Please permit me to backtrack:

My position at present is one for consideration of the boundaries which serve to constrain yet inhere within the breadth of all understanding — Vessuvius

.......all manner of understanding is bound (...), in contrast with that of an array of certain conceptions (...) on which it is predicated in full, which needn't themselves be grounded in the experiential as each must be held distinctly, a priori, independent of whether either be conceived, beforehand((and are thus in a discrete sense, boundless;transcendent(al?). — Vessuvius

The “array of certain conceptions” which “serve to constrain” the understanding within its logical bounds, are the categories, which are transcendental in their derivation, but not in their employment. The categories themselves are discrete but not boundless, there are but twelve after all, even if the objects which may be assigned to them, are. Metaphysicians from Aristotle onward grant the theoretical necessity and logical veracity of the categories, as sufficient means for the possibility of human empirical knowledge.
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The sum of our every faculty constituted thereof can yield only series' of representations which are to be vindicated through the acuity with which the appearance of each stands to reflect upon that to which it would pertain........ — Vessuvius

A.K.A., experience(?);

.........

Yet, herein rests an intrinsic fault if one is to have hope to speak of the world as it is, truly, which is itself to lie in vain, inasmuch as one be bound by the requisite for such faculties of mind to discern either. — Vessuvius

Yes, because experience is never complete and therefore induction, both given by the faculties of the mind, is itself entirely insufficient for determinations of “the world as it is, truly”.

The alternative is to theorize that our representations actually do conform to the world as it truly is, re: direct realism, and such and sundry external world explanatory speculations.
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Ever onward.

The modalities with which reason be conveyed, are neither more nor less tangible in form, and procedure, than the domain of mathematical thought — Vessuvius

Not sure what to do with this. Mathematical thought is reason exemplified, that is to say, mathematical thought does not exist without reason. Indeed no thought whatsoever exists without reason. Reason and thought are the same thing. It follows that reason said to be neither more nor less tangible in form and procedure than mathematical thought, is analytically true, but nonetheless entirely redundant.

If by modality is meant method of expression, or mode of presence, re: existence, then I suppose it could be said the conveyance of reason has no more or less tangibility than mathematical thought, for each is every bit as intangible in its strictest sense as the other. One glaring difficulty herein would be the fact that mathematical thought, while predicated on a priori conceptions, depends necessarily on experience for its proof, whereas pure reason, even by definitions alone regardless of its implicit content, cannot abide any empirical proof at all.
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Hence the prohibition imposed, for the sake of knowledge.......((is of tenuous ground as it imposes synthetic restrictions on reason, rather than permitting it to remain in its natural state, and inquiry, as to that same form by means of itself)).

Perhaps, if it were not for the availability of knowledge, the denial or contradiction of which leads to absurdities. All there needs be is an instance or series of instances of apodictic certainty, within the confines of the human cognitive system, for which the basis of constructive criticism of reason itself can stand on good ground. Permitting reason to subsist in its natural state invites imagination to overpower experience and while there is little to prevent any rational subject from relying on one or the other, he absolutely cannot do both simultaneously with respect to the same cognition. Besides, imagination carried too far inexorably becomes the irrational.
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Preservation of constancy in understanding, and reason by consequence, can be attained, without conceding to that of the intention upon which you have hitherto come to act; — Vessuvius

You are invited to inform me as to how this is to be accomplished, bearing in mind constancy in understanding is the norm for Everydayman, if by no other means than the innocuous methodology of mere habit, or miserly convention, re: Hume, and only comes to the fore in metaphysical inquiries.

Oh. Almost forgot: reason is not the consequence of understanding; it is understanding that is the consequence of reason. Obviously.....we always reason toward our understanding, which is nothing but the exercise of that faculty, with possible judgement always its immediate consequence, and cognition its termination.

Point/counterpoint; dialectics. Not proof of nor hinting toward logical error or lackadaisical rationality. Grain of salt. Etc, etc, etc.

