The demagogue expresses the society’s zeitgeist.

I think this is somewhat misleading. The demagogue taps into the dissatisfaction of some portion of society and promises to fix things. In part he does this by setting up a scapegoat. Eliminate the scapegoat and you eliminate the problem.

Unfortunately, and I think inadvertently, Hedges contributes to the problem when he says such things as:

Biden and the Democratic Party are responsible for this zeitgeist. They orchestrated the deindustrialization of the United States, ensuring that 30 million workers lost their jobs in mass layoffs.

Is there a generally agreed upon cause of deindustrialization? Has it been clearly shown that Biden and the Democratic party are responsible? Why does Hedges blame the Democrats?

Elsewhere he says:

What you really got was the transformation of the Democratic party into the Republican party.

When he blames democrats for becoming republicans I take it he is doing two things. The first is historical analysis. The second is to tell democrats that they have lost their way and need to reorient themselves. But things might look quite different when he places the blame at the feet of the Democratic party. This might be taken and used as a sound bite endorsement of the Republicans.

Trump is not only part of the establishment, he is the Republican wing of the establishment. The Republican Party is Trump. Trump is the Republican Party. Any daylight between then has vanished.

was Socrates literate? — isomorph

In the Phaedo he is putting some of Aesop's writings to verse. It is possible that he was working from memory from what he heard from others reading Aesop aloud, but there is no indication, as far as I am aware, that anyone else was writing down the verses he made for him.

Perhaps more importantly, he was literate in the sense of being able to discuss the writings of others.

There is no 'the good' in Aristotelian ethics and, consequently, there is no universal good which all species are geared towards. — Bob Ross

I will defer to Joe Sachs, a leading scholar and translator of Aristotle:

Aristotle asks about the way the various meanings of the good are organized, but he immediately drops the question, as being more at home in another sort of philosophic inquiry. (1096b, 26-32) It is widely claimed that Aristotle says there is no good itself, or any other form at all of the sort spoken of in Plato's dialogues. This is a misreading of any text of Aristotle to which it is referred. Here in the study of ethics it is a failure to see that the idea of the good is not rejected simply, but only held off as a question that does not arise as first for us. Aristotle praises Plato for understanding that philosophy does not argue from first principles but toward them.(1095a, 31-3)

("Three Little Words")

What Aristotle says in the passage cited from Nicomachean Ethics is:

Perhaps however this question must be dismissed for the present, since a detailed investigation of it belongs more properly to another branch of philosophy. And likewise with the Idea of the Good; for even if the goodness predicated of various in common really is a unity or something existing separately and absolute, it clearly will not be practicable or attainable by man; but the Good which we are now seeking is a good within human reach.

As previous pointed out and regarded by you as not relevant is that ethics is about the human good. The good for nature as a whole transcends the human good or the good of any other species. Its energeia and entelecheia, its "being at work" and "being at work staying itself" are for the sake of itself. It is its own arche and telos. Its own source or beginning and its own end or purpose. Whatever aims for some end or purpose aims for some good.

What happened to Sanders during 2016 was pretty wild. Hands down he would have won, but, the Clinton's wanted it their way and look what we got... — Shawn

It is not at all clear that Bernie would have won. He is a "socialist" and this scares lots of voters. To them the qualification 'democratic' socialist does not matter. Although Clinton won the popular vote, the states in which she lost are the states that are strongly opposed to socialism.

The irony is that many of the same people who oppose socialism because they equate it with government control are if favor of autocracy. The power of the demagogue to persuade the people!

Thank for that. A powerful, factual based ad. I don't know how effective it would be today. The Trumpsters just don't care. They believe he is their savior and either overlook his faults or think it is all liberal lies. Those who are less fanatical may regard it as a trade-off they are willing to accept. Perhaps there are still enough voters who have not made up their mind who might be swayed.

There's a big difference between managing the job for the 5 months and managing the job for 53 more months, should he have been reelected. — BC

This seems so obvious that should not need to be said ... but evidently and unfortunately it does.

This is contrary to Aristotle's understanding of nature

How so? — Bob Ross

The whole of nature and each organism in the hierarchical order of species works toward maintaining that order according to its nature. But it is not just any order, it has as its end, according to Aristotle, the good. A species whose sole purpose is to cause harm can play no role in this well ordered whole.

It's just incomplete. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, I agree.

