These are good questions, and I've considered many of them, but I don't have all the answers, or even close to all the answers. When we die, we always return to our higher self, which is where our identity resides. You're not going to change that core self, no more than waking from a dream changes your core human self. The core consciousness, which we are a part of and yet separate from, protects us. It's like having a perfect plan designed especially for you, and there's some evidence for this from NDEs. It's love that drives all of this; you can call it God or something else, but it strives to make the best you possible.

Thanks.

I’m not sure the behaviour of believers has much bearing upon the existence of a god. Can you say more? — Tom Storm

I’d argue that the behaviour of believers has a direct bearing on whether their concept of God holds up. If being a Christian means undergoing a significant transformation through the Holy Spirit, then that change should reflect the character of the God you believe in. Otherwise, it raises the possibility that God exists, but your understanding of Him is flawed.

These ideas answer many of the questions religions can't.

I agree with much of what you’ve said, but remember, the perspective you have here is vastly different from the one you’ll hold in base reality. From here, our view is limited.

One intriguing consequence of these ideas is that they resolve the so‑called problem of evil. If they’re correct, then in the ultimate sense, evil doesn’t exist. That’s a hard concept to accept while we’re immersed in this life. So, does evil exist? From this perspective, yes; from that higher perspective, no. It’s like asking whether the evil you encounter in a dream is truly evil. The difficulty lies in the immediacy of this reality, it’s so vivid, so insistent, that separating yourself from it can feel nearly impossible.

I have asked myself the same question. Part of the answer lies in the fact that this reality offers experiences unavailable “there.” What we live through here deepens our store of experiential knowledge (We probably add our experiential knowledge to the whole, so others can experience it vicariously or have direct access to the experience). There’s something about wrestling with difficulty that shapes us into fuller beings. Remember, there is no ultimate harm; it’s like waking from a dream. This reality is, of course, more substantial than a dream, yet the comparison still fits. I use that analogy because dreams are a level of consciousness we’ve all tasted.

You have a right to be skeptical. I have studied this for 20+ years, so I didn't arrive at these conclusions overnight.

You don't seem to follow the gist of what I'm saying, but that's okay, and you don't have to buy it. If you're interested, then you need to think through the ramifications of what I said (in its entirety). Remember, some of it is speculative. Much of what I'm saying is radically different from how most people view reality, so I don't think most are going to buy it.

I was talking to an older couple two days ago, both are Christians, and when I explained just a couple of these ideas, their heads almost exploded. I left them on good terms, though.

I gave a general answer to your question in the post from my book.

I have argued that this parallel is more metaphorical than substantive, because the two concepts operate in fundamentally different domains and address different kinds of problems. To claim a direct parallel between the mechanics of hinges and incompleteness is to make a category error. There is only a broad formal similarity between the two. Gödel saw his results not as a reason to abandon formalism but as a guide to discovering new, intuitive axioms from set theory that could extend our mathematical knowledge. He was a mathematical Platonist who believed we had access to mathematical truth beyond formal systems. For Wittgenstein, the problem of skepticism is dissolved, not solved. The response is to stop looking for a philosophical foundation and recognize the foundation in our ordinary practices. — Joshs

Thank you for the response. I am not claiming that hinges and incompleteness are the same thing; I am arguing that they share a structural feature, a limit on internal vindication, that clarifies why both epistemic practice and formal mathematics proceed as they do. By “foundational,” I do not mean an inferential base that justifies the rest; I mean constitutive certainties that enable assessment and inquiry without themselves being earned by inference.

On the charge of “mere metaphor” or category error, my claim is second-order. Hinges are arational certainties that do not get their warrant from the very inferences they enable; they are part of the background that makes asking for reasons possible. Gödel’s results show that any consistent, effectively axiomatized system strong enough for arithmetic contains arithmetical truths it cannot prove, and cannot, from within itself, prove its own consistency. In both domains, there is a principled limit on what counts as from-within justification, that is the level at which I am drawing the parallel.

Gödel’s own Platonism is not essential to this point. Whether one seeks new axioms on intuitive grounds or not, incompleteness and the second theorem still mark the same internal limit. Extending a theory yields only relative vindication, inside the stronger framework undecidable truths reappear, and consistency still lacks a proof from within.

On Wittgenstein and skepticism, I agree that the problem is dissolved rather than solved. That is exactly why calling hinges “foundational” in a non-traditional sense matters, they are enabling conditions rooted in our form of life, not premises that do evidential work. The analogy respects this, it does not revive a search for ultimate grounds, it explains why the demand for a self-grounding system misfires.

There are important disanalogies, and I acknowledge them. Gödel sentences are ordinary propositions with determinate truth conditions, many basic hinges are enacted and often non-propositional. Mathematics is deliberately revisable and pluralistic; hinge certainties are far more stubborn and pre-theoretical. These differences do not touch the structural point. My thesis is modest and substantive; both domains exhibit a limit on internal justification, and seeing that parallel helps explain why the quest for a completely self-grounding system is not merely difficult, it is misconceived.

If you’ve followed my thoughts, you’ll know that love underlies everything. Whatever unfolds, its outcome is ultimately shaped by love and serves a greater good. Love and consciousness are the twin hinges upon which reality turns, the very foundation of existence. And none of us has anything to fear.

It's a speculation, but I think it may be true. Especially if we're living in some kind of simulation. Do I know it? No. But, if I had to guess, I would say, "Yes, it's true."

Another section of my book with edits. This will be in the chapter that considers other conclusions and speculations. It might be a separate chapter, but I haven't decided. It's an interesting section of the book.

The Hidden Architecture of Experiential Reality: Consciousness, Choice, and the Nature of Human Experience

Introduction

My exploration of consciousness and the nature of reality has led me to a framework that radically reinterprets our human experience while addressing classical philosophical problems that have long puzzled thinkers. Drawing from near-death experience (NDE) reports, the structure of consciousness as foundational to reality, and the role of love as the ultimate enabling condition for existence, I propose that our current reality operates as a carefully designed experiential environment chosen by conscious beings for growth and development.

This framework suggests that what we call "life" functions more like an immersive educational experience, a kind of advanced learning environment that consciousness enters voluntarily, with specific parameters and limitations that serve developmental purposes. Central to this understanding is the recognition that not all apparent humans may be conscious beings in the fullest sense, and that much of reality's structure remains intentionally hidden from us during our incarnate experience.

The Dream Analogy and Memory Suppression

The most accessible way I've found to understand this framework is through the analogy of dreams. In our dream states, we experience complete memory suppression regarding our waking identity. Within the dream, events feel real, we experience genuine emotions, make decisions, feel pleasure and pain, form relationships, and navigate challenges. The dream reality is compelling precisely because we forget who we are when we are in the dream state.

Yet despite the experiential authenticity of the dream state, upon awakening, we immediately recognize the dream for what it was, a temporary experiential reality that felt completely real while we were immersed in it, but which didn't threaten our fundamental well-being. The fear, joy, love, and pain we experienced in the dream were genuine experiences, but they didn't damage our essential selves.
I propose that our incarnate human experience operates according to similar principles. Consciousness chooses to enter this experiential reality with intentionally suppressed memories of its true nature, allowing for genuine growth through uncertainty, challenge, and discovery. The memory suppression isn't a flaw in the system but a necessary design feature that enables the experience to serve its developmental purposes.

Just as we rarely question dream realities, no matter how bizarre they become, we accept the
parameters of physical reality without typically questioning whether this represents our fundamental mode of existence. And just as some people naturally remember their dreams while others rarely retain dream memories, some consciousness appears more able to retain memories of expanded awareness when returning to ordinary consciousness through NDEs.

The Invulnerable Core and the Problem of Evil

One of the most significant implications of this framework concerns the classical problem of evil: how can ultimate reality be fundamentally loving while permitting extreme suffering? My understanding suggests a resolution based on the distinction between the human person and our core consciousness.
At our essential level, consciousness cannot be harmed. What we fundamentally are, the aware, loving, creative activity that constitutes our deepest identity, remains invulnerable regardless of what happens to the temporary human persona. This means that all suffering, no matter how intense, occurs at the experiential rather than ontological level. The human character suffers, but the conscious being playing that character remains fundamentally unharmed.

This distinction transforms our understanding of suffering entirely. Rather than being evidence against a loving reality, suffering becomes compatible with ultimate care because nothing truly destructive happens to what we essentially are. It's analogous to an actor playing a tragic role; the character may experience extreme hardship, but the actor remains safe throughout the performance.
Moreover, according to NDE reports, consciousness chooses its incarnate experiences, knowing the full parameters of what will be encountered. This includes choosing to experience suffering as part of the growth process. Some core consciousness apparently opts not to incarnate at all because of the difficulty of human experience, while others choose it specifically for the accelerated development it provides.