Philosophical musings.

Thanks.

one need only concede to that of the principle, the condition, which permits all forms of reason to be exercised such that it have entrenchment in inquiry of itself as a matter of thought; to discern its own nature rather, than espouse, and abide by prohibition of each as you had done — Vessuvius

I understand reason already inquires as to itself, attempts to discern its own nature. But in doing so, reason may exercise its intrinsic capacity to exceed its own ability to tell us the truth about what we really want to know, overstep its boundaries as it were. If we are not interested in knowledge for its own sake, we permit reason to wander wherever it wishes to take us. Or, more accurately, we do not critique that which reason presents to us. Hence the prohibition imposed, for the sake of knowledge.

Odd though, to talk of reason as if it were an actual thing, rather than merely a specific kind of procedure adopted by the human animal, intended solely to accomplish a specific task.

It need be the case that all manner of judgement insofar as it make passage, and thus manifest, lies in predication of the experiential.......... — Vessuvius

A notion is a conceptualized idea, re: quantity, possibility, existence, etc., and for which no representation is given. Any judgement grounded on an idea, and from which a possible cognition follows, is entirely a priori, therefore not of necessary experiential derivation. If any mathematical judgement, as is any simple arithmetic expression from which applied mathematics arises, should manifest as cognition, a purely a priori conception must be antecedent to it, for it is quite impossible to express combinations of numbers in whatever form without the explicit incorporation of the pure conception of “quantity”. Simply put: if we don’t understand the idea of “one” and cognize it as a singular and therefore the simplest possible notion of quantity, we will never judge a multiplicity of “ones” in unity with themselves as having any meaning whatsoever.

If, on the other hand, by “manifest” is meant verified with objective validity, then experiential predication would be required. Nonetheless, the manifestation of judgement is primarily cognition, the possible proof of which lies in experience.
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........yet all forms of conception bear the privilege to subsist, though not be apprehended, in spite of absence of the former and that by means of which it can be yielded; the subject. — Vessuvius

I suppose forms of conception can subsist, meaning continue or prevail, without being in attention to conscious thought. Depends on what one considers a form of conception to be. If by form is meant a kind of pattern, the question becomes whether there subsists a pattern to which conceptions adhere, or some criteria to which conceptions conform, which in turn begs the question: how do we know the form of conceptions without first having conceptions for them? I don’t know, but am inclined to let conceptions be merely the spontaneity of the understanding.
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There need be held in sight prior to its inception, a subject through whom thought in its every form can manifest. — Vessuvius

The ego? If it be granted the human cognitive system is representational, and if ego as that which is presupposed by the act of thinking, such that all such thinking has that to which it necessarily belongs, it follows ego must have its representation. Reducing the systemic predicate far enough, we will end up with the ego determining its own representation, which defeats the lawfulness of the entire logical system. While I grant there must be a subject that exists thinking, in order to circumvent the inconsistencies intrinsic to “cogito, ergo sum”, which is at its final rest quite backward, it is sufficient to merely grant the subject without having to prove its fundamental constituency.

There exists the argument that the ego is represented by the “I”, which necessarily precedes all thought in general such that “I think” is given objective validity. It follows then, that a subject through whom thought can manifest, could be the “I”, without too serious a complication. Still, much closer examination will lead to self-contradictions, or at least the possibility of having no logical explanation, because we can always ask why such should be the case.
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If one were to speak of the unassailable boundary of understanding, and reason, as you have done, whilst regarding a certain sentiment as truthful, in which it be expressed that all manner of faculty therewith, cannot be exercised to inquire as to the truths to which its own modalities would pertain, and by which each be determined, is to make commitment of that which one had hoped to prevent; contradiction. — Vessuvius

This particular theoretical speculation is logically consistent, hence there is no contradiction. That is not to say another theory, grounded in other hypotheticals or conditionals would not falsify it. But as it stands, and given the premises that support it, in which it is given that there is a proverbial bottom line to such speculation from which no further truth be forthcoming, self-contradiction is averted. In other words, the truth is in and of the speculation itself, and no attempt is made by it to subsidize truth as a stand-alone entity.

