I'll start by answering a pertinent question from @Vera Mont.

To what end? This is a sincere question: What is it you hope to learn or achieve? — Vera Mont

The paper explores why we can know things at all by connecting two big ideas: Wittgenstein’s notion that our knowledge rests on unquestioned "hinges" (like assuming the ground will hold when we walk) and Gödel’s discovery that even math has true statements it can’t prove within its own rules. The goal isn’t to solve a practical problem like building a bridge, but to understand the foundations of how we think and reason, whether in everyday life or in fields like math and science. By demonstrating that both knowledge and mathematics depend on unprovable starting points, the paper reveals a universal idea, viz., that our systems of understanding require ungrounded foundations to function. This matters because it helps us appreciate the limits and strengths of human reasoning, encouraging a bit of humility about what we can justify and confidence in the systems despite these limits. It’s like mapping the bedrock of thought, not to change how we live day-to-day, but to deepen our grasp of what makes knowledge possible, which can inspire clearer thinking in any field, from philosophy to science to ethics.

Thanks,
Sam26

Those kinds of experiences are not unusual. Get better!

Hope you're feeling better Jack.

I tried to do something no one has done before with Wittgenstein's hinges; whether I accomplished it or not is another question. I can understand why it might be difficult to respond, especially considering no one, as far as I know, has made this connection.

Exactly

Me, write the Wittgenstein essay, that's crazy, I hate Wittgenstein!

Oh, the old “brain's house memory, it’s proven!” chestnut from @Hanover, and @180 Proof’s special pleading accusation. I love it, and I will deal with these criticisms in the book, but let’s have some fun.

First, critics act like consciousness is all figured out, as if the example given earlier in the thread about Pam Reynolds’ pinpoint recall of a bone saw’s weird shape during a flatlined brain (EEG flat, eyes taped shut, and ears blocked) is just a casual Tuesday for brain function. Sure, normally memory is tied to neurons, but NDEs like hers, verified by surgeons (corroborated), mind you, toss your proven fact into a blender. There are millions of NDE accounts across cultures that are consistent and corroborated, which demonstrate much more than seeing Jesus in a cereal bowl or faces in clouds. Random neural farts don’t produce globally verifiable stories.

Then, of course, there’s @180 Proofs special pleading cry, as if I’m waving a magic wand to exempt NDEs from scrutiny. Puh-lease. I’ve laid out, I don’t know how many times, five rock solid criteria – numbers, variety, consistency, corroboration, and firsthand accounts used for NDEs, which are also used in history, courtrooms, and good detective work. Why you would use these sorry excuses for an argument is beyond me. Moreover, to claim that my argument is fallacious by using special pleading is just evidence that you don't know this fallacy, as if repeating it will make it so.

The quip about “seeing faces in clouds” is cute, but NDEs aren’t cloud art. There’s just too much hard data from cross-cultural studies that put the kibosh on this kind of thinking, and frankly, again, show how much these remarks demonstrate a lack of understanding of what’s actually happening.

I assumed that @Hanover would apply equally to my arguments, so l lumped them together. If not, then disregard @Hanover. By the way, I'm making no claims to support Dr Ian Stevenson's arguments.

This strikes me as relevant to identifying who your argument would and wouldn't appeal to. — Relativist

Yes, that's true, but beyond that, I'm trying to solve or answer a fundamental problem about consciousness. Is it just limited to the brain? I believe solving or answering this problem is partly epistemological, partly conceptual, and partly empirical.

If you give it some thought, it very seldom happens that you convince people who are entrenched in their beliefs. This is especially true in politics and religion, but it's also true in the sciences. I try to keep up, for e.g., with the latest quantum physics arguments, and even here people are hardened by a particular theory (e.g., string theory vs loop quantum gravity). So, if I use your point, viz., "...reflect on the fact that you persuaded no one to come closer to your view that there's a spirtual basis for NDEs (the objections explain why)." - as something to consider, or as something that reflects poorly on an argument, then many good arguments would fail. It's something to consider (e.g., psychological causes of beliefs), but it's not something that should stand out as a major factor when it comes to good arguments. Arguments stand or fall on their own merits, period.

I'm not a fan of the word "spiritual" because of its religious connotations. I think reality is just more than what our current physics can explain. Although physics, along with other theories of consciousness, will eventually, I believe, move toward consciousness as being the primary driver of physical reality. All of reality swings on the "hinge" of consciousness.

