some minor way at the molecular level. Is this the same “Mom” or the same person anymore? What if “Mom” lost an arm at the macro level and I did not call her “Mom” anymore? Am I incorrect? Does reference really matter here as long as there is no misunderstanding in any particular case?

Hilary Putnam says something interesting in “From The Meaning of Meaning” in which he says “In fact, once we have discovered the nature of water, nothing counts as a possible world in which water isn’t H2O.”

So this locks in the “necessity” of “water is H2O”? This seems to be a naive view of science and how it has been practiced. I think Thomas Kuhn said it best in “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions” when he said “Does it really help to imagine that there is some one full, objective, true account of nature and that the proper measure of scientific achievement is the extent to which it bring us closer to that ultimate goal? If we can learn to substitute evolution from-what-we-do-know for evolution-toward-what we-wish-to-know, a number of vexing problems may vanish in the process”