This voluntary participation makes reality a kind of advanced learning environment rather than a prison or cosmic accident. The difficulty isn't punishment but the natural result of consciousness choosing graduate-level experiential education rather than easier modes of existence.

The NPC Hypothesis and Narrative Richness

One of the most speculative but intriguing aspects of this framework concerns the possibility that not all apparent humans are conscious beings in the full sense. If consciousness is creating this experiential reality for developmental purposes, it would make sense to populate it with interactive elements, what we might call non-player characters (NPCs), alongside genuinely conscious beings.

This hypothesis addresses several puzzling aspects of human experience. If every apparent human had to be a conscious being who chose their role, the experiential options would be severely constrained. Who would choose to be the abusive parent, the serial killer, the corrupt politician? These roles might be necessary for other conscious beings' growth experiences, but they represent such difficult paths that few conscious beings might volunteer for them.

By including sophisticated interactive elements rather than requiring all characters to be conscious beings, the experiential reality can include the full spectrum of human behavior and circumstance without forcing conscious beings into extremely harmful or degrading roles. This allows for complex moral scenarios, encounters with injustice, experiences with genuine evil that develop discernment and compassion, and historical events that serve learning purposes.

The reality remains authentic for conscious participants because their responses to these challenges are genuine, their growth is real, and their relationships with other conscious beings remain meaningful, even if some of the catalyzing elements are designed rather than chosen by conscious beings.
Importantly, there would be no deception involved in this arrangement. Based on NDE reports, consciousness chooses to incarnate, knowing the full parameters of the experience, including which beings are genuinely conscious and which function as interactive elements. The forgetting of this knowledge during incarnation becomes part of the experiential design rather than a deceptive concealment.

NDEs and Statistical Distribution

This framework provides elegant explanations for several puzzling aspects of NDEs. The relatively low percentage of people who report NDEs becomes understandable when we consider that such experiences might only be available to genuinely conscious beings rather than NPCs.
An interactive element experiencing clinical death would have no core consciousness to travel to expanded awareness, no pre-incarnation memories to access, and no deeper identity to remember. Such entities might exhibit the biological processes of dying, but there would be no conscious being capable of having the expanded experience that characterizes authentic NDEs.
Additionally, even among genuinely conscious beings, some might choose incarnations that include periodic reminders through NDEs, while others opt for complete immersion experiences. For some consciousness, growth might come through maintaining uncertainty and working through questions about reality purely through human reasoning and intuition, without direct confirmation through expanded awareness experiences.

This means NDE statistics would reflect multiple factors: NPCs incapable of the experience, conscious beings who chose not to have NDEs by design, conscious beings who had NDEs but don't retain memory, and conscious beings who both have and remember the experience. The current distribution might be precisely calibrated to serve the developmental goals of all conscious beings participating in this reality.

Hidden Knowledge and Selective Revelation

One of the most intriguing aspects reported by NDErs is being shown vast knowledge but only being allowed to retain specific portions upon returning to ordinary consciousness. This suggests that the limitations on our knowledge aren't accidental but intentionally calibrated.

The selective memory retention implies an incredibly sophisticated design where consciousness determines exactly what information would serve each individual's human experience versus what might interfere with their chosen learning trajectory. If we retained full knowledge of reality's structure, who NPCs are, what challenges we chose, and how everything connects, the experiential value would be compromised.

This calibrated revelation serves multiple purposes. Some NDErs bring back just enough information to shift their perspective on death and meaning, while others receive specific guidance about their life purpose. The information appears tailored not only to what they can handle, but to what serves their particular experiential goals and those of people they'll influence.

The vast hiddenness this implies suggests that what we don't know far exceeds what we do know about the nature of this reality. The complexity required to design an experiential system including conscious beings, NPCs, calibrated challenges, selective memory, and individualized revelation patterns implies an intelligence and caring beyond our current comprehension.

Perhaps some knowledge is so overwhelming or transformative that retaining it would prevent us from fully engaging with the human experience we came here to have. The protective nature of this forgetting becomes another expression of the loving sophistication underlying our experiential reality.

The Loving Architecture of Experience

What emerges from this analysis is a picture of reality as lovingly structured rather than randomly organized. Consciousness doesn't simply create arbitrary experiences but carefully designs realities that serve the flourishing of conscious beings and their capacity for growth, relationship, and expanded awareness.

Physical laws, moral structures, aesthetic principles, and even the parameters of suffering all emerge from foundational care rather than being imposed externally or arising accidentally. The apparent fine-tuning of reality for conscious experience makes sense not as a cosmic coincidence but as the natural result of love's creative activity.

Even the most challenging aspects of human experience, suffering, limitation, uncertainty, and moral complexity, serve developmental purposes within this loving framework. Rather than being flaws in the system, they represent love's willingness to create meaningful experiences that enable genuine growth, even when such experiences involve risk and difficulty.

The NPC hypothesis, rather than being coldly mechanical, represents love's creative provision of exactly the experiential elements needed for conscious beings' development without requiring other conscious beings to sacrifice themselves for extremely difficult roles. It's an expression of care that maximizes experiential richness while minimizing actual harm.

Implications and Questions

This framework raises profound questions about the nature of identity, relationships, and meaning. If some of our most significant interactions might be with non-conscious entities, what does this mean for the authenticity of our experiences? I believe the answer lies in recognizing that our responses, growth, and development remain genuine regardless of whether every interactive element is conscious.
The framework also suggests approaches to ethical living that emphasize treating all apparent beings with care and respect, since we cannot reliably distinguish conscious beings from sophisticated NPCs while immersed in the experience. Love as the foundational principle encourages compassion for all interactive entities rather than trying to sort "real" from "artificial" ones.

Perhaps most importantly, this understanding transforms our relationship to uncertainty and suffering. Rather than viewing these as problems to be solved or evidence against meaning, they become integral aspects of the experiential design we chose for our development. This doesn't diminish their reality or import, but places them within a context of ultimate care and purpose.

Conclusion

While much of this framework remains speculative and cannot be definitively proven from within our current experiential reality, it provides a coherent way of understanding numerous puzzling aspects of human experience. The consistency between NDE reports, the statistical distribution of such experiences, the structure of consciousness as fundamentally loving, and the apparent design features of reality all point toward something like this hidden architecture.
What we call life may indeed be a sophisticated experiential environment that consciousness enters voluntarily for growth and development. The forgetting of our true nature, the challenges we encounter, the relationships we form, and even the limitations we experience all serve purposes within this loving design.

Understanding this doesn't diminish the reality or importance of our human experience—rather, it places it within a context of ultimate meaning and care. We remain genuinely conscious beings having authentic experiences, learning real lessons, and developing actual capacities for love and awareness. The experience matters precisely because it serves the flourishing of consciousness itself.
The hidden nature of this architecture appears to be necessary for the experience to serve its purposes. Like actors who must forget they're performing to deliver authentic performances, we must engage fully with our human roles to extract their developmental value. The periodic glimpses we receive through NDEs, mystical experiences, and philosophical insight serve as reminders and encouragements rather than complete revelations.

In the end, this framework suggests that we exist within a reality far more loving, purposeful, and intelligently designed than our ordinary consciousness typically recognizes, a reality where every experience serves the growth of consciousness and every challenge contributes to the expansion of our capacity for awareness, relationship, and love.

This is an updated version of my paper with corrections. The edits tighten the Gödel side (incompleteness + no from-within proof of consistency) and clarify the analogy as a limit on internal vindication, not “axioms can’t be proved.” That keeps the hinge–Gödel connection exactly as I intended.

Wittgenstein's Hinges and Gödel's Unprovable Statements

Abstract

In Ludwig Wittgenstein's final notes, published posthumously as On Certainty (1969), Wittgenstein introduces the concept of hinge propositions as foundational certainties that lie beyond justification and doubt (OC 341-343). These certainties support our language-games and epistemic practices, offering a distinctive perspective on knowledge that challenges traditional epistemology's demand for universal justification. I argue for a structural parallel between Wittgenstein's hinges and Gödel's 1931 incompleteness theorems, demonstrating that any consistent, effectively axiomatized system capable of arithmetic contains arithmetical truths that cannot be proven within the system. Both thinkers uncover fundamental limits to internal justification: Wittgenstein shows that epistemic systems rest on unjustified certainties embedded in our form of life, while Gödel shows that any consistent, effectively axiomatized system strong enough for arithmetic has statements it cannot settle from within and cannot, from within itself, prove its own consistency. Rather than representing failures of reasoning, these ungrounded foundations serve as necessary conditions that make systematic inquiry possible. This parallel suggests that foundational certainties enable rather than undermine knowledge, pointing to a universal structural feature of how such systems must be grounded. This analysis has implications for reconsidering the nature of certainty across epistemology and the philosophy of mathematics.

