It’s probably impossible to ever know why or how the phrase “degrees of freedom” was chosen to represent the observable conditions of a physical system. I surmise its author had something in mind, such that the freedom relates some object to its lawful probabilities, and degree relates that object to a range within those probabilities. Or....he just picked the notion out of a lab-coat pocket because it sounded awe-inspiring. Who cares, really. The point is, freedom is strictly a metaphysical domain, an immaterial/rational....transcendental..... notion meant to qualify its object as to that object’s possession of it, but never to quantify its object as to how much of it that object has.

Which leaves us with, in a human physical system, in what manner of speaking can your “freedom absolutely applies” be true?
1.) If the will is free to do this but not free to do that, then it follows necessarily that freedom, in and of itself, cannot be a condition of the will, but must be either logically removed or temporally displaced from it.
2.) Or, there is no such thing, which is immediately self-contradictory from a metaphysicalist’s point of view with respect to morality and from a physicalist’s point of view with respect to degrees of freedom.
3.) Or, and which is much more prevalent, freedom is applied as an empirical predicate in the human system, just as it is in the dimensional domain in observable coordinate systems. Case in point...I am free to move my arm, free to like vanilla, and other similarly constructed absurdities, having nothing whatsoever to do with the faculty of will.

Opinions and noses........everybody’s got ‘em.

Automatic" actions taken in habit and familiarity could be considered to be choices, but only in the sense that a person has accepted living in them. — Pathogen

How very reminiscent of Hume-ian British Enlightenment empiricism are you!!

Peoples choices (...) influenced by hormone signaling that is never perceived at a conscious level. — Pathogen

How very reminiscent of Skinner-esque empirical psychology are you!!!

It’s ok, though, no big deal; those are both....ehhhh, somewhat.......historically at least....valid subsets of their respective doctrines with respect to the human condition in general. My only point would have been that neither of those, while being sufficiently explanatory regarding “unconscious choice”, can have any bearing on arguments for or against free will, which requires necessarily its ground in a priori rationality, absent by definition in both of them.

Moving on.....

the essential attribute of metaphysics is that, whereas what we conceive of as 'natural science' comprises what we think we can explain by way of natural principles, metaphysics is concerned in some sense with what explains us, and also what gives rise to those natural principles in the first place. It is, as it were, prior to any of the specific arts and sciences, and for that very reason, resists elaboration and explication, as it can only ever be intuited by the discursive intellect. — Wayfarer

If there ever was a dialectical nutshell, that would certainly be a worthy contender.

Wouldn't you need a conception of physical freedom before you can map degrees of it? — Echarmion

I would think. But in some defined coordinate system containing an observable object, the freedom it has is subject to the laws of the system, and the degrees of freedom it has are restricted by the system itself. Pretty lame kind of freedom, is all I’m sayin’.

Typical, though. Assigning a concept where it seemingly has no business. If we both hold that freedom isn’t physical, is that the same as saying freedom doesn’t belong to physical systems? And if that holds, why would there be such a thing as degrees of freedom in a physical system?

You know...I always thought that, too. But then I came across this “degrees of freedom” for showing coordinate dimensions in a phase space, and I got to wondering how freedom was meant to apply there. I don’t consider freedom to be physical either, but apparently, somebody figured degrees of it, are.

unconscious choices (which I admit exist) — Pathogen

What is an unconscious choice?

Could be. Reason the verb critiques reasons as nouns.

Reason has proven that we exist (...) without a rational foundation. — TheMadFool

Reason is sufficient to prove that brain operation is conditioned by an empirical foundation, but as yet, the brain’s operation is insufficient to prove reason cannot be rationally foundational.

Lots out there that has..... what.....figured out how to do away with those sets of dualisms? This presupposes lots out there realize there are dualisms to do away with. What else thinks like we do?

I dunno about stupid. Termites been here longer than we have, but while our caves and grass huts have become ostentatious high rises, their mounds are still just piles of dirt. And even if dolphins and orcas communicate to coerce sardines into becoming bait balls, none of them have been on an obscenely expensive guided tour of Paris.

Yeah, maybe, but it can’t. Damn Mother Nature anyway......making us wee humans prone to tripping over its own metaphysical feet.

Percepts' is an unusual word, but I take it to be 'perception of sense-able objects'. — Wayfarer

Good. I couldn’t see it otherwise, myself, and agree it is not problematic in itself. Still, we are left with the fact “percepts” do not belong in the aphorism, if it is to remain true to the Kantian methodology. This becomes quite apparent in context, for the passage sets the groundwork for justifying both the distinction and inter-connectedness of disparate forms of logic, by showing the distinction and inter-connectedness of the faculties of intuition and conception in the aphorism, by their employment of them respectively.