Thoughts about Kamala Harris? — Shawn

I don't know if she would be the best candidate in terms of electability or capability but she is certainly preferable to Orange Jesus.

The problem as I see it is that his arguments (if they can be called that) for rejecting private rule following don't seem to limit the problem to private rule following. They apply equally to public rule following. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't understand the shift from the problem private rule following to public rule following.

"from whence rules? — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think the answer is one that you seem to reject - convention. Given our species nature the rules from one group to another will have much in common based on our needs and characteristics as a species.

Presumably, if nature "follows rules" it is in a way that is at best analogous to how we follow them. — Count Timothy von Icarus

One fundamental difference is that we can choose to follow certain rules or not.

Why do disparate cultures that developed in relative isolation often develop similar rules? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Speaking generally, as a social species it is likely that there are norms of living together that promote the success of the group. These can be codified, but I do not think they are the result of prior agreement between members of the group. Other social species have their own rules and norms.

It is a species that, as per its nature, can only achieve a deep and persistent sense of happiness, flourishing, and well-being by committing egregious acts on other species (e.g., torture, abuse, mass genocide, etc.). — Bob Ross

This is contrary to Aristotle's understanding of nature. Since the thread is based on your claim that:

Aristotle is avoiding this glaring issue — Bob Ross

you should not be avoiding what he says about nature and telos. for when they are taken into account there is no glaring issue that he is avoiding. For Aristotle the nature and telos of a species is in accord with the whole of nature.

Per Wittgenstein, they can't be sure that they ever understand a rule. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I do not think he is a skeptic with regard to rule following. There is, for example, a right way of following the rules of addition. If someone does not add correctly they are corrected. If someone makes a move in chess that violates the rules they are corrected. It does not matter what they might or might not understand as long as what they do follows the established rules. But it would be quite odd if someone did not understand the rules and yet consistently acted in accordance with them.

5.1361 The events of the future cannot be inferred from those of the present. Superstition is the belief in the causal nexus.

There is a difference between human beings acting in compliance with established rules and the question of whether nature obeys rules. It makes sense to say that if someone does not follow the rules of a game she may be playing a different game, but does it make sense to say that if the sun does not rise tomorrow it is playing a different game?

Hence he could never really pin down rules outside of "custom," which in turn leaves them floating free from the world in an infinite sea of "possible rules." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Are you claiming that there are transcendent, fixed, eternal laws that human beings should follow that Wittgenstein fails to account for? One possibility might be prohibitions against killing, but although I would not say that there is an infinite sea of possible rules regarding killing, distinctions are made with regard to such things as species, war, self-defense, and euthanasia, and on which side one comes down on has not been adequately determined. None of this should be placed at the feet of Wittgenstein.

They're discussed in terms of speech acts and gesturing towards new ways of seeing though, right? There's little psychology in it. Or to put it better, the only things he seems interested in are those elements of perception which are mediated by not just involving acts of speech. The eye under the aspect of language. — fdrake

I think that he is trying to clear away conceptual misunderstanding that stand in the way of seeing. In the Tractatus seeing/showing is clearly distinguished from saying/propositional thinking. In his later works the distinction is blurred. What we say can influence what we see and what we see can influence what we say. His talk of possibilities is about new ways of thinking and seeing:

… our investigation is directed not towards phenomena, but rather, as one might say, towards the ‘possibilities’ of phenomena.

(PI 90)

The name “philosophy” might also be given to what is possible before all new discoveries and inventions.

(PI 126)

The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice something a because it is always before one’s eyes.) The real foundations of their inquiry do not strike people at all. Unless that fact has at some time struck them. And this means: we fail to be struck by what, once seen, is most striking and most powerful.

(129)

You can use Wittgenstein's ideas as a line in the sand between philosophical and non-philosophical use of thought - what counts as bewitched and right thinking. — fdrake

I agree. It can be used as a blunt instrument or where it is an inappropriate instrument, but we can and should consider whether the expectations and demands put on terms is appropriate. This leaves unaddressed the problem whether "ordinary everyday language" can lead to bewitchment as well.

More broadly, I think the emphasis on language can lead us to overlook something fundamental to Wittgenstein, namely, the distinction and connection between saying and showing or seeing, which remains throughout his writings, as can be seen it his discussions of such things as seeing aspects, aspect blindness, seeing-as, and seeing connections.

