You are correct about the spatial ordering of the words of the statement. I asked you to be aware of a temporal order.

I apologize for not making it understood I meant the temporal order native to the statement to reference the cognizant temporal order the terms of the statement represent.

If that makes no difference, we can either drop it, or you might explain to me what is so damn problematic, and why it is so.

it is perhaps worth reminding ourselves that the question of autonomy of choice with which philosophy is specifically concerned is that of moral autonomy of choice. — Robert Lockhart

Moral autonomy.......absolutely. But then....the kind of choices moral autonomy is responsible for, depends on one’s philosophical leanings that can only arise from pure a priori conceptions. Otherwise, you’re talking nothing but objective cultural ethics, which is very far indeed from subjective moral autonomy.
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Arguably therefore, it might be more appropriate to frame the free will question in a more reduced and specific form along the (lines) of, say, 'Do human beings possess a capacity for moral autonomy? — Robert Lockhart

Again, absolutely. Upon this level of reduced form, however, I venture to say some further reduction should be considered, for even the granting moral autonomy still needs sufficient justification.

As echarmion mentioned.......

Nope. As I said, make your decisions.....read your signs....any way you like.

Do I think it irrational? Maybe. Do I think you should think it irrational? Nahhhh. I don’t care, unless you rain on my parade somehow.

Suppose I believe in making decisions..... — Rufoid

What’s irrational is seeking or expecting a verifiable objective account of a decision making process by that which is not, and can never be, a first-person perspective.

The best I can say is that, given the available information and given my experience, it would be entirely irrational for me make my decisions under those conditions. Far as I’m concerned, you can make your decisions any ol’ way you want.

I do have to wonder though.....what does your research say about not seeing the right kind of bird? If your house is on fire, but there’s not a speckled finch to be found........

To be defined is always the primary ground for some subsequent cognizant ability. That's your words. — creativesoul

No, actually, they are not. Not quite.
(To be defined).....is to be conceived, which is always the primary ground.....

Those are my words. Please recognize the temporal displacement native to the statement.
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If one is using common language to take account of one's own mental ongoings, then one needs to recognize a particular terminology. If one cannot recognize that particular terminology, one cannot possibly be thinking about it. — creativesoul

Granted, of course. Nevertheless, in his normal course of events, e.g., some arbitrary objective appearance, one doesn’t take account of his own mental machinations, insofar as he is not thereby examining how cognitive relations manifest according to rules, such that those machinations arrive at a cognition proper to that occasion. In such case, the cognition is merely an inference abstracted from experience.

In any case, people don’t make mistakes in cognition a priori because they have mis-defined something; people make mistakes in conversation a posteriori because they have mis-defined something. People make mistakes in cognition because they misjudge a conception, and if it should be talked about it thereafter, the mistake in conception will necessarily manifest as a mistake in the definition that linguistically represents it.

Remember my disclaimer, which I probably should have qualified with “cognitive reductionism”. It’s just that I would have expected you to recognize that conditional and accept it as such, even if I can’t convince you of its theoretical validity.

“....General logic, then, resolves the whole formal business of understanding and reason into its elements, and exhibits them as principles of all logical judging of our cognitions. This part of logic may, therefore, be called analytic, and is at least the negative test of truth, because all cognitions must first of all be estimated and tried according to these laws before we proceed to investigate them in respect of their content, in order to discover whether they contain positive truth in regard to their object. Because, however, the mere form of a cognition, accurately as it may accord with logical laws, is insufficient to supply us with material (objective) truth, no one, by means of logic alone, can venture to predicate anything of or decide concerning objects, unless he has obtained, independently of logic, well-grounded information about them, in order afterwards to examine, according to logical laws, into the use and connection, in a cohering whole, of that information, or, what is still better, merely to test it by them.

Notwithstanding, there lies so seductive a charm in the possession of a specious art like this—an art which gives to all our cognitions the form of the understanding, although with respect to the content thereof we may be sadly deficient—that general logic, which is merely a canon of judgement, has been employed as an organon for the actual production, or rather for the semblance of production, of objective assertions, and has thus been grossly misapplied.