To be honest, I find the objections in this thread to be very weak, so there's not much to overcome. That said, I do address many of these objections, which are the objections that most people make. They're not new to this thread, that's for sure. I've been studying these objections for between 15 and 20 years, so I've given them their proper attention. My book is different in that it looks at the testimonial evidence from an epistemological angle and demonstrates that although testimonial evidence can be very weak, it can also be very strong.

I have completed the rough draft of my book (ebook), which I'll probably sell on Amazon for $5.99 within the next 90 days. I don't have a confirmed title yet, but I'm working on it. I'll probably post sections of the book in this thread. What makes my book unique is its epistemological foundation.

Of course I agree with Sam26 that a response is found in a treatment of what it is to doubt, along the lines of Wittgenstein's discussion of hinge propositions, but unlike Sam I reject idealism, along with certain sorts of realism, as a false juxtaposition. — Banno

The answers to the questions of this thread aren't dependent on metaphysics. I'm not juxtaposing anything, i.e., the argument is meant to stand on its own. If, on the other hand, someone were to bring in idealism as a way to answer the question, it might add an important layer, but it's not needed. In this respect, I would agree with Banno, but at some point, this agreement would fail, because my ultimate view of reality does involve metaphysical answers. I have no problem keeping these language-games distinct. Moreover, as much as I enjoy Wittgenstein, I depart from him when it comes to the limit of language. Wittgenstein didn't reject the metaphysical, he just thought that what can be said about the metaphysical is senseless (not nonsense, but senseless) because it goes beyond the world, and language is limited to the world.

Absolutely. This is why Descartes adoption of a method of radical doubt, to establish subjective certainty is so methodologically incoherent, — karl stone

I'm definitely not a fan of Descartes, so I agree.

Descartes begins by doubting everything, until he arrives at the cogito ("I think, therefore I am") as something indubitable. However, Wittgenstein would challenge the very possibility of such a universal doubt.

In OC, Wittgenstein would argue that doubt is not an autonomous or foundational act but rather depends on an unquestioned background. For example, he points out, "Doubt itself rests only on what is beyond doubt (OC 115)"

For Descartes to doubt everything, he must already be operating within a framework of language, thought, and experience. Doubt is a language game that requires a stable context, it's not a solitary exercise.

Wittgenstein demonstrates that certain beliefs (e.g., "The Earth has existed for a long time," "I have a body") are not the result of inference but are intrinsic to the form of life that makes reasoning possible. To doubt these very basic beliefs would be to undermine the very conditions for meaningful doubt.

Descartes is using doubt as a methodological tool to arrive at objective certainty, but this is a misunderstanding of how doubt functions in everyday life. "Doubt is not a state of mind, but a way of acting (OC 370)."

Descartes’ radical skepticism is not a genuine doubt but a philosophical fiction. The attempt to justify everything leads to an infinite regress or to nonsense.

I want to be clear - Wittgenstein uses certainty in OC in two distinct ways. Subjective certainty (like a conviction), and objective certainty, which can be used as a synonym for knowledge. These are different language games, and both are important.

You'll get a pushback against "you know it is real because you can see it" from the idealists and solipsists, who will claim that it might be an hallucination or other phantasm. — Banno

I'm an idealist, but I would argue very differently from most idealists. I try to keep these language games separate unless there is a reason to bring in metaphysics.

You raise an important point, doubt does arise spontaneously, and not everyone experiences certainty in the same way. I agree that the question "What is real?" can feel meaningful in moments of existential or philosophical reflection. But the insight I'm making isn’t that doubt never happens; it’s that doubt itself depends on a deeper, unquestioned framework of certainty.

When we doubt, we don’t doubt everything; we doubt within a system of beliefs that remain fixed. For example, suppose I wonder whether I’m dreaming. In such a case, I’m still assuming that dreams are a real phenomenon, that "I" exist to have experiences, and that there’s a difference between illusion and reality. Even radical doubt presupposes some hinges. So, while the question may feel urgent, I say it dissolves when we see that the very act of questioning relies on unstated certainties.

You’re right that the question might have "no point for me personally"—but I’d go further: it’s not just a personal stance, but a grammatical observation about how language and thought work. The question isn’t wrong, but it’s like trying to lift yourself by your own bootstraps. The search for a justification of reality is a category mistake because justification itself depends on reality being the unquestioned background.

"What is real? How do we know what is real?"

This is one of those questions that can’t be answered in the way most people expect. It’s not that there’s no answer, but rather that the question itself rests on a misunderstanding; it assumes we need a justification or proof for what we already take for granted in our actions.

