I kinda sorta favor the groundwork you’re laying here.

assume that the person has an objective reference point in the first place and is going exclusively by that reference point. — Cidat

Objective reference point for statements with empirical predicates would be experience; objective reference point for statements with intuitional or conceptual predicates alone, would be pure reason.
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So the concept of objectivity requires some basic assumptions. — Cidat

Beginning with a speculative epistemology predicated solely on the condition that all concepts in general are given from a logical ground, and from that assumption, it follows necessarily that objectivity as a concept is meaningless if not judged with respect to its complement.
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Everything is subjective" is an objective statement as it is being asserted to be true for everyone." is in my opinion the best argument in favor of the ultimate existence of objective truth. — Cidat

“Everything is subjective” doesn’t even need to be asserted as holding for everyone, to be an objective statement in itself. In at least one established theoretical human cognitive system, all cognitions are judgements, all judgements are objective, and all judgements are objective statements in form, when passed to an external observer.

Thing is.....”everything is subjective”, while being a valid objective statement, cannot be an objective truth, insofar as it is impossible that every thing is subjective. On the other hand, “any human knowledge of things is a subjective condition” would be an objective truth, iff that statement holds across the entire human domain without exception, which, theoretically, it does because its refutation is immediately self-contradictory under the same circumstances by which the statement was thought in the first place.

Anyway.....carry on.

I only have direct access to my own mental states and I can't think of a way that I can have the same access to anyone else's. — Andrew4Handel

Not sure about access to; if I am my mental state, that is, if no distinction is at all possible between the state and the representation of it, then to say I have direct access to myself is merely a trivial truth which tells me nothing I didn’t already know.

But I would agree without equivocation, that I have no direct access to any other mind in the same way, for then that mind would have two representations: the one that belongs to it, and mine, which certainly does not.

I think that our own access to our mental states is not very helpful either. — Andrew4Handel

Correct. To assert our accessibility to what we already are, doesn’t help anything.

Now, if one has reason to think that which has access is not a proper representation of the condition being accessed........that’s a whole different philosophy.

How are a priori truths the product of the mind? If they were produced, they would be a posteriori as a matter of definition. — Wayfarer

Production of a truth, which must always be in accordance with principles, is necessarily a priori; the production of the proof of a truth, which must always be in accordance with empirical conditions alone, is a posteriori.

the instrument which grasps relationships — Wayfarer

I would be inclined to go even further, and offer that the rational mind grasps relationships because such relationships are merely the product of its efforts. The rational mind always reasons to a conclusion from that which antecedes, that standing as the simplest and most complete form of relationship.

But then, inclinations are a dime a dozen, so.....

I hear ya.

I read everything but little interests me. Yours caused me to question my own interpretations, which is fine, Kant being the decent challenge he is.

Anyway...minor point en passant.

A matter of language. — tim wood

Boy howdy. That damn “in-itself”.....talk about a rabbit hole. So fundamentally necessary in the groundwork, so commonly mistaken in the dialogue. I concur with your objection.

space and time are the form of our intuition, and are therefore the result of our productive imagination, — Nagase

Form of intuition, ok, but how does “...are therefore the result of our productive imagination...” follow from it?

law is identical to moral obligation maybe never, but ought to run alongside. — tim wood

What a great idea for a moral philosophy: find a way to connect the rational conception of law with the transcendental conception of freedom, within the context of the ultimate subjectivity of moral feeling.

Oh wait.......never mind.

You make an excellent point, just sayin’.

It seems to me awkward to say that science is devoid of metaphysics. — Shawn

How else could a certain systematic way be recognized as necessary in order for something to be done in compliance with it, that is, the very possibility of science itself, if not first thought by means of reason? If human reason has its ground in metaphysics, it follows that science cannot be devoid of metaphysics. Understanding, of course, that that to which science is directed, is not itself science.

The theory concerns humans in general, and how experience relates to knowledge. As such, it doesn’t matter what it is we know about, but only how we go about knowing it. The same fundamental human cognitive apparatus is in play now, as was in play in the late 18th century.

Kant himself would already have the form of Nike “Airs”, as an intuition of a “foot covering”, the form of baseball cards as an intuition of some kind of “portrait art”. The names for those as we know them are mere judgements, or, cognitions as particular things, which he would accept as an experience, even if he gave them different names. Foot covering being a lot simpler than baseball cards, of course, because Kant would also need experience of the game in order to justify that the cards serve as a cognition of a specific kind of portrait art. But still, he would have been able to figure out a priori what the cards represent in general......buncha guys participating in some cricket-like kind of group event, maybe.

Computers as we know them Kant may have had no experience, but he certainly would have understood what it means to compute, so some sort of sensible matter used in computing would have appeared to him, a priori, as the form, that is, would have afforded him an intuition, of “computer” specific to his time. Abacus, astrolabe, slide rule.....stuff like that.

With Kant, a question with some weight. — tim wood

Weighty indeed. 25 years, four volumes, 1600-odd pages, being groped and pawed over ever since. Throw in half-dozen semi-conflicting translations......what’s not to like?

I think you need to reread the passage. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah.......think I’ll get right on that.

It’s been real.

In conclusion then, we need to reject your major premise "if an object affects perception...", because we need to determine how perception is constituted, and how it is disposed to be affected by objects, before we can draw any conclusions from that premise. — Metaphysician Undercover

Hmmmmm.....

So you’re saying theories concerning knowledge in general, depends on knowledge of particulars. Makes me wonder....how can we claim knowledge of a thing before we have decided how it is possible to know anything at all?

We must allow for the possibility that our observations are made through a lens, and that the lens itself, is contributing to the observation — Metaphysician Undercover

No, actually we don’t. We can just as well assume our sensory apparatus doesn’t distort our perceptions, work out a theory under those conditions, see if the conclusions make sense. If there is contradiction or inconsistency, it then becomes possible the apparatus does affect the perception; if there is no contradiction, and as a rule we are not confused by our sensations, we are justified in disclaiming the notion of an interfering lens. I have never ever looked at an apple and conceived from that observation, a grape. And even if my perception apparatus has distorted whatever that object actually is, to me it is a grape nonetheless.

Hence the value in a representational cognitive system. We already know the object in itself is not what the mind is working with anyway, and we already know the object in the aftermath of immediate perception is not itself lent to the mind, so it makes little difference if observations are lensed or not. Whatever gets to the mind is that which is cognized.

the fact that the referred to "transition" is supported by observation is insufficient to support the truth of the proposition or premise produced, because the "observation" itself must be verified. — Metaphysician Undercover

We’re not looking for truth of anything, no theory grounded on empirical conditions can ever be graded by its truth, but only on the non-contradiction of itself. All observations are verified, right up until they are not.

Therefore, we need a clear analysis and understanding of the means of observation (and this is sense, or sensibility, in the context of our discussion), before the observations themselves can be held as valid. — Metaphysician Undercover

We don’t care if the observations are valid, we actually know sometimes they are not. We do not need to reduce a theory of knowledge to the inception of it, but only to ascertain if the ends conforms to the means.
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The external and internal are not "very distinct". This is a necessary principle I've brought to your attention already, but you do not appear to have apprehended it. — Metaphysician Undercover

There you go again, attributing my lack of apprehension for what is actually sheer rejection. You cannot prove I reject this alleged necessary principle because I don’t apprehend the theory to which it belongs, as opposed to rejection of it because I do. Just because I find the internal/external dualism sufficiently explanatory doesn’t mean I don’t apprehend the arguments that it isn’t.

We might maintain the internal/external separation by saying one is a representation of the other, but which is which? — Metaphysician Undercover

If the separation is held as a valid hypothesis, the which is which is given by it.
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Suppose we start with a mind/body separation..... — Metaphysician Undercover

Everything including and after this opening paragraph, and ending with.....

So the people in the cave see sensible objects as the real things when they are really just reflections of the Ideas. — Metaphysician Undercover

......is acceptable from a Classic perspective. Sensibility is a tool, shaped for its purpose as a capacity for something, by Nature; sensibility is not a property of the internal nor the external, it is a gateway between, hence can be said to be shared by both but belongs to neither. Intuition is impossible without the appearance of objects and objects are unknowable by us as something if they do not appear to us as something.
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“....In the transcendental aesthetic we will therefore first isolate sensibility by separating off everything that the understanding thinks through its concepts, so that nothing but empirical intuition remains. Second, we will then detach from the latter everything that belongs to sensation,
so that nothing remains except pure intuition and the mere form of ap­pearances, which is the only thing that sensibility can make available a priori...”
— Mww

See, this is very consistent with what I said in the last passage. First we exclude what is proper to the mind, concepts etc.. Then we take empirical intuition and remove everything derived from sensation. So we are left with everything which is prior to sensation. Effectively, this is "the lens". The only problem is that Kant goes and posits space and time as the pure intuitions, the lens, and that is completely unwarranted. — Metaphysician Undercover

You’re misreading the passage. Isolate sensibility is to separate it, and in effect use an erasure on it. It’s gone, extinguished. Separating off what understanding thinks is what extinguishes it. You’re thinking separating off means sensibility is left. But if nothing but empirical intuition remains, it cannot be sensibility that is left because sensibility does not give us empirical intuitions as representations. It gives us appearances as representations by means of the sensations objects impress upon us, which is merely part of the capacity for receiving impressions.

Then, from this empirical intuition remainder, is anything from sensation separated, which are those other representations, re: appearances, which are always empirical. Now, the empirical intuition has lost its empirical part, but is nonetheless intuition. So the final remainder is an intuition, but without anything belonging to it whatsoever. If a thing exists in some form, but has no content, it is nothing but a condition for that which was separated from it. It has become irreducible. What was taken was appearance, the empirical content from sensation, which in its turn came from the impression of objects, which in their turn, are actual real objects all given from sensibility, the capacity to receive objects. Therefore, for us, space and time as pure intuitions, are the necessary conditions of objects.

We are not left with everything prior to sensation; we are left with everything after it, which is what is meant by “...all that sensibility can make available a priori....”. Just another.....18th Century scholastic upper class Prussian.....way of saying, if there is something a priori we have, from which sensibility is the ground for its abstraction, it is intuitions in general, of which pure intuitions are included. This also explains why all intuitions are a priori in origin, but empirical in employment, for these must also apply to merely possible objects. It also contradicts your claim that a priori means prior to, because there cannot be an intuition of an object antecedent to its impression on our senses. Just the opposite of what you’re claiming.
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“.....But, though all our knowledge begins with experience, it by no means follows that all arises out of experience. For, on the contrary, it is quite possible that our empirical knowledge is a compound of that which we receive through impressions, and that which the faculty of cognition supplies from itself (sensuous impressions giving merely the occasion), an addition which we cannot distinguish from the original element...
— Mww

This is not what Kant is giving us though. He says all intuitions are derived from sensibility. And, it makes much more sense this way. How could the mind produce ideas, or any sort of thought, which is free from sense impressions. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, he does not. We do, in current parlance, because we disregard what he is trying to say under the constraint of his language, and disregarding exactly to whom he is aiming that language. We say derived from sensibility because nothing happens to our knowledge that doesn’t begin with sensibility, but that doesn’t mean we have knowledge because we have sensibility. Again...capacity vs faculty.

Intuitions are the product of experience, sensuous impressions giving merely the occassion....for that experience. This should be obvious, because it is possible to perceive something, have the impression or sensation of a thing, and have no knowledge of what it is. But we can still think that sensation relates to something. We just won’t know if what we think about the sensation represents what it actually is. We may think “bug” when we experience a tickle in a place we can’t see, but it turns out to be a hair. We may very well know we have a sensation, but that doesn’t mean we know the content of it. If knowledge begins with experience, it cannot begin with something that happens in the system long before it can even be called experience.

The mind produces ideas and thought of all sorts of things without sensation. Whenever nothing is the immediate focus of our attention, the mind can think whatever it wants. I mean.....when was the last time you had a sensation of potentiality, that wasn’t simply the sensation of something in possession of it?
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It looks to me like you failed.
"For, in speaking of knowledge which has its sources in experience, we are wont to say, that this or that may be known a priori, because we do not derive this knowledge immediately from experience, but from a general rule, which, however, we have itself borrowed from experience...."
Notice, the temporal procession described here. — Metaphysician Undercover

Irrelevant. The context is empirical knowledge: “speaking of knowledge which has its sources in experience”. We are wont to say it is a priori, but it isn’t if it’s given from a rule that was itself given from experience. This is impure a priori, as opposed to pure, which is covered in the next paragraph. For all intents and purposes, it is reason operating under an improper judgement.