Different as are the significations in which the ancients used this term for a science or an art, we may safely infer, from their actual employment of it, that with them it was nothing else than a logic of illusion—a sophistical art for giving ignorance, nay, even intentional sophistries, the colouring of truth, in which the thoroughness of procedure which logic requires was imitated, and their topic employed to cloak the empty pretensions. Now it may be taken as a safe and useful warning, that general logic, considered as an organon, must always be a logic of illusion, that is, be dialectical, for, as it teaches us nothing whatever respecting the content of our cognitions, but merely the formal conditions of their accordance with the understanding, which do not relate to and are quite indifferent in respect of objects, any attempt to employ it as an instrument (organon) in order to extend and enlarge the range of our knowledge must end in mere prating; any one being able to maintain or oppose, with some appearance of truth, any single assertion whatever....”

All that to say this.....it is possible for worthy logic to give nothing worthy, it is possible for good logic to give nothing better than.....yeah, so?

And buried in there is a resolution for understanding the Euthyphro problem: for Socrates, in opposing, the analytic, insofar as there is no apodeitic correctness for the base of the charge against him, and for Euthyphro himself, in maintaining, the dialectic, insofar as he just stomps his foot and vacates the field, for the very same lack of apodeitic correctness. As such, the Euthyphro problem doesn’t fail at all, but rather demonstrates a failure.

Exit, stage right.

If definitions are required for cognizant ability... He couldn't possibly be doing the same thing. — creativesoul

I didn’t say definitions were required, you did:

Me: to define is to conceive
You: What does that take?
Me: self-consciousness and a rational methodology
You: we need definitions, self-awareness, and a rational methodology.

I said to define is to conceive, which makes explicit conception is the presupposition for definition. Conception enables the cognition; definition is the transition from thought to expression of thought. We don’t define to ourselves as a matter of mere cognition, we image or we synthesize images. We manufacture the expression which represents the synthesis of images in pure thought when we wish to communicate, or, when we think as if we are to communicate.

Besides, if he isn’t, as you suggest, doing the same thing, by means of self-consciousness and a rational methodology alone, we are left with the absurdity of requiring of two separate and distinct res cogitans in otherwise congruent agencies, predicated solely on the existence or non-existence of mere word play between them. Nahhhh.....it is the more parsimonious to grant any two separate agencies are doing exactly the same thing in the exercise of a singular rational methodology, but one may very well be doing a better job of it than another.

Disclaimer: non-Cartesian, i.e., representational, dualism being understood as given. Right? I mean....all the cool kids are doing it.

I’m more or less agreeing with you with respect to the claim as stated. Even if I hadn’t read a substantial catalog of moral philosophy, in which there is barely a mention of that Socratic dialectic itself, I’d say it’s pretty unlikely a group of folks like moral philosophers would band together enough to agree that dialectic formed part of their respective philosophies.

The form of the dialectic, however, with substitute conditionals, has been tossed around ever since: is it this because of that or is it that because of this.

How so?

The particulars of the dialogue itself, probably not the foundation of subjectivist condemnation. The dialectical form of the conversation may very well be, however, insofar as, no matter what somebody says, somebody else can find something wrong with it if he puts enough effort into it.

I don’t do religion or its philosophies, so I’ll let the aside be.

Thanks.

Mind taking a little side trip with me?

What is the

specific claim about interpreting Euthyphro. — Terrapin Station

you are skeptical of, and, in what way are you skeptical of it?

Reason doesn’t give a hoot how old you are; the day you die you’ve got the same brain you were born with....albeit more developed and rather more well-organized, I should think.

As to first cognitions....just because a subject doesn’t recognize a particular terminology for his conscious mental machinations, isn’t sufficient reason to suppose he isn’t doing the same thing he’d be doing if he did.

All of which is quite irrelevant. I, at least, because I exist in the present, must always think in the present.

For humans, self-consciousness and a rational methodology.

Yes, definitions are sufficient to value, for to be defined is to be conceived, which is always the primary ground for some immediate and subsequent mediate cognizant ability, in this case, re: to value. Nothing inconceivable can be thought, therefore can never be valued.

