Thanks, I'll check it out.

You're referring to modern metaphysics. My question concerns metaphysics in the time of early Greek philosophy, specifically the Pre-Socratics and Plato/Aristotle, for whom becoming meant something (merely) physical and the object of scientific study, and being meant something metaphysical.

Nietzsche would be an example of a modern (19th-century) thinker engaging with the aforesaid time period, and hence using ''being'' and ''becoming'' specifically to mean the difference between a static world and a changing world.

Even so, to me both parties are correct and both parties' claims are demonstrable. — Shamshir

I'm tempted to agree, which is why it's such a frustrating and fascinating question!

As aforestated, Aristotle did not consider the questions that Heraclitus and Parmenides were asking to be scientific; questions relating to ''Being'', for Aristotle, belong to a subject prior to science, that subject being metaphysics.

There's no good reason to take "being" to refer to something unchanging, and distinguising it from becoming is a big error.

Perhaps there isn't, but that is how the term has been used historically. You can quibble about semantics but the question remains the same: Is Being (i.e. a metaphysical, unchanging world) accessible to reason? Nietzsche would argue that it isn't. Perhaps there are arguments to the contrary?

Because ''Being'' has traditionally been understood to mean an unchanging, metaphysical reality and ''Becoming'' has been understood to mean a world of flux. ''Metaphysics'' literally means ''after physics'', that is, after the subject-matter of physics (the physical world of change), and Aristotle acknowledged that the questions that Parmenides and Heraclitus were asking were not scientific questions but metaphysical questions.

Yeah, I also like ''continuum''.

If you're interested, I'd recommend you check out Parmenides' argument (easily accessible online) as it is fascinating. As I understand it, Parmenides' argument runs as follows:
I. Either Being or Not-Being.
II. Being is.
III. Not-Being is not.
IV. The world is full.
Therefore,
V. Change is impossible.

Again, best to go back to the original argument and check for yourself.

If being is not an object of sense experience, then frankly, I don't even know what the hell we'd be talking about. What is "being" supposed to refer to in that case?

I think that's the point, especially when we come to Nietzsche. Being (i.e. an unchanging, metaphysical reality) cannot be accessed either through the senses or through reason. It has no determinations and hence is indistinguishable from nothing, of which Parmenides himself says ''nothing can be said''. We leave the realm of the logical and enter the realm of the mystical where we sit down and chant ''Om'' like the Yogis do.

I should have defined the terms, my bad. In this context, ''Being'' refers to an unchanging reality. ''Becoming'' refers to changing reality. Our senses tell us that all is change (Heraclitus/Nietzsche); Parmenides argues that the senses deceive us and that the world is really one and unchanging (Being).

Being = metaphysical world = unchanging reality (e.g. Parmenides' block universe, Plato's Forms, the Christian Heaven, etc.) The argument contra Parmenides is that we can think of these things but we cannot think them, that is, we cannot actually access them (at least not in the here and now), and so they are all indemonstrable and useless. The only world we have access to is the physical world of change.

But change seems to presuppose the existence of a thing. If something is changing then there must be a thing, i.e. an identity, that is undergoing change. It does not seem to make sense to speak of change independently of things, hence independently of pluralism.

I agree with you and it is for these very reasons that I am not sympathetic to post-modernism. Perhaps I phrased myself incorrectly. What I should have added is that post-modern attacks on reason/logic/truth are self-defeating/self-refuting.

But continental philosophy is not the same as postmodernism. Kant and Husserl were certainly not post-modernists, and arguably neither was Hegel. All three shared a faith in the exercise of reason to solve timeless, philosophical problems. Kant was a universalist; Husserl explicitly attacked psychologism; and Hegel was the last systematic philosopher building a ''meta-narrative''. Marx, another continental thinker, was also not a post-modernist, given his construction of a ''meta-narrative'' in the form of dialectical materialism, and his endorsing a materialist ontology (and hence remaining within the metaphysical tradition). These are all the things post-modernism attacks (among other things). The widespread study and teaching of continental philosophy does not entail the widespread study and teaching of post-modernism.

Agreed. He makes for awful reading.

if you think about what a ball actually is, it is bunch of atoms, made of fields, and these fields transmit the information — wax

But this still means that there is something that transmits this information. We can distinguish between that which transmits and that which is transmitted. By definition, we can only measure that which is transmitted. But wouldn't that which transmits be the underling, objective basis for what we call the ''ball''?

Is there somehow an objective speed of the ball? — wax

I think so, yes. Wouldn't the objective speed of the ball be the speed of the ball as it is, independent of observation? The moment we observe the ball we are doing so from a perspective. If the light rays travelling from the ball take longer/shorter to reach me than they do you, then we reach different perspectives regarding the motion of the ball. But why should we tie the motion of the ball to the distance that light rays travel? This seems arbitrary. There is an objective motion to the ball but it cannot itself be observed.