And all that was set by the premise that, not so much that both idealists and empiricists were incorrect with their respective philosophies, but rather, they were insufficient, because neither could explain the universal necessity for, and reliability of, a priori knowledge. This is the whole raison d’etre for Kantian speculative metaphysics, aimed at Hume in particular as the foremost era-specific philosophical empiricist, and all dogmatic subjective-dominant philosophies in general, as the idealists. As this makes quite clear, Kantian epistemological dualism has little to do with the Augustine/Aquinas theological dualism system per se, which is entirely predicated on some transcendent reality.

Of course, Kant could not argue against theological dualism and retain professorial tenure or hope to be published. His work-around was to ground the dualistic nature of knowledge within the thinking subject himself, thus removing the transcendent from the participation in human reason. In effect, while granting the current idea of the god of his time, at the same time attributing the power of rational thought, and everything that arising from it, to man alone.

Not that you didn’t already know all that........
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I find this particular passage both profound and intriguing, although it hasn't elicited much response here when I've mentioned it previously. — Wayfarer

With respect to the passage itself, parts of which are still relevant, I would suspect it hasn’t garnered much support because philosophers since, have gone to great pains to separate form from substance, rather than maintain they are necessarily inseparable. Beginning with Descartes culminating in the paradigm-shift in Kant, all because of that little ol’ sump’n sump’n called mathematics. Gotta admit....against pure logic on the one hand and astrophysics/quantum reality on the other, old fashion theology doesn’t stand much of a chance.

The general job of the will might be to insure the person's future in combination with reflecting the person as s/he has become as of that moment. — PoeticUniverse

I can live with that. It simplifies to that which I see you enunciated in the next paragraph: “...basically remain true to oneself”. Although, I would take exception to the “useful means to one’s survival”. We don’t have the survival issues of our predecessors. Nothing, in the normal course of current events, wants us for dinner, and nobody wants to hang our heads on a pike at the castle keep. Worldly scale and humanity in general being understood, of course.
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The fuss is about the consistency of the will — PoeticUniverse

....which reflects back on what one thinks the will should be doing. If the will is the causal determinant of moral dispositions, and one remains, as you say, true to himself, in other words, he is a moral agent, then his will must be consistent. If the will is inconsistent, then the agent is necessarily contradicting himself, hence is immoral by implication. Consistency of will is morality reduced to its core.

One way of looking at it anyway.

libertarianism — rlclauer

I have no problem with libertarianism of the philosophical sort, re: Belsham, 1789. So saying, the libertarian premise of the non-anarchist personal autonomy is a necessary condition for the will’s determinant functionality.
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Just drop the qualifier — rlclauer

Absolutely. Will is a rational faculty in and of itself, or rather, it must be treated as such if it is expected to be the foundation of moral dispositions. I guess the whole....er.....fuss..... really depends on what one thinks the will is supposed to do.
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a range of options that appear to be able to be subjected to conscious deliberation on our part — rlclauer

At no time is this more apparent then when the moral agent wills himself to do something he really doesn’t want to do.....and does it despite his wants.
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it seems to us as if we are making choices. Therefore, it might be safe to say that we have a "will." — rlclauer

Exactly. It is impossible to prove one way or another, but no one can rationally argue, except for the case of reflex or accident, that we do not weigh options for purely personal well-being, especially when no imperative is in residence.

While I concur wholeheartedly with this, it does merely kick the metaphysical can down the transcendental road. There has to be some logically sustainable rendition of “free” in order for the will to do its job. Therein lay the fuss.

You:

requirement that knowledge is equally informed by perception — Wayfarer

Him:
“....In whatsoever mode, or by whatsoever means, our knowledge may relate to objects, it is at least quite clear that the only manner in which it immediately relates to them is by means of an intuition...”

I’m curious to know what you mean by equally informed. The apparent disparity in my understanding, between your position and his, might be removed if you could clarify how perception is an equal informant of knowledge, when Kant apparently doesn’t think so.

And this relates to your aphorism, where your use of “percepts”, re:

percepts without concepts are blind, concepts without percepts are empty'. — Wayfarer

......in which “percepts” I must take to be short for perceptions because the alternative, precepts, is even more inconsistent with the more familiar aphorism found irrespective of translator in A52/B76:

Guyer/Wood, 1998: “...thoughts without content are empty, intuition without concepts, blind...”
Kemp Smith, 1929: “...thoughts without content are void, intuition without concepts are blind...”
Meiklejohn, 1855: “....thoughts without content are void; intuitions without conceptions, blind....”