But the capacity to value is not the same as to place a value. The former, as a function of understanding, and therefore the possible cognition of an object to which this particular activity would apply, is a relation category of which the principle of necessity has no part......
(If I cognize the subsistence of thing, or think the content of an idea, does not necessitate a value be inherent in it)

.......the latter, the placement or assignment of some value, as mere judgement a priori, is a modal category, of which the principle of necessity may have a significant part, for the reality of that which is to be given a value must already be presupposed, and depending on its form, or its content, may indeed require a very specific value to be assigned to it.
(When I judge a thing as beneficial for me, I absolutely must value it as good)

It still remains, as to whether there exists something valued necessarily in and of itself, something of value necessarily in and of itself, without regard to definition, form or content.

According to our definitions, which is immediately sufficient for any valuings so determined, to be merely empirically grounded, re: from experience alone. As they must be, in order to prevent some one definition from infringing on another in good standing antecedent to it. Hence, always contingent.

Nevertheless, there must be something necessary, and otherwise irreducible, from which all relevant contingencies arise, that which is a condition for, rather than a definition of, and to which logical syllogisms of empirical ground do not apply.

There is no such thing as morally valuable; there are only contingent values, and those of which are morally conditioned, the volitions which follow from them are thereby morally necessary.

Question....just because:

Given herein that the principle of necessity makes explicit that for which contingency is impossible. What is it for any rational agent that it is absolutely impossible not to value, such that it must be valued necessarily?

Default wrong' doesn't mean always and everywhere wrong. Sheesh, are you doing this on purpose? — Bartricks

My argument is - for the umpteenth time - 'Kantian'. — Bartricks

Yes, I am. And yes, I know. Not all things are default wrong, but one of the things you claimed as a default wrong, isn’t, the rebuttal sustained by the premier, original, foremost Kantian kind of response there could possibly be, therefore consistent with your argument. Attempted argument. Stab in the dark argument.

The acts I mentioned align with your qualification for what are particular examples of default wrong, insofar as a significant act is done without consent from the object of the act, so I am arguing in accordance with the first positive major premise......and successfully refuted it, by proving the doing of a significant act is not wrong by mere default of non-consent. All without invoking Kantian ethics or labels, as you have so graciously disallowed.

Anywhooo.......Talk about someone not liking a philosophical discussion for fear he’ll find out something he doesn’t want to be true. Which of course you will deny with just the right amount of foot-stompin’ righteous indignation, but I’ll be in Canada by then, so.....have a ball.

But we barely notice a lot of our thoughts — Coben

Yeah, Mother Nature has deemed it good to imbue us with a sensory overload protection mechanism on the one hand, and an internal trash collecting mechanism on the other.

So being affected in a significant way without consent — Janus

......is “default wrong”: everything from birthday presents to battlefield dressings to....EGAD!!! Sending us to school without seeking our permission. No wonder I hated my parents.

It’s all so clear to me now.

As said before, this thread is about whether procreation is default wrong due to blah did blah consent (can't be bothered to keep writing it). It is not about Kant. — Bartricks

Yeah, I know. The blah blah blah is due to the lack of consent from the unborn person, and such is quite frightful to Kantian deontology because it de-values his intrinsic humanity. I am a Kantian deontologist, which presupposes I understand Kantian moral philosophy, which in turn is necessarily predicated on understanding his definitions, one of which is: “....rational beings, on the contrary, are called persons..”

An unborn person, in your usage, is not yet, and may never be, a rational being, and the entire Kantian deontological thesis is predicated on “...Rational beings in possession of a will...”.

Therefore, to a Kantian deontology view, procreation is not anathema, nor is it immoral, nor does it infringe on the intrinsic value of an person, because the unborn isn’t a person because it isn’t a rational being.

You shoulda referenced Bentham instead of Kant; you’d have been better off. Or even Ross, for that matter.

Enjoy your knife fight; you’re slashing at 65,000 ton shadows. Mothballed as it may be.

I don't think you understand this thread (...) - certainly not Kant. — Bartricks

You might be right. But I’m correcting what you think Kant means, using Kant’s words for what he means, and they are not the same.

Yes, it is, because what you said he said, or what you think he means by what he said, is wrong.

I don’t care about your procreation foolishness; I care about butchering Kant by associating him with it.
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act that affects another — Bartricks

I am under the impression by another, you mean an unborn human person. Is that correct?
And you’re implying Kantian ethics either supports or contributes to that argument, Correct?

Yes, I read that, and after looking up the terms because I had no experience with them, pretty much agreed with you. There is certainly an inner and an outer domain, and as long as the names given to them reflect the distinction, it doesn’t really matter what the names are.