We don’t know reality in the same way we know facts; instead, we act with a certain conviction that things are real. This acting isn’t based on reasoning or evidence; it’s the foundation upon which reasoning and evidence even make sense. Doubt and knowledge only function because we already move through the world with an unquestioned trust in its reality. In this sense, the question "How do we know what is real?" is like asking, "How do we know that the ground holds us up?"—it’s not something we know in the usual sense; it’s the condition that allows knowing to exist at all.

So, the question isn’t meaningful, it’s misguided. It treats certainty as something that needs to be justified, when in truth, certainty is what makes justification possible in the first place.

Here's another simple way to explain Wittgenstein's hinges.

Imagine opening a door; you don't ask yourself if the hinges will do their job by holding the weight of the door and allowing it to swing, you simply trust they'll do the job. Now compare this to our everyday beliefs, you don't consider whether or not the ground won't vanish under your feet, or whether the person you're talking to really exists. These bedrock assumptions are what we call hinges, and they're the grounding of every action and question you ever ask, yet you rarely stop to justify them.

Wittgensteinian hinges aren't based on theories or logical proofs. They're the unspoken bedrock certainties that make epistemology possible. If someone asked you, "How do you know the Earth will be here tomorrow?" You'd probably reply, "I just do." Questioning hinges feels absurd, yet without them, you couldn't even begin to act or think.

Wittgenstein is making a profound point. Just as the door would fail to function without its hinges, so would our entire system of thought or epistemology collapse if we tried to justify all of our bedrock convictions. Hinges are the silent pillars holding everything up, everything we know, and we rarely notice them.

Comments on Gettier

I claim that the Gettier problem is a philosophical non-issue, driven by the semantic confusion of conflating subjective certainty with objective justification. Far from undermining JTB, it exposes a misinterpretation of how justification works within language. I find the debate a waste of time, fixating on contrived cases that distort epistemic practices and offer no substantive challenge to JTB.

JTB is a practical working definition of knowledge. A person knows something if they believe it, it’s true, and they have objective justification (good reasons for supporting the truth). In everyday contexts, JTB works seamlessly: I know it’s 3:00 PM if I believe it (based on a clock), it’s true, and I’m justified (the clock is reliable). The Gettier problem claims to show that JTB is insufficient, but it relies on a misunderstanding of justification, not a defect in the definition.

People often conflate subjective certainty (feeling justified) with objective justification (having good reasons as required by JTB). For example, if I believe a clock shows the correct time because clocks are generally reliable, then I have subjective certainty. But if the clock is stopped, I’m not actually justified, my reason fails to connect to the truth. JTB demands objective justification and conflating it with subjective certainty creates confusion about JTB.

Wittgenstein’s language games reveal that justification is not a universal standard but a context-specific practice (or a practice that extends across our forms of life), varying across epistemic games like testimony, logic, sensory experience, and linguistic training. Each game has its own rules:

In the sensory experience game, justification comes from trusting perceptions (e.g., a working clock), but a stopped clock violates the rule.

In the logic game, justification follows from sound reasoning, but false assumptions (e.g., about Jones) undermine it.

Subjective certainty arises when a person follows a game’s rules (e.g., trusting a clock), but objective justification requires those rules to hold up (e.g., the clock must work). The Gettier problem misapplies these rules, treating subjective certainty as objective justification.

In Gettier cases, subjects have subjective certainty but lack objective justification, yet philosophers debate whether their true beliefs are JTB. This is a semantic error:

In the clock case, Smith feels justified (sensory experience game: clocks are reliable), but the stopped clock means he’s not objectively justified. His true belief is lucky, not knowledge, and JTB correctly dismisses it.

In the job case, Smith feels justified (logic game: strong evidence about Jones), but his false assumption undermines objective justification. The truth is coincidental, and JTB rightly denies knowledge status.
The problem arises when philosophers equate subjective certainty with JTB’s justification condition, then puzzle over the lucky truth. This is a linguistic trap, debating justification or knowledge abstractly, ignoring the contextual rules of our language games

The Gettier problem is unproductive because it’s rooted in this semantic confusion and disconnected from real epistemic practices:

Stopped clocks and coincidental coin counts are artificial, and they're unlike the everyday scenarios where JTB thrives (e.g., trusting testimony in court, and reasoning in science).

The debate hinges on misusing justification (subjective vs. objective) and knowledge (everyday vs. philosophical), turning epistemology into a semantic game.

Gettier cases fail as knowledge because the justification isn’t objective (due to poor reasoning or luck). JTB stands firm; the debate adds nothing.