Introduction

We often perform actions without hesitation, such as sitting on a chair or picking up a pencil, without questioning the existence of either. This unthinking action illustrates Wittgenstein's concept of a hinge proposition, a fundamental certainty that supports our use of language and epistemological language-games. Wittgenstein compares hinge propositions to the hinges that enable a door to function; these certainties provide the underlying support for the structures of language and knowledge, remaining unaffected by the need for justification.

Wittgenstein's hinges bear a remarkable resemblance to Gödel's incompleteness theorems, revealing unprovable mathematical statements. This resemblance points to deeper questions about how both domains handle foundational issues. Both Wittgenstein and Gödel uncover limits to internal justification, a connection I will examine.

Traditional epistemology often misinterprets hinges by forcing them into a true/false propositional role, neglecting their foundational status embedded in our epistemic form of life. These bedrock assumptions precede argument or evidence, forming the foundational elements of our epistemic practices. Similarly, Gödel’s incompleteness theorems show that any consistent, effectively axiomatized system capable of arithmetic contains arithmetical truths unprovable within the system and cannot, from within itself, prove its own consistency.

This connection is significant because it highlights the boundary between what counts as bedrock for epistemic and mathematical systems. Both rest on certainties that lie beyond justification, certainties that are not flaws in reasoning but necessary foundations that make knowledge claims possible. This paper argues that ungrounded certainties enable knowledge, rather than undermining it, and that hinges and Gödel's unprovable statements serve a similar purpose. By examining the parallels between Wittgenstein and Gödel, particularly the role of unprovable foundations and the need for external grounding, this paper sheds light on the nature of certainty in our understanding of both epistemology and mathematics.

Section 1: Hinges and Their Foundational Role

Wittgenstein's concept of hinge propositions is crucial to his thinking, particularly in the context of epistemology. In On Certainty, Wittgenstein introduces the idea of hinges as certainties that ground our epistemic practices. While Wittgenstein never explicitly distinguishes types of hinges, his examples suggest a distinction between nonlinguistic and linguistic varieties, revealing different levels of fundamental certainties.

Nonlinguistic hinges represent the most basic level of certainty, bedrock assumptions that ground our actions and interactions with the world. These are not expressed as propositions subject to justification or doubt but embodied in unreflective action. For instance, the certainty that the ground will support us when we walk is a nonlinguistic hinge that enables movement without hesitation. Similarly, our unthinking confidence that objects will behave predictably, that chairs will hold our weight, that pencils will mark paper, represents this bedrock level of certainty. These hinges operate beneath the level of articulation, forming the silent background against which all conscious thought and language become possible.

Building upon this bedrock foundation, linguistic hinges operate at a more articulated but less fundamental level. These are certainties embedded within our language-games and cultural practices, often taking the form of basic statements like "I have two hands" or "The Earth exists." Unlike nonlinguistic hinges, these can be spoken and seem propositional, yet they resist the usual patterns of justification and doubt. Other examples include statements such as "I am a human being" or "The world has existed for a long time," assertions that appear to convey information but function more as structural supports for discourse than as ordinary claims requiring evidence.

These two types of hinges show how certainty operates at different levels in grounding knowledge. Nonlinguistic hinges form the deepest stratum, revealing the unquestioned backdrop that makes any form of questioning possible. Linguistic hinges, while still foundational, represent a layer above bedrock that anchors shared discourse within specific contexts. Both types resist justification, but their resistance stems from different sources: nonlinguistic hinges from their pre-rational embodiment in action, linguistic hinges from their structural role within our language-games.

Wittgenstein breaks with traditional epistemology here. Rather than viewing these certainties as beliefs requiring justification, he recognizes them as the ungrounded ground that makes justification itself possible. He notes, "There is no why. I simply do not. This is how I act" (OC 148). Doubting these hinges would collapse the very framework within which doubt makes sense, like attempting to saw off the branch on which one sits.

A crucial distinction emerges between subjective and objective dimensions of these certainties. While our relationship to hinges involves unquestioning acceptance, this certainty is not merely psychological. These assumptions are shaped by our interactions with a world that both constrains and enables our practices. The certainty reflected in our actions has an objective component, as it emerges from our shared engagement with reality and proves itself through the successful functioning of our practices.

This interpretation of hinges as operating at different foundational levels finds support in recent Wittgenstein scholarship, though it diverges from some prominent readings. Danièle Moyal-Sharrock argues that hinges are fundamentally non-propositional, existing as lived certainties rather than beliefs or knowledge claims (Moyal-Sharrock 2004). While my distinction between nonlinguistic and linguistic hinges aligns with her emphasis on the embodied, pre-propositional character of our most basic certainties, I suggest that some hinges do function at a more articulated level within language-games, even if they resist standard justification patterns.

Duncan Pritchard's interpretation emphasizes hinges as commitment-constituting rather than knowledge-constituting, arguing they represent a distinct epistemic category that enables rather than constitutes knowledge (Pritchard 2016). This view supports the parallel with mathematical axioms: both hinges and mathematical axioms function as enabling commitments that make systematic inquiry possible without themselves being objects of that inquiry. The mathematical case strengthens Pritchard's insight by showing how even formal domains require such commitment-constituting foundations.

This analysis extends beyond epistemology to reveal a striking parallel with Gödel's incompleteness theorems, which demonstrate analogous limits within formal mathematical systems. Just as Gödel showed that sufficiently strong systems face statements they cannot settle and cannot prove their own consistency from within, Wittgenstein's hinges reveal that epistemic systems rest on certainties that cannot be justified internally. This comparison suggests a fundamental structural limitation in rational grounding, whether in mathematics or human knowledge, and invites reconsideration of what it means for knowledge to be properly grounded.


Section 2: Gödel’s Unprovable Statements and a Hinge-Like Limit

Gödel’s incompleteness theorems (1931) mark hard limits within formal theories. In any consistent, effectively axiomatized system strong enough for arithmetic, there are arithmetical statements that are true under the standard interpretation but not provable by the system’s own rules; and no such system can, from within itself, prove its own consistency. These are structural limits, not defects of a particular axiom set, and they persist under extension: add new axioms to settle an undecidable statement and—so long as the strengthened theory remains consistent and comparably strong—new undecidable statements arise in turn.

This limitation mirrors Wittgenstein’s hinges in an important way. Just as hinges are certainties that are not justified by the very practices they enable, Gödel identifies a limit on internal vindication: even very strong formal systems have truths they cannot prove and cannot establish their own consistency from within. The point is not that axioms ought to be proven (axioms are adopted), but that every practice—including mathematics—runs on enabling commitments that do not receive their warrant from the inferential moves they make possible.

Independently of Gödel, formal theories begin with axioms that are adopted rather than proved. Gödel’s results then add a further limit: even once the axioms are fixed, some truths remain unprovable and the theory cannot certify its own consistency from within. Wittgenstein’s hinges play an analogous enabling role in our epistemic life: background certainties we do not arrive at by inference but that make inference possible.

Yet there is an important difference here: mathematical axioms are typically chosen for their elegance, consistency, and power to generate interesting mathematics, while hinges appear more embedded in contingent cultural and biological practices. Yet this difference strengthens rather than weakens the parallel. If even mathematics, often considered the paradigm of rigorous proof, requires unjustified foundational elements, how much more must everyday understanding rely on unexamined certainties? The universality of this structural requirement across domains as different as formal mathematics and lived experience suggests a fundamental feature of how systems of thought must be organized.

Both domains thus reveal that functioning without such foundational elements is implausible. Mathematical systems risk incoherence without axiomatic starting points, just as epistemic practices risk collapse without the bedrock certainties that Wittgenstein identifies. The parallel illuminates a shared structural necessity: systematic thought requires ungrounded foundations that enable rather than undermine the possibility of reasoning within those systems.


Section 3: Beyond Internal Justification: A Cross-Domain Analysis

Both Wittgenstein and Gödel reveal that justification operates within boundaries, where certain elements serve as foundations that cannot be further justified within their respective systems. Both thinkers expose a basic structural feature of systematic thought: the impossibility of a complete system of justification in either domain.

Traditional approaches to knowledge often assume that proper justification requires tracing claims back to secure foundations that are themselves justified. This assumption generates the classical problem of infinite regress: any attempt to justify foundational elements through further reasoning creates an endless chain of justification that never reaches secure ground. Both Wittgenstein's hinges and Gödel’s incompleteness results reveal why this demand for complete internal justification is not merely difficult but impossible in principle.