Problem solved if you could refer me to the similar assertorial that uses percepts, so I could grasp the context, or, failing that, clarify what you intend by substituting your own terms. I mean......if percepts are indeed short for perception, then, if nothing else, “concepts without percepts are empty” is utterly false because there are certainly a priori conceptions, re: categories (i.e., quantity), with content intrinsic to them, re: schema (i.e., numbers), are therefore not empty but nevertheless have nothing whatsoever to do with sensibility in general nor perception in particular.

As I said.....curious. Not argumentative, or correctional.

Have at it.

You had me lulled into believing...... — S

No one is exempt from the reach of my subliminal powers.

I don’t ignore anyone; you just happened to say something I found worth commenting on.

It was supposed to?

Damn. I missed all the clues that would have informed me which of the author’s major or assorted minors were intentionally frivolous. All this time, I thought he was seriously claiming science can’t be done without free will. You know.....thread title and all....

What fundamental event?

Never mind....doesn’t matter. That any fundamental event has a fundamental cause is still a synthetic a priori proposition.

Ehhh.....I’m not really interested in subject qua subject, it being merely a necessary condition for the human cognitive process. And I’m not really interested in deviant human reason, for that merely tells me what it isn’t when I want to know what it is in its purest form.

If you come up with something you think might be interesting......throw it at me.....see if it sticks.

The only bridge there is between us and noumena is sensation. — Arthur Rupel

If you think that is the case, I have no problem with it; a guy can think whatever he likes. In keeping with the title of the thread, I will insist such thinking is unjustified, because according to Kant, if there were such a thing as a bridge between us and noumena, implying some methodology for the thinking subject (us) to connect to noumena, it would be the function of understanding, not sensation. But there is no such connection, so the notion of a bridge is moot.
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Kant seems to give a low priority to sensation — Arthur Rupel

You could say Kant gives low priority to sensation, but he actually means to give low priority to perception. Perception is passive; it is the affect on its respective organs. What that affect is, is called sensation. It’s like a sieve, perception is on one side, the organs are the sieve, and sensation is on the other side. Sensation gives appearance to perception, perception cannot give appearance to itself. Minor point, to be sure. Either way, it is correct that perception/sensation is meaningless without the a priori conceptions of space and time.
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There must be an implicit order given given by noumena to sensation, otherwise even the unity of sensation with the apriori concepts could never give meaning — Arthur Rupel

Again, think what you like, but this isn’t the Kantian system. In it, sensation doesn’t unite with anything, and the a priori concepts in intuition, space and time, are necessary conditions for the existence of objects for us, but do nothing to tell us what they are, so technically they don’t unite anything either, and certainly do not impart any meaning. The a priori conceptions that do tell us about objects, reside in understanding and are called categories.

Meaning is a judgement, and all judgement derives from the unity of phenomenon which resides in imagination with its concept which resides in understanding as schema. Sensation itself has long since become moot.
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All this says simply that the real external world has order and structure. Sensation and this "inherited' order come to us already prepackaged. — Arthur Rupel

Oh, you think so, huh? Well, riddle me this, Batman: with respect to humans at least....which we happen to be, coincidentally enough....if it is absolutely impossible to say anything whatsoever, without exception, about the world without first thinking about it....how can you tell the difference between the world having intrinsic structure and order, or structure and order being given to the world simply by the way it is thought in order for us to access its intelligibility?

The world may indeed have intrinsic structure and order, but as long as it is a human asking questions, it can never be proven with apodeitic certainty. The very best we will ever be able to do, currently, is find no contradiction between the world as it is and the way the world seems to us.

BOOM!!!!! (Grin)

But from there on, how the subject emerges, and what additional faculties are necessary for them to experience and evaluate this fact awareness, I don't know. — simeonz

I’d be very surprised if anybody does. I certainly don’t. Could be just a natural result of the plurality of extant physical conditions that makes it seem like a subject emerges. Maybe the subject only emerges because of the human propensity to explain everything, and when the notion of “subject” first came about, there were no explanations related to brain even possible, never mind sufficient, so we invented one.