Wittgenstein’s language games dissolve the problem by showing that justification and knowledge derive meaning from their use in our form of life (or language games). Philosophical confusion arises when we take these terms out of their natural games, seeking universal definitions. In the sensory experience game, a stopped clock isn’t a valid justification; in the logic game, false assumptions aren’t either. JTB works within each game’s rules, and Gettier cases are outliers that violate those rules. The debate is a philosophical misfiring, obsessing over edge cases instead of clarifying how we justify beliefs in practice.

Conclusion: The Gettier problem is a distraction, not a crisis. It stems from conflating subjective certainty with objective justification, misapplying the contextual rules of language games like sensory experience or logic. JTB remains a robust definition: knowledge requires a true belief with objective justification, which Gettier cases lack. Philosophers should abandon this semantic quibble and focus on real epistemic practices, viz., how we use testimony, reasoning, or perception in daily life. Let's leave the Gettier puzzles behind to the philosophers entangled in semantic quibbles and focus on the practical language games where knowledge really lives and thrives.

Ya, that was meant for Bob Ross and it's part of the title of the thread.

I have no idea what "finite sins" are; no one talks like this.

If you want to argue against eternal or everlasting punishment (depending on your view of time) and whether it's just or not, I think there is a simpler way to argue the point.

Most Christians, for example, argue that God is omniscient, which means that God knows everything that can be possibly known. It certainly would be reasonable to conclude that before God created you, he knew who you would become and, at the very least, would know many of the choices you would make freely. So, as part of his omniscience, he would know before creating you that you would probably make choices that would lead to eternal punishment. If God knew this before creating you, then creating you would be inconsistent with his moral character because the outcome would be devastating for that person. Why would any loving being create a person whose ultimate end would be torturous? Even a being that is not omniscient could reasonably deduce such an outcome. At the very least this is an argument against eternal punishment and is inconsistent with how many religious people define God.

This is just a general response to your opening statement.

Here is a more detailed definition of bedrock beliefs or bedrock convictions, aka hinges.

Hinges are layered, arational foundational convictions shared by all humans within our form of life. They serve as indubitable certainties grounding our epistemological language, systems of doubt, and justification. Hinges operate on both the prelinguistic and linguistic levels, with their truth shown in our actions rather than in propositional form.

Prelinguistic Hinges: These are the most foundational convictions, such as “Chairs exist” (shown by sitting) or “I have hands” (shown by using them), which are instinctual, prelinguistic beliefs embedded in our actions before language develops (OC 475: “I want to regard man here as an animal…”; OC 148: “Why do I not satisfy myself that I have two feet…? There is no why. I simply don’t. This is how I act”). They form the primary layer, enabling both language and language games by providing the unarticulated certainties on which linguistic practices are built (OC 115: “The game of doubting itself presupposes certainty”).

Linguistic Hinges: These are articulated convictions that develop within language games, such as “I am not a brain in a vat” (OC 114) or “2+2=4,” which remain indubitable and ground specific epistemic or mathematical practices (PI 23). They build on the prelinguistic layer, extending its certainties into linguistic frameworks while retaining their foundational role.

Arational Nature: Hinges are arational, neither true nor false in the traditional epistemological sense because they are not subject to justification or doubt (OC 205: “If the true is what is grounded, then the ground is not true, nor yet false”). They are the “hinges on which our questions turn” (OC 341-343), exempt from the true/false evaluation applied to propositional statements (OC 243: “One says ‘I know’ when one is ready to give compelling grounds… However, with hinges, there is no such possibility”).

Foundational Convictions: Hinges are foundational convictions that anchor our epistemological systems, providing the ungrounded basis for language, doubt, and justification. They are the inherited background against which we distinguish true and false (OC 94: “I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness…”). In OC 102, Wittgenstein says, “There are propositions which… are expressions of a conviction,” highlighting their role as the untested certainties we live by.

Shared Within Our Form of Life: Hinges are communal, not individualistic, they are subjective certainties shared by all humans within our form of life. The prelinguistic belief in chairs’ existence, shown by sitting, is a universal certainty across humans, persisting even after language develops.

Truth Shown Through Actions: The truth of hinges is pragmatic and lived, shown in our actions, both physical and linguistic, rather than through propositional confirmation. For prelinguistic hinges, truth is in the acting: sitting on a chair shows the truth of “Chairs exist." For linguistic hinges, truth is shown in lived practices within language games: treating the world as real reflects the truth of “I am not a brain in a vat” (OC 206: “If someone asked us ‘but is that true [referring to a hinge]?’ we might say ‘yes’ to him…”). This truth is a new category, pragmatic, lived truth, quite distinct from propositional truth, as it exists apart from language for prelinguistic hinges and remains action-based for linguistic hinges.