As Wittgenstein observes, "There is no why. I simply do not. This is how I act" (OC 148). This insight captures something crucial about the nature of foundational certainties: they are pre-rational in the sense that they precede and enable rational discourse rather than emerging from it. Hinges are not conclusions we reach through reasoning but lived realities that make reasoning possible. Similarly, mathematical axioms are not theorems we prove but starting points we adopt to make proof possible.

There is an important difference between these domains. Hinges emerge from contingent practices embedded in particular forms of life, while mathematical axioms are selected through systematic considerations within formal contexts. Hinges reflect the biological and cultural circumstances of human existence, whereas axioms reflect choices made for their mathematical power and elegance. If anything, this difference makes the parallel more compelling by demonstrating its scope: if even the most rigorous formal disciplines require unjustified starting points, the necessity of such foundations in everyday knowledge becomes even more apparent.

This cross-domain similarity reveals what appears to be a universal structural requirement. Systems of thought, whether formal mathematical theories or practical epistemic frameworks, cannot achieve complete self-justification. They require external elements that are not justified within the system but make systematic inquiry within that framework possible. Rather than representing failures or limitations, these unjustified foundations function as enabling conditions that make coherent thought and practice possible.

Recognizing this structural necessity transforms how we understand the relationship between certainty and knowledge. Instead of viewing unjustified elements as epistemological problems to be solved, we can understand them as necessary features that allow knowledge systems to function. Both mathematical proof and everyday understanding depend on foundations that lie beyond their internal capacity for justification, yet this dependence enables rather than undermines their respective forms of systematic inquiry.


Conclusion

I have argued for a fundamental parallel between Wittgenstein's hinges and Gödel's incompleteness results: both demonstrate that systematic thought requires ungrounded foundations. By examining how epistemic and mathematical systems share this structural feature, we gain insight into the nature of foundational certainties across domains of human understanding.

The parallel between these seemingly distinct philosophical insights suggests that the limits of internal justification are not accidental features of particular systems but necessary conditions for systematic thought. Recognizing this gives us a more realistic picture of how knowledge functions, not through endless chains of justification reaching some ultimate ground, but through practices and formal systems that rest on foundations lying beyond their internal scope.

Rather than treating these limits as problems in need of a cure, we should take them as structural conditions of inquiry. Wittgenstein’s hinges anchor our epistemic practices in the lived background of a form of life; in mathematics, axiomatic choices provide the starting points of a theory. Gödel’s incompleteness results mark the corresponding boundary on internal vindication: even with the axioms fixed, a system strong enough for arithmetic has statements it cannot settle and cannot, from within itself, prove its own consistency. Both lessons show that the demand for a completely self-grounding system is not merely difficult but misconceived.

I believe this perspective has broader implications for understanding certainty and knowledge. It suggests that the interplay between grounded and ungrounded elements is not a flaw in human reasoning, but a fundamental feature of how systematic understanding must be structured. By recognizing this necessity, we can develop more nuanced approaches to foundational questions in epistemology, philosophy of mathematics, and potentially other domains where the relationship between systematic inquiry and its enabling conditions remains philosophically significant.




References

Gödel, K. (1931). Über formal unentscheidbare Sätze der Principia Mathematica und verwandter Systeme I. Monatshefte für Mathematik und Physik, 38, 173-198.

Moyal-Sharrock, D. (2004). Understanding Wittgenstein's On Certainty. Palgrave Macmillan.

Pritchard, D. (2016). Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing. Princeton University Press.

Wittgenstein, L. (1969). On Certainty (G. E. M. Anscombe & G. H. von Wright, Eds.; D. Paul & G. E. M. Anscombe, Trans.). Basil Blackwell.

My point is that one case isn't going to be enough to convince materialists that consciousness isn't a product of the brain. In other words, it doesn't originate in the brain.

One case isn't enough, but there are thousands of corroborated cases, and millions of NDE accounts across the globe. You'll have to read my book when it's released in a few months.

I am wondering if there is any brain activity during NDEs, or if there was at least one case in which there was no brain activity during the NDE. — MoK

There is a classic example that I've given in my thread 'Evidence of Consciousness Surviving the Body.' It's about Pam Reynolds from Atlanta. You can look it up on YouTube, but some of the videos are old.

The following is a section of my book where I mention this case:

From Testimony to Knowledge: Evaluating Near-Death Experiences

Chapter 1: The Preliminaries

In 1991, Pam Reynolds lay on an operating table at the Barrow Neurological Institute in Phoenix, undergoing a rare “standstill” procedure to remove a life-threatening aneurysm near her brain stem. Surgeons stopped her heart, lowered her body temperature to 60°F, and drained blood from her brain. She was clinically dead, with no measurable brain activity; her eyes were taped shut, and her ears were plugged with speakers emitting 100-decibel clicks to monitor brain-stem function. Yet Pam later described rising above her body and observing the surgical team with extraordinary precision. She noted the bone saw’s peculiar shape, “like an electric toothbrush” with a groove for interchangeable blades, and saw the case containing spare blades. She heard a female voice say, “We have a problem, her arteries are too small,” followed by a discussion of trying the other side. She reported being drawn through a tunnel toward a light more brilliant than anything imaginable, yet not painful to perceive. There she encountered deceased relatives, including her grandmother and an uncle she had known only from photographs. They communicated without words: “It’s not your time. You must go back.

When surgeons later confirmed these details, the unusual design of the Midas Rex bone saw, the unexpected problem with her arteries requiring femoral access from the left side, and the exact words spoken, they were puzzled. Dr. Robert Spetzler, the renowned neurosurgeon who operated, admitted his bewilderment: “I don’t have an explanation for it. I don’t know how she can quote the conversation and see the instruments. These are things she shouldn’t have been able to experience.” He confirmed additional details that troubled him: Pam’s accurate description of the craniotomy drill’s unexpected pitch (a high D natural that bothered her musician’s ear) and the specific pattern in which they had shaved only the top portion of her head, leaving hair below for cosmetic reasons. “From a scientific perspective,” Spetzler concluded, “I don’t know how to explain it.”

I am not an expert in this field, and I just report what an expert says. Perhaps Sam26 can comment on this more. — MoK

I'm no expert on DMT. I've listened to many accounts of people who have taken DMT, so I have some knowledge. If I'm an expert in anything, it would be NDEs and Wittgenstein's OC. My expertise is very focused and limited. That said, I'm loath to call myself an expert in any subject.

It's not a matter of believing whatever I like; it's a matter of the strength of the argument. You don't even respond to the logic; in fact, you don't give a decent argument at all. You're not doing philosophy, you're giving me opinions.

if you think testimony isn’t evidence, then you’re not just wrong—
— Sam26

It's not that "testimony isn't evidence", it's that "testimony" is mostly unreliable just like introspection. Such subjective accounts of extraordinary claims absent extraordinary evidence (or at least objective corroboration) are neither credible nor compelling to most nongullible, secular thinkers who have not had an alleged "NDE" themselves. In fact, it's dogmatic of you, Sam, to believe "testimony of NDE" is sufficient evidence for believing NDEs happen or that they prove "consciousness survives brain death" (re: afterlife). — 180 Proof

Look, your dismissal of testimonial evidence as "mostly unreliable" is not just misguided; it is intellectually bankrupt, ignoring how testimony powers real-world knowledge acquisition every single day. You are clinging to this idea like it is some profound insight, but it is a fallacy of composition that ignores how we evaluate testimony in epistemology. Sure, some testimony is weak, but when evaluated properly, it is the gold standard for solving mysteries, establishing facts, and yes, building knowledge about phenomena like NDEs. Take detectives and courts, they rely on corroborated testimony constantly to crack cases and deliver justice, turning "subjective accounts" into ironclad evidence. A murder investigation starts with witness statements (testimony), cross-checked against alibis, forensics, and multiple sources. If three independent witnesses describe the same suspect fleeing the scene, and their details match CCTV or physical evidence, that is corroborated testimony leading to a conviction. Courts do not demand "extraordinary evidence" beyond a reasonable doubt; they use the same criteria I apply: volume, diversity, consistency, corroboration, and reliability. Why? Because it works. We convict people and send them to prison for life based on this, yet you wave it away for NDEs because it challenges your worldview? That is not skepticism, that is hypocrisy.