No matter what, we cannot remove ourselves from the subjective condition, its reality or illusory appearance notwithstanding. That being the case, it doesn’t really matter where it comes from nor does it matter how it makes its presence felt. Thus, it would seem much the more productive to concentrate on what “subject” does, rather than what “subject” is.
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we know that understanding requires awareness, but not self-awareness. — simeonz

Ok, true enough, insofar as understanding works by means of integral synthesis, so doesn’t hold any consideration for the source of that which it synthesizes, that source being the thinking, conscious subject who by definition is certainly self-aware.
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If I am going to talk about what a subject is, I would prefer a definition that doesn't rely on actual existence (, but rather just plausibility) of the subject, creating an epistemic reference context of some kind and a mapping to a material context. — simeonz

As well you should, because it’s highly doubtful the subject has an actual existence anyway. Rational existence, of course, because we can conceive it, conception being the standard-bearer for plausibility, but to call a rational existence an actual existence casts epistemic shadows on objective reality, and just sustains the notion that the primary defect in human reason is its proclivity for confusing itself.

Can we agree there cannot even be talk, which implies communication, about what a subject is without the ubiquitous subject/copula/object process? I mean, that is the condition upon which our language is built and we are never going to understand each other if we don’t both use that very specific propositional construction, irrespective of its content. But before either of us speaks anything, we have to think it, and the thought which becomes intelligible communication absolutely must adhere to the same propositional construction. It follows that when I think about what a “subject” is, the “subject” immediately becomes the object in the propositional construction, re: for me, that which exists as the necessary condition for all rational enterprise exists as “subject”, and when I communicate the thought, the objective nature of “subject” holds.

That being said, there is an intrinsic epistemic reference context, because what I think is known to me to be true, but for a concept that is itself immaterial, my talk about what a subject is, cannot have a material context. Objective context, certainly; material.....not so much.
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The assignment of truth values is a different matter, which requires something more, which if materially expressed, is very hard to define. — simeonz

Truth values are relative to human intelligence alone, and the something more for its assignment is reducible to, “....the accordance of the cognition with its object...”. Because this is merely a logical representation of what truth is, a material expression of it cannot hold universally because it is absolutely impossible to cognize the manifold of all possible objects. Very hard to define indeed.

Ok.

I drift towards materialism, as the most void philosophical position. — simeonz

Yeah, that’s pretty much standard, isn’t it? The more one voids philosophical predicates the more he leaves room for empirical predicates, if he chooses to furnish the room at all. Still, “most void” is not empty, and as long as one reasons, the philosophical position can never be empty.
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if awareness turned out to be potentially (or in some sense actually) impersonal. — simeonz

Awareness is impersonal, for it merely indicates an arbitrary condition of that which is in possession of it, but cannot define it. What a subject is aware of, serves as sufficient determination of what kind of subject it is, which does define the personal.
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The necessity or capacity to make distinctions is lost to a non-extant subject, but does that preclude the truth from being in its own right? — simeonz

Truth is a distinction, insofar as it is a member of a complementary pair, and if the capacity to make distinctions, that is, recognize a complementary pair, becomes lost, doesn’t that make the complement itself moot? If there is no making or comprehending a distinction, how can it be said there is one?

And, truth is already a being, the being of true. The loss of distinction of being true is exactly the same as the loss of distinction of truth. But is the truth precluded from being in its own right? So, no, I guess not. A truth will be true whether it is known or not, but that still gives us nothing. We still have to know what is true in order to know a truth.

Semantic word games....BOOOO!!! Sound logical reductionism......YEA!!!!!

We decide what is obligatory and what is optional. — TheMadFool

Yes, we do. But those two are so different.........

Are we free to choose our preferences that necessarily influence our thoughts in this case? — TheMadFool

Depends on what you call preferences. If by preference is meant innate values, or moral predispositions, then no, we are not free to choose these. They are the ground of personality, an entirely subjective condition. If by preference is meant some inclination to satisfy an empirical interest, then yes, we are free to choose these.

But the qualifier in the query is “...that necessarily influence our thoughts...”, and is most important, for then it must be considered by what means is it possible for preference to influence that which is an entirely personal necessity, as opposed to what means is it possible for preference to satisfy what is merely a subjective empirical interest? In other words, on the one hand we have a imperative determination based on a given condition, and on the other we have a hypothetical determination based on a possible benefit.

What legitimate philosophy would ever deem it reasonable to expect the human will to meet two such disparate, in fact two mutually exclusive and occasionally even self-contradictory, demands? Re: obligatory and optional.