Forget the Tractatus, it has nothing to do with any of this. Some of this is my own extrapolations from OC, but I believe it follows. OC is an unfinished work. We don't know what Witt would have left in or out, or what he would've added.

We can talk about prelinguistic truth in terms of facts by understanding facts as states of affairs that are separate from language, similar to the lived truth of prelinguistic hinges. The fact that “The Earth has one moon” exists as a reality (a fact), and a prelinguistic human’s engagement with it (e.g., navigating by moonlight) reflects a lived belief in that fact, similar to how sitting on a chair reflects the lived truth that “Chairs exist.” This isn’t about hinges corresponding to facts in a propositional sense but about their truth being a lived engagement with facts as prelinguistic realities.

Here's a rough definition of hinges.

Hinges are layered, arational (arational because they are not subject to the rational processes of justification, doubt, or proof that characterize traditional epistemological theory), foundational convictions shared by all humans within our forms of life that serve as indubitable certainties grounding our epistemological language, systems of doubt, and justification. They exist both prelinguistically and linguistically, with their truth shown through our actions rather than propositional validation.

Today, that "here is one hand" means waving one hand is beyond doubt, and is therefore a hinge.

Neither "here is one hand" nor waving one hand is a hinge. "Here is one hand" means waving one hand is the hinge. — RussellA

What makes Moorean propositions ("Here is one hand.") a hinge, according to Wittgenstein, is their status as bedrock certainties. This particular bedrock certainty is prelinguistic (not all hinges are prelinguistic, but bedrock certainties are), i.e., it's shown in our actions. Our actions alone demonstrate our certainty that we have hands. (This is not an objective certainty, i.e., it's subjective and communal, not individualistic, meaning they’re shared in our forms of life.) Many such bedrock hinges fall into this prelinguistic category and they're the foundation for language itself. These prelinguistic certainties or beliefs are a necessary precursor for all our talk of justification and truth (i.e., traditional propositional talk). The subjective certainty in these bedrock hinges is lived, prelinguistic beliefs shown in actions—is equivalent to what we hold to be true in a pragmatic lived sense, but not in the traditional, propositional sense. You still seem to want to think of them in the traditional sense. They don't function like that.

We treat certain actions as true in a very practical way. The act of opening a door shows that we treat this hinge as true in a very practical and pragmatic sense. There is no doubt here, there is just action that reflects our subjective communal certainties.

Point 1:
You seem to agree that truth is more than a propositional notion, tied to our actions, which aligns with Wittgenstein’s meaning as use (PI 43). You point out that this is already present in Wittgenstein’s philosophy, and I agree – it’s a cornerstone of my argument. In OC 204, Wittgenstein says, “It is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language game.” I build on this by showing how the truth of hinges is demonstrated in our actions. For example, sitting in a chair shows the truth that chairs exist, a prelinguistic certainty (OC 148), whereas linguistic actions – like saying “I know the Earth exists” in a communal context reflect lived certainties (OC 206). Your acknowledgment doesn’t fully address my layered view of hinges, which makes a distinction between prelinguistic and linguistic certainties. This is crucial to understanding how truth operates at different levels of our practices. I’ll return to this point as I address your other critiques.

Point 2:
There is a tension between Godel’s formal notion of truth and Wittgenstein’s constructivist approach, which suggests the need for further investigation. Godel’s incompleteness theorems (1931) rely on objective truth—unprovable statements are true in a mathematical sense, independent of proof within the system. You argue that Wittgenstein leans toward constructivism, which ties truth to our practices (OC 241). However, my analogy between Godel and Wittgenstein is structural. Godel shows that formal systems require unprovable statements to function, and Wittgenstein shows that epistemological systems require unprovable hinges that enable justification and doubt (OC 115). Both systems rely on unprovable foundations despite being in different domains (formal systems vs lived practices). This supports my argument about the limits of human knowledge without conflating the two notions of truth.