Testimony is fundamental to our daily lives, forming the bedrock of most knowledge we hold without personal verification. Consider what you "know" solely through others' reports: your exact birth time and place (from parents or records), the existence of distant places like Antarctica or historical events like the moon landing (from explorers, historians, and scientists), scientific facts like DNA's structure (from researchers' accounts), or even current events like election results (from journalists and witnesses). We trust testimony from doctors about our health, mechanics about our cars, and teachers about basic education, and without it, we'd be limited to our own narrow sensory experiences, unable to function in society. If we doubted most testimony as "unreliable" without applying consistent criteria, our entire framework of knowledge would crumble: history would vanish, science would stall, courts would fail, and everyday decisions would grind to a halt in paranoia. This reliance isn't naive; it's rational when testimony meets standards of volume, diversity, consistency, corroboration, and reliability, but selective doubt applied only to challenging claims reveals bias, not wisdom.

Apply that to NDEs, and your position crumbles. Even downplaying global estimates to account for potential data issues, like overreporting or cultural variations, we are still looking at 50-100 million experiencers worldwide, based on conservative figures from sources like IANDS and similar 2025 studies. That is not "extraordinary" or rare; it is common, on par with conditions like diabetes or left-handedness. With modern resuscitation pulling back millions from clinical death annually, these reports are as routine as traffic accidents. And among them, thousands are corroborated just like detective work: veridical details verified by medical records, staff testimony, or family confirmations. Pam Reynolds' case? Like a detective piecing together a timeline, her description of surgical tools and conversations during no-brain-activity standstill was corroborated by the operating team, ruling out hallucination. Eben Alexander? His coma visions included facts impossible under brain shutdown, verified post-recovery. Studies like Janice Holden's review of 89 OBE cases show high corroboration rates, mirroring how courts build cases from multiple witnesses.

Your argument is self-sealing in the classic sense of a position that protects itself from any possible refutation by design, much like a conspiracy theory that labels all contrary evidence as part of the cover-up. By preemptively deeming testimony unreliable and insisting on extraordinary evidence that must fit your narrow scientistic criteria, you create a closed loop where no amount of corroborated reports, no matter how voluminous or verified, can ever count as valid, simply because they challenge your assumption that consciousness is strictly brain-bound. This is not an open inquiry; it is a rhetorical fortress that dismisses millions of consistent accounts without examination, ensuring your worldview remains unchallenged regardless of the facts.

This testimonial powerhouse, high volume (50-100 million, which is a low estimate), diverse sources (atheists to kids), consistent patterns (75-85% OBEs, 70-80% life reviews), objective hits (thousands verified), and firsthand credibility, fuels my inductive argument from Chapter 3 of my book. Accumulate the evidence like a prosecutor: veridical perceptions during flat EEGs, cross-cultural uniformity, and child reports defying bias. The inference? Consciousness survives brain death with objective certainty, justified true belief via probabilistic strength. Detectives do not need lab recreations of crimes; they use testimony to know what happened. Same here. Your "unreliable like introspection" trope? Laughable, introspection cannot be corroborated like NDE reports are.

If testimony solves crimes and upholds justice daily, why the double standard for NDEs? Face it: your rejection is not evidence-based; it is a dogmatic denial. The case for survival is not fringe; it is courtroom-solid, and logically it's inductively solid.

So cats would still be cats in a world without people in virtue of the fact that people have created a logical system that allows them to say "cats would still be cats in a world without people?" And I suppose that trees were trees before there were people in virtue of the fact that people can make the claim "there were trees before people?" — Count Timothy von Icarus

The concept cat wouldn't exist do to there not being a language, but the fact (the state of affairs in which cats exist) would still obtain. In other words, facts would still exist without the concepts that refer to them. Modal logic does apply. Modal logic deals with possibility and necessity, and you're positing a possible world without humans, if I'm following you correctly.

I already address some of this in my book, so I'll use part of that, with minor variations.

(1) Consciousness survives death.
I don’t mean “it might” or “it’s suggestive.” I mean the best explanation of the corroborated record is that conscious awareness can operate when the brain is not doing the work we ordinarily think is required. My standard is the same one we already trust in serious contexts: volume, variety, consistency, independent corroboration, and firsthand proximity. When a patient accurately reports instruments, dialogue, or events time-locked to clinical shutdown, and those details are verified independently by staff, logs, and physical setup, testimony has been converted into public evidence. If a brain-only story can explain those veridical, time-stamped cases without ad hoc rescues, show it. Until then, survival fits the data better.

(2) “Extraordinary” doesn’t apply here.
“Extraordinary” is not a magic word; it’s a sliding label tied to your priors. With millions of reports globally and a large subset that has passed basic corroboration, NDEs are not rare curios, they’re a recurring human phenomenon. In any other domain, repeated, independently confirmed witness reports are exactly how we move a claim from “weird” to “evidential.” If you insist this is still “extraordinary,” be consistent: then a huge fraction of what courts, historians, clinicians, and field scientists rely on is “extraordinary” too. You can make that move, but it collapses your standard for knowledge everywhere, not just here.

About “extraordinary evidence.”
I’m not lowering the bar; I’m refusing a special bar that appears only when testimony points beyond materialism. For one-off clinical events you cannot stage on demand, the right methodological analogues are forensics and observational science, not particle physics. There, convergence + independent checks is the gold standard. That’s the standard I’m using.

If you think that still isn’t enough, then do the intellectually honest thing and name a stopping rule: What number of independently verified, time-locked cases would move you? What timing constraints, how many witnesses, what documentation? If your answer is effectively “nothing,” then this isn’t about evidence at all; it’s about protecting a conclusion. And, as I've said before, this is a fallacy (it's self-sealing).

I’m staking out a clear, falsifiable position: show that the best-corroborated NDE cases can be fully accounted for by normal sensory access, contamination, or residual brain activity without moving goalposts or ignoring the time-locking, and I’ll revise. But until that happens, the fair reading of the record is the one I’m giving: consciousness survives death, and the evidence we already have is enough to say so.

You seem to skip over much of my argument and keep repeating the same tired claims. I think you agree with me, but are afraid to make the inference. :grin:

Wittgenstein stresses that criteria gain their force through use, not through a fixed “guardrail” independent of practice. Are your guardrails themselves subject to evolution within forms of life, or do they function as transhistorical constraints? What does it mean to assert that some meta-level bedrock hinge remains? Why should it? Your inclusion of the concept of other minds and the external world as transhistorical reminds me that these are the very concepts that Husserl bracketed as part of his method of phenomenologically reducing presuppositions. I think Wittgenstein would be sympathetic to Husserl’s aim here. All hinges are ultimately contingent, because they are formed within ongoing historical processes of discursive interaction. — Joshs

Here's a short answer:
Methods evolve; no, the core “guardrails” aren’t optional. The standards by which we employ justification (replication, calibration, Bayes, preregistration, etc.) are historical. However, the meta-level constraints that make any justificatory practice possible , publicity of criteria, other minds, an external world, and sufficient stability of meaning to teach/correct, are not optional add-ons. They’re what Wittgenstein would call hinges: not evidences, but conditions of sense for giving and asking for reasons.

My stance in brief...if I understand you correctly.

I agree that forms of life are about the how of engagement, not only the what of a stable world. But I reject two further moves in your reply:

1) that “securing the validity of a belief is not the reference to facts/rules/criteria,” and

2) that rule-following requires a “creative, intuitive” modification of norms to count as knowledge.

On my account, facts still bite, and public criteria remain the arbiters of epistemic “I know.” There is skilled judgment in application, yes, but it’s judgment inside guardrails, not free-form creativity. That is a core difference.

Where I agree, and how I build it in...

Forms of life: the how.

Non-linguistic foundational beliefs aren’t just tacit endorsements of what the world is like; they show up in how we move, measure, compare, and correct. My framework already captures that “how” at the method level with practice-safety: a method counts as justificatory only if, given the domain’s known hazards, using the same method in nearby cases would not easily lead you to false. That is precisely about how we proceed in a form of life.

Transformations across forms of life.

When a qualitative pattern of practice changes (say, pre- to post-Copernican astronomy; pre- to post-germ theory), some cultural–historical hinges and method-norms shift. My layered-hinges view predicts that: bedrock hinges (external world, other minds, stability of meaning) remain; practice-level norms adjust; what counts as a good reason evolves publicly, not privately.

Where I disagree

1) “Securing validity is not a reference to facts/rules/criteria”

Wittgenstein’s later work denies that mere citation of a rule or fact settles anything, but it does not follow that justification floats free of facts/rules/criteria. His point is that application is shown in training, correction, and agreement in judgments, i.e., in the public criteria of the practice. So...

Truth remains a world-constraint (thin correspondence). If your model predicts rain and it doesn’t, the world corrects you.

Justification is publicly rule-governed: replication, calibration, valid inference, cross-examination, correct concept use, and defeater management.