“We are wont to say” means it is our habit, without due consideration of the truth of it.
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We need to consider the meaning of "ideal". Space and time may be ideal for the purpose of representing material objects, but "ideal" is relative to the purpose. — Metaphysician Undercover

Sure. Space and time are the ideal relative to the purpose of explaining how it is possible for us to know material objects. Ideal here means “Perfect for explaining....” because it is irreducible to something which could be more perfect for explaining. Purpose is defined as what is sought, and what is sought is knowledge. Transcendental, not Platonic.
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Let me state it bluntly, there is no "faculty of representation". The immaterial aspect, what you call the internal, is active, doing things, creating ideas, etc.. These things which the internal mind is creating, ideas and such, are created for a purpose, implying that their existence is based in a final cause. — Metaphysician Undercover

Sure, I can dig it. The final cause of the activities of the internal aspect, is pure reason, and its purpose is either knowledge with respect to what is, or morality with respect to what ought to be. Damn!!! Yet another necessary dualism.

Speculative.

You know.....I love a good Socratic, and even a somewhat Hegelian, dialectic as much as the next guy. Being from two distinct metaphysical paradigms pretty much promises you and I will go back and forth for the foreseeable future, without agreeing on much of anything. I don’t mind, though, so, once more into the breech.....

See, the faculty of representation produces a representation through synthesis, but the capacity of sensation produces an appearance only by being affected by objects. The pure intuitions, the a priori, are required to account for that synthesis which produces the representations. But how do we account for the synthesis within sensation, required to produce an appearance? The pure intuitions are not supposed to be there, within sensation, or are they? — Metaphysician Undercover

In a theory of knowledge predicated on logical structure, but initiated by physical means, the transition between the two needs no technical account; it is sufficient that the transition occurs, and is sustained by observation. Think of that transition as the major premise in a propositional syllogism: if an object affects perception and from such affect is given an appearance that represents the affect, and if....(continue to minor premise). This is a valid procedure, regardless of whether such logical system is representational or not, because obviously there is in fact a transition of some kind between the physical external and the rational internal. I know you have doubts about the external/internal relation, having to do with possibilities and activities and whatnot....but I don’t see why that should be the case. No matter their names, a dualism of some kind is consistent with the human complementary architecture under which the logical system works. Up/down; left/right; yes/no......ad infinitum.

So we don’t synthesize within sensation, we grant a physical/mental transition, a representation being the result, and get on with it. Representation understood to indicate a “change in the subjective state”. The pure intuitions are not there, no, but the time until they are is practically instantaneous.
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The ambiguity is because of the inconsistency and lack of clarity in Kant's work. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ok, I’m forced to grant you that. He’s infamous for apparent inconsistencies and notorious for lack of clarity, employing, as is his wont, the paragraph for a unit of argument. Still, we do the best we can with what we have to work with. The strength of the theory as a whole far outweighs the troubles in its construction, and whether it was from the validity on the pro side or vagary on the con side, that philosophical academia reinvented itself after CPR, is irrelevant.

As an aside, the Transcendental Analytic is far FAR more controversial, ambiguous and obfuscated than the easy stuff occupying us here in this first, merely groundwork part of Elements, the Transcendental Aesthetic.
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This distinguishes a capacity from a faculty....
— Mww

Here's that same inconsistency again. You distinguish a rational function from a physical ability to do something, with reference to the "resultant product". However, there is a resultant product from the capacity to do something called "sensibility", or sensation. There is an appearance, just like the representation is the resultant product of the rational faculty. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ways and means, I say. Ways and means. It being abundantly manifest that the external and internal are very distinct, it follows the operational parameters governing the expositions of them must also be. Interchange the terminology if you like, in that a capacity can be a faculty and vice versa, (Kant does this himself regarding sensibility, four times throughout the text) but what have you gained? If the gain is clarity and consistency, but we end up in the same speculative end......who cares? Again, no matter the names, there is a difference between them. All each has to do is be self-consistent within its own arena, and not functionally intrude on the other. It’s a process, after all.

Sensibility is the capacity for receiving impressions, it does not have a product of its own. Nothing will make any sense if it is not shown that we actually do perceive things, and how they relate, what their place is. Sets the stage, if you will. Sensibility the conception, merely denotes that we are able to perceive things as external to us, while the affect on us still belongs to the object. Sensation is the affect of an object of perception on “our faculty of representation”, of which sensibility is not a part.

Hopefully, this horse is now dead enough.
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If there is something a priori, some sort of pure intuition, involved in producing rational representations, that same pure intuition must also be involved in producing the appearances of sensation. — Metaphysician Undercover

Intuition does not produce representation, intuition is a representation of a certain kind, produced by the human system. It follows then, that pure intuitions also do not produce representations, they are the conditions which must be met in order for there to be empirical representations. Appearance is just a name for a kind, along with the name conception, idea, and of course, intuition, the kind dependent on the cause and effect of each.

Space and time are called intuitions because they are representations of a kind that indicates a subjective state, just as they all do. Space and time are called pure intuitions because there is nothing in experience that belongs to them. Empirical intuitions, on the other hand, represents empirical predicates, because only empirical objects are perceived by us and become experiences.

Gotta keep in mind the theory under discussion, in which space and time are the absolutely necessary ground of the possibility of all experience. If involved at all in the producing appearance as representing sensations, it is because without space and time, objects and the sensation of them are impossible for us. That is not to say appearances are actually produced by them.
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This must be the case, understanding is the faculty of thought, and phenomena are absolutely required for understanding......
— Mww

Right, except the a priori intuitions cannot be already residing in the faculty of understanding, because all intuitions are provided from sensibility. So how could these a priori intuitions, space and time, get into the cognitive faculty which gives us understanding? — Metaphysician Undercover

They don’t. There are no intuitions at all in understanding, there are only conceptions. Space and time are not conceptions. We need space and time as the necessary conditions for objects, but absent perception, we can still think objects, which just means we are thinking the form of objects as representations arranged a priori as phenomena. This explains why time is the condition of our conceptions but space is not. Thoughts do not occupy space but they do subsist in time.

Just as there are the pure intuitions represented as space and time, there are the pure conceptions of the understanding called categories, which relate phenomena to empirical conceptions.

Understanding isn’t given to us; it is what we do as part of our nature, just as we intuit, and judge, and cognize and experience.

How does the faculty of understanding receive a priori intuitions? — Metaphysician Undercover

It doesn’t; it receives phenomena that imagination synthesizes with conceptions, which gives judgement.

if the a priori pure intuitions are free from sensible content (appearances), they must be prior to sensibility. — Metaphysician Undercover

Technically, it isn’t quite right to say intuitions are free from appearances. It is more that the content of appearance have no organization, or “...arranged under certain relations...”, which intuition provides. Saying imagination synthesizes is the same as saying intuition arranges the content of appearance into the organized form called phenomena.
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"The science of all principles of a priori sensibility I call transcendental aesthetic — Metaphysician Undercover

Interesting. Kemp Smith and Guyer/Wood translations read that way, but Meikeljohn reads: "The science of all principles of sensibility a priori I call transcendental aesthetic...”. I like that better, because of what follows:

“....In the transcendental aesthetic we will therefore first isolate sensibility by separating off everything that the understanding thinks through its concepts, so that nothing but empirical intuition remains. Second, we will then detach from the latter everything that belongs to sensation,
so that nothing remains except pure intuition and the mere form of ap­pearances, which is the only thing that sensibility can make available a priori...”

Taken together, we should see it isn’t sensibility itself that is a priori, but only the rational product of it, which we have agreed all along, is mere appearance. This reflects back to my interpretation that the affects of objects stops at sensation, whereby the mind takes over from the empirical, hence the advent of a priori conditions. Not prior to physicality, but instead of it.
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Don't you recognize that a condition for something means that this thing which is the condition, is necessarily prior in time to the thing which it is a condition for? How can you even think that you might remove temporality from this concept? — Metaphysician Undercover

I wouldn’t, and I haven’t. I said there are situations where the notion of temporal sense is unwarranted, and that the a priori is just as much a logical relation from deductive inference as it is a relation in time. Furthermore, we need to keep in mind what we actually talking about here, and that is a theory of knowledge, in which the hypotheticals make clear we don’t give a hoot about the when of something, but only the use of it. Saying the premises of a syllogism are necessarily prior in time to the conclusion of it, it a trivial truth, and serves no purpose whatsoever.
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it would be extremely bizarre if one faculty of the mind was receiving a posteriori intuitions, and another part was creating a priori intuitions. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not what I said, and certainly not what I meant. The mind doesn’t receive intuitions, it creates them because objects are given to us, hence always a priori but with empirical cause. Pure intuitions created as the form of empirical intuitions.

You know.....you can’t have matter/form necessarily in one place, use that necessity for something else, yet arbitrarily drop out the matter/form complementarity, just because. If the theory starts with it, the theory must maintain it for its own internal consistency. Form has always been a rational aspect, so at some point, the matter part of the complement must also become rational, or the theory defeats itself again, it being, after all, a metaphysical thesis.
——————

it makes no sense to say that the possibility of objects as perceptions, is a property of the human mind, because this makes it impossible for other sensing animals to sense objects as perceptions. — Metaphysician Undercover

To say anything is a property of humans does nothing to say it is thereby an impossible property of anything else. For humans, space and time are the necessary conditions of the possibility of objects, and thereby the possibility of experience. Keyword.....for humans. At best, we may allow other rational beings like us to be imbued with similar cognitive apparatus, but rational beings does not necessarily include “sensing animals” in general, but only certain kinds.

“.....I join one representation to another, and am conscious of the synthesis of them....”, is the determinant factor in what a rational being would be.

It makes perfect sense to say the possibility of objects as perceptions is a property of humans, but such property in no manner makes the possibility of objects in themselves dependent on human perception. Human experience of objects, on the other hand, is entirely predicated on the initiating perception of them. Such proclamation should broker no controversy whatsoever.
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You would have to define "a priori" in some non temporal way, but this would be nonsense — Metaphysician Undercover

“.....But, though all our knowledge begins with experience, it by no means follows that all arises out of experience. For, on the contrary, it is quite possible that our empirical knowledge is a compound of that which we receive through impressions, and that which the faculty of cognition supplies from itself (sensuous impressions giving merely the occasion), an addition which we cannot distinguish from the original element...

.....For, in speaking of knowledge which has its sources in experience, we are wont to say, that this or that may be known a priori, because we do not derive this knowledge immediately from experience, but from a general rule, which, however, we have itself borrowed from experience....

......By the term "knowledge a priori," therefore, we shall in the sequel understand, not such as is independent of this or that kind of experience, but such as is absolutely so of all experience. Opposed to this is empirical knowledge, or that which is possible only a posteriori, that is, through experience. Knowledge a priori is either pure or impure. Pure knowledge a priori is that with which no empirical element is mixed up....”

So there!!! PPPFFFTTTT!!! Defined, just as you demanded. Notice, if you will, the glaringly obvious lack of temporal and non-sense. This being independent of that removes time from their relation.
——————

This is why I am trying to demonstrate to you how Kant's system makes very little sense. — Metaphysician Undercover

And doing a good job of it, too, I must say. Thing is, I like to think I’m doing just as well in refuting your demonstrations. Still, the controversy intrinsic to a thing, and the degree of sense it makes, are directly related to the understanding of it, assuming it is comprehensible in the first place, of course.