Rhetorically speaking......

but the problem is - I am not sure that the subjective (in principle) is not an emergent, complex, partially distributed, potentially mutable property. — simeonz

You along with every physicalist/materialist worth his lab coat, property herein meaning something that belongs to a real substance. Not that you gave any indication you are one, just that experience informs me they think along the same lines you just spoke. I sympathize; it’s pretty hard to posit as certain, a thing that has no quantifiable predicates. I rationalize the situation by coming at it from behind....I don’t have to prove subjectivity, but rather all I have to do is show how everything else becomes immediately unintelligible if there isn’t such a thing.
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Since I cannot be sure that the subjective is intrinsic indivisible immutable property, I cannot say "I think therefore I am", but rather "something thinks, therefore something is". — simeonz

Exactly right!!! Well done, I must say. I take that “something thinks, therefore something exists” and turn it into “I” am that which exists as thinking subject. “I” taken to represent the spontaneity of all thought in general, also called “ego” in empirical psychology, and the thinking subject taken to represent consciousness itself, which is the totality of conscious thought in general.

Hey....it’s a theory, for whatever that’s worth.
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the subject (...) need not even comprehend the correlation as it applies, for it to be true. — simeonz

Perhaps, but what good would a truth be if it wasn’t comprehended as such?

Are you hinting that truth implies existence? — simeonz

Mmmmm..........no. Never crossed my mind. If it had, I would’ve had to say that which exists truly does exist, but that which is true does not exist necessarily. So, truth does not imply existence.

Nahhhh.....I was just wondering if you held some unassailable truth. So as not to extend the concept of existence into the far reaches of dumb, an analytic proposition, which begins merely as something one thinks, would be true when its negation is impossible. The most famous one of all being cogito ergo sum.
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Whose existence - the subject or the object - is a requirement for a statement to be true? — simeonz

I think the criteria for truth is the relation between subject and object, not always the existence of one or the other. The statement every effect has a cause is true, but neither cause nor effect exist. At least in the strictest sense. If we mean anything that is an object of thought exists just as objects of experience exist, such as concepts or ideas, then the answer to your question would have to be....both.

From what I understand noumena is the external reality, "the real of the "real." We can never have knowledge of noumena. You are right, we have no use to us other than it is the external reality upon which our reality is based. — Arthur Rupel

Sorry, Arthur, but this understanding is self-contradictory. If noumena were the external reality then it would be of use to us necessarily. Noumena are not that which our reality is based, that being the thing-in-itself, which is the real empirical object that affects our sensibility. This understanding highlights a common misinterpretation, in as much as because no knowledge of two disparate conceptions is at all possible, those two conceptions are the same.
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We can never have an appearance from nothing. It must come from something (Kant's statement) — Arthur Rupel

.......

This is correct, as shown here: “...For, otherwise, we should require to affirm the existence of an appearance, without something that appears—which would be absurd....”. In other words, there are real objects external to us. That’s all he is saying. Kant was, after all, an empirical realist.

......

and that something is the "thing in itself," — Arthur Rupel

......

Only in the most liberal interpretations. When you’re talking about Kantian reason, all you can talk about is that which is internal in us, and nothing whatsoever concerning that which is external to us, except for the fact that’s its there. It follows that appearance is not so much the thing-in-itself, which is external, but that which is passed on from perception, which is internal. Thus, appearance, in and of itself, simply stands for that “something” that has caused perception to react to an affectation on it.

Properly speaking, the “thing-in-itself” is a term of knowledge, not of cognition. Think of counting to ten in the most logical way, in which you start at one. If knowledge is the ten, then the affect on perception is the one. At one, the “thing-in-itself” has no meaning. At ten, what we know is what reason has told us, and reason only tells us anything, by means of itself. That which affected our senses, that which appeared to us, tells us nothing at all about itself, other than it is there. In effect, what we know, is a determination from appearances alone, if for no other reason than that’s how the human cognitive system works. Which of course, has always begged the question.....what tells us what we know from appearance is not exactly the same as what we would know about the thing that appeared. Such may indeed be the case, but in this particular speculative metaphysics, if reason is the source of knowledge, the thing-in-itself cannot be, because if we had two sources we would have no means to determine which was correct in the event of a conflict between them.
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.......