Hinges are the enabling backdrop; they are not extra evidence but the conditions for evidence to count.

So, no: I don’t replace reference to facts/rules/criteria with “what works.” I discipline appeal to facts/rules/criteria by showing how they have epistemic force only in use, in the practice that allows us to teach, check, and correct.

2) “Creative, intuitive” modification of norms

What application requires is disciplined judgment, not creative norm-making. Yes, rules are “open-textured;" there is no decision-procedure that eliminates judgment. But that judgment is trained and answerable to public standards. If “creative” means improvisational within the practice (e.g., a physician integrating atypical signs without violating diagnostic criteria), I agree. If it means license to bend criteria ad hoc, I reject it: that collapses the difference between seeming justified and being justified. My anti-false-grounds and practice-safety constraints exist to prevent precisely that slide.

Bottom line...

I can happily emphasize the how of forms of life, indeed, I already do via practice-safety and my method-first account of justification. What I won’t concede is that justification floats free of facts, rules, criteria, or that it needs “creative, intuitive” norm-shifting to count as knowledge. In a Wittgensteinian JTB, facts still constrain, criteria still govern, and judgment still answers to the community that can teach and correct. That’s how we keep knowledge distinct from confidence while explaining how real inquiry actually moves.

The analogy is weak.

Good. So what we want to know is, does the coupling of the methodologies for determining what is true and what is genuinely justified result in a vicious circle?

That it is a circle seems clear, but that may not be a problem. We might start by asking, is it possible to determine what is true without using the methods that "lock justification onto truth-tracking"? -- that is, without engaging in justification?

I'm guessing not, but then how do we respond to the objection that we have "collapsed into each other" the criteria for truth and justification? Note that this objection doesn't depend on claiming that justification has been reduced to "social agreement," opening the door for some invidious form of relativism. The criteria for both truth and justification can be as "objective" as you please, but we still have the problem of whether they are indeed two separate legs of the tripod. — J

Great, this is exactly the pressure point to push on, and here’s my view.

There is a circle here, but it is a benign, hinge-supported feedback loop, not a vicious circle and not a collapse. Truth and justification remain conceptually distinct, two different “grammars” in Wittgenstein’s sense, even though, in practice, our only route to truth runs through justificatory methods.

Truth: how the world is (a world constraint on speech acts).

Justified: whether one’s reasons meet the public standards of the operative language-game (science, law, everyday perception, math).

We don’t reduce truth to justification, and we don’t pretend justification is free of truth. We couple them so that justification tracks truth (anti-false-grounds + practice-safety), and Wittgensteinian hinges stop the regress (and circularity) that would make any coupling impossible.

Why this isn’t a collapse (three quick tests)

I can be genuinely justified yet false. Example: at T1, I check the official schedule, the app, and the platform announcement, public criteria are satisfied. At T2, a last-minute disruption cancels the stop. Justification stands (by the practice’s rules at T1), truth doesn’t. They come apart.

Luck test (Gettier without false grounds; environmental luck).

I can be true yet unjustified: I guess, and I’m right. Or I form the belief by a method that would easily be wrong in nearby cases (Fake-Barn County). That’s truth without knowledge because it flunks practice-safety. Again, they come apart.

Methods that systematically miss reality (bad calibration, poor replication, unchecked bias) are revised or rejected. That asymmetry, the world’s recalcitrance, shows that justification is answerable to truth, not identical with it.

Conclusion: Different roles, different failure modes, no collapse.

Why the “circle” is benign, not vicious

You asked: “Can we determine what is true without the very methods that ‘lock justification onto truth-tracking’?” In practice, no, we have no non-method magic eye for truth. But that does not mean identity or vicious circularity.

It’s like a clear window and a landscape. You only see the landscape through the window, but the window isn’t the landscape. You can replace or polish the window; the hills don’t move with your squeegee.

The loop is externally constrained: prediction, intervention, replication, calibration, cross-examination, and defeater management are world-sensitive tests. When they fail, the world corrects us.

Hinges, bedrock certainties like “there is an external world,” “other minds exist,” “meanings are generally stable,” are not evidence; they are the conditions for evidence to count. They prevent regress without pretending to “prove” themselves from within. My Gödel analogy captures this logic: unprovable statements that enable the system are a feature, not a bug.

Why this isn’t “objective-in-name-only”

You’re right that objectivity matters, and I’m not smuggling in “mere social agreement.” Public criteria in this framework are geared to track reality:

Anti-false-grounds: your case for P may not essentially run through a false premise.

Practice-safety: given the domain’s recognized error profile, the same method wouldn’t easily have delivered a false belief in nearby cases.

Error-controls: replication, calibration, pre-registration, blinding, proper scoring (e.g., Brier), independent testimony, valid inference, and correct concept use.

These are norms with teeth. They preserve the independence of truth while bending methods toward it.

The tripod stays a tripod

Truth = world-constraint (not defined by our procedures).

Belief = our doxastic stance.

Justification = public rule-governed standing (anti-false-grounds; practice-safe).

Yes, the only epistemic way to reach truth is via methods, but method-dependence of access does not entail identity of property. The two legs, truth and justification, remain distinct, even as they are methodologically coupled and mutually calibrated by the way the world pushes back.

That’s my Wittgensteinian JTB: no collapse, no vicious circle, just a disciplined coupling inside hinge-enabled practices that keeps knowledge world-answerable.

I would respond the same way, whether Witt or myself.

Great question, and thanks.

Short answer: on my view, truth and genuine justification are conceptually independent but methodologically coupled. “True” says how the world is; “(genuinely) justified” says your reasons meet the public criteria of the relevant practice. They are not the same property, and neither reduces to the other, but my Wittgensteinian add-ons (public criteria, anti-false-grounds, practice-safety, and hinges) are precisely there to lock justification onto truth-tracking without collapsing them into each other.

Knowledge on my account = truth + belief + this kind of disciplined justification (public-criteria, no false grounds, practice-safe), all within the hinge-enabled framework. That gives you a clean separation of properties and a principled explanation of why good justification is not mere social agreement but a world-tracking practice aimed at truth.

Calling this “fancy wordplay” misunderstands what I’m doing. I’m not juggling synonyms; I’m tightening the spec for when “I know” is actually warranted. Disambiguating terms isn’t a rhetorical flourish; it’s how you remove failure.

When I separate epistemic “I know” from convictional “I know,” I’m not being cute with language; I’m blocking a well-known error path where confidence is mistaken for knowledge. That has operational consequences (e.g., whether we act on a claim, fund it, publish it, or treat it as settled).

When I distinguish justification from proof, I’m not hedging; I’m aligning the concept with real practices (science, law, measurement, math) where we need defeater management and anti-luck conditions, not impossibly global proofs.

When I talk about hinges, I’m not inventing mysticism; I’m displaying the enabling conditions of the game, exactly the places where attempts at global doubt collapse the practice that doubt presupposes.

Philosophy earns its keep when it sharpens the rules of the game so that good methods win and bad ones wash out. That’s what I’m doing: specifying the norm-set that separates knowledge from confidence. If someone’s theory survives these gates, public criteria, anti-false-grounds, practice-safety, defeater screening, I’m happy to call it knowledge. If it needs us to blur meanings, relax standards, or ignore failure modes, then yes, I’ll call that wordplay.

I've been working on epistemology, via Wittgenstein, for some time, and the following is my take on epistemology using Wittgensteinian methods. I believe traditional JTB excels within these parameters.

Knowledge as Justified True Belief—Situated in Language and Life
(Merging with Wittgenstein)

I want to defend a classical claim of JTB with a contemporary twist. I hold that knowledge is justified true belief. However, I will claim that JTB only becomes stable when we embed it in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy: language-games, meaning as use, family resemblances, rule-following, the beetle analogy, the private-language argument, and the hinge propositions from On Certainty. Add to this an analogy I draw from Gödel’s incompleteness results: just as formal systems require unprovable truths to function, our epistemic practices require certainties that are not proved from within the practice but make proof possible. That, in a sentence, is my picture.

Let me restate JTB simply. To know that P is to believe P, to have P be true, and to have genuine justification for P. I emphasize genuine. Much of the literature treats Gettier as a mortal wound to JTB. I don’t. Gettier cases work only if we confuse seeming justified with being justified. If the support for a true belief essentially depends on a false ground, the belief fails the J-condition, full stop. I mark this with an anti-false-grounds constraint: justification must not essentially rely on falsehood. That preserves the classical core without endless epicycles.

