Kant was attempting to do exactly this kind of thing.... — Pfhorrest

Maybe. Or maybe those coming after foisted such “synthesis” on him. He certainly didn’t acknowledge such synthesis as his philosophical intent, that I am aware of, anyway.

I think he found both the dogmatic idealism of Berkeley and the material realism of Hume entirely insufficient for satisfying the criteria for human knowledge. Then, of course, he went ahead and re-defined human knowledge, and created a completely new philosophy that did account for it. He named it Transcendental Philosophy, and intended it to be, not a synthesis of the two major antecedent philosophies, but a “system of perspectives, based on principles” meant to replace them.

On the other hand, Kant grants some valid rationality to both Hume’s empiricism and Descartes’ idealism while rejecting Berkeley’s, but granting validity doesn’t necessarily lead to the synthesis of parts in order to forge a new version.

Kinda comical, considering the time of his writing, in that at one time he calls Hume “ablest and most ingenious of all sceptical philosophers,” then turns right around and accuses him of making bone-headed mistakes in reasoning: “did not distinguish these two kinds of judgements, as he ought to have done“.

Perhaps a term might be....architectonic?

Anyway.....two cents worth of examples of a third way.

if you agree reason is conscious abstract thought, then if something is happening when we're not aware of it -- is that still "reason"? — Xtrix

There is a transcendental argument which says reason is the entirety of the human cognitive system, from perception to knowledge, so at least some people think reason, or at least some part of the system to which it belongs, may be something that is happening when we’re not aware of it.

However, in a certain speculative philosophy, thought is “cognition by means of conceptions”, and cognition is “process of joining different representations (conceptions) to each other and of comprehending their diversity in one cognition”. Therein, that which happens of which we are not aware is the generation of conceptions, as means given from the faculty of understanding, but the process of joining different conceptions, and of comprehending the diversity of them, is reason proper, the cognitions of which we are certainly aware, as ends given from the faculty of judgement.

Granting all that, the assertion that we reason constantly becomes clear, for otherwise we must have a system informing us of that which we already know, and a separate and distinct system informing us of that which we do not know. Just because we reason much faster under conditions of extant experience, as opposed to having to process new representations in order to cognize merely a possible experience, doesn’t mean we’re not using reason in same way.
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this "intelligent biological creature" is still more intelligent than anything else in the animal kingdom, if only for the simple fact that we all have the faculty of language. — Xtrix

We have no right to make that claim, that doesn’t smack of anthropomorphism, re: Nagel, 1974. Even if reason is a strictly human condition, and we claim it as proprietary, it is fraught with illusion and intrinsic circularity, one prime example of which is to judge by our standards, that which cannot possibly conform to it.

What was the question again????? (Grin)

I see reason....as....abstract thought. — Xtrix

So reason plays an important role, but it's not the only one. — Xtrix

In the synthesis of the two, are we not then left with one of two inevitable conclusions: either there are times in our conscious living when we don’t think, or, the constant mental activity called thought, implied by being conscious, isn’t necessarily reason?

I agree reason is conscious abstract thought, but I rather think we reason constantly, all else being given, whether or not we are aware of it, which makes explicit that not only does reason have an important role, it is the necessarily determinant one. Without it, we have no justification in calling ourselves human, as opposed to merely existing as some kind of intelligent biological creature.

Anyway.....thanks.

So....”What” is the answer to that question.....satisfies the query?

I’m ok with that; I just left out the rest of the declarative.

Odd, isn’t it? The answer is given in the query, but stating the answer extinguishes the query.

What’s the older version?

What.

my background is in psychology. — Xtrix

Of course reason has weight in our daily lives. — Xtrix

What role does reason play....wherein lays its weight....in humans generally, from a psychological point of view?

Lyrics need edit.

Judge conflicting opinions with something of demonstrably greater certainty.

I dunno, man......awful lot of free-thinking there, but with a conspicuous lack of method to justify it. I’m sure you understand, that for people who summarily reject such notions as soul, infinite knowledge, the unconscious/subconscious barrier, and so on, no method will be sufficient.

Interesting read, and I appreciate the effort, but I can’t do much with it, myself. I just don’t really care about the origin of all things.

if there is a conscious being who can perceive all perspectives at once, instantly, then the computational structure of "me" exists somewhere within that sentient being, and thus I remain an observer of the Universe. — Justin Peterson

Sure, I can see that. Mighty big if, and, would require a certain kind of sentient being. On the other hand, in order for your “me” to remain an observer, wouldn’t the omni-percipient being have to possess the same kind of consciousness as you? Otherwise, your computational structure would be lost. Pretty hard to make cross-sentient beings compatible, seems like, and anything else is very far into anthropomorphism.
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I'm saying that everything is a computation — Justin Peterson

A la Tegmark, MUH, 2007, you say? Fine for mathematicians, but hardly satisfies Everydayman.

nulled by the planets moving until they find a comfortable place, where everything becomes still — Justin Peterson

Entropic equilibrium? I assume you mean all matter, not just planets. In which case, there would be no need of time or space.