Am I to understand it is your position that understanding has no boundaries? If by chance my position is contradictory, what means would you suggest to mitigate the conditions which suggest it?

I want to make sense of the whole thing. — Ilya B Shambat

The opening salvo makes clear that ain’t gonna happen. Kant never says the senses are imprecise....
(“no consideration is here made of optical illusion”)
.........nor that the senses “see”, much less “see” the appearance of things......
(“...the faculty of sensation, which I term receptivity...”)
........and worst of all, the catastrophic misinterpretation of the distinction between phenomena and noumena makes abundantly clear no sense is to made of this particular examination of the Kantian approach....period.

Literary license in the form of “this is how I see it” is one thing; throwing interpretive jello at the paradigmatic wall is quite something else.

Carry on.
(Waves at Tim as he sashays out the door)

How is discernment to be made of wherein that boundary truly lies amongst the breadth of all understanding, hitherto known? — Vessuvius

Judgement. The faculty whereby a conception is cognized as belonging to its object. The limit of understanding is, therefore, where judgement does not cognize a conception as belonging to its object. For instance, if we see a bicycle with square tires, we understand immediately the bicycle will not move, for the concept of square does not belong to the concept of tire. Because experience promises bicycles with round tires always move, we will never understand how it is possible a bicycle with square tires will also move. Of course, we could force a bicycle with square tires to move, but then we’d have to judge some force as conjoined to the conception of moving bicycle which does not naturally belong to it. We would thus understand how it is possible to move a bicycle with square tires, but then we’d have trouble understanding how one would employ the bicycle in its primary function, whereby understanding devolves from a faculty of rational thought, to a merely non-intuitive speculation.
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What is that through which one can deem its nature as unassailable in the truthful sense; need a certain condition if not series thereof be evident, if such a boundary as drawn is to be granted credence? — Vessuvius

The principle of non-contradiction, predicated on experience or empirical possibility in general. On the other hand, we can think anything we want, but to arrive at valid cognitions when doing so we must still abide the principle. Any principle deemed intrinsic to human rationality presupposes a very unique capacity, which must escape definitive investigation, for in such case reason must be used to investigate itself.
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We ourselves each traverse the path halfway, if alone, and as such are reliant upon one another to permit its completion, for which only the sum of our every effort is of consequence. — Vessuvius

Herein a prime example of the diversity of human understanding, despite is fundamental structural congruency. I analyze the statement as: if we each transverse a path halfway no completion is permitted, and, if we rely upon another to complete the path, we are not alone. At the same time, I also understand completely the intention in the construction of the statement irrespective of my analysis of it.

an unassailable boundary in the depth of understanding which can be attained — Vessuvius

Yes, I hold with an unassailable boundary for understanding, a limit, the overstepping of which leads to illusion in the form of cognitions with the inherent possibility of self-contradiction.

I don’t think your thesis is contrived, however much I find it, at some fundamental level, in opposition to my understanding. Given the difficulty I have with your half of the dialogue, I accept responsibility for failure to properly interpret your arguments.

The notion of truth can arise irrespective of whether the subject and all faculties contained therewith are in absence...... — Vessuvius

I understand this as an attempt to report that the conditions for an analytic proposition, tautological expressions in general the contradictions of which are impossible, are antecedent to the conceptions contained in the subject and predicate of such proposition, expressions. While it may be given that the conditions pre-exist the conceptions, no synthesis of the condition with the conception, such that the notion of truth should arise from it, is at all possible absent a rational entity in possession of a natural ability to so synthesize.