Point 3:
You argue that truth is propositional, rooted in the Tractates’ “the world is all that is the case” (T 1), and that hinges are effectively not about the world” but set up our language (as per Anscombe). You trace this through Wittgenstein’s development—PI’s focus on what we do with words (PI 43), and OC’s hinges grounding our language use. I disagree with your interpretation on two grounds. First, your reliance on the Tractatus overlooks Wittgenstein’s evolution in On Certainty. In OC 241, he says, “It is what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the language they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life.” Truth is embedded in our communal practices, not just what can be stated. Hinges aren’t merely linguistic setups—they’re tied to the world we live in (OC 94: “I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness…”). Sitting on a chair shows my belief in chairs, this is an action in the world, not just a language rule.

Second, you claim that hinges can’t be non-propositional truths because truth is statable, which misses my layered view. Prelinguistic hinges, like “Chairs exist,” are shown in actions before language (OC 475: “I want to regard man here as an animal…”). Their truth is in the acting itself—sitting on a chair demonstrates its truth (OC 204). Linguistic hinges, like “I am not a brain in a vat,” are stated, but their truth is still pragmatic—I live as if the world is real. In OC 206, Wittgenstein says we might say ‘yes’ if asked if a hinge is true—we treat it as true because we live it, not because it’s a justified proposition. My view isn’t about unstatable truths; it’s about truths shown in actions, which later we articulate. Your propositional focus overlooks this prelinguistic layer, where truth precedes language.

Point 4:
Finally, you claim I haven’t provided an “adequate” notion of truth, suggesting I’ve tried to do “too much” by extending truth beyond propositions. I believe this is an unfair critique because it doesn’t fully engage with my pragmatic view, which is specific to hinges, not a universal redefinition of truth. I argue that truth for hinges is shown in our actions—physical (sitting on a chair) and linguistic (using words in language games)—and embedded in our forms of life. This isn’t a new theory of truth but a way of understanding how truth functions for hinges, aligning with Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. In OC 204 he emphasizes acting, and in OC 206, he notes we treat hinges as true - as a lived certainty. My layered view ensures this applies to both prelinguistic hinges (truth in acting) and linguistic hinges (truth in language games). Your T-sentence model assumes truth is propositional, but prelinguistic hinges aren’t propositions—their truth is in the acting itself. My notion of truth is adequate for hinges—it captures their lived, communal nature, offering a nuanced perspective on how truth works in our practices, not just in statements.

It is my position that Wittgenstein is offering a more nuanced view of truth that is embedded in our subjective certainties, practices, and language use. His nuanced view takes into account the relationship between language, practice, and reality. This account is a departure from the traditional notions of correspondence and coherence. He doesn’t offer a theory so much as a way of understanding how truth works in our lives. So, truth is more than a propositional notion, it's deeply tied to our actions, both physical and linguistic. We couldn’t even understand propositional truth without these very basic or bedrock shared convictions. They provide the framework that allows the language of traditional propositions to work. Such convictions (hinges) underlie our entire way of thinking, speaking, and acting in the world.

(Subjectivity here isn’t about individualism but about what is shared by all of us, i.e., it's communal agreement.)

Now you want things that are outside the world, that are the case but not true, or true but not the case. — Banno

I'm not talking about anything outside the world. His hinges are tied to the world, i.e., there would be no hinges without the world. You're tied to the notion of propositions and language, but hinges, at least some hinges, support the very ideas you're proposing. The language game of propositions wouldn't exist without these basic certainties.

I think we can get locked into formal definitions and miss these subtleties.

I see truth as more than propositional truth. I don't think we'll get passed this disagreement.

OC 206. If someone asked us "but is that true?" we might say "yes" to him; and if he demanded grounds we might say "I can't give you any grounds, but if you learn more you too will think the same"

In other words, if someone asked me "is it true that hinges are beyond doubt", I might say "yes".

If someone asked me "is it true that one feels pain when stung by a wasp", I might say "yes"

The truth is that one feels pain when stung by a wasp. It is not the pain that is true.

The truth is that hinges are beyond doubt. It is not the hinge that is true. — RussellA

You're going a bit too far. My point is that when referring to truth, Wittgenstein is not only thinking in terms of traditional propositions. He applies truth to hinges, too. This is in reference to my discussion with Banno. The truth is built into the actions. The actions show their truth.

And being a hinge proposition is a role taken on in the course of setting up a language game. While playing the game it cannot be doubted. And some games are always being played. — Banno

Hinges are layered. Some hinges, the most basic kind, like "The Earth has existed for more than ten minutes," must be accepted to even have a language or a language game. Here, I'm speaking of the most basic beliefs (such beliefs are the precursors to language) shown only in our actions (although they remain even after language develops), apart from language. The act of sitting on a chair shows my belief in chairs. The act of using my hands shows my belief in hands, etc. This is where hinges start, and they are more fundamental than the hinges that form as part of language. "t is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language game (OC 241). The truth is shown in the actions. This is different from traditional thinking about truth because these truths cannot be doubted or falsified.