Is there somehow an objective speed of the ball? — wax

I get your point here. But what if we had a universe with no observers? If motion is relative to an observer, would it not follow that there would be no motion in said universe?

You experience time tacitly by existing. — emancipate

This is interesting. So, if a person were locked in a room with nothing in that room, would that person still retain a sense of the passage of time?

But isn't the key word in all this appearance? The ball appears to travel slowly for the observer on Earth, but it doesn't follow from this that the ball is really travelling slowly.

but how would you experience time, if it wasn't by measuring physical activity?

My premise is that time is constant; it does not speed up, nor slow down. So, if we are using measuring devices to indicate time, those devices have to be constant. So, when someone travels at the speed of light away from a clock, and sees that the hand on the clock has stopped moving, they know that time hasn't really slowed down; it appears that the clock hand has slowed down but, in reality, the clock hand is still moving at a constant rate (assume for the sake of the thought experiment that it's a perfect clock that is not prone to mechanical failure), it's just that the light from the clock hand will never reach you.

Thanks for your answer.

Heidegger's account, then, seems to lead to a certain subjectivism that undermines science. The scientist claims that he is describing the world as it is, and the great success of his theories/predictions in the empirical world would suggest that science is not merely describing the world as it appears to human beings but as it really is.

Take Heidegger's account of time. We know that this account differs from that of modern physics, specifically Einstein's special relativity, which treats space and time not as distinct entities (as Kant had assumed) but as combined, thus creating a four-dimensional world. Thus, the physicist would argue that Heidegger's account of time is flawed. I suspect Heidegger would reply that the physicist has conflated a mathematical model for how human beings experience the world, and these are two different things. In other words, one can accept the physicists' account of spacetime and accept Heidegger's account of how human beings experience time. But this is nevertheless to concede that there is a scientific view of the world and an ''existentialist'' view (I use quotation marks there as I am aware that Heidegger rejected that label) concerned with human experience.

@MindForged

Thanks. I'd be curious to hear what your views on Nietzsche are regarding this. Nietzsche essentially argues that we simplify the world by means of logic, reason, number, etc. and, in so doing, falsify it. Logic distorts the world by creating entities that do not actually refer to anything in the world (e.g. ''things'', ''identity'', ''permanence'', etc.), but we have to rely on logic in order to live at all. In other words, Nietzsche argues that we falsify the world in order to live, hence his questioning the value of truth in Beyond Good and Evil.

I think you typoed. Synthetic propositions are *not* true in virtue of meaning.

I thought that was the definition of a synthetic proposition though? A synthetic proposition is true by virtue of the meaning of its terms and due to facts about the world, whereas analytic propositions are true by virtue of the meaning of their terms alone?

I've got to go for now but I will respond when I'm back.

''All that I can know are my perceptions''.

Translation: All of my knowledge consists of perceptions.

Is knowledge defined as "What I am perceiving"? — Terrapin Station

Yes. I would have thought that that would follow from ''All of my knowledge consists of perceptions.''

The key word is ''All'' since it means that knowledge cannot take the form of anything other than my perceptions.

I literally just wrote in the post above: ''all that I can know are my perceptions''

If that does not answer your question there's not much more I can say. Again, I refer you to the Hume quote:

''We may observe, that 'tis universally allow'd by philosophers, and is besides pretty obvious of itself, that nothing is ever really present with the mind but its perceptions or impressions and ideas, and that external objects become known to us only by those perceptions which they occasion...Now since nothing is ever present to the mind but perceptions...it follows that 'tis impossible for us so much as to conceive or form an idea of any thing specifically different from ideas and impressions.'' [my emphasis]

Beautiful, butI didn't ask you that. — Terrapin Station

If perception of an unperceived object is impossible, and hence I cannot know unperceived objects, then all that I can know are my perceptions.

There's no need for a condescending tone.

Is knowledge defined as "what I am perceiving" ? — Terrapin Station

I have repeatedly said that perception of an unperceived object is impossible, hence we can have no knowledge of it. Hence, all that I can know are my perceptions (see the Hume quote).

Again, why would you use the word "know" to only refer to "things that I am perceiving" — Terrapin Station

Sorry, I thought I would have made this clear.

Answer: because ''knowledge'' that is independent of that which you perceive entails knowledge of that which you are not perceiving. To repeat my question: how could you possibly know that which is beyond your perception? You're not perceiving it, hence you cannot know it.

I can make inferences that the tree continues to exist in the quad after nobody is perceiving it, but I can't infer that it's God keeping it there. — Marchesk

Sure, you can infer that the tree continues to exist independently of your perception of it but it does not follow that you can know this.