...........as a matter of truth within its own intrinsic form — Vessuvius

Wherein lays a differentiation between our arguments: truth as humans understand it, does not have its own intrinsic form, but rather, rationality constructs a form a priori within which the possible notion of truth resides necessarily, re: a logical syllogism, or merely a subject/predicate statement.

with regard to all forms of tautology for which the truth of each, as conferred implicitly unto itself by means of its own content as intrinsic in nature, determine that the former must be transcendental amongst the object of which it stands reflective in appearance. — Vessuvius

OK, but this suggests a kind of truth different than the kind of truth understood as such by humans, which are to be considered herein the “object(s) of which it stands reflective”. At any rate, “implicit unto itself” would seem more transcendent than transcendental. Not to say such is impossible, but I submit such at least makes little sense, hence is of precious little use, and at most is utterly beyond the scope of human knowledge.
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By what means, in your belief, could there be amended the prior, in full, and permit it to be reconciled with, in the account, without as consequence deferring to the former to ensure preservation of constancy in form and deter the encroachment of fault in that upon which it need be reflective? — Vessuvius

In the interest of dialectical consistency, please clarify to what “prior” is in reference, as opposed to what “former” is in reference. You’re asking for a means by which A can be amended such that it reconciles A with B without consequential deference to......A(?). Thanks aforehand.

Briefly, with respect to the explanation for my query, you added “no longer conditioned by the subject”, but the original proposition IS conditioned by SOME member of X attempting to engage in the impossible act of conceiving the absence of ALL members of X from Z. In effect, reducing the proposition to an unintelligible state. “None can conceive...” presupposes a subject or a multiplicity of subjects present that can otherwise properly conceive but cannot conceive the absence of all conceivers, in keeping with the map/territory directive.

Superficially a tautology, perhaps, better formed as “there are no conceptions without conceiving subjects”, but actually an unintelligible assertion, unless it carries the implication of a mode of cognition without human intuition or understanding, re: the noumenal realm, which is entirely speculative.

A minor point, to be sure.

Carry on.

Oh Wait. There’s something amiss with y. How can the condition of truth be attributed to anything not in apprehension? There may be a mode of cognition foreign to humans, there may be objects beyond human experience, but what gives us as humans the right to say there is a y, that which holds true regardless of us?

It’s all good; you added schema to the list of references. I’m happy now.

I could use some help with the #4 in your first post. One can conceive an instance where one’s not in it, ok. But this: “none can for that in which all are in absence”. If all are absent, who would be around to conceive no one was around?

Probably my fault, but I can’t see how that even rises to the level of tautology.

That is....if you still wanna play.

I grant your thesis pt-2 parenthetical; it conforms to my understanding of noumena, keyword: independent of representation.

I will nevertheless insist....privately of course...... the remainder, in as much as it concerns itself with perception, apprehension and therefore experience or possible experience with respect to a human thinking subject, is absolutely predicated on the inherent viability of the faculty of intuition, again, of which noumena can never be a part. Mudus intelligibilis, sure; mudus sensibilis.......not a chance in hell. Nor even high water, dammit!!!!!

Yeah, but the reference should be to schema, not noumenon. All that is intimated by the thesis presented here has to do with empirical knowledge, for it involves juxtaposition of phenomena inhering in an apprehending subject, given by the physical world in relation to time, which noumena are not meant to address.

No, objectivity and truth are not the same.

Objectivity is a judgement of negation, in which content is given (no opinion about objects has intrinsic validity); truth is a judgement of affirmation, in which content is irrelevant (if this then that necessarily).

The former is an empirical judgement grounded by intuition (if from sense there is some object), the latter is an a priori judgement grounded in understanding (wherein a cognition must conform to its object).

Objectivity is a judgement of quality by practical reason; truth is a judgement on relation by pure reason.

Objectivity is a rational inclination, truth is a rational construction.

Not even close.......... it would seem.

Sorry. I just couldn’t help it. I had to, I just HAD to.......