We find certain things about seeing puzzling, because we do not find the whole business of seeing puzzling enough.

(Philosophy of Psychology - A Fragment. [aka Part II of Philosophical Investigations] 251)

The concept of an aspect is related to the concept of imagination.
In other words, the concept ‘Now I see it as . . .’ is related to ‘Now I am imagining that’.
Doesn’t it take imagination to hear something as a variation on a
particular theme? And yet one does perceive something in so hearing it.

(254)

Seeing an aspect and imagining are subject to the will. There is
such an order as “Imagine this!”, and also, “Now see the figure like
this!”; but not “Now see this leaf green!”.

(256)

The question now arises: Could there be human beings lacking the ability to see something as something a and what would that be like?
What sort of consequences would it have? —– Would this defect be comparable to colour-blindness, or to not having absolute pitch? a We will call it “aspect-blindness” a and will now consider what might be meant by this. (A conceptual investigation.)

(257)

Aspect-blindness will be akin to the lack of a ‘musical ear’.

260)

The importance of this concept lies in the connection between the concepts of seeing an aspect and of experiencing the meaning of a word. For we want to ask, “What would someone be missing if he did not experience the meaning of a word?

(261)

That the party is not able to coordinate an effective response to Biden's flagging mental state is damning, especially since it's an entirely predictable scenario. — Echarmion

It may be more of a matter of not having yet coordinated a effective response than of not being able to, but that is not a prediction.

the Republican agenda going forward will be to put Trump allies in all corners of the civil service including the Pentagon so the next time Trump wants help, nobody is pushing back. There won't be a coup. — frank

A quiet bloodless coup? Or a fundamental shift in our understanding of how the world works and our role in it? Or perhaps the movement of popular public opinion that can change with the wind?

If it's a misrepresentation it's not Grayling's, since he is commenting on efforts by some "Wittgensteinians, to clarify what Wittgenstein's philosophy entails." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Perhaps, but as I said it is a matter of:

... the enterprise of creating such problems for how Wittgenstein is read — Fooloso4

The problem remains and he is a part of it. We cannot exclude what Wittgenstein said from the problems other manufacture from what he said.

My personal opinion is that Wittgenstein's work is too vague to decide this issue. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I would include Plato and Aristotle, as evidenced by the continued and varied amount of work on them.

As he says in the preface to PI:

I should not like my writing to spare other people the trouble of thinking. But if possible, to stimulate someone to thoughts of his own.

It could, of course, be argued that this is what those who generate these problems are doing. There is, however, a difference between creating pseudo-problems and the problems of thinking that Wittgenstein is addressing. Although he has his doubts as to what he will accomplish

in the darkness of this time

he holds to the hope that his work might:

bring light into one brain or another

To this end, much of what he does is to clear away what occludes our ability to see.

Wittgenstein's concept of "forms of life" in his later philosophy is infamously vague, despite doing a lot of heavy lifting. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Despite the theories about forms of life, I do not think it is vague unless one treats it as a theory. He has no theory about forms of life, he is simply pointing beyond language as something existing in and of itself to our being in the world and all that entails conceptually and practically. The boundaries between one way of life and another or one practice and another are not fixed and immutable.

With regard to "cognitive relativism", Grayling says:

In effect this means that the concepts in question are not concepts of truth and the rest, as we usually wish to understand them, but concepts of opinion and belief.

Unless some "tribe" (a favorite thought example of Wittgenstein) is in possession of the truth itself and the rest itself, we are dealing with opinions and beliefs held at that time and place to be true. The truth is, we are not in possession of the whole of the immutable truth. Throughout history human beings have held things to be true that turn out not to be. This is not something to be solves by attacks on the truth of relativism so understood.

We could debate whether Wittgenstein really was such a relativist. What I wanted to point out though is that, if he does embrace the more relativistic reading, he essentially undermines his entire later philosophy. — Count Timothy von Icarus

On my reading, what Grayling is doing is creating problems that do not exist in Wittgenstein's work. He is, of course, not alone in the enterprise of creating such problems for how Wittgenstein is read and subsequently discussed and written about. If Grayling is wrong, and I think he is, then the only thing that is undermined is what follows from this false picture.

What is the point? If we are to exclude the question of whether Grayling misrepresents Wittgenstein then are we to take seriously other misrepresentations however misguided they may be? Wittgenstein drops out of the picture.