“.....Despite its brevity - a mere thirty pages in the first edition and forty in the second - the "Transcendental Aesthetic" argues for a series of striking, paradoxical and even revolutionary theses that deter­mine the course of the whole remainder of the Critique and that have been the subject of a very large proportion of the scholarly work de­ voted to the Critique in the last two centuries. In this section, Kant at­ tempts to distinguish the contribution to cognition made by our receptive faculty of sensibility from that made solely by the objects that affect us (A21-2/B36), and argues that space and time are pure forms of all intuition contributed by our own faculty of sensibility, and therefore forms of which we can have a priori knowledge. This is the basis for Kant's resolution of the debate about space and time that had raged be­tween the Newtonians, who held space and time to be self-subsisting entities existing independently of the objects that occupy them, and the Leibnizians, who held space and time to be systems of relations, con­ceptual constructs based on non-relational properties inhering in the things we think of as spatiotemporally related. Kant's alternative to both of these positions is that space and time are neither subsistent be­ings nor inherent in things as they are in themselves, but are rather only forms of our sensibility, hence conditions under which objects of expe­rience can be given at all and the fundamental principle of their repre­sentation and individuation. Only in this way, Kant argues, can we adequately account for the necessary manifestation of space and time throughout all experience as single but infinite magnitudes - the fea­ture of experience that Newton attempted to account for with his meta­physically incoherent notion of absolute space and time as the sensorium dei - and also explain the a priori yet synthetic character of the mathe­matical propositions expressing our cognition of the physical properties of quantities and shapes given in space and time - the epistemological certainty undercut by Leibniz's account of space and time as mere rela­tions abstracted from antecedently existing objects (A22-5IB37-41, A30--2IB46-9).
Kant's thesis that space and time are pure forms of intuition leads him to the paradoxical conclusion that although space and time are empiri­cally real, they are transcendentally ideal, and so are the objects given in them. Although the precise meaning of this claim remains subject to debate, in general terms it is the claim that it is only from the human standpoint that we can speak of space, time, and the spatiotemporality of the objects of experience, thus that we cognize these things not as they are in themselves but only as they appear under the conditions of our sensibility (A26-30/B42-5, A32-48/B49-73). This is Kant's famous doctrine of transcendental idealism, which is employed throughout the Critique of Pure Reason (and the two subsequent critiques) in a variety of ways....”
(Guyer, Cambridge Press, 1998)

All that to say this: nothing is but what we think of it.

Can you see the problem here now which the ambiguity creates? — Metaphysician Undercover

Of course. The ambiguity arises from using Aristotle to qualify Kantian methodology, which just ain’t gonna work.

“....A philosophical system cannot come forward armed at all points like a mathematical treatise, and hence it may be quite possible to take objection to particular passages, while the organic structure of the system, considered as a unity, has no danger to apprehend. But few possess the ability, and still fewer the inclination, to take a comprehensive view of a new system. By confining the view to particular passages, taking these out of their connection and comparing them with another, it is easy to pick out apparent contradictions....”
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First, notice that sensibility is a passive, receptive thing. It is a capacity, like an Aristotelian potency, like "matter" is for Aristotle. — Metaphysician Undercover

“...The capacity (receptivity) for receiving representations through the mode in which we are affected by objects, is entitled sensibility...”. (1);
“...We apply the term sensibility to the receptivity of the mind for impressions, in so far as it is in some way affected....” (2)

The mode in which we are affected by objects, is the five varieties of perception. Objects here being real physical things, affected by objects indicates the kind of sensation corresponding to the mode of perception, the cause of sensations, in short, an impression. That which is received from an impression of an object is its effect, called an appearance. This is where sensibility stops, insofar as it has fulfilled its capacity for receiving impressions of sensation, such that “...the faculty of cognition is awakened into exercise...”. (3). It is also here that the physical matter of real objects stops, because the object’s extension in space and duration in time is not represented merely by their impressions on our sensation.
(Sidebar: in order to maintain consistency between the presence of a real object and the impression by a real object, the real object without its physical matter is thought a priori as a transcendental object. For the process of cognition, however, this is not pertinent. It is like reason saying to itself.....yep, ok, sensibility was right, there really is somebody at the door. For cognition to be awakened to its exercise is not a waste of my time)

“....The effect of an object upon the faculty of representation, so far as we are affected by the said object, is sensation. That sort of intuition which relates to an object by means of sensation is called an empirical intuition....” (4)

This distinguishes a capacity from a faculty, the latter a rational, that is, other than a physical, function with a resultant product, the former merely the physical ability to do something from which all else follows. As such, the resultant product of the faculty of representation are themselves representations, and in this preliminary stage, with an impression as a cause, is an intuition and this is accomplished by the imagination in its synthesis of appearance of an object in sensation with the arrangement of its matter in consciousness. This means the faculty of representation is every rational function which we have already termed the unconscious part of the mind, up to and including the understanding, but not including the part of understanding having to do with a priori judgements.

The “sort of intuition” does not indicate there are a multiplicity of sorts, but indicates the only sort of intuition there is, and the only sort of intuition there is, is empirical because it is by the impression of empirical objects that it is at all possible.

“.....the undetermined object of an empirical intuition is called phenomenon....” (5).

Of course undetermined, because the determinant itself has yet to be given. Nothing whatsoever has been given to conscious cognition, but only that something has been given possible to cognize. Also, because intuition is a representation, its object can only be a representation, therefore object here has nothing to do with matter, but is merely a rational, albeit unconscious, hence a priori, product.

“...but that which effects that the content of the phenomenon can be arranged under certain relations and by which they are susceptible of assuming a certain form (...) cannot be itself sensation....”

That the content of phenomena is susceptible to arrangement into a form because of certain relations of the characteristics of its content, is a valid observation given from judgement, in as much as we know from experience certain conditions about objects, that there is one by sensation of it, and what it is like by the form of it. If the content of phenomena is derived from the matter of objects through their sensations, then it follows that “that which effects that the content can be arranged”, cannot be sensation, so must be something subsequent to phenomena themselves, or, something common to both objects and their representations.

But now the sensation, the object given to the mind, has no form at all, and cannot correctly be called an object, it is completely dependent on the mind for its form. — Metaphysician Undercover

That which is given to, or affects, perception is an object as such. That which is given to, or affects, the mind is not an object, so cannot properly be called one; it is, rather, a representation of the object that affects perception. And it has content, given from the characteristics of the object, intuited as such. The representation from intuition, called phenomenon, is dependent on the mind for the ordering of its content according to certain relations.

“....The difference between a confused and a clear representation is merely logical and has nothing to do with content....”

This says that without the certain relations, which are always logical, under which the content of phenomena are susceptible to arrangement, we cannot have any use for them, regardless of what they represent, or, regardless of their content. This is just a roundabout way of saying we can only conceive “dog” if the matter intuited as tail is on the other end from the matter intuited as nose, and we need the tail, and the nose to be constituted of different substances. These arrangements are necessary in order to cognize a particular object of sense even if it is not an object immediately present to sense. It is how we remember things already known every bit as much as how we learn a thing not yet known. Phenomena are undetermined, always, regardless of extant experience or novelty, but to be eventually determined in conformity to experience or instantiation a new one, it must have a certain logical order to its content.

There are only two ways for us to cognize anything, one is by sense perception, the other is by thought. It would be totally bizarre of Mother Nature to imbue us with two separate and distinct cognitive systems, one for cognizing objects present to our senses, and another to cognize objects not present to sense, but of which there is antecedent experience of when it was present to our sense, and, in addition, of which we are completely capable of presenting to ourselves in thought alone without it having ever been an experience at all. It is much more parsimonious, and logically consistent, that we as rational agents operate under the auspices of a singular system, albeit under the restrictions pursuant to the two types of cognition given by our very nature.

Obviously, the difference between the conditions for cognitions is only given from the faculty of representation, And then only that part of the faculty of representation that has appearance for its product. All else remains exactly the same, as it must, because understanding needs something to think about even if there is no object present to our senses. If appearance is missing, and imagination synthesizes appearance with intuition to give phenomena, then phenomena become necessarily comprised of intuition alone. This must be the case, understanding is the faculty of thought, and phenomena are absolutely required for understanding. If we think, we must be using understanding and if we use understanding, there must be phenomena. That which the understanding thinks about must necessarily already exist for us in the faculty of representation from which it arises. And if it arises not from anything empirical, because the source of it is missing, it must arise a priori as already residing in the faculty of representation called intuition.

Furthermore, if intuition arises a priori under one condition, there is no reason to suspect it does not so arise under any condition. If it arises a priori under any conditions, it arises a priori under all conditions. Remembering that this is all occurring in the unconscious part of the mind, makes explicit there is no conscious mechanism in place to tell the faculty of cognition from where or how phenomena come from. If there is no conscious mechanism supports the notion that all intuitions reside a priori in the mind.

It should be clear now that the notion of a priori is not temporally significant, but is merely a condition for a means for something. A priori isn’t necessarily before experience when it is logically instead of experience. The problem then becomes, even if forms of cognized objects reside a priori in intuition, says nothing about how they got there in the first place. Simply put, they are derived from experience, and thereby suffices as logical equivalent to the psychological principle of memory. Just as we can never remember that which was never known, so too can we never have empirical intuition of that which we’ve never experienced.

Lastly, the form of empirical intuition is not the form of empirical objects represented as phenomena. Intuition is given from objects of sense, so the form of intuition must be that which all objects have in common, or, which is the same thing, that which makes objects possible as perceptions, which in turn makes intuition itself possible. The number of intuitions is predicated on the number of perceptions, but the possibility of intuitions is directly related to the possibility of objects. For humans, space and time are the necessary conditions of the possibility of objects, and thereby the possibility of experience. Theoretical derivatives to follow, if interested.
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If the a priori is produced by understanding, it only exists in potential prior to being understood. — Metaphysician Undercover

It isn’t. A priori isn’t a production at all, it’s a relation.
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Kant undoes all this, foregoing the cosmological argument — Metaphysician Undercover

See “SECTION VII. Critical Solution of the Cosmological Problem“, CPR B519. From there, for the next few chapters, is a rather thorough dissertation on the cosmological argument. Kant certainly cannot be said to forego it.

It is obvious empirical science has put the general hurts on much of pure metaphysics, more so for Aristotle than Kant, who didn’t grant the empirical any apodeictic unconditioned conditions, which the C.A. demands.
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To assume that time is not real is to assume a falsity, rendering the principles which follow from this assumption as unsound. Again, you are showing that you do not believe in free will. Free will requires that there is a real difference between past and future, and therefore time is real. — Metaphysician Undercover

Correct, I do not think free will as a valid conception. That there is a will, and that it is grounded in the transcendental causality of freedom, all conditioned by pure practical reason, having nothing whatsoever to do with the reality of time for its implementation, but may invoke coexistence or successions in time for its predicates.

But you’re more than welcome to enlighten me as to these alleged false assumptions.
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You are assuming that the temporal necessity can be removed from "a priori", and this is impossible. — Metaphysician Undercover

I can show how temporal necessity for some a priori considerations is unwarranted. There may be conditions for temporal necessity, but withdrawing such necessity is not impossible. Remember, this is all with respect to human cognition alone, without reflection on all and everything that is or may be possible.
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Here's an example, 1 is prior to 2. You could argue that it is logically prior, but not temporally prior, arguing that the concept of two is logically dependent on the concept of one, but there is no need for one to be temporally prior to two. But this is false because it is impossible that there could be two things, prior in time to there being one thing. The concept of "2" requires that there be two individual "ones". — Metaphysician Undercover

Numbers are nothing but the schema of the category of quantity. If there are two things, each is already in its own part of time from its perspective, but they may very well coexist in the same time from mine.

Only if I count objects, must there be temporal priority, because I cannot count all things at the same time. But this has to do with me, not the temporal necessity of existences. And it has to do with me, because time is merely the subjective condition within which all phenomena are possible. We cannot think the non-existence of time, even if we may think the non-existence of things in time.
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This is why the Aristotelian metaphysics is actually more sound than the Kantian. — Metaphysician Undercover

I’ll take your word for that. Hell....it might actually be more sound. I dunno. But I judge the value of a theory only on how much sense it makes to me, so if I spent as much time and effort on Aristotle as I have on Kant, I might’ve had a different allegiance. But I didn’t, so I don’t. So there ya go....

It must be kept in mind, that there is no matter, per se, except external to us. Internal to us is merely representation of matter.
— Mww

This is hard for me to grasp, because as human, we are material beings. So I don't see how you can say matter is only external to us. — Metaphysician Undercover

Us. Me. We. External to that which is represented by personal pronouns. I may experience my own blood but I think I’d be in serious trouble if I come to experience my own brain. And even if I could, I’m not about to experience the workings of it, except by means of philosophical musings. Imagine....a machine on my head, showing me what it looks like to enjoy a brisk swim in the lake. I don’t think so. The point being, there is no matter of basketball in my head when I represent one to myself upon perceiving or remembering it.

If I am supposed to assume that all matter is external to me, then where does this leave "me"? — Metaphysician Undercover

As nothing but a representation of that which thinks about stuff. You can't deny the reality of your “me”, in some form or another, so if you decide to make some claim about it, you can only do so theoretically. The hard sciences may tell us eventually exactly what “me” is, but as you said before....what’s the point? Is the “me” going away just because you’ve been given some empirical facts about it? Won’t you still say, I wonder; I think; we’re going; our plans, in my mind......