one view of noumena. — Arthur Rupel

Yeah, I suppose it could be one view, but it most certainly is not Kant’s view. One of the greatest feats of Kantian theoretical epistemology is its completeness, meaning that guy had an answer for every-damn-thing. Well, if there are only two possible sources of knowledge, knowledge of the empirically real and knowledge of the rationally thought, and if the “thing-in-itself” is proved to be a limitation on the former, then there absolutely must be a limitation on the latter, if only for the sake of logical consistency. Empirical knowledge is derived from sensibility, rational knowledge is derived from the understanding. Therefore, that which limits rational (a priori) knowledge must be a limit on understanding. Kant limits the faculty of understanding by positing its pure conceptions, called categories, can only be applied to phenomena, which, from the above, are shown to come from the faculty of intuition. But noumena are merely thought in general a priori, which means they have no object of intuition to represent them, which means the categories cannot be applied to them, which means we can have no cognition of them, hence they are meaningless. But......what are they, if they can be thought? We can’t say. We could say, if we had a mode of non-empirically grounded intuition to which the categories could be applied, but we don’t, so understanding is brought up short. He goes on to grant the possibility of “intellectual” intuitions, but nonetheless, the categories still couldn’t synthesize a mere intellectual object into either an empirical or rational cognition without devolving the entire system into an irreconcilable inconsistency.

All this because of the common misunderstanding, that because both the thing-in-itself and noumena are unknowable, they are the same thing. They are very far from the same thing, and even though Kant himself confuses everybody by actually calling them out identically, within the context of his doing that, he does not mean them to be the same thing. Thought of the same way, perhaps, but never thought of as being the same thing.

So.......

how do we get phenomena from noumena. — Arthur Rupel

By having a faculty of intuition other than the one we actually have, which makes explicit....we don’t.

“......But if we understand by it an object of a non-sensuous intuition, we in this case assume a peculiar mode of intuition, an intellectual intuition, to wit, which does not, however, belong to us, of the very possibility of which we have no notion—and this is a noumenon in the positive sense of the term. The doctrine of sensibility is also the doctrine of noumena in the negative sense, that is, of things which the understanding is obliged to cogitate apart from any relation to our mode of intuition, consequently not as mere phenomena....”

Print reference: CPR, B307, 1787, in Meiklejohn, 1855, B307 slightly re-worded in Kemp Smith, 1929, but irrespective of translator, Sec I, First Division, Book II, Chapter III.

Good luck and have fun with it.

Kant discusses sensory perception from one and only one context.....the possibility of, and the theoretical conditions for, empirical knowledge.

Kant uses three pages to say how and why noumena are logically possible, followed by two pages on how and why noumena can never be of any use to the human rational or moral agent.

If you’re studying Kantian philosophy seriously you’ll need to understand what he says about them; if you’re not....forget noumena. They have no place in intuitive metaphysics. It follows necessarily from that, that

"representation" or "appearance" of phenomena from noumena — Arthur Rupel

is unintelligible. There ain’t no such thing.

I think that our opinions may be irreconcilable. — simeonz

Maybe.......
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I feel that the majority opinion is that humanity is entitled to some kind of exceptionalism — simeonz

......maybe not. There’s nothing exceptional about humanity. It only does what it is capable of doing, just as does every other natural object. It would be exceptional if humanity did something it wasn’t capable of doing. If anything, I suppose we’re exceptional at self-aggrandizement. Just because we’re apex-intelligensia and apex-praedator in this environment through sheer evolutionary happenstance, says nothing about any other.
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But I doubt that immutable comprehension of any kind will be obtained (...) anytime soon. — simeonz

If you mean by “immutable comprehension” an irreducible understanding, is there no one simple thing for which you have no doubt at all? Or, is there no one simple thing for which the doubt of it contradicts something....or possibly everything.....else?

I see what you’re getting at, though, I think. Given that human empirical knowledge is transitory to say the least gives rise to the idea that understanding, which is always antecedent to knowledge, might be the cause of doubt of immutable comprehension. We would certainly have irreconcilable opinions on that, if you respond in the negative to the questions above.

Just my point of view.......

First off......good post.

logical reductionism compels defensive thinking exactly for this reason - it tries to plant theories into sacred foundational assumptions — simeonz

.....compels defensive thinking, yes. Tries to plant theories into sacred foundational principles, not assumptions. A theory may indeed arise from an assumption, but it can never consequently be defended by one at its foundation.

I would have agreed if you’d said logical reductionism may try to plant an idea into a sacred foundational assumption, re: the infinite, any sort of unconditional, an uncaused cause, and so on. Still, even then, a theory developed to justify such ideas, should be grounded in something immutable, which no assumption can be.

In addition, I would think logical reductionism would promote “logical interrelations between different kinds of statements”, by analyzing conclusions. While that in itself may not prevent partiality, it certainly shouldn’t be said to invite it.

Maybe logical reductionism compels defensive thinking impartially. While that may seem self-contradictory, it also seems that defense-by-law must be impartial by definition. Then it becomes an issue of partiality to a particular law, but not partiality for defense by logical reductionism.