I don't think you realize that we are making the same argument here — Justin Peterson

I don’t see it, myself. I’m no where near that far outside the box. Hell....I’m still stuck in the Enlightenment, fercryin’ outloud.

But these seem philosophies of other times. — David Mo

So.....no causa sui? With respect to moral systems based on an autonomous will, rather than ethical theories based on cultural norms, I mean.

we must recognize that definitive reasons in morality are not very apparent. — David Mo

Not very indeed.

moral obligation is not a physical necessity. (...) In the moral sense you decide what rules you must follow. Even if you say reason obliges you, you can choose irrationally. — David Mo

I pretty much agree with your argument, but here, mightn’t it be said we chose immorally, rather than irrationally? Reason does obligate, but merely some other reason is sufficient to negate moral conformity.

Hmmm....maybe the choice is immoral, but the judgement which then facilitates the act which follows from the choice, is irrational. Could you live with that?

See Chalmers, 2004, “Representational Character of Experience”, pt 6 (on Russell), and 7 (on Frege).

I see you removed the false proposition “all possible propositions are necessary”. Every proposition, that is, all subject/copula/predicate compositions, are possible; there is no such thing as an impossible proposition.

If there are multiple universes, then there exists other forms of me with different thoughts. — Justin Peterson

In this proposition, there is no concept in the subject that is sufficient to justify the concept in the predicate. There may be other universes qua universe, but each so different there is no other form of me at all. And for one who identifies with his thoughts, or deems it to be the case he is identified by his thoughts, than “another form of me with different thoughts” is self-contradictory, hence impossible.
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the theory of Schroedinger's Cat — Justin Peterson

.....began as a co-conspiratorial exercise in perfectly rational absurdity between The Genius Twins, Erwin and Albert. I can’t imagine what place it would have here.
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something cannot be moved without time — Justin Peterson

Time is causality? Really? Is that what’s being taught at universities these days? Nahhhh.....just because the human understanding of the concept of motion necessarily presupposes the conditions of space and time, doesn’t mean time or space is responsible for physical motion. The ball flies into center field because I hit the damn thing with a bat. Done deal.

Motion in time, not because of it. Much more parsimonious to suppose physical things are moved by physical things (and yes, a gravitational field is a thing, according to Feynman anyway), than to suppose physical things are moved by immaterial notions. Begs the question....why wouldn’t Pythagoras’ formula move the needle on a voltmeter?

The rest.....too divinical, too psychological, too.....Hegelian.....for me. But, you’re more than welcome to it, so have fun with it.

Understood. Thanks.

So how does any of that relate to time and existence?

thought is such that it can be defined as conflict between two states. It is because of this that there is the conscious and unconscious mind. In the conscious mind there is conflict between multiple ideas or perceptions of a given subject. When the conscious mind has accepted one thing to be true, it is passed to the subconscious mind. — Justin Peterson

Ok....so....thought is the conflict between two states.......of mind? There are two conflicting states of mind, which can be used as the definition of thought?

In the conscious mind multiple ideas or perceptions conflict (with themselves?). When something is accepted as true, it is passed to the subconscious mind.

When a thing is accepted as true, there wouldn’t be that particular conflict in the conscious mind, and if that true thing is passed to the SUB-conscious mind, the other half of the definition of thought, the unconscious mind, is left out, which means the conflict with it shouldn’t have occurred, which means there shouldn’t have been that thought accepting a true thing, which raises the question, how did the true thing get accepted and then passed on? Can a thing be true without the thought of it, or the thought about it?

Could be, dunno. I never took a philosophy class, so........don’t mind me none.

So generalized, intuitions, concepts, and one’s conscience, would hence all be objects of awareness when thus contextualized – but these are all what I’ve termed “allologic”, for they are other relative to the subject which apprehends them. — javra

Technically everything is relative to the subject which apprehends, except whatever one chooses to represent his self, re: ego, “I”, consciousness......whatever floats boats. The only problem here would be, depending on the extent of metaphysical reductionism being called into play, it becomes inevitable that different renditions of a common representation will conflict with each other. That is to say, if “thirst” is an object of awareness and “basketball” is an object of awareness, some method must be instituted in order to tell them apart, which mandates that ideas such as thirst and sadness and such not be converted to phenomena on the one hand, and physical objects of sense not be converted into mere contingent ideas on the other.