How could the sensations, and all unconscious faculties relate to the conscious mind if not through the means of the material body? — Metaphysician Undercover

It probably does. It almost has to. But as long as we have no suitable explanation for everything we do with respect to mind, we are permitted to theorize on it as much as we like. Helps to be reasonable, logical, comprehensible about it, though, obviously. Just can’t claim such theories as necessarily the case, even if we can claim them as logically sufficient.

Now look at what happens if I divide myself into distinct objects, like we could divide a culture into distinct individuals. Where would I find the internal source of activity? — Metaphysician Undercover

You’re dividing an immaterial representation. Therefore, you can only divide into others of the same kind. The source of the activities of such divisions would depend on what you want them to do, what they’re supposed to accomplish. The most fundamental division of self, I suppose, brings up the representation of consciousness as ego, and is the source of both feelings and cognitions, the only mental activities of which humans are capable.

We might resolve the issue by dissolving the boundaries between individual objects, allowing them all to overlap, like atoms and molecules overlap, but then we might completely lose the meaning of "internal". — Metaphysician Undercover

Absolutely, we might. All the needs to be done is come up with a theory that allows its hypotheticals to overlap. Problem is, what is responsible for what, if they stumble all over themselves? How do they stay out of each other’s territories? A molecule cannot be confused with an atom, even if their fundamental physical constituency overlaps. In the same way, hypotheticals cannot be confused with each other even if their respective logical conditions overlap. Still, if individual things have individual jobs, I don’t see how boundaries for those things won’t be part of the bargain.
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Granted. Actual a priori and actual a posteriori. Both from the principle of cause and effect. Done deal.)
— Mww

The problem here is that "a priori" is given the status as prior to sensation, in the form of sensibility. In this way it becomes a possibility rather than an actuality. — Metaphysician Undercover

This from Aristotle? Could be.....I’ll take your word for it. In Kant, to reiterate, a priori and a posteriori are conditions relative to their respective objects or relative to each other, within the context of a particular cognitive system, and not necessarily in a temporally prior sense.

I might be starting to see what you mean....sorta. Your saying intuitions, for example, don’t determine an object, which means the best they can do, because they are a priori, is determine the possible identity of an object. This notion is reconciled by the operational parameters of the modern term “memory”, same as the old term “intuition”, which we agree readily identifies objects of our extant knowledge.

Anyway......think I’ll let the rest of your post alone. Thing to keep in mind is, Kant knew Aristotle very well, being a professor of metaphysics and held the chair in logic. Kant’s major philosophical claim to fame is taking Aristotle where he either didn’t know he could go, or refused to go because he saw no reason to. Either way, Kant is based on Aristotle, for most intents and purposes.

For what that’s worth.

We'd be best off to place internal/external as the two extremes of a single category, spatial existence, and represent all activities as occurring by degrees in between. — Metaphysician Undercover

All in the paragraphs before this ending for them, is theoretically acceptable. If anything were to disavow the tenets, it would be that the subject cannot think a spatial existence for itself. Even if I can think your internal activities as merely an extreme of spatial existence, I could never think that for myself.
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It has already been agreed, that any content of a thought prevents all other content for that thought. (....)
— Mww

OK this is a starting point of agreement The thought prevents contrary thoughts, at the same time. This is during the act of thinking. But what do you think happens when a decision is made? I propose that the conclusion (decision) is either acted upon immediately, or relegated to memory, then the act of thinking on that subject, therefore all thoughts on that subject, are prevented. If the conclusion is acted on and the act is successful, this is relegated to memory as well. So anytime there is an urge to think about that subject, the mind is directed toward that conclusion in the memory, and thoughts on that subject are avoided. If the conclusion is acted on and there are problems, thoughts might be resumed. — Metaphysician Undercover

By substituting the terminology and procedure from my philosophy, I can understand where you’re going with this. Still.....how are thoughts on the subject avoided, if the mind is directed toward the conclusion in memory with respect to it? How does the mind know it’s being directed to the conclusion that corresponds to the subject it is avoiding thinking about?
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re: space and time are the forms of all sensible intuition; categories are the forms of all experience, and so on.
— Mww

Do you apprehend the suffix "ible" on "the forms of all sensible intuition"? This introduces possibility into the phrase, in an ambiguous way, because Kant does not make it clear as to where the possibility lies. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah, that was me using “sensible”, not Kant, who used “sensuous”, or external or empirical. A sensible intuition indicates an intuition given from sense data of real physical objects in space, thus not to be mistaken for an intuition that is sensible, that is to say, makes sense in itself. Intuition from sense, not intuition that makes sense. In the introduction to the “Doctrine of Elements” is found the definitions for terms used explicitly in his theory of knowledge, of which I may have taken some liberties.

In case such clarification wasn’t needed in the first place, the thing about possibility remains. Just let me say.....form does not indicate possibility, if possibility means there is some arbitrariness in the association of form to appearance. As you have said already, intuition is merely a “memory”, in that objects for which there are intuitions, have already been subjected to experience. Combined with the Kantian definition which says, “form is the arrangement of the matter of objects”, we see that some object given to us, if it is known already as a particular thing, re: “cat”, it is represented as having its matter arranged in a certain way already given a priori.

But this designation, that the form is a priori renders it as nothing other than the capacity for sensation. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not in my philosophy. The effect of an object, so far as we are affected by the said object, is sensation. Form, as intuition, is not yet a procedural presence. Sensation represents a physical effect; form is an a priori representation of the composition of the effect. The capacity for sensation is, therefore, dependent on our sense organs and something that effects them. In truth....theoretically....this designation, that the form as a priori, renders it as nothing other than the capacity for phenomena, and subsequently, the capacity for experience of objects.

The forms of intuition, space and time, as a prior to sense experience, are rolled together under the term "sensibility", which is the possibility for sensation, and this is a category mistake from an Aristotelian perspective, to make "forms" possibilities. — Metaphysician Undercover

I understand where this comes from, though, for Kant says, “...These (space and time) belong to pure intuition, which exists a priori in the mind, as a mere form of sensibility, and without any real object of the senses or any sensation...”. I rather think this conundrum is a manifestation of the necessary separation between what is given to us, and how we treat what is given to us. On the one hand, a thing is given to us because it is in space and time, which implies space and time are properties of objects, and on the other hand, a thing is given to us only if we can say it is in space and time, in which case space and time are merely subjective conditions for objects, and of course, subjective conditions are always a priori. In the former, space and time could be said to be rolled under the possibility of sensation, insofar as sensation only becomes possible when space and time adhere in the objects being sensed, but in the latter, space and time, being conditions for things of sense, do not need to be thought as properties of things of sense. The proof thereof, is quite facile, being a scant few uncharacteristically short paragraphs, and readily understandable.

Now, we ought to represent sensation in the same way, the living being is actively sensing, such that the activity comes from within, as the being senses its surroundings. Under this representation, the possibility for sensation (sensibility) is provided by the environment. And in Aristotelian categories, possibility, or potential, is provided by matter. So the "forms of intuition", would be proper to the activity of sensation, not properties of sensibility, because the capacity for sensation, as the possibility for sensation is provided by the external, matter. — Metaphysician Undercover

Close enough. The “forms of intuition”, however, are not proper to the activity of sensibility, for the very reason that the capacity for sensation is provided by the external matter, the environment. Also, there are only two “forms of intuition”, but there are as many intuitions as forms as there are arrangements of matter met with in perception.

Again....immediately upon perception, our knowledge of what we’ve been affected by is not available to us, but that we have been affected must have a validation in order for the eventual experience given from it to be called knowledge. The reasons are legion for why the unconscious part of our mind is necessarily ordered, and the fact Aristotle didn’t recognize them is why his metaphysics was subsumed under an advanced theory that does. His theory wasn’t wrong, per se, just incomplete. And there is nothing to say Kant’s theory is right, per se, no matter how complete it is.

so he brings matter right into the living being, as an essential part of "the being" in this way. (....), yet there is still an immaterial source for the activities of the material being. — Metaphysician Undercover

That matter is brought right into the living being is easy enough to understand, as is the immaterial source of the activities of the material being. I don’t understand matter as the essential part of “the being”, as different than the living being. If I were to simplify it in some way, I might say something like...reason is one of two fundamental conditions of the being of human. But I wouldn’t go as far as to imply that’s what you meant.
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In Kant, though....two things: matter is not a category, and, possibility for thought does not require matter, if the thoughts are a priori, re: space, time, causality, existence, geometry, etc.
— Mww

This is the difficulty I have in interpreting Kant. (...) A priori implies "necessary for", prerequisite, or required for. Any sense of "prior" is reducible to a temporal sense. People try to argue that logically prior is distinct from temporally prior, but in the end this makes no sense, because logic is dependent on understanding, which is a temporal process. — Metaphysician Undercover

Prior to is a temporal relation, to be sure, but is generally understood as an empirical predicate. A logical temporal relation of the same kind is usually represented by “antecedent”. A priori is a logical distinction representing the relation between things, or, the ground of the origin of things, but not necessarily in a temporal sense. We have empirical objects given to us simultaneously with the a priori representations of them, after all.

Analytic propositions are necessarily true or false because of the relationship of their content, but not because they are a priori. A priori judgements are true of necessity, but may very well be empirical judgements, re: married men, and all that......, true just as much as pure a priori judgements of no empirical content whatsoever are true or false, re: every part of space is itself space (true), all bodies are heavy (false).

Temporal priority can only be logical, if one accepts that time is not real. The time of this thing may be prior to the time of that thing, not because of time itself, but because of our understanding of things.

In a strictly Kantian point of view, and because you were wondering about why he never said much about possibilities, it is from the a priori itself that his reasoning for possibilities is given. In short, that which is known is a posteriori because the cognitions from which such knowledge is given is from the senses alone, what it only possible to know is a priori, is not given by the senses but is merely thought. It may become knowledge, but while it is not, it remains a priori.

So the issue here is that a priori thoughts have to be grounded in something.....

(Yes, they do. They are grounded in the faculty of understanding)

.....If they are looked at as the potential for a posterior thoughts, then this is a temporal priority....

(True enough, but they are not so looked at)

.....If we do not ground them in the Aristotelian way, by saying that they only have actual existence by being "discovered" (which really means created) by the human mind, then they become eternal like Pythagorean or Platonic idealism.....

(Maybe, but rather then eternal, they are called transcendental, for they are either discovered or created by human reason)

......So Plato could not validate Pythagorean idealism, and Aristotle decisively refuted it with what is known as the cosmological argument. Because of these principles, a priori thoughts, or thoughts which do not require matter (or perhaps some other form of potential) are incomprehensible.....

(By classic Greek reckoning, perhaps. Enlightenment reckoning says a priori thoughts do not require matter, but the proofs for them do, re: mathematics. This is why forms are a priori; they have no matter but are applied to or justify our knowledge of matter)

.....We could move toward some other form of potential, but what's the point? All this does is add an extra layer of complexity for the sake of denying the reality that human thought requires a material element. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, except humans are capable of thought of non-material things, some of which, as in beauty or the sublime, can hardly be said to be incomprehensible, even with, or despite, the added complexity of a faculty never considered fundamentally important.

Enough for now, in order to get something put up without being 2 feet long. You know....the ol’ word salad dismissal.

Glad you’re back; was afraid you mighta got The Big C-19!!! We did major necessity shopping the other day, and we’re exercising a selective “Katie, BAR THE DOOR!!” mentality for the duration. (Grin)

Outstanding post. I should have something in return tomorrow. Depends on how much backspacing/mindchanging I have to do.

The real dichotomy it is far more complex. — Metaphysician Undercover

...and far more numerous. At the apex, I submit the immanent/transcendent; descending to practical/speculative; analytic/synthetic; transcendental/experiential, culminating at the bottom of complexity in the ubiquitous subject/object.

No wonder philosophy has lasted so long: it is self-generating and self-sustaining. For better or worse.

From his post-solution time, he can easily think another solution, which means it is false further solutions are prevented.
— Mww

He can think of another solution, but he doesn't because he believes the problem has been solved. Therefore these thoughts (looking for other solutions) are prevented. — Metaphysician Undercover

It has already been agreed, that any content of a thought prevents all other content for that thought. This is a necessary prevention, because its negation is impossible. If the thinker doesn’t think something at some time, it is a contingent prevention, for the impossibility of a thought is not given merely from the not having of it, but from the having of a different one.
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Of course it is possible that at some future time the person will reconsider, and at that time allow those thoughts — Metaphysician Undercover

Yep. That’s the way I see it.
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I'm wary of the Kantian use of "form", because in the Aristotelian sense "form" is strictly actual, while Kant seemed to allow "form" to be possibility. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not sure of any benefit in mixing the two greatest thinkers known to man. I prefer Kant maybe for no other reason than he operates from a period in time with 1000 years of advancement in knowledge beyond the time of Aristotle. Everything evolves, given sufficient stimuli, the greatest of which is, of course, time itself

Not sure how you arrive at form as possibility in a Kantian sense. Seems to me the idea always refers to something definitive, re: space and time are the forms of all sensible intuition; categories are the forms of all experience, and so on.