And finally, the epitome of logical reductionism is of course, the Aristotelian laws of thought, which makes explicit any theory defended by them does try to plant it right squarely into a sacred foundational principle.
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I don't logically oppose dualism and idealism (even if I don't believe that all variants are sound), but I challenge the distinction between pantheism (consciousness as intrinsic matter potentiality) and eliminativism (matter in its own right), because I find that such distinction lacks reasonable explanation or definite value. — simeonz

Absolutely. 1.) not all idealism is sound; 2.) matter and consciousness (as it is metaphysically described) are mutually exclusive; 3.) eliminitivism is at worst self-contradictory and at best explanatory deficient.

And I submit, Good Sir or Madam (unabashedly stolen from “Paperback Writer”) if you try to logically oppose dualism, you’ll be met with an exercise in absolute futility. ‘Tis the nature of the rational beast, and there ain’t no way around it.
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You meant something more constrictive then I originally imagined. That your notion of the mind can be compared to a kind of bondage — simeonz

Constrictive yes; a kind of bondage...ehhh, ok. But any relation to pain is beyond the scope. Physical pain has purely empirical predicates and emotional pain is not a cognition, but a feeling, hence neither has to do with the intricacies of a rational mind.

A test for you: even if an itch is not a pain, it is still the same thing in principle. Next time you have an itch.....don’t scratch. Takes awhile, a few times, but after that, the itch just goes away. Bug bites, ant walks, sweat drops included. Bacon spatters....not included. (Grin)
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I am able to investigate the nature of my thoughts, precisely because I am able to think about them, not merely to think in its own right. — simeonz

Therein lay the key: thought without content is meaningless.

But this.......

if we assume that sensation cannot articulate its own structure, then we could make a similar argument that thinking about thinking or emoting about emotions is impossible. — simeonz

.....I don’t quite understand. I fail to grasp how one follows from the other. I hold that sensation cannot articulate its own structure, which implies sensation has the capacity for reason, but to reason with respect to our thoughts cannot be impossible. Right? What did I miss?

Anyway......good stuff. Point/counterpoint. A proper philosophic dialectic. Socrates would be proud.

Yet particular members of the human species have been engaged in what has been conventionally established as the doing of science from at least the early 1600’s. So either the human species hasn’t really been doing science at all, or your argument is junk because it’s conclusion is catastrophically false.

......Eenie meanie minee moe......

why would we arbitrate our philosophical position for reasons that are not purely methodological? — simeonz

I would say we shouldn’t. Any sound philosophical position would seem to require either subscribing to a method which grounds it, or actually being a method in itself from which something else is grounded. But from the context, it appears you are saying brain states that are not observable are hypothetical, and the epistemic substance of a hypothetical is questionable. I would substitute logical for hypothetical, from which a valid method may follow necessarily, and there arises something on which to base our philosophical positions. Still, I see the arbitrariness of epistemic substance, because one person may find such method satisfactory and another find such method faulty.
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don't you feel compelled to increase the comprehensiveness of your conceptualization? — simeonz

Actually, with respect to mind, no. One can use the principles of reduction and of sufficient reason only to a certain point, after which he gets himself into absurdities and self-contradictions. If one treats mind as an unconditioned necessity, then tries to elaborate on the unconditioned, which is as you say, increase the comprehensiveness of conceptualizations, he has defeated the primary logical justification of absolute necessity, which translates to making the mind conditioned by whatever the elaboration becomes. A self-contradiction, which negates the entire thesis prescribing mind as the rationally unconditioned. Maybe it’s merely the lesser of two philosophical evils: it’s better to accept one immanent possibility than to require more than one transcendent possibility. In other words, grant one unprovable hypothetical rather than regress into a morass of unprovables.

So, yes, I suppose it could be said I am indifferent towards the issue. I really don’t care about mind that much; it is enough that I exist as a thinking subject and if I happen to think about mind, I can only think so far and no further without venturing into the irrational.
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A person can think or emote, or they can think or emote about the nature of their thoughts and emotions. While the latter actions involve greater sophistication, they are usually assumed to be fundamentally realized (...) in the same way as the former. — simeonz

I guess you could say there is greater sophistication, insofar as thinking about the nature of thinking is the actual dissection of the thought process itself, theoretically, that normally occurs just short of instantaneously. But, yes, thought and thinking about the nature of thought are both fundamentally realized the same way. Thinking about thinking is, after all, just thinking. And to say from that, that the brain is observing itself, may be a conventional easement, it is nonetheless philosophically bankrupt, because it invokes a categorical error. Thinking is one thing, observing is quite another.