“.....For this reason, when it happens that there exists only a single word to express a certain conception, and this word, in its usual acceptation, is thoroughly adequate to the conception, the accurate distinction of which from related conceptions is of great importance, we ought not to employ the expression improvidently, or, for the sake of variety and elegance of style, use it as a synonym for other cognate words. It is our duty, on the contrary, carefully to preserve its peculiar signification, as otherwise it easily happens that when the attention of the reader is no longer particularly attracted to the expression, and it is lost amid the multitude of other words of very different import, the thought which it conveyed, and which it alone conveyed, is lost with it.....

(Sigh)

Worth a decent chuckle, wasn’t it???

(Extemporaneous guffaw) Damn straight!!!!

In the day of “r u goin 2 c the flick 2night”, there’s great difficulty in distinguishing class from vanity, elegance from arrogance.

I appreciate writing in the classic style.

I can live with it. These are, after all, just philosophical musings, with no life or death or similarly catastrophic implications. Not to mention.......what other choice is there but to go with the flow, so to speak, if the interest be of a continuous dialectic.

The human cognitive system is complementary: up/down, left/right, yes/no, ad infinitum. That is to say, relational; knowledge only has any standing when it avails itself to comparison. This relates to the idealist/materialist dichotomy, insofar as one need not chose one over the other, but he is nonetheless well advised to comprehend their inherent distinctions and what each distinction actually does for us. Thus far in our human intellectual evolution, it is quite apparent, in keeping with the complementary system with which we’re saddled, we require both parts of that modality relation in order to understand our world and our place in it. If for no other reason than each half of the complementary pair is in itself insufficient to explain the totality of the human condition. That being said, I find it hard to accept a strictly unqualified monist paradigm.

I would agree without hesitation we must have a fundamental assumption, no matter what we’re investigating. I personally go with perception, in its common understanding, being passive and therefore not the cause of whatever difficulties we have with reason in general and knowledge in particular. I will admit to not knowing what other fundamental assumptions would serve the same purpose, mostly because I guess I never thought much about it.

The distinction between natural and transcendental causality is necessary. Simply put, natural causality is phenomenal, transcendental causality is merely thought, the former subject to sense and thereby intuition, the latter subject to understanding and thereby mere conception. If the objects of sense have a cause, it is logical to suppose objects of pure reason must also have a cause. One we may measure and justifies experience, the other we will not but nevertheless justifies logical possibilities. The human complementary cognitive system writ large.

It’s fine to think writing letters to Santa presupposes Santa’s existence. Right up until one knows with apodeictic certainty he doesn’t. Then it’s still fine as long as one acknowledges he doesn’t and writes to him anyway, perhaps to laugh at himself, or even to hold a faint hope. A problem, in the form of a logical inconsistency, may arise when you write to him, knowing he doesn’t exist and intuit/cognize him as if he does. Otherwise known as .........wait for it........

............the transcendental illusion!!!!!!

I don’t think about ontology that much; whatever I want to know about empirically presupposes the existence or possible existence of it, whatever its nature. When drilling down into the metaphysics of human knowledge, on the other hand, one may have to assume existences without their proofs, or even propose them outright including their proofs, in order to justify a particular theory, but that’s ok as long as he maintains logical consistency.

Besides......wouldn’t it be better to understand how knowledge is possible before professing the ability to know something? But then, of course, we stand in danger of being immersed in an inevitable circularity; as you say.....it’s the way our minds work. Or brain, as the materialists would insist.

Tough mentally, no doubt. Between pissing off the clergy (busted on his Master’s thesis by Piest academia) and being somewhat contrary to Newton (the reigning God of Science), what ducks he had he must have kept well-lined.