Although I was not included in your illustrious list I will comment anyway.

I agree with him regarding "democracy by the polls", but the concern about Biden's current abilities is not simply a matter of what the polls say. I also agree with his criticism of the press, but the press plays a less significant role when a propaganda machine has a significant portion of the population believing that what it tells them is the news and the truth. Lichtman's track record on prediction election outcomes is impressive but I am not confident that Biden will win or that the attempt to get him to step down is self-destructive.

Based on his evaluation of this administration's performance his prediction might have been right up until the debate, Biden's past performance does not matter if he is no longer capable of performing as well as he once did.

But would it be morally intuitive to say that a social species that maintains their society by torturing another social species as doing something 'good'? That's what is implied by Aristotelian ethics if the social species requires it to fulfill their nature. — Bob Ross

What is it to be a member of this species? Is it to torture other species? By saying they do so to maintain their society implies that it is a means to an end and not an end in itself. If there were no external threats from another social species would they continue to torture other species? In a
Aristotle's terms, is the energeia and entelecheia of this species to torture other species? Does it cease to be when it is not torturing other species?

Are you talking about what we think is 'true' for ourselves? — Amity

I was referring to Nietzsche's claim about "real philosophers".

Fooloso4 - I think we discussed the meaning of Socrates last words in your thread?
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/10914/platos-phaedo/p1 — Amity

From page 12 of that thread:

Much has been written about what this means. Asclepius is the god of medicine. This suggests that there has been a cure or recovery. Some interpret this to mean that Socrates has been cured of the disease of life. But he says “we” not “I”.

In the center of the dialogue Phaedo said that they had been “healed” of their distress and readiness to abandon argument. (89a) In other words, Socrates saved them from misologic,about which he said "there is no greater evil than hating arguments". (89d)

There is one other mention of illness. In the beginning when we are told that Plato was ill. We are not told the nature of the illness that kept him away, but we know he recovered. Perhaps he too was cured of misologic. Rather than giving up on philosophy he went on to make the “greatest music”. Misologic is at the center of the problem, framed by Plato’s illness and the offer to Asclepius. And perhaps conquering the greatest evil is in the end a good reason to regard this as a comedy rather than a tragedy.

↪Fooloso4 Correct, but that is irrelevant to the OP. — Bob Ross

Of course it's relevant! It is not a "glaring issue" that Aristotle is avoiding. The question of the ethics of a species that is by its nature unethical makes no sense. It is asking how something bad is good.

Since Aristotle is attaching the 'goodness' or 'badness' of a thing relative to its nature, wouldn't it follow that a rational species, S, which had a nature completely anti-thetical to justice and altruism be a 'good' S IFF it was unjust and egoistic? — Bob Ross

What is the relation between nature and the nature of a species? Can they be at odds?

presumably "demon men" would be rational as well — Count Timothy von Icarus

What do we know of this imagined demon species? Why assume that they are men? Why assume that they are rational? See the following in reply to Bob Ross.

what about a devil species? — Bob Ross

Aristotle's ethics is about the human good, not some imagined devil species.

How is that pointing in the right direction? — Amity

In the Republic the education of the philosopher consists of gymnastics and music. That music is in large part appropriate stories. This education does not include philosophy. That comes later for those few with the right temperament and maturity. The developmental stages do not include the quest for the truth. The "truth" as it is given moves from stories to mathematics, from what is told to them as true to what can be demonstrated as true.

Our relation to the truth has changed. This is reflected in your statement:

I really don't find it easy to talk about the Big Truth or little truths as something to aim for. — Amity

And so, your question:

It isn't always about a desire for truth, is it? — Amity

is not so simple. Whether or not we might think the truth is or is not preferable, we do not have a choice, unless perhaps we live in a closed, sheltered society.

The talk of 'real philosophers' suggests that is a 'truth' for him. — Amity

We might look at this in different ways. As a truth for him, this might be regarded as merely his perspective, no more or less true than others. But perspectives are for him of great importance and not to be dismissed simply as one way of seeing things rather than some alternative. Perspectivism is additive. Not a matter of either this one or that one, but of what can be gained from seeing things this way or that way or this way and that way.

We need to consider what he means when he says that real philosophers are commanders and law-givers and whether or not it is true. It is in this way not simply a truth for him. In order to test this we need to look at how certain thinkers and ideas have influenced the way we think, what we believe, and how we live.