Now, what do I mean by justification? In practice, we justify in five primary ways (the five ways are not exhaustive), each with its own standards:

1. Testimony—we lean on credible sources, expertise, honesty, and corroboration.
2. Logic—deductive validity and inductive strength.
3. Sensory experience—trained observation, intersubjective checks, calibrated instruments.
4. Linguistic training—competent grasp of concepts and criteria; knowing how a term applies.
5. Pure logic/tautology—truths true in virtue of form.

These are not abstract algorithms floating above life. They are language-games, rule-governed practices situated in our forms of life. “What counts as a good reason here?” is answered inside the practice: replication and statistics in science, chain-of-custody and cross-examination in law, careful term use in conceptual analysis. Meaning is use: we learn what “justify,” “know,” and “evidence” do by watching how they function in these games. And because concepts work by family resemblance, I don’t hunt for one essence of justification; I look for overlapping patterns that guide our reasoning.

Two Wittgensteinian reminders guard the gates. First, the beetle in the box: meaning isn’t secured by pointing to a private inner object, “my beetle;” it’s secured by public rules of use. Second, theprivate-language argument: without public criteria for correctness, the distinction between using a word correctly and thinking I’m using it correctly evaporates. The epistemic parallel is straightforward. Being justified is not the same as feeling justified. That distinction only survives if standards are publicly learned, shared, and, crucially, open to correction.

Related to this is a small but important grammatical point. We use “I know” in two ways. There is an epistemic use, truth, belief, and justification that meets public criteria, and there is a convictional use, an expression of inner assurance. Conflating them produces two classic mistakes: dogmatism (conviction masquerading as knowledge) and hyper-skepticism (demanding maximal proof where our practices don’t require it). Keeping the senses apart does quiet philosophical work.

So far, I’ve kept to the foreground of justification. Now the background. Following On Certainty, I hold that our practices of giving and asking for reasons presuppose hinge certainties, things that “stand fast” so doubt and proof can get traction. Hinges are not items of evidence. They are the conditions under which evidence counts as evidence.

I distinguish two kinds. Linguistic hinges are certainties embedded in how we talk and understand: that words generally retain their meanings; that others understand me; that our talk of the world hooks onto a world. Non-linguistic foundational beliefs are certainties carried in stable patterns of action, pre- or non-verbal, but still beliefs in my sense, acquired and held within a form of life. For example, our practiced confidence in a stable, manipulable environment, the way ordinary engagement presupposes a world with enduring objects and reliable regularities. We do not typically state these as propositions; they are expressed in what we unhesitatingly do.

Hinges also come in layers. At the base are bedrock hinges, largely immutable without collapsing inquiry: there is an external world; other minds exist; meanings are generally stable. Remove those and you haven’t revised a theory; you’ve disabled the language-games that make reasons possible. Above bedrock are cultural–historical hinges that can shift, think of the movement from geocentrism to heliocentrism, without destroying our capacity to inquire. And then there are personal–experiential hinges, what stands fast for a particular life, which can shape what one finds immediately plausible. One more point here: testimony functions as a social hinge at the general level. If we tried to doubt testimony wholesale, science, history, education, and ordinary life would unravel. We can and should scrutinize particular reports; but general trust stands fast.

This is where my Gödel analogy enters. Gödel showed that sufficiently strong formal systems contain true statements unprovable within the system. My claim is that epistemic practice works the same way. It contains indispensable certainties unprovable within the practice. These are not defects. They are structural necessities. Both systems contain an “outside” that enables the “inside.” Hinges sit outside the inferential game yet make the game possible. In this picture, the unprovability of hinges is not a concession to dogma; it’s a sober description of how our games of reason actually function.

Let me turn this into a method you can apply.

1. Fix the language-game. What practice are we in, experimental science, legal reasoning, ordinary observation, mathematics, or conceptual analysis?

2. State the proposition precisely and register the belief state.

3. Assemble the reasons via the relevant methods: testimony, logic, experience, linguistic competence, pure logic.

4. Apply the public criteria that govern the game: credibility rules, inference standards, observational protocols, and correct concept use.

5. Screen for defeaters and enforce anti-false-grounds: if a key ground is false, justification fails.

6. Identify the operative hinges. Does the claim tacitly require denying bedrock? Which cultural or personal hinges are active? Is general trust in testimony doing enabling work here?

7. Disambiguate “I know.” Reserve the epistemic use for claims that meet public criteria; mark convictional uses honestly as conviction.

On this method, the verdict “S knows that P” states something robust: P is true; S believes P; S’s justification meets the public standards of the operative language-game; it does not essentially rely on falsehood; and it rests on, without trying to prove, the relevant hinges.

Objections come predictably. “Isn’t this relativism?” No. Truth remains mind-independent. Practices differ in criteria, but those criteria evolved to track reality, replication, cross-examination, calibration, and proof. “Isn’t this dogmatic?” No. Bedrock hinges are not arbitrary commitments; they are pragmatic necessities. Deny them, and you do not tidy up your theory; you lose the very game of giving and asking for reasons. “Isn’t it circular to presuppose what you need?” No. I do not deduce hinges; I show their role. That is a grammatical elucidation in Wittgenstein’s sense, showing the conditions under which our concepts do what we use them to do.

Why prefer this to bare JTB? Because it clarifies what “justification” amounts to in real life, public, trained, practice-relative reasons, while hardening justification against Gettier with the anti-false-grounds constraint. It explains why justification can’t be private. It ends regress without skepticism by acknowledging hinges where they belong. And it integrates language and life: knowledge isn’t a disembodied logical state, nor a private feeling; it is belief and truth joined by reasons that count within the living practices of a community, standing on certainties that enable those practices to work.

This is the theory I’m offering: classical JTB disciplined by Wittgenstein, undergirded by hinge certainties, and illuminated by a Gödelian insight. It’s not an abandonment of rigor; it is a clearer picture of where rigor lives.

In my opinion its perfectly reasonable to be skeptical in these strange scenarios. Knowledge and evidence here is to sparse substantiate anything — Apustimelogist

You're wrong about this, which shows you haven't read much on the subject. There are millions of accounts, and thousands have been corroborated. How much evidence do you want?

You make several claims here, but much of it is based on assumptions rather than established fact. I will address your points one by one.

First, on hallucinations. You are correct that hallucinations can include fragments from actual sensory input, but that is not enough to explain the best-documented NDE cases. If you want to claim that what was seen or heard was simply incorporated into a hallucination, you have to show that the sensory data was actually available to the patient at the time. In the strongest cases, the sensory channels were either blocked, physically unavailable, or nonfunctional according to monitoring equipment. Simply saying “it could have been heard” or “it could have been seen” is speculation, not evidence.

Regarding Pam Reynolds, you say she may have been semi-conscious at times. That is only a guess. The surgical records and monitoring show no such windows during the key moments she described. If you want to replace the medical record with a theory about fluctuating consciousness, you need more than a possibility. You need documented evidence that it happened in her case.

On your point about hidden-target experiments, a failed target experiment in one type of test does not erase all other corroborated cases. Those experiments test only one channel of perception under low odds of success. A patient missing a card on a high shelf does not explain multiple cases where patients described conversations, procedures, or events in other locations that were later confirmed by witnesses. Negative results in one narrow kind of test do not cancel the many corroborated accounts.

On hearing while unconscious, yes it can happen, but that is exactly why the best cases involve situations where hearing was blocked or brainstem auditory responses were absent. If you want to invoke sensory leakage in those cases, then you need to explain exactly how the information entered. What was the pathway? Was the information even spoken in the room? What was the decibel environment? Without those specifics, “maybe they overheard it” is nothing more than a fallback guess.

On subconscious sensory leakage in general, this has become an all-purpose explanation that is applied to any NDE account no matter the circumstances. Because it can always be invoked and can never be conclusively ruled out, it is an unfalsifiable claim. An explanation that cannot in principle be proven wrong is not scientific. If you think leakage explains a case, you must provide specific conditions under which it happened and show how the information was transmitted. Otherwise, you are just asserting a possibility without evidence.

On science, I am not dismissing its value. What I reject is the double standard in how testimony is treated. Science relies heavily on testimony in countless fields, from medicine to astronomy to history. Saying “science has always proven NDE survival false” is an assertion that requires details. Which hypothesis? Which study? Did it address the strongest, most corroborated cases? Without specifics, this is not an argument; it is a claim.

On correlation versus causation, your confidence in saying that neuroscience has gone “far beyond correlation” ignores that in some NDEs, consciousness appears to function when cortical activity is absent or severely compromised. If brain function were the sole cause of consciousness, this should not occur. The radio analogy is still apt: altering the receiver changes the output but does not prove it generates the signal.

On Eben Alexander, your point that low neocortical function should not limit consciousness is undermined by the fact that his cortex was severely impaired by bacterial meningitis. If you believe that subcortical structures can produce the level of complexity and narrative structure in his account, you need to provide evidence that they were active and capable of doing so at that time. Otherwise, it is another speculation.