We’ll never know whether Euthyphro‘s arguably inconclusive definitions of piety actually left ol’ Socrates defenseless, or whether Socrates was doomed from the beginning regardless of whatever defense he may have mounted. While it may seem your Euthyphro is being surrepitously investigated, I just want to make some effort in understanding where you’re coming from.
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Yes, it is the maxim, as sustained by numerous references.
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The commonality is the impossibility of conformity as a universal law of nature. If the myriad of hypothetical imperatives are dismissed as not abiding as universal laws of nature, but the categorical imperative demands accordance “as if” a universal law is actually possible....what kind of law is it? It may indeed be the case, that the categorical imperative only has any meaning for those rational agents that think themselves in possession of a transcendental causality.

Perhaps. Far be it from me to deny the possibility. Nevertheless, Herr Kant seems to have his own misgivings:

“.....Here then we see philosophy brought to a critical position, since it has to be firmly fixed, notwithstanding that it has nothing to support it in heaven or earth. Here it must show its purity as absolute director of its own laws, not the herald of those which are whispered to it by an implanted sense or who knows what tutelary nature. Although these may be better than nothing, yet they can never afford principles dictated by reason, which must have their source wholly a priori and thence their commanding authority, expecting everything from the supremacy of the law and the due respect for it, nothing from inclination, or else condemning the man to self-contempt and inward abhorrence. Thus every empirical element is not only quite incapable of being an aid to the principle of morality, but is even highly prejudicial to the purity of morals, for the proper and inestimable worth of an absolutely good will consists just in this, that the principle of action is free from all influence of contingent grounds, which alone experience can furnish. We cannot too much or too often repeat our warning against this lax and even mean habit of thought which seeks for its principle amongst empirical motives and laws; for human reason in its weariness is glad to rest on this pillow, and in a dream of sweet illusions (in which, instead of Juno, it embraces a cloud) it substitutes for morality a bastard patched up from limbs of various derivation, which looks like anything one chooses to see in it, only not like virtue to one who has once beheld her in her true form....”
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and scrolling down a bit lower, we find: — Theologian

Are you noticing a pattern here? — Theologian

I would ask you a similar question: when scrolling a bit lower, do you find a commonality in the four given examples? There is one, and its importance is significant.
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What do you think the “it” stands for in the primary rendition of the categorical imperative?

Interesting.

“A” for effort.

That is, the clerk could be rude for lots of reasons, none of moral significance. — tim wood

This is key, because Kantian deontological moral philosophy has to do with what IS morally significant, and not with the haphazard machinations of common life. This also releases Kant from the critical “arcane and obscure fluff” exemplified when “...he fails to investigate the possibility of conflicting moral claims....”**

While it is quite obvious Kant recognized the reality of conflicting moral claims; his was not the purpose to investigate them, but to provide knowledge of the supreme ground of good and right, in order for us to resolve them on our own:

“....Innocence is indeed a glorious thing; only, on the other hand, it is very sad that it cannot well maintain itself and is easily seduced. On this account even wisdom-which otherwise consists more in conduct than in knowledge-yet has need of science, not in order to learn from it, but to secure for its precepts admission and permanence. Against all the commands of duty which reason represents to man as so deserving of respect, he feels in himself a powerful counterpoise in his wants and inclinations, the entire satisfaction of which he sums up under the name of happiness. Now reason issues its commands unyieldingly, without promising anything to the inclinations, and, as it were, with disregard and contempt for these claims, which are so impetuous, and at the same time so plausible, and which will not allow themselves to be suppressed by any command. Hence there arises a natural dialectic, i.e., a disposition, to argue against these strict laws of duty and to question their validity, or at least their purity and strictness; and, if possible, to make them more accordant with our wishes and inclinations, that is to say, to corrupt them at their very source, and entirely to destroy their worth-a thing which even common practical reason cannot ultimately call good....”
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On competing maxims:
The reason for reducing moral philosophy to the idea of law, is to describe an absolute necessity. To will an action as if it were a universal law, therefore, carries that very absolute necessity as intrinsic to it. From here, one can see there is no competition within absolute necessity whatsoever. But that, in and of itself, isn’t sufficient for good moral conduct, for one must still feel the need to acquiesce to it, hence the principle of duty, from which the “act ONLY....” arises.