In so far as he intends to influence the philosophers who come after him, we might regard this as the story he tells them. If they are to be philosophers, what are their responsibilities to others both now and in the future? If, to use Plato's imagery, they are to be puppet-masters and opinion makers, what stories are they to tell?

where's your dedication, man? — Amity

I have limited time and energy. I am not sure where I will spend it, but it probably will not with Cicero.

Is that what you meant? — Amity

Yes. I don't think the need to hide, however, is for us at this moment something necessary, but that may change in the next few years.

It depends on what you mean by 'the philosopher'. — Amity

I mean the philosopher in the context of the education of the philosopher in the Republic.

It isn't always about a desire for truth, is it? I really don't find it easy to talk about the Big Truth or little truths as something to aim for. — Amity

I think Nietzsche points in the right direction:

He identifies three deadly truths:

... the doctrines of sovereign becoming, of the fluidity of all concepts, types and species, of the lack of any cardinal distinction between man and animals

(Nietzsche, Untimely Meditations)

These doctrines are the antithesis of what are often regarded as key Platonic doctrines based on immutable kinds or forms, which are key to the education of philosopher.

It is not simply that we do not always desire the truth, but that certain truths should be hidden, because they can be harmful.

That these truths are deadly may seem odd to us because:

“No one dies of fatal truths nowadays: there are too many antidotes.” (Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits)

That anything should remain hidden seems to us antithetical to free and open inquiry. But free and open inquiry is not value neutral. Plato's noble lies are not simply a political expedient. We have paid a price for "deadly truth". That what was long held out as the truth may not be the truth is a hard truth to accept. It can leave us rudderless.

On the question of the philosopher Nietzsche says:

The real philosophers, however, are commanders and law-givers ...

(BGE 211)

Accordingly, most who study and write on philosophy are not philosophers. He reserves the title for the rare, exception individuals who shape and determine our lives.

Have you read all of the Tusculan Disputations? — Amity

Most of it I have not read.

Is it a form of nostalgia? — Amity

I think the last line I quoted is important:

... and argue so as to conceal my own opinion ...

Justice Thomas wrote a separate bit in the recent immunity decision aimed at Special Counsels and Cannon received the lateral pass and ran with it. — Paine

Thomas did give it unofficial authority but I don't think it is a new argument. I think she is complicit in the Trump run out the clock strategy. The timing of her decision does not seem to me to be merely coincidental.

Is this something that just occurred to Cannon or was just brought to her attention or ...?

I can’t see how that can be construed as ‘theology’. — Wayfarer

I hope Paine will not mind me jumping in. When you say:

In Aristotle and Other Platonists, Gerson proposed a positive characterization of the tradition, as comprising seven key themes: 1. The universe has a systematic unity; 2. This unity reflects an explanatory hierarchy and in particular a “top-down” approach to explanation (as opposed to the “bottom-up” approach of naturalism), especially in the two key respects that the simple is prior to the complex and the intelligible is prior to the sensible; 3. The divine constitutes an irreducible explanatory category, and is to be conceived of in personal terms (even if in some Ur-Platonist thinkers the personal aspect is highly attenuated); — Join the Ur-Platonist Alliance!

What is at the top of this top down hierarchy? Is the intelligible dependent on an intelligible being? What is the divine which constitutes an irreducible explanatory category? Earlier in the thread you said:

'The gods' are, of course, those of the Greek pantheon, but from comparative religion, we learn that have much in common with the other Indo-European cultures, so there are parallels with the Indian pantheon. But in this case, they represent 'the divine' — Wayfarer

What does it mean to conceive of the divine in personal terms?

Whose words are they? Second-hand Socrates? Who is the audience and how will they be persuaded by whatever message the author is attempting to convey. — Amity

Some of the myths are probably Plato's own, but Socrates credits the ancients of different cultures. Some take themes, such as the afterlife and recollection, which Socrates says are hearsay., that is, things he has heard but has no first hand experience of. I think this relates to the question of who the audience is. The philosopher who desires the truth will not take these stories as true, but as part of her education they may be suitable.

To question is also to challenge the status quo. — Amity

That is true. Socrates does question in order to challenge.

In the interpretive tradition of the Midrash, questioning is a mode of understanding. This may come as a surprise to those who have been taught not to question scripture.

