Are you seriously claiming that all opinions on such a subject are equally good? Of course they aren't. Goodall and de Waal are experts in primate behaviour; you, I assume, are not. Get real. — Herg

I'm not questioning the expertise of Goodall and de Waal. I'm questioning whether the principles of communitarianism can be consistently applied.

Someone may feel it's right to kill Harambe, yet at the same time feel it's not right if the plan by his country to use biological or chemical weapons on innocent lives is not reported to the UN. In this case then, he is not being consistent: he is a communitarian in the first case but not so in the second case.

As for 'conclusive evidence', in order to get that, the zookeepers would have had to wait and see whether the gorilla injured the child. That would have been utterly immoral and irresponsible. — Herg

To the communitarians, it would be utterly immoral and irresponsible. But to the non-communitarians, it would be utterly immoral and irresponsible to kill Harambe.

Primatologists Jane Goodall and Frans de Waal both stated that the child was at risk of being killed, if only because the gorilla was so immensely strong. There was, in their opinion (which is more to be trusted than any of ours) an imminent threat. — Herg

That is their opinion, not conclusive evidence or indication.

Are you arguing that there is nothing intrinsically wrong with lying? — tim wood

I was, but now on second thought I agree with Kant that lying is wrong. For the case of lying, unlike many other acts, we can't separate the act from the intention, because by definition, to lie is to intentionally give false information. If you do so unintentionally, then that's not lying. So while the act of unintentionally giving false information may not be wrong, lying would be, because you are not respecting the dignity of the person to whom you lie, be he a murderer or otherwise, and his rights to the truth.

Are you arguing that there is nothing intrinsically wrong with lying? — tim wood

Yes I was arguing there is nothing intrinsically right or wrong with the act of lying. But on second thought, I find that lying is different from other acts. To lie is to intentionally give false information. So unlike many other acts, we cannot separate the act and the intention for the case of lying, according to its very definition.

In this light, Kant is consistent. Lying is wrong however good your reason may be, because the intention to provide false information is wrong; you are not respecting the dignity of the person, be it a murderer or otherwise, and his rights to truth, when you lie. (The act of providing false information may not be wrong though, for example, when you are acting unintentionally.)