I suppose you’re of the mind that form belongs outside the mind, thus forms are actual because that to which they belong are themselves actual. Which is fine, except we don’t really care about the actuality of things, such being presupposed when we want to know what the thing is. In addition, maybe you’re of the mind that the Kantian ding an sich, being unknowable, makes its form merely possible. In a representational cognitive system, however, the ding an sich doesn’t matter.

So when we talk about what is derived from the unconscious, if this is understood as possibilities for thought, then we must place it in the category of matter rather than form, if we adhere to Aristotelian terms. — Metaphysician Undercover

If you say so. Like I said, I’m not that well-versed in Greek thinking. In Kant, though....two things: matter is not a category, and, possibility for thought does not require matter, if the thoughts are a priori, re: space, time, causality, existence, geometry, etc. Empirical thought, on the other hand, requires both matter and form.
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Forms from intuition and appearances from sensibility are the subject matter of the unconscious faculty of imagination, the synthesis of which gives us phenomena.
— Mww

I wouldn't say this though. The faculty of imagination gives us forms, as images, what you call phenomena. If that faculty works with both, forms from intuition, and appearances from sensation, I would say that only one of these is the "subject matter". Since we have a workable form/matter distinction, and we say that the imagination gets forms from intuition, then we ought to say that it gets subject matter from sensation, and synthesis of the two is phenomena. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I would guess you wouldn’t, favoring Aristotle as you seem to do. But to put things in order...imagination gives us phenomena, but they are not images, because this occurs in the unconscious part of the mind and we are always aware of our mental images.

Matter is nothing but extension in space, and sensation merely represents such extension as it appears to the sense organs. Intuition is the origin of a pattern into which the appearance fits, and is given from previous experience. Whether or not the form matches the perception, and the phenomenon is valid is irrelevant, because it is unconscious subject matter. If the phenomenon subsequently turns out to conform to its experience we learn nothing; if it turns out to contradict all experience we know we made a mistake somewhere, or, we learn something new about the object of our perception.

That being said, you are correct in that the synthesis of the two is phenomena. It must be kept in mind, that there is no matter, per se, except external to us. Internal to us is merely representation of matter. It follows “subject matter” can attributed to any of the individual faculties for which there is an object derived from it, therefore “subject matter” of the unconscious part of the mind in general, is phenomena. The subject matter of the faculty of sensibility is represented as appearance; the subject matter of the faculty of intuition is the form of the appearance.
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An important point though, is that the subject matter, the appearances from sensibility, must already have forms of their own — Metaphysician Undercover

As history would have it, yes. However, in order to theorize on the possibility and truth of a priori cognitions in general, as the means to explain the certainty of mathematics in particular, rather than just take such certainty for granted, the entire historical methodology for the understanding the real world needed a paradigmatic overhaul. And the most radical part of the overhaul, was the speculation that it is us that assigns form to objects, not, as history warrants, that objects come to us with their forms included.

So even within this unconscious faculty of imagination, there must be something (a faculty) which establishes compatibility or consistency between the forms from intuition and the forms from sensibility (which are the material aspect, as the possibility of phenomena, contrary to Kant) — Metaphysician Undercover

It isn’t the consistency between the forms of intuition and the forms of sensibility, it is the consistency between the forms of intuition and the matter of sensibility, and the consistency is determined by the categories intrinsic to understanding, not imagination. In the quest for knowledge in concreto, we gain nothing from imaging a world, but from understanding the affect it has on us.
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Within the conscious mind is subject matter, yes, but that subject matter is what is known, or possibly known. Experience or possible experience.
— Mww

I don't think you are adequately grasping the role of the possible......

(Perhaps not, as you envision it. From where I sit, my grasp is doing ok)

.........There are two distinct roles for "the actual". There is the actual which is activity within, creating forms of intuition, knowledge, etc.. And, there is the actual which is activity outside the individual subject, creating the material world of objects. The two types of activity need to be understood as distinct.....

(Granted. Actual a priori and actual a posteriori. Both from the principle of cause and effect. Done deal.)

............as I described, because the internal forms are universal principles, while the forms external to me are individuals, particulars. Since we cannot establish compatibility between these two types of activity, within and without,.....

(But we can; there is compatibility or there is not. Either of which is an establishment with respect to ontological disparity)

........we look at all the external activity as possibility.....

(Yeah, I guess, sorta. The external activity is given, so not a possibility, but knowledge of what the external activity entails, is possibility. In effect, what we are trying to establish is not compatibility, but intelligibility, insofar as the external activity could be anything at all, but in order for us to comprehend it, it absolutely must at the very least be logically possible, or......intelligible.)

........Then we have the basis for a dichotomy. But the dichotomy doesn't work, because it's not clear cut....

(Isn’t external/internal clear cut?)

............Judgement and decision are how we impose activity onto the external possibility, while indecisiveness and skepticism is how possibility seeps into the internal activity. So we cannot hold such a dichotomy. — Metaphysician Undercover

(I take “imposing activity onto the external possibility” to mean we tell Nature what it is rather than Nature telling us, to which I agree. Skepticism just indicates our impositions on Nature cannot be proven with apodeictic certainty, with which I also agree. So we cannot hold such dichotomy just means it doesn’t do us any good to be so skeptical we falsify every judgement we ever made. Actually, this is the primary justification for the paradigm shift in epistemological metaphysics, in that, e.g., to be skeptical of, or merely hold an opinion on, the certainty of mathematics is absurd. Recognition of the absurdity, rather than adhering to the skepticism of the possibility, is the ground for the relative truth of all synthetic judgements, of which the most common to humanity is experience itself.)
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If that were the case, irrationality would be impossible. We would never make a mistake in judgement if all understandings were predicated on necessity and universality.
— Mww

Why do you say that? Failing to abide by the law is a real possibility. What you don't seem to realize is that law does not produce necessity, laws are produced out of some necessity.....

(Correct, we may fail to abide by law as the condition of our thinking, as witnessed by our possible errors in judgement, which is the same as being unintentionally irrational. All that means is that it was never absolutely necessary we think in a certain way to begin with, which is the same as saying reason is not law-abiding in itself. It couldn’t be, given the differences in subjectivity in otherwise perfectly similar people. Still, if a cognitive system as a whole is theoretically predicated on logic, then reason should theoretically adhere to logical law in order for us to trust in its authority.)

..........This is why it is far better to approach this subject from the precepts of moral philosophy, rather than to approach it as a speculative epistemology. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, if we wish to instill a necessary ground for something. It is never the case we absolutely must know some external object as a single thing, but it is absolutely necessary we act in a very certain way iff we wish to think ourselves as moral agents. That is to say, we are allowed to contradict ourselves with respect to what we know, which merely makes us silly, but we are never allowed to contradict ourselves in our moral determinations, the occurrence of which jeopardizes our very human worthiness. Thus it is the power of necessity, and the authority of law given from fundamental principles, from which a singular effect called “morality”, is at all possible.

Again, not to put too fine a point on it, all knowledge is possible from pure reason; morality is possible from pure practical reason. The difference is that morality has its own object, that being the agency that both formulates its own criteria for formulating his moral disposition, then obligates itself to conform to such formulation in order that becoming such an agent is possible.
—————

The precise separation between passive (possible) intellect, and active (agent) intellect, has never been resolved. Logic has determined the need to assume both of these as distinct categories, but no one has been able to adequately demonstrate which things are property of each, because all things are a combination of both (matter/form). — Metaphysician Undercover

I would say logic has determined the need to assume distinct ontologies, but not so much distinct intellects. Transcendental idealism dictates there is but one intellect, which functions under two ontological conditions. The external condition is a passive ontology, insofar as everything about it is given to us. The internal condition is the active ontology, insofar as everything about our cognitive system arises from itself. There is one inconsistency intrinsic to this system, in that we think perception to be passive, which falsifies the notion that our entire cognitive system is active. We just allow an overlap between them, so we can move on. Hence the lack of precision??

Some wanted to deny material elements within the mind, attempting to maintain the pure immateriality of the human mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

That’s me. Pure immateriality of the human mind, but granting the physical properties of the brain from which the mind seems to evolve.

That's why I propose we go to a different form of analysis, a sort of analysis where we look at the things to be categorized as essentially of one category, with accidents of the other category, in an attempt to avoid the confusion. — Metaphysician Undercover

Lay it on me. Just keep in mind, what appears to be a failure to grasp is really nothing but a difference in points of view. I would never be so presumptuous to think you fail to grasp your own philosophy, so I’d appreciate reciprocity.

"Reason" by definition is law abiding. — Metaphysician Undercover

If that were the case, irrationality would be impossible. We would never make a mistake in judgement if all understandings were predicated on necessity and universality. The principle of induction forbids those principles from conditioning experience, and is sufficient reason for asserting the tentative nature of empirical knowledge.

Pure logic is law abiding, which makes mathematics law abiding. Transcendental speculative metaphysics is grounded in logic merely as the means to exemplify its ideal, which the human can never attain.

Took some extra time with this one, dija? Worthy dialecticians are so awful hard to find, n’est ce pas?

And away we go.......
——————-

You (a): Once the thinker believes oneself to have solved the problem, further thoughts about that problem, and alternative solutions are prevented. Are you denying this?

Me: Yes, insofar as it is false that alternative solutions are necessarily prevented.

You (b): But it's not false. Alternative solutions are prevented (...) when an action is taken alternative possibilities (...) are prevented from occurring.

Ok, we have a temporal disconnect here. (a) and (b) are different times. Your (b) is correct: the time of action taken, is the time of the thought of the solution, and because we have but one thought at a time, all other thoughts, as alternative solutions, are prevented therefrom. However, your (a), “once believed to have solved”, the ground of my initial response, is post hoc, looking back to the time of the thought of the solution. From his post-solution time, he can easily think another solution, which means it is false further solutions are prevented. The one and only time in which no other and all alternative solutions is prevented, is the time of the thought of a solution. This principle applies for any number of successive thoughts, for each and every thought can be a solution in itself.

From the day before......

If you’d said the content of a thought at t1 prevents any other content of that thought, I would have agreed. — Mww

......which is saying the same thing as your (b) here today.

Shall we call it a draw?
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I agree with this, we cannot prevent thoughts in an absolute sense. (...). If you agree, we can call this "content", or "subject matter". I like the latter because it implies a sort of "matter" which is proper to the individual human "subject".

Would you agree that this "subject matter" is what is derived from the unconscious, and taken by the conscious mind to be worked with? — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, as long as we are allowed our choice. I would prefer content, because reason considers the individual self as a subject, thus will try to convince him the notion “subject matter” pertains to the content of his self rather than the contents of his mental activities. Minor point, to be sure, but in speculative metaphysics, everything in its place and nothing left out of place.

That aside, content or subject matter arises from unconscious and is worked with by the conscious, yes.
——————

Beginning at....

However, if we adhere to the Aristotelian concept of "matter" — Metaphysician Undercover

....well done indeed. Each line has something which can be said about it, but taking just a few.....

we might allow that this subject matter has no necessity of any particular form, though it necessarily has "form". There is no particular form which is proper to it. So it might come to the mind in any "form", a problem, a word, a concept, etc., it still must come to the mind as a form. — Metaphysician Undercover

I should have given your comment on conscious vs unconscious parts of mind, and the general uselessness of the conception itself, more attention. It is relevant now, because you brought up coming to the mind, and we never agreed on what that really means. In the Kantian sense, form is a priori, hence derived from the unconscious, and from that the fun, and rampant confusion, really begins......

Physical objects do have proper form, which is the particular arrangement of its matter. So....“subject matter” as mere sense data alone, does come from the unconscious part of mind in a particular form, but is yet unknowable to the conscious mind. This kind of form is called intuition, by which we represent to ourselves the arrangement of the matter of a thing as it is perceived. This is the fur, claws, whiskers, etc., thought to belong to some yet unnamed thing, which will eventually become conceived as some kind or another, of “cat”.

Such is the case for real subject matter, that is, data given to sensibility by physical things. But there is the kind of “subject matter” not given directly from matter, but is still given from thinking a particular arrangement of it. In this way, we conceive a possible object with the form of board, from the sense data of a tree.