In other games, the hinge may be doubted. — Banno

A hinge is never doubted, or it wouldn't be a hinge.

You don't follow the post where I referred to OC 205, 206? I'll try to clarify.

I understand that you want to use OC 205 to support your position, viz., that hinges are not true or false. My point is that OC 206 says, "If someone asked us 'but is that true [referring to a hinge]?' we might say 'yes' to him..." OC 206 refers to a response about hinges, and 205 refers to traditional propositions. In other words, hinges (the ground) are not yet true or false in the same way traditional propositions are true or false. He then points out in 206 that despite not being able to call the ground true or false, you can still say they're (hinges) true (206). This indicates to me and others that truth can be ascribed to hinges, just not in a propositional sense. They're like subjective truths that we all hold firm or as indubitable.

What would it mean to say one is certain or one has a conviction, which Wittgenstein points out over and over again, about hinges other than you believe they're true? This is a bedrock truth that cannot be doubted or falsified, which is why they're not like traditional propositions, which can be falsified.

Our differences go a little deeper because my idea of a belief is that it goes beyond propositions. In other words, our actions show our beliefs apart from language.

I made an error/typo in the first sentence. It should read, "OC 205 seems to indicate that the true/false idea shouldn't be used with hinges, but again, he's talking about traditional propositions[/quote]

@Banno @RussellA @Josh

OC 205 seems to indicate that the true/false idea shouldn't be used with hinges, but again, he's talking about traditional hinges. Moreover, we can't forget OC 206, where Wittgenstein points out that if someone asked, "but is that true" (referring to hinges), we might respond "yes," Which gets to my point that we do treat hinges as true in a practical sense, i.e., a lived certainty. In other words, I act in a way that shows their truth. The act of opening a door shows my certainty that there is a door to be opened, and it shows my certainty that I have hands. This practical certainty is a very practical truth.

Wittgenstein's pragmatic view handles different kinds of hinges "I have hands," "The Earth has existed for a long time," and "2+2=4." Their truth is seen in how we live them, whether through actions, practices, or the rules of the game.

Apparently you can't doubt that you exist (in some sense). — frank

It's logically impossible to doubt that you exist. Doubting your existence shows your existence. :grin:

Wittgenstein is not referring to traditional theories of truth - like the correspondence (matches reality) or coherence theories (fits within a system of beliefs). These may work for empirical propositions like "It is raining." Hinges are about lived truths, i.e., how we act without doubting. If you're stuck with traditional ideas, then you'll never see this. Wittgenstein is thinking outside the box of traditional ideas of epistemology. These truths are outside epistemology, they give life to epistemology, which means they give life to our ideas of justification and truth. Without these truths/convictions, there would be no talk of propositional truth. So, it's very pragmatic, and they lie at the very bottom of our forms of life. If you doubt what's bedrock, everything collapses. If you're looking for a definition, especially a traditional one, you won't find one.

They're a pragmatic lived foundational/bedrock truths, but without the possibility of being false, i.e., doubted. Remember, if you doubt the truth or falsity of a traditional proposition, you're challenging one of the true/false paradigms. Hinges are beliefs accepted without question. If you doubt them, nothing follows, even the questions fall apart.

I'm not sure I haven't read Frege's account. I suspect that it might be similar in some respects but dissimilar in others. I'm guessing.

The T-sentence assumes a proposition’s truth is about whether the content matches reality, but hinges aren’t evaluated like that. In OC 205, Wittgenstein says the ground (hinges) isn’t true or false—it’s just the ground. “The earth has existed for a long time” (OC 85) isn’t true because we’ve checked it against reality—it’s true because it’s a hinge, a certainty we don’t doubt. The T-sentence (“‘The earth has existed for a long time’ is true if and only if the earth has existed for a long time”) doesn’t capture this. It’s a formal equivalence, but it misses the lived role of the hinge as a conviction we act on. Hinges don't play this formal game.

The truth for hinges is pragmatic, not formal. Wittgenstein ties truth to our forms of life, not to logical definitions. In OC 241, he says truth and falsity depend on our shared language, our forms of life, not on a formal standard like the T-sentence. Thetruth of “I have hands” isn’t in a T-sentence; it’s how I live: I use my hands every day, and I don’t doubt them. In OC 204, he says our acting is what matters. The T-sentence is too abstract, it doesn’t get at the pragmatic, action-based nature of hinges’ truth.