The Stoics revered Socrates, but that Socrates wasn't the Socrates of Plato.

From Cicero:

But Socrates was the first who brought down philosophy from the heavens, placed it in cities, introduced it into families, and obliged it to examine into life and morals, and good and evil. And his different methods of discussing questions, together with the variety of his topics, and the greatness of his abilities, being immortalized by the memory and writings of Plato, gave rise to many sects of philosophers of different sentiments, of all which I have principally adhered to that one which, in my opinion, Socrates himself followed; and argue so as to conceal my own opinion ...

(Tusculan Disputations, Book V, IV)

So if everything is divine, then the word means nothing. Is that the drift of the argument? That 'the divine' has no referent? — Wayfarer

Some things are not everything. In that short list three things are referred to as divine.


The behavior of the gods in the Greek pantheon seems to be problematic as a model.

'What is a Socratic philosopher?' — Amity

As I understand it, a Socratic philosopher is one who knows he does not know and thus devotes her life to inquiry. Some hold to the assumption that to question is to deny, but it can be a mode of inquiry, an attempt to understand.

It seems we have to go through a great deal of hellishness and deterioration of lives and services until rock bottom is reached. Before we can begin to climb out. — Amity

Wittgenstein said:

When you are philosophizing you have to descend into primeval chaos and feel at home there.

(Culture and Value)

I started a thread Wittgenstein the Socratic a few months ago. I do not think that Socrates was tormented by indeterminacy, but early on Wittgenstein was. He eventually came to see that the need for complete clarity was misguided.

Is this more subjective than objective? — Amity

I would not put it in those terms, but do think there are differences in character and @Tom Storm temperament that play a role.

It's strange but when I read 'Socratic philosopher', I was thinking of Stoicism. — Amity

Not so strange.

Is it about taking Socrates as a role model? Or the use of Socratic questioning? — Amity

Maybe a role model for questioning. His single-minded devotion, however, could only be suited to someone who shares that devotion.

'The gods' are, of course, those of the Greek pantheon — Wayfarer

Are they? I would think that Plotinus would agree with Socrates' criticism of the gods in Euthyphro.

The knowledge of which he speaks is rooted in revealed truth — Wayfarer

In the tradition of the Greek poets, the gods are credited as the author of the poet's works.

But I notice references to the divine ('the devas') in many of the excepts being discussed in the thread in ancient philosophy. — Wayfarer

In the Sophist Theodorus says with regard to the Stranger:

Indeed, the man does not seem to me to be a god at all, though he is certainly divine. For I refer to all philosophers as divine.

(216b-c)

In the Phaedo Socrates calls Homer divine. In the Iliad Homer call salt divine (9.214)

Has the philosopher outgrown the need for stories?
— Fooloso4

I'm not entirely sure what this quesion involves. Isn't human knowledge a story, or a series of interrelated, overlapping narratives? Can you say some more on this? — Tom Storm

The closing question relates to the opening question. Although it is not meant to close off but open up further consideration. What one expects from philosophy may determine how one thinks about the place of stories. I agree with you regarding narrative. The opening question is an invitation to narrative reflection.

Do you mean our knowledge and understanding could just as well degenerate as improve? — Janus

As it moves toward something, for example, the quest for certainty or linguistic analysis, it moves away from something vital to philosophy, the examined life.

It is the current state of political affairs that most concerns me. Does being a 'Socratic philosopher' help? — Amity

I don't know. Help in what way?

From the Republic:

Now, those who belong to this small group [those who are worthy to consort with philosophy] have tasted the sweetness and blessedness of this possession, and can also see the madness of the multitude quite well, realising that in a sense no one does anything reasonable in the conduct of civic affairs, nor is there an ally with whom a man could go to the aid of justice and still survive. Instead, he is like a man who has fallen in with wild animals, has no desire to conspire in wrongdoing but is not up to the task of resisting all their savagery, a man who will perish before he is of any benefit to the city or his friends, and would be of no use to himself or anyone else. Having understood all this through reflection, he is at peace, and attends to his own affairs, like a man in a storm of wind-driven dust and rain who crouches beneath a low wall. And seeing that all else is crammed full of lawlessness, he is content if somehow he can live this life here purified of injustice and unholy deeds, and take his departure with good hope, gracious and kindly as he goes.” (496 a-e)