.........

Would you agree that this "subject matter" is what is derived from the unconscious, and taken by the conscious mind to be worked with? As required for thinking, it is temporally prior to the conscious act of thinking......

(Not exactly. Forms from intuition and appearances from sensibility are the subject matter of the unconscious faculty of imagination, the synthesis of which gives us phenomena. So yes....forms are required for thinking, are temporally prior to conscious thinking, but forms are not taken up to be worked with by the conscious mind. Judgement and cognition are operatives in the conscious thought, forms being left far behind in the process.)

.......and therefore the conscious mind has no capacity for causal impact on this subject matter....

(Agreed. The conscious part of the mind already has its conditions set. It only remains for judgement to conform to or conflict with experience.)

.....However, if we adhere to the Aristotelian concept of "matter", we might allow that this subject matter has no necessity of any particular form, though it necessarily has "form". There is no particular form which is proper to it. So it might come to the mind in any "form", a problem, a word, a concept, etc., it still must come to the mind as a form. — Metaphysician Undercover

I’m ok with Aristotle in some places, particularly the categories, but not here, with respect to forms. But then, I’m not so learned in his metaphysics, so I must excuse myself.
————————

However, since the "form" is what the conscious mind works with.....

(No, it isn’t. The conscious mind works with cognition. Imagination works with forms.

.......and the conscious mind has the capacity to change the form which the subject matter has.....

(No, it can’t. At best, the conscious mind can misjudge the phenomenon given to it by the unconscious.)

...... through imposing the causal limitations described above, the subject matter itself has no inherent capacity to restrict the conscious mind.....

(True, but not for those reasons)

...........So in spite of the fact that we tend to think that things come to the conscious mind from the unconscious systems,.....

(Agreed, they cannot arrive in the conscious mind any other way than through the antecedent unconscious. Nothing whatsoever comes immediately into the conscious mind, but is always conditioned by the unconscious.)

...............and these things constitute the content of the thought, as imposing on the person, what that person will think about,.....

(True)

......this is actually false,....

(Gasp)

.......because the conscious mind will actually impose the form (the 'whatness') on to that subject matter, through the imposition of the restrictions described. This is how we can say that the will is free. — Metaphysician Undercover

(Errr....not no, but oh HELL no!!! Moral philosophy has nothing to do with speculative epistemology)
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You appear to be claiming that the subject matter, the content which comes to the conscious mind, from the unconscious, is necessarily a "conception", and this is what I dispute. — Metaphysician Undercover

Good. As well you should. The subject matter in the conscious mind is not conception alone, which is what I said. The subject matter of the conscious mind is cognition.

The rest of that section is also very good, well-written and thoughtful. I don’t agree with much of it, but to go through it item by item, in order to refute it successfully (from my point of view) is just too much. At the end of it, you wrote:

So within the conscious mind there is both "what is given", subject matter with a particular form, and "what is known", conceptions, as universal forms. — Metaphysician Undercover

Within the conscious mind is subject matter, yes, but that subject matter is what is known, or possibly known. Experience or possible experience. I don’t think the human cognitive system can be divided as you think it to be. Divided yes, conscious and unconscious, but both parts are equally necessary and the system cannot function without both, at least under empirical conditions. You said as much as well.
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Lots of good stuff. Sorry it took me so long to respond, and sorry I didn’t get to everything.

......cautioning reason against exceeding its proper bounds, even while it presumes its own warrant for doing just that.

Thinking and reasoning are carried out for a purpose. In general the purpose is to solve a problem. — Metaphysician Undercover

Now, WE, in order to responsible for preventing something from coming into the mind, must have something presented to us, otherwise we have nothing to work with, and if we have nothing to work with it cannot be said anything occurred, in this case, the occurrence of prevention for which we are the cause.
— Mww

It is not the case that we have nothing to work with. We have something to work with, this is the subject, what is being thought about, what I described as the problem to be solved. Once the thinker believes oneself to have solved the problem, further thoughts about that problem, and alternative solutions are prevented. Are you denying this? — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, insofar as it is false that alternative solutions are necessarily prevented. There’s nothing about one solution to a problem sufficient to cause the impossibility of another. Once the thinker has solved the problem, further thoughts about that problem, and alternative solutions qua solutions, are just redundant, and if pursued could actually be irrational, illogical or even catastrophic. On the other hand, there’s nothing preventing further thought on an alternative solution facilitating a solution of greater benefit. But even a greater benefit is not a necessity in itself. Nahhhhh.....not thinking an alternative solution is not the prevention of it; not thinking an alternative solution is merely the lack of causality for it.

And I question the relevance. When we’re awake and aware, we always have something to work with, because it is impossible to prevent, which has been my position all along. The questionable relevance arises from the fact that the something we always have to work with is not always a problem to be solved. Problem solving is the domain of empirical psychology/anthropology, where the analysis of words and concepts is the domain of pure reason, or, speculative epistemology.

Nails are a given; I wish to know all there is to know about their relationship to hammers.
———————

From this, it is clear it makes no difference what this something is that is necessary for us to work with, but the very minimal thing it can be, and still be an affect on the mind, is a conception.
— Mww

Are you saying that a problem to be solved is a conception? I don't think so. Conceiving the exact nature of the problem is half way to solving it. — Metaphysician Undercover

Me: something necessary; minimal; conception;
You: problem, conception, solution;

How in the hell am I suppose to relate those? I never said anything about a problem, or anything that could relate to a problem.

What is a problem if not a separation between what is given and what is known. Conceiving the exact nature of a problem is understanding the synthesis of its fundamental a priori representations, and judging that relation to experience. So no, a problem to be solved is not a conception alone, but rather, it is reason in conflict with itself, temporarily if subsequently solved without contradiction, other than temporarily if solved with contradictions, hence irrationally, or, permanently, if unsolved because of insufficient rational predicates.
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The content of the thought at t1 makes no absolutely necessary restriction whatsoever on the content of the thought at t2
— Mww

Are you serious? Despite the fact that I do not know what you might mean by "absolutely necessary restriction", if it were true that the thoughts at t1 had no restriction whatsoever on the thoughts at t2, we'd have no control over our thoughts at all. The temporal progression of thoughts would be completely random. — Metaphysician Undercover

Absolutely necessary is one of two principles of law, the other being universality. Reason, and by association, human thought, is not law-abiding, which is sufficient reason to justify the proposition that thought at t1 does not legislate thought at t2. Thought may be random, and often is, but it stands just as much chance of being pertinent, or logically related, to its antecedent.
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Issue grasping? So what...you have a bunch of ideas on a subject, one right after another, pick one, cease examining further ideas, stop thinking about the subject. Move on to the next. How is that any different overall than what I said?
— Mww

What I say is different from what you say because I say that "picking one", deciding, choosing, is what allows one to stop thinking about the subject. You are arguing that a person cannot stop oneself from thinking about a subject. — Metaphysician Undercover

Perfect example of conflating the particular with the general. It is quite obvious one may indeed stop paying attention to any given particular subject for any given reason. But an aware, otherwise cognizant thinker cannot not think about something, so in effect never stops thinking about some subject in general.

Keyword....overall.

Not to put too fine a point on it, but what we’re conventionally calling the subject is actually the object. That which is thought about is the object of thought, the subject being that to which the thought belongs, the thinker, represented by “I”, or other grammatically coherent personal pronouns. The proper form of all human thought is “I think (__x___), x being the object to which the subject directs himself. Such is the only reasonable way to account for subjectivity, even if it is only an appearance.
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Even if you’ve done the same problem repeatedly, since the solution of it, you still have to do something mentally in order to ensure the solution you give actually belongs to the problem given to you.
— Mww

Yes, I agree you must do something mentally, but all you have to do is pass it in front of your conscious mind to make sure it looks right. That is the point, the person is not solving the problem at this point, just making sure that it looks right. — Metaphysician Undercover

And what would that be, except thinking? Is there something else we do mentally, such that knowledge is possible from it? Feelings don’t count here; they are not cognitions, and we’re not interested in whether or not feelings “look right”.

Such are two arguments refuting the assertion we can prevent things from coming into the mind.
— Mww

You argument is clearly contradictory. It assumes that something must exist before it can be prevented. But that's nonsensical contradiction, because if it exists, it hasn't been prevented. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeahhhh-no, it isn’t. You are neglecting the domain of discourse which gives the proposition its validity. There are things that may indeed be prevented from coming into the mind, including the set of empirical things which don’t exist or the set of things that exist but have never been presented to us, and, the set of logically impossible things, but in those cases it is not WE who are preventing.

Now, WE, in order to responsible for preventing something from coming into the mind, must have something presented to us, otherwise we have nothing to work with, and if we have nothing to work with it cannot be said anything occurred, in this case, the occurrence of prevention for which we are the cause. From this, it is clear it makes no difference what this something is that is necessary for us to work with, but the very minimal thing it can be, and still be an affect on the mind, is a conception. Obviously...I mean, if an object is given to us we cannot deny it has been given to us, which is the same as saying we cannot prevent it from coming into the mind. So all that’s left that can be an affect on the mind is a conception. But.....and here’s the kicker.....if there is a conception, the mind has already done something, has already been affected by itself, which immediately makes it impossible for the mind to be prevented from doing what it just did.

We, as conscious, otherwise fully cognizant individual humans, cannot prevent things from coming into the mind. There is never a time the mind is empty of the representation of a thought/idea/notion a priori, or empty of the representation of an object a posteriori.

BOOM!!!! Mic drop.
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We commonly prevent things which we haven't even identified. We do this by limiting the possibilities. By doing one thing (,) in the next minute I prevent a whole bunch of things from happening which were possible, but now impossible, which I haven't even identified. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is nothing given from a thought at t1 preventing anything at t2. The content of the thought at t1 makes no absolutely necessary restriction whatsoever on the content of the thought at t2. Ever lost track of what you were thinking, the next thought of which you are aware having nothing to do with the first?

It is a categorical error of relation (cause and effect) and modality (existence-non existence) to say a thing has been prevented from entering the mind when no reality had ever been connected to it in the first place. Transcendental illusion writ large. If one happens to acknowledge such things, that is.

If you’d said the content of a thought at t1 prevents any other content of that thought, I would have agreed.

Metaphysical reductionism is your friend.
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Can you honestly tell me you’ve had more than one thought at a time? I’d be very suspicious of an affirmative claim......
— Mww

You don't seem to grasp the issue. Suppose I have an open question in my mind, "what will I do tomorrow morning?". As soon as an idea comes which I accept, and I decide that's what I will do tomorrow morning, then I stop thinking about it, and no more ideas for what I might do tomorrow morning come to my mind. I close my mind to that subject. — Metaphysician Undercover

Issue grasping? So what...you have a bunch of ideas on a subject, one right after another, pick one, cease examining further ideas, stop thinking about the subject. Move on to the next. How is that any different overall than what I said?

Is the problem.....“as soon as an idea comes”, in that they may be all come at once? You know that can’t be, otherwise you wouldn’t be able to tell them apart in order to give your acceptance a valid ground, such that closing the subject actually occurs. If you picked an idea that doesn’t fit, the subject may very well remain open.
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The thinking goes into solving the problem, but once the problem is solved the procedure is carried out without thought. — Metaphysician Undercover

Carried out without the same thinking that went into solving the problem, but not without thinking of some kind. Even if you’ve done the same problem repeatedly, since the solution of it, you still have to do something mentally in order to ensure the solution you give actually belongs to the problem given to you. Simple arithmetic isn’t that much of an issue, but the same principle applies to the problem of, say.....solving the problem of exiting the shower such that the floor doesn’t impact your face.
———————

If someone asked me, when I see an apple, how do I know it is an apple, I would say I don't know, I just kind of recognize it as an apple. So I can start to describe an apple, different features, but this is not really how I know an apple is an apple, by naming these features I see in it. I just see an apple, and somehow I know it's an apple, without relating it to anything else, or comparing features. — Metaphysician Undercover

Hmmmm....yeah, radical skepticism. Reminds me of a quip by Russell: “....element of frivolous insincerity in any philosophy which pretends to accept it...” But just perceiving being good enough for knowing is exactly the opposite of skepticism. Tell ya what I do: I tell a thing what it is, that way, there’s no doubt about what I know it as. I do have to make sure what I know as an apple isn’t already known as a 2 x 4, but that’s easy enough.

Been real.....