The language game of hinges is different. The game of truth for empirical propositions (“It’s raining,” check the window) is different from the game of truth for hinges. In OC 243, he says, “One says ‘I know’ when one is ready to give compelling ground - but with hinges, there is no such possibility.” Hinges don’t play the game of justification or demonstration. They’re certainties we live by. The T-sentence assumes a single game of truth, but Wittgenstein’s approach is more pluralistic. The truth of hinges is a different game—one of lived certainty, not formal equivalence.

Not all hinges fit the "counts as" mold (if that's your point @Banno): "The Earth has existed for more than 10 minutes" or "Objects don't vanish randomly" are background certainties (convictions), not rule-setting propositions. I think Wittgenstein's pragmatism captures the truth of these certainties and fits our life forms much better.

We treat hinges as true for practical reasons. And the fact that they're not doubted demonstrates they don't play the true/false game. We accept them as true, period.

@RussellA @Josh

How Are Hinges True?

Hinge propositions, like the earth has existed for more than ten minutes or "I have two hands” —aren’t true in the way we typically think of propositions being true (i.e., through evidence, justification, or correspondence to reality). Wittgenstein’s point in OC is that hinges are the bedrock of our epistemic practices—they’re what we don’t doubt to even start asking questions or justifying anything else (OC 341-343). So, their truth isn’t about being proven; it’s about their role in our forms of life.

Hinges are true in a practical, functional sense—they’re the scaffolding we rely on to play our language games. In OC 94, Wittgenstein says, “I do not explicitly learn the propositions that stand fast for me. I can discover them subsequently like the axis around which a body rotates.” They’re true because they’re embedded in how we act and think, not because we’ve epistemologically validated them. For example,things don’t vanish randomly (OC 342) isn’t something we test - it’s what lets us test other things.

Their truth comes from being immune to doubt within our system. In OC 115, he writes, “If you tried to doubt everything, you would not get as far as doubting anything. The game of doubting itself presupposes certainty.” Hinges are true in the sense that they’re the ground we stand on—doubting them unravels the whole game, like pulling the tablecloth out from under a dinner party.

Traditional truth often means a proposition matches reality (e.g., “snow is white” is true if snow is, in fact, white). Hinges don’t work that way. “The earth exists” (OC 99) isn’t true because we checked; it’s true because our entire way of living—building houses, farming, launching rockets - assumes it. Their truth is more like a lived certainty, not a verified fact. This is very similar to the rules of chess that allow the game to be played.

Justification, as an epistemological practice, stops at hinges. Wittgenstein says in OC 204, “Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end;—but the end is not certain propositions’ striking us immediately as true, i.e., it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game.” So, if hinges aren’t epistemologically justified, what kind of truth do they have?

If justification is epistemological, hinges live in a pre-epistemic space. Their truth is a kind of certainty that’s more basic—almost instinctual or animal, as Wittgenstein hints in OC 475: “I want to regard man here as an animal; as a primitive being to which one grants instinct but not ratiocination.” The truth of “I have hands” (OC 153) isn’t argued for—it’s a certainty I live with, like breathing. It’s true because it’s part of the scaffolding of my existence, not because I epistemologically proved or justified it.

How can you have a conviction (OC 102) that's not an expression of something you believe is true? Hinges are true is a matter of pragmatics or a way of acting, it's a different language game. Again, like the rules of chess. Someone might ask you "Is it true that bishops move diagonally?" and you reply, "Yes," but does this mean that it's true in an epistemological sense? No,

OC isn't a finished work, so we don't know which passages would have been left in or eliminated.

There is support, but there is also seeing where his notes are leading us. I've said this before, but let me repeat it. There are two language games of truth in OC. One is the language game of traditional propositions, which can be true or false and require justification. The other language game of truth is one of foundational convictions. The latter convictions are accepted as true and cannot be sensibly doubted. If they can't be doubted, it means they can't be false. Whereas traditional propositions have true/false built into their meaning. These convictions are lived truths built into our actions. They reflect subjective certainties that we all have. If they could be doubted and thus false, knowledge would collapse

The two language games I'm referring to are seen in one use of 'I know.." as an epistemological use, the other use as an expression of a conviction. Something I believe to be an indubitable truth, which doesn't have a justification like normal propositions. There is no justification; it's a lived conviction shown in our actions.

It's ok if people disagree that's just the nature of philosophy.

Well, we disagree. I think this position is clear and a common misinterpretation of OC.