Still interesting.

How do you do (science) without free will? — RogueAI

Easy. All you gotta do is figure out that you don’t have to will yourself to be a scientist. If you do science properly, which presupposes you know how, you are automatically a proper scientist. No willing required.

Does anyone really think a good scientist has to will himself to perform the right experiment in accordance with a prediction, rather than automatically recognize a certain experiment to perform based on the empirical necessity that a prediction demands?

Physical science divorced itself from subjective predicates such as free will for a reason, with humanity in general being the beneficiary.

So the question is what type of knowledge allows us to say that there is a difference between future and past — Metaphysician Undercover

It isn’t a type of knowledge; it is an understanding. From a past to a future, the regressive series of conditions (from any now to any before now**) are given, therefore necessary, but the progressive series of conditions (from any now to any after now**) are merely presupposed as possible, therefore contingent.

If one were to insist on a type of knowledge regarding experience with respect to time, it can only be a priori, because no direct a posteriori knowledge is at all possible for either past or future.

** and because it’s you, because of your name, the former is antecedentia, the latter is consequentia.

we have no free will and if we do it is subdued by our unchosen inclinations. In essence we're not free. — TheMadFool

Even if we are not free with respect to a certain obligatory action, it is only because the will is free to determine what that obligation ought to be.

The will can be subdued by inclination, but it just as easily thwarts them. If a will can be free and not free, then free cannot be a necessary condition for it. So.....I agree: we do not have free will. What we do have, is a will that acts on its own behalf.

How the will goes about doing that, is a philosophy in itself.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/6447/what-is-science-founded-on

Observation.

some positions have assumptions that could actually be falsified experimentally — simeonz

While I might agree some brain states are experimentally quantifiable, insofar as reactive indicators are present for observation, I disagree that purely abstract mental conditions, that which is theorized as reason and its integrated particulars, will ever be displayed on a screen or graph. That is to say, the result of thought may be externally witnessed, but the machinations for its implementation, won’t. I mean.....how does one even look for “understanding”? And because such is altogether quite impossible, gives rise to my position that the e.m.-ist’s position is that they don’t need to measure it because there’s no such thing as understanding, e.g., corresponding to a physical brain state. Which of course, drives speculative metaphysicians straight up a very tall wall.

Me, I just think it’s kinda funny, that physicalists/materialists in general tend to deny the philosophical paradigm, all the while employing the very thing for which the philosophical paradigm stands. Still, one should be really careful in his declarations favoring one side or the other, for the sheer complexity of the human brain does not easily submit itself for definitive examination.
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I just realized that the posters in this discussion may be concerned with the fact that the mind has only partial awareness of its own being. — simeonz

I have no such concern; I think the proposition has no meaning, because of my idea of what mind is. Mind is merely a word, a placeholder for some immaterial totality, a sort of catch-all that for which we have no better word. If I reduce my thinking to a unconditioned necessity, I arrive at mind. But I don’t need the concept of mind, in and of itself, for my reason to proceed as it does simply because I exist as a thinking subject. This modus operandi completely eliminates any possibility of partial awareness, because there is no doubt I am fully aware of that which affects my thinking, and if it was the case I was not fully aware, the very idea of the possibility of knowledge itself, becomes moot. I could never be certain of anything whatsoever, which is precisely what reason seeks.

And the beat goes on............

A sort of logical desperation on both sides: the materialist insists the brain is the source of the illusion of subjective experience because both reside between the ears but only the brain can be found there, and the non-solipsistic idealist insists any illusion that appears so real must be treated as real enough to warrant the preemptive significance no one is actually foolish enough to deny.

Both are met with impossible circumstance: the one cannot prove with apodeictic certainty the mind is nothing but illusion, and the other cannot prove its apodeitically certain reality, so they both fall back on insisting they don’t have to.

All of which raises the question......what good is it when science eliminates the free thinker?

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/6432/can-you-ever-correctly-determine-if-someone-is-saying-the-truth-when-they-share-their-opinions

No. Nevertheless, if one never meets with a contradiction to the stated opinion, he can assume the opinion is grounded in a subjective truth.

Can there be a universe, world, etc. in which only one thing exists? — InTheChair

The requirement of a second thing that experiences the truth of a world of one thing, at the same time contradicts it. World herein taken to mean a perfectly isolated physical system, hypothetical as they may be, which implies observations of it must be from within it.

There could be such a world, but questions about it could never be answered. Like....against the principle of cause and effect, if there is but one thing.....what caused it?

Interesting.