We prevent things from coming into our mind all the time. — Metaphysician Undercover

What are your thoughts on mental imagery? We agree on a lot of stuff, however different the terminology. The major difference, is in the imagery, so if you reject the reality of it, we won’t ever get past being stuck in our own predications.
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If “we” have that much influence on “mind”, than we and mind must be separate entities. I reject that “I” am in any way distinct and separate from my mind; “I” am my mind. To say some natural activity that justifies and legitimizes what this “I” is, by means of the manifold of my thoughts, is willfully prevented by that very same “I” from thinking something less than that manifold, is ultimately a self-contradiction. This condition can be alleviated by granting reason as possessing sufficient power for preventing things from coming into the mind, in as much as reason prevents nothing except logical impossibilities from coming into the mind, as a consequence of the human methodological system.

To say we can prevent a thing from coming into the mind presupposes the thing. The thing presupposed is at least a valid conception, otherwise we are preventing a thing that is nothing. But to conceive a thing makes explicit it has already entered the mind, for the faculties of mind in general are the sole arbiters of validity in conceptions.

Such are two arguments refuting the assertion we can prevent things from coming into the mind. What we can do, and is more the case, is disregard a legitimate judgement. And THAT is what close-minded really means. But even close-minded is an insufficient notion, with respect to an irrational judgement, wherein a judgement is not disregarded, but simply incompatible with the empirical conditions from which it arises.

Once you accept as the phrase you will say, and say it "…" you prevent other possibilities from coming to your mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

Can you honestly tell me you’ve had more than one thought at a time? I’d be very suspicious of an affirmative claim, insofar as it is generally accepted in the literature that human thought is singular and successive, rather multiple and co-existent. It follows that words representing thoughts and phrases representing groups of thoughts, and eventually representing cognitions, must also be singular and successive.
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When we pass judgement, decide that the solution has been found, we no longer think about that subject. — Metaphysician Undercover

So you think that as soon as I, e.g., learn arithmetic propositions, I don’t think about them the next time I find myself in the presence of one? Even if I need no noticeable time in the accomplishment of any learned task, I am still required to relate something to something else, such the solution of the same problem is consistent. While it is true I may not need to judge some object in general as a particular object of sense more than once in order to know what it is, thereafter I still need to judge the consistency between subsequent observations of that object, and extant intuitions already understood as necessarily belonging to it, such that I will know it as the same object. Or same kind of object.

That's why people on this forum will defend a position to no end, refusing to even consider contrary arguments. — Metaphysician Undercover

Oh, I'm guilty of that, I must say. Thing is, I can defend my position til the crowd of smelly bovines amble into the wooden containment structure, I mean, right down to the principles, which not one other person engaged here is ever wont to do. Even you, telling me all kinds of this and that, which I accept as given out of respect for your intelligence, still haven’t yet told me how it is done.——————

From here, that which comes to one’s mind by habit is just a repetitive relation, or, which is the same thing, good ol’ experience.
— Mww

If this were really the case, how would it differ from straight forward memory? — Metaphysician Undercover

For the empirical psychologist or the cognitive neuroscientist, it isn’t. The epistemological speculative philosopher, on the other hand, dealing as he does in pure abstracts in a strictly representational system, calls “memory” the faculty of intuitions, in order to distinguish the origins of its contents, which is, coincidentally enough.....experience.

It's not really the case though, because each situation that a person finds oneself in is different from the last, so we can't describe this as a "repetitive relation". — Metaphysician Undercover

Hmmmm....possibly correct; I should have been more precise in my terminology. If I see a red apple more than once, the observations of apples is repetitive and its relations hold, but if I’ve never seen a green apple, the concept “apple” fails in at least one of its relations, so technically I have no right to know the green thing as an apple. Nonetheless, if I observe this green thing on the ground under an apple tree, surrounded by red apples, similar extension and mass being given, I am safe in drawing a new relation, such that future observations will abide as repetitive relations.

It's more like the words just come to mind in relation to each other, like some words just kind of go together, and the situation (being asked a question with specific words for example) just sort of triggers a particular grouping of words to come forward as a reply. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is pretty much what I’m saying, except I use concepts where you use words. Some concepts go together, and some situation will trigger concepts to come forward. Introspection resolves the “inner voice” reality, but we spend far less time introspecting than we do understanding the world’s relationship to us, which just means we use words less than we use the means to understand the world, through the representations of mental imagery.
—————-

What I suggested is that certain combinations of words come from the memory into the conscious mind, depending on the situation, in a sort of habitual way. But how can this really be habitual, when all the situations are different, and the combination of words which comes forward into the mind as ready to be spoken, is tailored for the situation already, when it comes into the conscious mind? How can an action be said to be habitual when it is different every time it occurs? — Metaphysician Undercover

Do you recognize how screwed the system would be, if it required absolute precision for each of its responses to any given situation? If “it was an accident” was the habitual response for tipping over a glass of water, wouldn’t it suffice for tipping over a glass of milk? Particular relations can hold in general experiences.

Ehhhh....I read them all up through knowledge. Interesting, but not particularly enlightening, my personal philosophy etched in the stone of continental Enlightenment.

Carry on.

We were talking about awareness. — Metaphysician Undercover

We were talking about words, and the awareness/use of them relative to the human cognitive system in general. Your unconscious part of the mechanics of walking is analogous to my unconscious part of empirical cognitions. I haven’t switched anything, and I reject that awareness and the faculty of representation are one and the same.
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The habitual answer is not the only answer, because a person might interrupt one's own inclination to speak, and decide on a different answer. — Metaphysician Undercover

Answers other than the habitual are possible, but answering habitually makes all of them irrelevant. Otherwise, it wouldn’t be habitual.

So the whole apparatus of speaking appears to be an interplay between allowing what comes to one's mind by habit, and also at the same time possibly declining this, to decide on saying something else. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don’t care for “allowing to come to one’s mind”; it carries the implication I could actually prevent something from coming into my mind. In order to prevent a thought, the only thing that ever comes into my mind in the first place,** I must first think what I intend to prevent, which is self-contradictory, or, I must be able to un-think the thought I wish to prevent, which is impossible. We don’t “allow” thoughts; they arise from reason necessarily, invited or uninvited, from our very nature as humans, and we may allow them to matter if they relate to something or we may reject them because they don’t. From here, that which comes to one’s mind by habit is just a repetitive relation, or, which is the same thing, good ol’ experience.

If you decide against saying something in favor of saying something else, all you’ve done is relate one to the other and judge something about that relation.

I don’t know or care much about “the whole apparatus of speaking”, but I suspect it is mostly sheer mechanics. But there must be some part of the speech apparatus in which the thought of what to say transitions into being said, at least in general conversation, which would seem to be a lot like your walking muscles.....operating behind the conscious scenes and only comes to the fore upon defect or accident of some kind. Just as stumbling is not necessarily the fault of muscles, so too is speaking falsely not the fault of the language.
—————

It may be the case that all words come from the unconscious cognitive apparatus, and the conscious mind only makes the judgement of whether or not to say them. — Metaphysician Undercover

Positing that words come from a place still needs justification for the ways and means of them being there. Going to be pretty hard to tell ourselves something about that of which we are not consciously aware, except as a logical possibility. Which sometimes just has to be good enough.

** CPR B67
“.....all in our cognition that belongs to intuition contains nothing more than mere relations. (The feelings of pain and pleasure, and the will, which are not cognitions, are excepted.)...”

So how would you draw a line between which activities happen absent of awareness and which activities require awareness? — Metaphysician Undercover

By only considering activities within speculative epistemological metaphysics. Physical activities essentially belong to behaviorism, the domain of empirical psychology and therefore outside my experiential/educational comfort zone.

Still, there is a sort of correspondence here.....

I could get right into the activities of all my muscles when I'm walking, and I'm sure I'm not aware of all that. — Metaphysician Undercover

.....in that me telling you all about the human faculty of representation, for which the necessity of language is given in the objective telling but not in the subjective doing, is congruent to subjectively getting right into the activities of the muscles used in objectively walking. In other words, inasmuch as we only think about walking muscles for some reason other than merely walking, so too do we only think about the unconscious operation of the faculty of representation for some other reason than merely thinking. We walk, but how is it that we walk; we think, but how is it that we think. Same-o, same-o.

And I don’t care how it is that we walk, so....there’s my red line in the activity sand.
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Suppose someone asks me a question, and I answer from habit, without really thinking. — Metaphysician Undercover

Hume’s “constant conjunction”. From habit is temporal antecedent made explicit, and from temporal antecedents arise the notion of two objects, re: repeated question and habitual answer. Critical examination of the literature in which the so-called two objects are found,** shows not all judgements, which is exactly what any response to a question really is, require contemplation***. That it seems to us we are not contemplating our response, is equivalent to seeming to occur without thinking, but in fact it is reason recognizing the impossibility of a contradiction (again, rationality and intellectual consistency being given). Hume thought the impossibility of contradiction followed from the invariance of Nature, but Kant showed such impossibility cannot arise from empirical conditions, because Nature cannot be proved invariant, but is certainly granted by reason from the principle of deduction given a priori, the power of which Hume went to great lengths to deny.

** ECHU 5.1.5
“.....And it is certain we here advance a very intelligible proposition at least, if not a true one, when we assert that, after the constant conjunction of two objects (...) we are determined by custom alone to expect the one from the appearance of the other....”

*** CPR B317
“....Many judgements are admitted to be true from mere habit or inclination; but, because reflection neither precedes nor follows, it is held to be a judgement that has its origin in the understanding. All judgements do not require examination, that is, investigation into the grounds of their truth....”

So....answering from habit still requires thought, just doesn’t require understanding to waste any time on it. Because answering a question even out of habit, presupposes a set of empirical conditions in the form of the receptivity of the question, the unconscious cognitive apparatus remains in play just as in any other empirical consideration. Of the myriad of intuitions residing in consciousness, of all the possible answers to that question, just slightly different this or that (his shirt was red (redwood, rosewood, rust, terra cotta and auburn)) the habitual answer is only one, because its precedent has been set, hence the impossibility of understanding contradicting itself. This is how contemplation in judgement, from which the answer is delivered as its cognition, is shown to be unnecessary, and from which follows the immediacy of habitual cognitions in general.

Do you think that this part of cognition which is absent from our awareness (...) uses words? — Metaphysician Undercover

I think....not a chance. Only the preliminaries for empirical cognitions function absent our awareness, which makes sense because to be unaware of the objects of cognition reason creates on its own accord is contradictory. The preliminaries of empirical cognitions begin, of course, with some real object of perception, which is then transformed into some kind of information usable by mechanisms totally different then the mechanisms the initially perceived the object, re: eyeballs are quite different arrangements of matter than optic nerves. This is the blind or unconscious spot I mentioned, blind (unconscious) because whatever that information is, makes no difference to us. That it is, is crucial; what it is, is irrelevant. Nothing controversial here; we are unconscious of this transformed information, even if such information is an absolutely necessary part of the system in general.

Science calls it electrochemical potentials, philosophy calls it appearances. When science measures the potential, a name becomes generated corresponding to the result of the measurement, but that result of measurement of potential is not the object that was perceived. The named potential represents the real object. No one has yet fallen for the absurdity of calling a tree “1.6734uv”. Philosophy, on the other hand, has no means to measure, but cannot ignore what science can measure, thus philosophy cannot name its form of representation, but it no less a representation for lacking a name. So far, to answer your question.....no, there is no use of words.
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human cognition is a process, some of which is absent from our awareness. Words are never absent from our awareness, which makes explicit some part of human cognition cannot be predicated on words.
— Mww

I don't agree with this division. We can free our minds from words. Try humming a tune for example. — Metaphysician Undercover

Absent from our awareness means not contained in it; never absent from our awareness means always contained in it. What’s to disagree with? I’m saying awareness is sufficient for words but words are not necessary merely from being aware. So, yes, of course we can free our minds from words; it is my position we do exactly that any time we are not communicating. And meditation is really just extreme non-communication, so.....there ya go.

But if you cannot successfully banish all words from your mind you cannot control which words are in your mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

Banish: Delete, remove, dismiss, abolish. If I do that, I automatically banish anything to which the word relates, because by means of representation of conceptions do conceptions exist and without conceptions, cognition, hence knowledge, is impossible. Ever notice how empty your mind gets when some word is right on “the tip of your tongue”? You become rationally incapacitated, you’re stuck in your cognitive tracks, forced to take a different path that doesn’t require that word. That gawd-awful dreaded Blue Screen of Crash, no less. Nahhhh....I ain’t banishing no words; I got enough short-term memory problems without intentionally exacerbating them to my own disadvantage.