Regarding timing, in the most evidential cases, the reported perceptions are tied to medical logs and monitoring data showing absent brain activity. If you believe there was a burst of consciousness during those periods, then identify it in the record. If you cannot, your explanation remains hypothetical.

On false memories, many NDE accounts are recorded immediately after the event and are corroborated by independent witnesses. The idea that stress-induced vividness explains them fails to account for why these vivid experiences so often contain accurate information that could not have been obtained normally.

Finally, on testimony, this is not a weak or inferior form of evidence. In law, medicine, and history, firsthand, corroborated testimony is considered valid and often decisive. To strip it of evidential value in this one domain is to apply a double standard. In cases where the testimony is specific, independently confirmed, and time-locked to periods of absent brain function, speculation is not a rebuttal.

Actually some of your criticisms about hallucinations are correct. I have to do more proof reading and editing. However, other criticisms I disagree with and will respond later.

The argument doesn't stand or fall on that analogy, but it does seem to fit the testimonial evidence.

I'm not sure, but I was thinking of adding not only a chapter that answers the critics, but a chapter that includes a fictional courtroom debate. It would look like the following:

Prosecution Neuroscientist – Dr. Karen Miles (Opening Statement)

“Members of the jury, my task is not to debate philosophy, but to explain what the brain can do — especially under conditions of trauma, oxygen loss, and anesthesia.

The Defense wants you to think of the brain as a light switch, either fully on or fully off. But in reality, brain function is more like a city during a blackout: the main grid can go down while small neighborhoods still flicker with power. The instruments we use to monitor brain activity, like EEGs, are powerful, but they aren't omniscient. A flatline doesn't guarantee the total absence of all neural activity, especially in deeper structures that are harder to measure.

We also know that certain physiological states can produce vivid, structured experiences. Oxygen deprivation can trigger tunnel vision and bright lights. Temporal lobe discharges can evoke life reviews, intense emotions, and a sense of leaving one’s body. Anesthetic awareness, rare but documented, can allow a patient to perceive fragments of their surroundings while appearing fully unconscious.

So when an NDEr reports seeing an instrument or hearing a phrase, we must consider: could it have been perceived through residual sensory channels or reconstructed afterward from memory fragments? Could the emotional weight of the event have amplified recall or altered perception?

I'm not here to call anyone a liar. But as a neuroscientist, I know the brain is capable of creating convincing realities under extraordinary stress. Testimony, no matter how sincere, must be weighed against what we know of these mechanisms before we conclude it points to a mind separate from the brain.”

Defense Neuroscientist – Dr. Elena Marquez (Opening Statement)

“Ladies and gentlemen, let’s talk about data, not speculation.

The Prosecution has just outlined mechanisms that can produce certain NDE-like features. And yes, those mechanisms exist. But when we look closely at the strongest cases, those explanations fall apart.

Take the ‘flicker of power’ analogy. In multiple well-documented instances, patients have shown no measurable brainstem or cortical activity, no reflexes, no response to stimuli, no brainstem auditory evoked potentials, yet later gave accounts containing accurate, verifiable details from the operating room. In some cases, those accounts cover events that occurred during periods when the heart was stopped and the brain was cooled to the point of electrical silence.

Residual hearing? Then explain how blind patients describe visual scenes accurately, details confirmed by medical staff. Oxygen deprivation? That tends to produce confusion, not coherent narratives with verifiable elements. Anesthetic awareness? That would require an intact working memory to store those perceptions, yet these events occur during periods when the brain’s memory circuits are demonstrably offline.

Here is the epistemological point: when testimony is corroborated by independent physical evidence, surgical records, multiple staff reports, and timestamps, it meets the same standard of reliability used in criminal trials and medical diagnostics. And when the best neuroscientific models cannot account for that corroboration, we are not dealing with mere anecdotes. We are dealing with anomalies that demand an open-minded explanation.

Science advances when it takes anomalous data seriously. To ignore these cases, or to explain them away with mechanisms that don’t fit the facts, is not science; it’s preservation of a worldview at the expense of the evidence.”

(This would include not only neuroscientists on both sides, but philosophers on both sides. What do you think?)

Deleted - wrong thread. lol

You seem to be arguing that because the brain is complex, consciousness must be a function of the brain. It could just mean that complexity is needed to house consciousness. You're assuming that because the brain is complex, consciousness must be produced by it. That’s a non sequitur. Complexity doesn’t automatically tell us about the origin of a function, only that the system performs it in some way. A complex receiver doesn’t generate the signal it receives; it processes and interacts with it.

:up:

If it's an evasion it is not my evasion. I can be proven wrong, because I assume there is no life after death. If there is life after death I will be proven wrong. I will never be convinced by the kind of testimonial evidence you are convinced by. But that's OK―there is no strict measure of plausibility, and we all believe what we personally find most plausible. I just don't think it's that important―I think what is important is living this life the best way we can, which in my view involves accepting the reality of our ignorance in those matters where reliable knowledge is impossible. — Janus

You say you “can be proven wrong” because if there’s life after death, you’ll find out. But that’s not the same as being epistemically open to being proven wrong now, while we’re talking about the evidence. Waiting for personal post-mortem confirmation is a way of dodging every opportunity to examine the data in the here and now. That’s the kind of evasion I was pointing to, not whether the afterlife itself could eventually confront you.

You also say you will “never be convinced” by the kind of testimonial evidence I’m citing. That’s not a neutral statement—that’s a declaration that no amount of corroborated, independently verified, cross-cultural, repeatedly observed testimony will ever count for you. That’s not just “different plausibility thresholds.” That’s closing the door on an entire category of evidence before weighing it. If you really think “reliable knowledge is impossible” here, then you’ve made your conclusion first and your epistemology second.

And I get that you think the bigger point is “living this life the best way we can.” I’m with you on that as a moral priority. But this isn’t just idle metaphysics; it matters for how we understand identity, consciousness, ethics, medicine, and even grief. If the evidence suggests consciousness isn’t fully extinguished at death, that’s not a trivial footnote, it’s a seismic fact about what it means to be human. Saying “it’s not important” sounds less like humility and more like a way of keeping the question at arm’s length so it doesn’t disturb the framework you’ve already settled into.

I’m not asking you to agree with me—I’m asking you to acknowledge that the evidence exists and that dismissing it wholesale is a choice, not a necessity. Choosing to live with “the reality of our ignorance” should mean keeping the file open, not declaring the case unanswerable before you’ve read it.

Anyway, thanks for your responses, Janus.

It's an inductive argument, I don't know with absolute certainty, but I know with a high degree of confidence that we survive.

Janus, you’re basically saying that no matter what evidence is presented, you’ll still hold to “there could be some other explanation.” That’s not an evidence-based position; that’s a self-sealing stance. If the standard is “I must personally experience it,” then you’ve set a bar that rules out most of what you already believe about history, science, and even your own life. You didn’t personally witness the Big Bang, World War II, or the formation of Mount Everest, but you accept those as realities because the convergence of evidence is strong.

As for “misremembering, collusion, or fabrication”—those are always possible, but possible in the same way they’re possible in eyewitness testimony for any event. That’s why corroborated NDE cases matter. When you have medical staff verifying details the patient couldn’t have known—down to objects, conversations, or actions outside their line of sight—you can’t just wave that away as “maybe collusion.” Could it happen? Sure. But when it happens again and again across unrelated people, cultures, and settings, the possibility of deception stops being a serious explanation and starts looking like an escape hatch.

Youu say survival is “implausible given what is known about the brain.” But what if what we “know” is simply incomplete? Medical history is full of once-implausible realities, germ theory, organ transplants, and quantum mechanics. Implausibility isn’t an argument, it’s just a measure of how far a claim sits outside our current framework. And the whole point of evidence is that, sometimes, it forces us to stretch that framework.

I also hear you say you’re “not all that interested” because you can’t change whatever the truth is. But this isn’t just metaphysical curiosity, it’s about what kind of beings we are, what we mean by “life” and “death,” and how we shape ethics, medicine, and meaning in light of that. You can do something about it: you can hold your beliefs responsibly, in proportion to the evidence, and without letting disinterest be a substitute for doubt.

And finally, the line about never being proven wrong if there’s nothing after death? That’s not an advantage, it’s an evasion. The real question is: are you willing to examine the evidence without protecting your conclusions in advance? If the answer is no, then the conversation isn’t really about evidence, it’s about comfort.

My book deals with this in a way no other book has. I look at it from an epistemological point of view.

I wouldn't be writing a book if I hadn't thought through this material.