**Timmermann, 2013, “Kantian Dilemmas? Moral Conflict in Kant’s Ethical Theory”

Good stuff. Thanks.

Scribble 10 E=MC2 on yonder blackboard, go forth amongst the vulgar masses* and philosophize as you see fit.

In your defense, I must say it is odd, and somewhat disturbing, that Kant would use exactly the same phraseology for an imperative standing as a law, as a principle standing for nothing more than a subjective interest. From that it is easy to see, as you have hinted already, that passing familiarity with Kantian metaphysics will never suffice for meaningful dialectic about it.

* Hume, 1740. He apparently never had to worry about being culturally correct. (Grin)

On the other note, you are probably well aware that Kant never married, never had a serious lasting relationship with the other gender, never traveled, hardly socialized at all, seemingly never did much of anything but think. I guess if you spent 70-odd years at thinking, you pretty much cover everything that has any relevance to you. Boring as hell if you had to live with him, I bet, but looking back on his catalogue of writings.....a thoroughly fascinating intellect to be sure.

if there is even one maxim that an act violates, Kant’s first formulation of the categorical imperative has been contravened. — Theologian

This is correct. The whole point being, of course.......don’t act on that maxim.

The maxim could very well be agent A’s subjective principle formulating his volition, which he himself willed as if it were to be a universal law, but if such principle is in conflict with agent B’s, yet B acts consistent with the judgement required in conforming to A’s will......B’s imperative is violated and he has lost his claim to moral worthiness. On the other hand, historical precedent shows B may merely change his mind, that is to say, think an alternate rendition of pure practical reason based on a witnessed objective validity, altered his personal imperative by means of his willful choice of volition, and he then tacitly subscribes to the idea of a possible universal law even if not originally of his own will.

It is impossible for a thinking subject to be absolutely controlled by rational law, in the same way he is controlled by natural law. Any moral philosophy grounded in rational law is merely a guide to private conduct, with the understanding explicit in its formulation that there is no fundamental causal accounting for diverse cultural and psychological subjectivity. Even allowing the universality of the faculty of human reason in general doesn’t account for the influence of experience on its members.

Dunno what to tell ya, bud. I figured the text would come across the screen consistently no matter the device, but maybe not. I’m on an iPad so my description follows that appearance.

Not the seventh or eighth paragraph; the 7th indented paragraph, of the second section, with the asterisk that denotes it as a footnote in an actual book, before any sub-sections of the second section.

I already quoted it directly, but I’ll add some to it, from the Gutenberg link:

“....When I conceive a hypothetical imperative, in general I do not know beforehand what it will contain until I am given the condition. But when I conceive a categorical imperative, I know at once what it contains. For as the imperative contains besides the law only the necessity that the maxims * shall conform to this law, while the law contains no conditions restricting it, there remains nothing but the general statement that the maxim of the action should conform to a universal law, and it is this conformity alone that the imperative properly represents as necessary.

* A maxim is a subjective principle of action, and must be
distinguished from the objective principle, namely,
practical law. The former contains the practical rule set by
reason according to the conditions of the subject (often its
ignorance or its inclinations), so that it is the principle
on which the subject acts; but the law is the objective
principle valid for every rational being, and is the
principle on which it ought to act that is an imperative.

There is therefore but one categorical imperative, namely, this: Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law....”
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I see how you arrived at your three versions of the C. I. and how it relates to proving my one version wrong.

On reading/studying: Gotta wonder, doncha??
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My reference can be found here: http://www.gutenberg.org/files/5682/5682-h/5682-h.htm#link2H_4_0005 . Scroll to SECOND SECTION—TRANSITION FROM POPULAR MORAL PHILOSOPHY TO THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS, then scroll some more to the 7th indented footnote on what a maxim is. Next, in its own paragraph, is the statement, by The Good Professor himself.