That said, I’ll stick with these non-cognizable ideas as being called subjective conditions, rather than objects of awareness. Just because I am consciously aware of both basketballs and thirst, doesn’t mean I apprehend them the same way or use the same faculties for it.
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So, in being conscious of being glad I am not conscious of a representation of what I am but, instead, am conscious of what I momentarily am as subject of consciousness which apprehends representations. — javra

And there ya go......momentarily am as subject is the same as being in a subjective condition.

Well done!!!!

Yeah...that damn soapbox. Been luggin’ that thing around for better than half a century. It’s harmless, though, don’t worry.

One is certainly permitted to think whatever he likes, so if you think the C.I. is an improved golden rule, far be it from me to argue the thought.

Arguing the ground for it, is another matter, insofar as “Do unto others....”, even if considered a command of reason hence a subjective principle, can hardly be willed into law, much less a universal law governing moral agents in general, because that command is amended by another, separate subjective agenda which may be in conflict with it, re: “...as others would do...”. In other words, a legislative principle a priori, conditioned by something empirical, cannot be legislative at all. As much is said in the quote I gave above, from “Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals”.

As to “forming laws by legislative bodies”, they are indeed helpful and benevolent to the citizenry to which they are given, and their universality is not altogether impossible, but they also incorporate their own consequences. Neither the C.I. nor the golden rule incorporate their own consequences, which seems to indicate an irreconcilable antinomy between empirical judicial law punishable by others in the form of e.g., incarceration, and rational moral law punishable one’s self in the form of disrespect.

Interesting thinking, though.

Carry on.

Kant's work, 2nd Critique, Critique of Practical Reason, for Kantian Ethics added sanity to the Golden Rule. Note Critique of Practical Reason, Wikipedia — DrOlsnesLea

Given this from 1785......

“...Let it not be thought that the common "quod tibi non vis fieri" could serve here as the rule or principle. For it is only a deduction, though with several limitations; it cannot be a universal law, for it does not contain the principle of duties to oneself, nor of the duties of benevolence to others (for many a one would gladly consent that others should not benefit him, provided only that he might be excused from showing benevolence to them), nor finally that of duties of strict obligation to one another, for on this principle the criminal might argue against the judge who punishes him, and so on...”

...perhaps you could show me where the Critique “added sanity to the Golden Rule”, other than to refute its authority, insofar as a command imperative can never be a mere rule.

I like it's radicalness, and what that radicalness may imply. If forces upon me a kind of creativity — Statilius

Which is fine, thinking folks been so inclined for millennia. Still, beware the greatest danger to radical-ness, self-contradiction.

while there is no given term or phrase in the English lexicon for this mode of awareness that I know of (...) In my own work I’ve termed this form of awareness “autological”. — javra

Kudos on originality. Under the assumption, of course, that you were not aware of the “transcendental unity of apperception”, which for all intents and purposes, fairly well describes the content of your thesis, but originated in 1787. Sorry ‘bout that. (grin)

Or....you are aware of said apperception, and found it wanting.
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a state of affairs in which the subject of conscious awareness is simultaneously the object of which it is aware. — javra

one here doesn’t feel oneself to be X (.....) but, instead, one here is X: “I am thirsty”, “I am sad”, etc. — javra

These two are arguable. As to the first, because “thirsty”, “sad”, etc, are not objects, so “simultaneously the object” becomes an empty, hence impossible, judgement, and as to the second, to suggest the conjunction of the two, carries the implication that “....I must have as many-coloured and various a self as are the representations of which I am conscious....” (CPR B135), which is exactly the opposite of what the unity of consciousness is supposed to represent.

(On soapbox)
Still....congrats on the depth of your investigations. The dearth of good philosophy is understandable these days, given the mere crumbs left by the masters.
(Off soapbox)

I’ll defer, designate myself as second chair.

Understood.

Thanks.

Wouldn’t it have to exhaust something, in order to circumvent such infinite regress illusions as the dreaded homunculus argument?

But that’s alright....I don’t want to sidetrack the progress of the standing dialogue.

The Subject as Subject cannot be described in Objective terms because that which would be described is going to be an abstraction (such as an Object of thought or reflection) in the Subject's consciousness. — PessimisticIdealism

Agreed. It is impossible to intuit the self, for intuition is always an undetermined phenomenon, and all phenomena, hence all empirical intuitions, are predicated on sensibility. Therefore, to intuit the self is to have it met with perception, which is impossible. But it is nonetheless not contradictory, to think and thereby conceive a representation of the unity of consciousness in one transcendental object, and name such representation as “I”. While all that does is nip infinite regress in the metaphysical bud, whole philosophical paradigms have faithfully clung to it. For better or worse.