The inductive argument would be: ''The tree will persist independently of my perception since it has always done this before.''

And then Hume will ask: ''Why are you using induction?''

''Because induction has worked before...''

Hence circularity.

But why is this faith and not inductive logic? — Marchesk

I guess it depends how you define ''faith''. Regarding induction, Hume showed that there is no non-circular justification of induction and, as such, induction cannot be justified on rational grounds.

I distinguished between knowledge of what I am perceiving and knowledge of that which is beyond my perception. The idealist affirms that you can know the former but not the latter. The realist maintains that you can know both. I have shown that the realist's position leads to a contradiction in terms. Hence, the position of the realist is refutable in a way that that of the idealist is not.

I completely agree that it makes sense. Hume would as well (can't remember the exact passage but he says ultimately that once he's stopped philosophizing he's going to live like any other person and accept the existence of external objects).

The point, however, is that said existence cannot be justified on the basis of reason but on faith. I believe that a world independent of my mind exists but I cannot possibly know this.

So I agree with your point, but it does not constitute a refutation of (epistemological) idealism.

Because I know that I am perceiving what I am perceiving. I cannot know whether what I am perceiving exists independent of my perception of it since this would entail my perceiving an unperceived object, a contradiction in terms, hence refuted.

Again, I believe that the realist position leads to a contradiction in terms that the idealist position does not lead to. Hence, one is refuted whilst the other is not.

I haven't said that just because Hume says something it must be correct; I quoted him to better clarify my position.

How do you know that an object can exist independently of perception? You can never know this since it is, by definition, that which is independent of perception, i.e. experience. The realist, in positing a mind-independent world, is making a claim beyond experience.

But it still seems to me that realism is refutable in a way that idealism is not.

Realism is refutable in that it commits one to a contradictory term, ''unperceived object''. To quote Hume on unperceived objects:

''We may observe, that 'tis universally allow'd by philosophers, and is besides pretty obvious of itself, that nothing is ever really present with the mind but its perceptions or impressions and ideas, and that external objects become known to us only by those perceptions which they occasion...Now since nothing is ever present to the mind but perceptions...it follows that 'tis impossible for us so much as to conceive or form an idea of any thing specifically different from ideas and impressions.''

If I'm not mistaken, Hume was writing after Berkeley.

Although I think it is fair to call both Hume and Berkeley ''idealists'', they are idealists in different senses.

Berkeley is an ontological idealist in that he believes that only ideas exist.

Hume is an epistemological idealist in that he believes that all that he can know to exist are ideas.

I agree regarding radical empiricism logically leading to idealism. Kant attempted to solve this problem by conceding to the empiricists that all knowledge begins with experience, but adding that it does not follow from this that all knowledge arises out of experience.

External to my body is locational in that the pen is in a different location to my body.

External to my mind seems to be non-locational. My position is that the pen is in my mind and that I cannot know whether it has an existence independent of my mind.

Sorry, could you clarify how you would distinguish between a locational and a non-locational view of externality? I have an idea of what you mean but I'd prefer you clarify to make sure I've understood.

The pen is external to the body in that it is outside my body. The pen is not external to my mind since it is being perceived, i.e. it is inside my mind. Is there a pen beyond my perception of it? I do not know.

I'll concede that I've made a claim about relative extension, but I'm not sure that this commits me to a theory of how mind and body relate? It definitely doesn't entail my saying that the mind ''extends'' beyond my body.

Again, my body is as much an external object as any other. What I say about the pen I can also say about the body.

I am not aware that I have made a claim about relative extension? You seem to be suggesting that I believe that the mind extends beyond the body. I have said that I do not know the relation between mind and body.

What I have said is that the body is as much an external object as any other that I encounter in perception.

To quote the passage from Hume that I've been referring to:

''We may observe, that 'tis universally allow'd by philosophers, and is besides pretty obvious of itself, that nothing is ever really present with the mind but its perceptions or impressions and ideas, and that external objects become known to us only by those perceptions which they occasion...Now since nothing is ever present to the mind but perceptions...it follows that 'tis impossible for us so much as to conceive or form an idea of any thing specifically different from ideas and impressions.''

- ''Of the Idea of Existence and of External Existence'', A Treatise of Human Nature

I have no idea what the relation between mind and body is. My body is as much an external object to my mind as is the pen.

My point is that the moment I cease to perceive anything at all I cannot know that it has an existence independent of my perception since this would entail perceiving an unperceived object.

This might imply that I cannot even know whether the experiences I have happen in ''my'' mind or in ''a'', ''some'', ''the'' mind, etc. Again, I believe this is the position Hume reaches in his Treatise.