OK...found it, read it. It appears we’re mingling your conflict of duties with my singular C.I. Yours comes from The Metaphysics of Morals, mine comes from The Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals. We can discuss each concept, duty and/or imperative, but I don’t think we can discuss how they relate to each other, for the formulation of the imperative is a conscious practical act of reason and is always antecedent to our abiding by it, whereas duty is a necessary human attribute which makes such abiding possible.

Kant’s moral philosophy is every bit as confusing as his theoretical epistemology. There’s a lot of reference material from which to pick one’s personal axioms, to be sure.

Yes, you may now proceed to gloat, but only because you are right in what you say, not because I am wrong in what I say. Half a gloat? Partial gloat. Something less than a full-blown gloat.

Hang on.........

Wrong book. Mine is from Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, sometimes called Groundwork, yes. Kant, and Abbott, call it F. P. M. M., 1785.

Correct. The maxim tells what to do. The imperative is just the form what to do either should (hypothetically) or must (categorically) take.

Gutenberg has the Meiklejohn translation, downloadable to Kindle for IPad or PC, with click-able chapters and sections. Lots easier if one has an idea what he’s specifically looking for.

Still not as satisfying as a book, though, methinks.

I’m using the Gutenberg online tenth Thomas Kingsmill Abbott edition, 1895, IPad reference pagination is 535 of 1265. Translations may differ, but the gist should be consistent.

While this is indeed the case, without the Kantian context.....the theoretical background....for such a daring assertorial, you’re not gonna get much positive reaction.

Only categorical imperatives serve as conditions for moral dispositions, hypotheticals are confined to general, that is, ethical, applications;
No universal law may ever follow from a hypothetical imperative*;
Categorical imperatives do not “compete” with each other, nor does any one displace any other, for the excruciatingly simple reason....there is only one**;
Deontological moral philosophy is “contextually insensitive” because it is grounded in pure practical reason, having merely a logically consistent idea as its fundamental principle, that idea itself being “contextually insensitive”;

* “...hypothetical imperative only says that the action is good for some purpose, possible or actual...”

** “....There is therefore but one categorical imperative, namely, this: Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law....”

The flaw isn’t in Kantian deontology, it’s in the frailties of human nature.

Psychology is the trap, here, and we need to avoid it. — tim wood

.....like the plague!!! “And how does that make you feel?” is of absolutely no interest to me, but “And how did you come to think that” tells me everything I might want to know.
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So I would argue that first morality is driven by passion — tim wood

There is an argument that, initially, private happiness drives morality. Quick analysis shows how any mere desire is very far from strong ground for a good will, or, examination of the vast diversity of subjectivity with respect to what happiness means, and the methods for its attainment, shows the weakening of morality itself as a fundamental human condition, insofar as instinct has determining power over the will rather than reason.
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I think just here we must take care to qualify the "causal" as a logical cause — tim wood

OK. I can live with that. Moral philosophy cannot abide the infinite cause/effect regress intrinsic to empiricism. If we merely think a cause which holds no logical contradiction in itself, we are permitted to assign an effect to it also without its contradiction. Doesn’t have to actually be the case; just has to be logically possible.
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Why did psychology and psychologisms make an appearance here? Care to elaborate on that a bit?

Exhaustive.....perhaps not; but the two options are certainly adequate for conceptualizing that particular problem. Unless one does not accept the classic rendition of “relative existence” as the proper problem.

Common sense helps discriminate between notions/conceptions/frameworks/schema. — creativesoul

Good.
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Not all concepts of "existence" are on equal footing. — creativesoul

Better.
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The concept of "existence" is determined entirely by us. — creativesoul

Best.

Existence: an absolutely necessary empirical condition for human experience, because its negation admits an impossibility.

It isn’t existence that’s relative; what is relative is the paradigm under which existence is understood, re: things exist as they are, or things exist as they appear to us. And THAT is the problem: we do not have the means to know with apodeictic certainty which paradigm is true.

All language does is fuel the war.