Again, I appreciate the enlarged context. If you, and/or she, had said some thinking is a function of morality, I wouldn’t have taken so great an exception.

“all thinking is a function of morality, it's done by humans, it's touched by values right into it's centre, empirical science is no exception” — Statilius

Good. Now I have proper context. It’s clear you and the author, and I, have very different conceptions of morality. Nothing wrong with that, of course, but I personally reject the supposition that thinking predicated on the appearance of an objective reality, re: empirical science, carries the same implications as thinking predicated on pure a priori conceptions, re: morality, having nothing whatsoever to do with objective reality. It is a fatal flaw in reason, to conflate the rational ground of moral thinking with the empirical exercise of it.

I can dig the gist of Polanyi‘s thesis, given your brief synopsis of sorts, but I really don’t see why a book needs to be written about personal knowledge, seeing as how there’s no such thing as knowledge that isn’t personal.

No. Best we can say is thought is in time, but time itself, if it merely signifies a relation, can have no content of its own. Divisions of time, is still just time.

HA!! Excellent.

Thankyouthankyouthankyou....donations gratefully accepted, and will be forwarded to your favorite charity. Honest. Trust me.

If every thought is singular and successive, then every thought is new with respect to its time, but not necessarily new with respect to its content.

Round 1.....

all thinking is a function of morality — Statilius

thinking itself can be pure, without values, like genuine science, like maths — Statilius

If one accepts that one’s thinking with respect to morality is the ground of a subjective code of public conduct, it must depend on personal values, in order for the subject to determine in which form his conduct manifests.

If one accepts thinking itself CAN BE without values, as in the genuine sciences, which manifest no personal code of conduct necessarily, then it follows that NOT all thinking is a function of values, hence NOT a function of morality.
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Round 2....

there is no such thing as a pure 'is' — Statilius

If that is the case, how much truth can there be in the assertion, “all thinking is a function of morality”? Even dyeing this “is” in an “ought”, giving “all thinking ought to be a function of morality” doesn’t diminish the falsification derived in Round 1.

Anyway....thanks for your effort with the dialogues. Nevertheless, would I be correct in supposing you insinuated the personal interpretation “all thinking is a function of morality” in place of the author’s “serious thinking depends on the justice and truthfulness of the thinker”? Perhaps justice and truthfulness suffice for your idea of morality? Among other things, to be sure.

Taking a sharp right turn here, it might be interesting to know how you connect judgements to the notion that the is/ought divide doesn’t exist. I guess....what is meant by the is/ought divide, such that judgements have something to do with the divide rather than the is or the ought.

I haven’t read the book. I wonder how the author justifies the proposition, probably somewhere in the story, on the one hand, and why you find it so attractive, on the other.

all thinking is a function of morality — Statilius

Not necessarily.....or.....why would one think this might be true?

Kant, 1785, “Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals”, in T. K. Abbott, 1889, on Project Gutenberg ebooks.

“...We have then to develop the notion of a will which deserves to be highly esteemed for itself and is good without a view to anything further, a notion which exists already in the sound natural understanding, requiring rather to be cleared up than to be taught, and which in estimating the value of our actions always takes the first place and constitutes the condition of all the rest....”

Follow-up: “Critique of Practical Reason”, 1788, ibid, from which the concept of freedom as necessary causality arises:

“....For if, as pure reason, it is actually practical, it proves its own reality and that of its concepts by fact, and all disputation against the possibility of its being real is futile. With this faculty, transcendental freedom is also established; freedom, namely, in that absolute sense in which speculative reason required it in its use of the concept of causality in order to escape the antinomy into which it inevitably falls, when in the chain of cause and effect it tries to think the unconditioned....”

Two books, because free and will do not necessarily belong together. The Metaphysics establishes the purpose and employment of will, from a deontological perspective, with respect to moral law, and the Critique establishes the notion of freedom, and serves as justification for the will’s operative parameters.

Theoretical, hence controversial and susceptible to severe cross-examination. It’s philosophical, just as it ever was.

Have fun!!!

we are taught a mnemonic (....) to write for an audience assumed to be “stupid, lazy, and mean”. — Pfhorrest

Yikes!! What does that say about peer review?

Not really. I’m just demonstrating that Kantian deontology faces its own form of enforcement, that’s all. There are worse things than being led away in handcuffs.

Fascinating.

Ahhh.....I see. Because you can’t express why you wouldn’t do something, you’ve been given tacit permission to do it? Another win for utilitarianism, then?