Thesis:
A.) “....Kant is all about respect - respecting that which has value, rather than 'promoting' that which has value. For example, Kant is all about respecting free will...”

B.) “......You respect the intrinsic value of free will...”

Antithesis, and for the correcting of the record:

A1.) “...The immediate determination of the will by the law, and the consciousness of this, is called respect...”

A2.) “...The object of respect is the law only, and that the law which we impose on ourselves and yet recognise as necessary in itself...”

B.) “...There is, however, something so strange in this idea of the absolute value of the mere will, in which no account is taken of its utility, that notwithstanding the thorough assent of even common reason to the idea, yet a suspicion must arise that it may perhaps really be the product of mere high-flown fancy...”

Like bringing an antithesis battleship to a thesis knife fight.

The dreaded, cursed, Cartesian theater!!! BOOOO!!!! I turned him on to that, but he missed it. Page 4.

An otherwise normal human knows his thought as soon as he has them. It’s their relation to other thoughts he may have trouble with.

I argue the the propositions and conditions in support of the definition given.

You know......Socratic dialectics. Philosophy done right.

I think the definition of introspection is whatever any decent English dictionary says it is, but I’ve never looked it up.

But here, I’m using Clark’s, from page one: “Introspection is observing yourself the same way you observe the rest of the world”, as I gave above, slightly embellished: introspection as the most obvious, most readily available, most commonly accessed, means for self-observation.

what's introspection if not "thinking about it"? — Judaka

Exactly. Nothing whatsoever happens between the ears that doesn’t rise to the self as pure thought, which, ironically enough, serves as a good definition of rationality. Not introspection.

I didn’t change your definition of introspection; I substituted an different conception of it.
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What other methods of self-observation are there? — T Clark

Generally, pure thought; specifically, as a component of it, understanding.

OK, I don't think I've asserted that — Coben

No, you didn’t. I embellished what the idea of introspection represents to me

It is in their best interests, it's just that people do not become that way naturally — Judaka

They could. All they gotta do is think about it.
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matches my sense that people have a lot of blind spots in introspection. — Coben

And I will admit that people are liable to have blind spots in their understandings.
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Nobody has full knowledge about the reasoning for their thoughts and actions — Judaka

Full knowledge about the reasoning, probably not. But reasoning itself is a conscious activity, which makes explicit the subject absolutely must fully know the thoughts it is reasoning about.

What is the idea you reject? — Coben

I reject the idea of introspection as the most obvious, most readily available, most commonly accessed, means for self-observation.
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I’m not understanding what you’re driving at, here.

Awww.....does that mean I don’t get a Christmas card?

you don't deny our experience, just that what we experienced exists. — T Clark

I don’t even deny introspection exists. I reject that the idea of introspection is sufficient to justify what you say it does. But if you do think it sufficient......have at it.

And, in my own mind, I can reduce the rejection of the idea of introspection a further step, to the idea that it isn’t introspection at all. It is understanding that’s actually doing all the hard work you reserve for introspection. But that’s just me.

What?!!? Hell, no. I got no right to reject anything of the sort. If someone said they were rejecting my experiences, I’d give ‘em a funny look and just walk away.

An idea is not, and never can be, an experience. Especially the idea involving one person, and the experience involving other persons.

What....did I over-simplify?

You accused me of being arrogant in rejecting some collective experience, when all I’m rejecting is an idea.

(Sigh)

Cognitive biases, particularly, by definition, are not something people are likely to be aware of. — Judaka

Generally speaking, they damn well should be. One’s interpretations, cognitive biases, prejudices form the spectrum of judgements he is going to make on a rather large range of possible situations presented to him at any given time. It is in his best interest to have some idea what those might be, don’t you think? How else is it even possible to make moral decisions, especially? Accident and reflex being the only exceptions to the rule.
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You believe people exist in a level of self-awareness that I cannot agree with. — Judaka

What level is that?

I don’t like e.g., the Dallas Cowboys, but I wouldn’t disallow a friend from coming in my house because he’s wearing one of their t-shirts.

Can’t help ya. Sounds about right though.

I never said, nor even hinted, that I reject your collective experiences of introspection.

But don’t worry....I won’t judge you for misunderstanding me.