By the way.....I like some of your stuff in the Time thread.

Why would you think the concept is the source of the word rather than that the word is the source of the concept? — Metaphysician Undercover

I never said it was. I said the word is subsumed under the concept, which just means the concept conditions the word that represents it. As you said, given acceptable convention, we can use any word we like for a conception, but the conception itself, stands for a single thought. There are as many conceptions as there are thoughts, and most are mere images without names. All that means is words come from some aspect of cognitive awareness, of which conceptions themselves are not a part. This must be the case, otherwise we’d have a word already, for a perception or a thought we’ve never had and the knowledge for which we never possess, which is absurd. If it be granted judgement is the first conscious aspect of the human cognitive system, it follows words are only available at judgement or subsequently, in cognition or experience.

Gotta let go of habits, I must say. These days, there are so few perceptions or thoughts we’ve never had....too many people, too much automation, very little significant subjective privacy.....folks tend to allow themselves to be blinded by teaching instead of wondering how teaching occurs. The proverbial dogmatic slumbers.
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I think that words are concepts. — Metaphysician Undercover

How would you prove it? And if not prove, sustain logically?
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but "pure thought" doesn't necessarily contains concepts. — Metaphysician Undercover

Then you must find it absolutely impossible to account for objects we think, but do not empirically exist. I suppose it depends on what you mean by “pure”, and how your notion of it pertains to thought. Is there impure thought, and what kind of thought is that, such that pure and impure stand for different things?

It is only when we think in words, or other symbols like mathematical symbols, that we think in concepts. — Metaphysician Undercover

OK, so this is how you account for non-existent objects. So....it is only when we think in words that we think in concepts, which implies words and concepts are the same thing, or at least do the same cognitive job. Again, human cognition is a process, some of which is absent from our awareness. Words are never absent from our awareness, which makes explicit some part of human cognition cannot be predicated on words. Depending on the stage of cognition one thinks himself aware of the process, that must be the stage at which he begins using words. We’ve already established that the faculty of understanding is the seat of conceptions (theoretically), so the question becomes, are we aware of our faculty of understanding? We are quite apt to say, “I understand what you mean”, but does that necessarily indicate we are aware of the employment of the faculty itself?

We know from science, there is a blank spot between the object meeting perception, and the transfer of that information within the brain, culminating in what we call experience. In the same manner as science has its blank spot in its process, cognitive philosophy has subconscious spot in its process. When science examines its blank spot, it requires empirical justifications for its claims relating to it, but cognitive philosophy only needs logical justifications for its claims.

Both science and philosophy acknowledge the objects of perception become objects of knowledge. But what science can’t examine that philosophy can, is the objects we merely think can also become objects of knowledge. Different kind of object, different kind of knowledge, but undeniable certainty nonetheless, at least from a private point of view. Skipping a few steps, if science grants the combination of this and that to get to an end, and philosophy grants the same thing, it still remains that philosophy has something over and above science, insofar as the “this” is missing. When we have what you call “pure thought”, perception is the “this” of both science and philosophy that is missing.

All this methodology so far being under our awareness, with the exception of the initiating sensation, and in the case of absent perception which simultaneously absents sensation, where is the content of pure thought coming from? Such content can have nothing whatsoever to do with perception, which eliminates anything having to do with experience. From the point of view of science, memory, feedback loops, pre-existent enabled neural networks are eliminated; from the point of view of cognitive philosophy, appearance, phenomena and intuitions are all eliminated. All of those being determined a posteriori, the source of which in “pure thought” does not figure into the process.

Just as science demands its certainty in the form of compliance to observation, so too does logic demand its certainty in the form of conclusions following necessarily from premises. All syllogisms have a major premise, a minor premise conditioning the major, and a conclusion reconciling both, from which certainty is given, or is at least certainly possible. Returning to the this and that to get an end, we arrive at “this” being intuition (the major), “that” being conception (the minor), ending in judgement (the conclusion). But in pure thought the “this” is missing, so we have demoted a logical syllogism to merely the form of a simple subject/predicate proposition. All change must have a cause, is such a pure thought, wherein no content for the subject or predicate is given, but the proposition remains true, and substitution of empirical conditions serves to prove it apodeitically.

It should be clear by now, all those properties we assign to objects are not concepts, they are intuitions, because in pure thought, all empirical predicates, which are the constituents of intuition, become vacant. Absent all empirical properties, we cannot even say we ever knew there was such a thing as a cat. Experience tells us about fur, whiskers, claws, etc, from which the cognition “cat” is given so it follows that absent all those, “cat” disappears. The synthesis of a set of intuitions in accordance with a rule (this and this and this belong together, that does not) is a phenomenon. The phenomenon presented to understanding is then conceived as a particular thing. As long as the logical process meets with no contradictions (somehow a wing got intuited into the phenomenon of fur, claws and whiskers), it befalls the faculty of judgement to conclude, given the sound-ness of its premises, the conception can be thought of, and accordingly named, or, which is the same thing, cognized, as “cat”.

And THERE is the first instance of a word. It should be evident we don’t need the words for fur, claws and whiskers to form our judgements. All we need are representations of objects or parts of objects, all we need is something to synthesize, no matter its name assigned in retrospect, or even if there isn’t one in the first occurrence of it. Only un-named things are representations, all named things are cognitions; of which the former we are unaware, the latter we are fully conscious.

An admission: with respect “lackadaisical minds”, I have one myself, in that I usually say words represent conceptions, but in fact, words represent cognitions. I can rationalize my wanton whimsy by claiming one follows on the heels of the other in so immediate a fashion they are cognitively indistinguishable. The problem only arises in the case of some beliefs, where the cognition cannot conform to a conception without reason being inconsistent with itself. Like....that cloud looks like a rabbit.
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Anyway......this is Sunday morning, and this is what I do on Sunday mornings.

Ahhh...I didn’t read far enough. My bad. So yes, I can distinguish objects by their respective representations, without words.

In your mind, you have a description of a cat that isn't composed of representations, but of the actual physical characteristics that make a cat different than a dog, and anything else. — Harry Hindu

Yeah....I leave the “what it’s like” arguments, the notion of qualia, direct realism and whatnot, to those with an affinity for them.

Conceptions don’t get larger, they get less susceptible to skepticism. The more representations of an object, the less contradictory the knowledge of it.

Without using words (representations of concepts), can you distinguish cats from dogs? — Harry Hindu

Honestly now, when you see a dog, do you really use words to tell yourself what you just saw wasn’t a cat?

symbols or words have no necessary referent — Metaphysician Undercover

You know......people talk so damn much, they think that’s all they ever do. And because when they talk, they use words, so they think words are all there are. If, as you say, the source of the thing is distinct from the thing itself, it follows necessarily that the source of a word is distinct from the word itself, which grants that the concept is presented in the word or represented by the word, which either way immediately subsumes the word under the antecedent concept.

Don’t get me wrong, I fully sympathize with the philosophical vagary, “.....spontaneously producing representations, or the spontaneity of cognition....”**, and the speculative methodology derived from it. Nobody likes spontaneity; it can’t be falsified or established as the case, and the fact it isn’t theoretically self-contradictory is little solace to the ultra-modern, analytic heart. All of which, I suppose, makes it ok to just throw in something or other in order to relieve ourselves of by-gone vagaries we detest so much, justifying the rise of the language gang, which is, of course, merely substituting one vagary for another.

Descriptions and definitions are propositions composed of words; words represent concepts; therefore concepts describe and define concepts, which is impossible. A concept cannot define itself. If a concept cannot define itself, and if the reality of it is given, it must represent that which can be defined, but only as the means to facilitate the possibility of communication. We have no need of definitions in pure thought. You know...pure thought....that thing we do when we’re not so busy talking. And whether we label a particular geometric figure constructed in accordance with precise a priori principles a square or a equilateral rectangle, we still refer to a single conception. We should find we are merely defining the principles which make the conception possible, when closer examination inevitably reveals the lackadaisical attitude of the mind in general, that is, not subjected to critical analysis, when it makes it seem like we are actually defining the conception. We at the same time should find mathematical conceptions, as opposed to philosophical conceptions, are themselves necessary referents, given their construction is entirely dependent on the a priori, albeit synthetic, cognitions of individuals that think them, as long as the principles for it are contained by it.

** CPR B75
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both concepts and objects are created by the application of boundaries. — Metaphysician Undercover

The only way I see this working, is if the boundaries applied are the categories, specifically the category of quantity and modality. A quantity of space is a boundary for the possibility of objects and necessity is a boundary for the realization of concepts. Still, I’d hesitate to grant application of the categories creates anything, but rather makes the construction of conceptions possible a priori and experience of things possible a posteriori. We don’t construct experience and we don’t experience constructs, but both occur in us, so a common ground for them seems to be required. Judgement is common but is not a ground; understanding is a ground but is not common, so something underpins both.

Nahhhh.....I’m going to reject the assertion that we create objects, but grant....sorta.....the assertion that we create conceptions. Arising “spontaneously from pure thought”, as conceptions are said to do, is close enough to creation so as to not cause any major upheaval in The Grand Scheme of Minor Things.

It’s a tangled web, by all accounts.

I hear ya, but still.......

.......I’m not going to give up the notion that concept is independent of word. All representations presuppose that to which they belong;
.......I don’t think concepts are shared. Concepts are mental stuff, yes, but the source of all immanent conceptions, the only ones to which words properly belong, because they relate to possible experience, is understanding, and, just as in consciousness, understanding is never shared;
......because it is logically sufficient to state where concepts are to be found, perhaps the epitome of transcendental illusion is to think only words are to be found there. Concepts, in and of themselves, have a purpose and thereby a use, but not a description. If we find words where there should be concepts, we’re doing something very wrong;
......agreed, the word within the mind does not represent the concept. It is more the case that the word is found in judgement, which represents the concept in cognition, which is the exposition of it;
......we have no empirical evidence of the existence of concepts, no. Rational evidence would seem to be necessary, nonetheless;
......there are those inclined to grant concepts are words, but I submit it is only because they don’t know any better;
......and for those, the search for concepts from the mere representation of them, will be fruitless and endless. And foolish.
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objects and concepts are the same type of thing — Metaphysician Undercover

Why would you say that? How are they the same type of thing?

At the beginning of the video, where Austin comments on the first of two things “immensely important to understand...”:

“...Despite the great wealth of words which European languages possess, the thinker finds himself often at a loss for an expression exactly suited to his conception, for want of which he is unable to make himself intelligible either to others or to himself. To coin new words is a pretension to legislation in language which is seldom successful; and, before recourse is taken to so desperate an expedient, it is advisable to examine the dead and learned languages, with the hope and the probability that we may there meet with some adequate expression of the notion we have in our minds. In this case, even if the original meaning of the word has become somewhat uncertain, from carelessness or want of caution on the part of the authors of it, it is always better to adhere to and confirm its proper meaning—even although it may be doubtful whether it was formerly used in exactly this sense—than to make our labour vain by want of sufficient care to render ourselves intelligible. For this reason, when it happens that there exists only a single word to express a certain conception, and this word, in its usual acceptation, is thoroughly adequate to the conception, the accurate distinction of which from related conceptions is of great importance, we ought not to employ the expression improvidently, or, for the sake of variety and elegance of style, use it as a synonym for other cognate words. It is our duty, on the contrary, carefully to preserve its peculiar signification, as otherwise it easily happens that when the attention of the reader is no longer particularly attracted to the expression, and it is lost amid the multitude of other words of very different import, the thought which it conveyed, and which it alone conveyed, is lost with it...”
(CPR, B369)

Similar admonitions, it seems.

Prelinguistic belief does not have propositional form. — creativesoul

Because belief is no more than a judgement. Judgements are correlations of that which consists in their entirety, etc, etc, etc......

Judgements are linguistic iff expressed; if not, remain mere cognitions.

The fundamental criteria of any belief: subjective validity.

Two cents, and not a penny more........

Acquisition of skill, by definition, cannot be innate, in the general sense of the term. The ability to acquire a skill is merely evinced by an interest in it, for try as he may, one may never realize any fruition from his attempt. Even if one excels in a skill, without training or preparation, it would still be impossible to determine the innate-ness of such ability, as opposed to merely an extraordinary adaptation to it.

The rest is superfluous.

A priori is a relational determination in the human complementary cognitive system.
— Mww
Where would instincts fall into this explanation. — Harry Hindu

They don’t. Instinct is innate and automatic, cognition is developed and reactive.

It also seems to me....... — Harry Hindu

Ok, no problem. Everyone is entitled to his own seemings.