The argument for PSR is, as I understand it, that it is necessary to assume PSR in order to do science. My purpose is to question that argument. — Banno
We might indeed look for a cause for any event, but we cannot assume ahead of our investigations that there must be one — Banno
And the man who can do that discerns clearly one form everywhere extended throughout many, where each one lies apart, and many forms, different from one another, embraced from without by one form, and again one form connected in a unity through many wholes, and many forms, entirely marked off apart. That means knowing how to distinguish kind by kind, in what ways the kinds can or cannot combine.
Socrates: Because, if a thing has parts, the whole thing must be the same as all the parts. Or do you say that a whole likewise is a single entity that arises out of the parts and is different from the aggregate of the parts?
Theaetetus: Yes, I do. — Theaetetus, 204, translated by F.M. Cornford
And ψευδομένους cannot be "a single lie" because it is plural. — Apollodorus
The English phrase "a noble lie" is only three words. It should not require 4 Greek words when translated back into Greek. — Apollodorus
Were this not the case, you would be able to show us the three Greek words that together form the phrase "a noble lie" — Apollodorus
Relativism is the nemesis of absolutism. :confused: I don't understand how the former could coexist with latter? — TheMadFool
These thinkers came upon the doctrine of Ideas because they were convinced about the truth of the Heraclitean arguments which state that all sensible things are always in a state of flux, so that if there is to be a science or knowledge of anything, there must exist apart from the sensible things some other natures which are permanent, for there can be no science of things which are in a state of flux. — Metaphysics, 1078b, translated by H.G. Apostle
Isn't that putting the cart before the horse? The differences in ability amongst men explains/supports Protagoras' stand that "man is the measure of all things". — TheMadFool
That proposition is addressed and deemed inadequate in the Theaetetus starting at 200d. — Valentinus
Can't be because of Gettier cases. — TheMadFool
So, "every day is like every other"? In a certain sense, yes (cyclical aspects) but in a different sense, no (acyclical aspects). I guess it depends on how we look at it aka perspective. Protagoras? — TheMadFool
Basically, the world is chaotic, pulling us in all directions.
Change is the only constant. — Heraclitus — TheMadFool
Homer was wrong in saying, "Would that strife might perish from amongst gods and men." For if that would occur, then all things would cease to exist.
And he still hasn't shown us where Plato uses the phrase "a noble lie" .... — Apollodorus
By the way, Valentinus, you seem to be very adept at pulling up the most highly relevant and significant passages from Plato. How do you do this? What supports that skill? — Metaphysician Undercover
I thought Socrates defined knowledge as justified, true belief? — TheMadFool
The future is within our grasp given the laws of nature are universal and constant - a good basketball player can, if he's skilled enough, score. — TheMadFool
Also, if the future can't be known isn't Heraclitus right? — TheMadFool
Hesiod distinguishes good days and bad day, not knowing every day is like every other.
It should be understood that war is the common condition, that strife is justice, and that all things come to pass through the compulsion of strife.
I think that to say that a Form is a kind, is a misunderstanding of Forms. — Metaphysician Undercover
Stranger: Dividing according to kinds, not taking the same form for a different one or different one for the same - is not that the business of the science of dialectic?
Stranger: And the man who can do that discerns clearly one form everywhere extended throughout many, where each one lies apart, and many forms, entirely marked off apart. That means knowing how to distinguish, kind by kind, in what ways the several kinds can and cannot combine.
Theaetetus: Most certainly.
Stranger: And the only person , I imagine, to whom you would allow this mastery of dialectic is the pure and rightful lover of wisdom. — Sophist, 253d, translated by F.M. Cornford
We are in a society of icy intolerance, where the slightest diversion from, the mildest breach of, the reality principle is violently repressed. Realist Philistinism and Pharisaism are triumphant on all sides. All ideas are immediately cast in concrete. The anathema level is the equal of any religious or Stalinist society. Nothing has changed. The conspiracy of imbeciles is total.
These fashionable spots where everyone recognizes everyone else without ever having known them. The voracity of faces, each lit up by the anticipated mutual recognition. Yet perhaps they did know each other in another world. This is the impression you get from Left Bank cocktail parties. Everyone has an air of déjà vu about them, and they float like shadows over the waters of the Styx. Moreover, hell must be just this: compulsive remembrance of all you've been through without ever being able to put a name to a face. — Baudrillard, Fragments, pg 25, translated by Emily Agar
Basically, Plato's allegory of the cave. — TheMadFool
We must, then , look more closely into the matter, as our defense of Protagoras enjoined, and study this moving reality, ringing its metal to hear if it sounds true or cracked. However that may be, there has been no inconsiderable battle over it, and not a few combatants. — translated by F.M Cornford
That Heraclitus is wrong does not mean that Parmenides is right. That would make a terrible argument. You are wrong, therefore anyone who says something different from you, must be right. — Metaphysician Undercover
This form of argumentation is what supports the stranger's metaphysics. The deficiencies of it are exposed more clearly in The Parmenides. But the proposed kinds, boundaries, and consequent category mistakes, expressed by Parmenides are extremely difficult to following, requiring great attention to detail. It is evident therefore, that Plato is rejecting this metaphysics, as based in faulty arguments, rather than supporting it. — Metaphysician Undercover
Socrates: A feeling of respect keeps me from treating in an unworthy spirit Mellisus and the others who say the universe is one and at rest., but there is one being I respect above all. Parmenides himself is in my eyes, as Homer says, a 'reverend and awful' figure. I met him when I was quite young and he quite elderly, and I thought there was a sort of depth in him that was altogether noble. I am afraid we might not understand his words and still less follow the thought they express. Above all, the original purpose of our discussion - the nature of knowledge - might be thrust out of sight, if we attend to these importunate topics that keep breaking in upon us. In particular, this subject we are raising now is of vast extent. It cannot be fairly treated as a side issue, and an adequate handling would take so long that we should lose sight of our question about knowledge. Either course would be wrong. My business is rather to try, by means of my midwife's art, to deliver Theaetetus of his conceptions about knowledge. — Thaeatetus, 183d, translated by Benjamin Jowett
In the same way both reasoning and refutation are sometimes genuine and sometimes not, though inexperience may make them appear ; for inexperienced people obtain only , as it were, a distant view of these things. — 164b, translated by W.A. Pickard-Cambridge
Being concerned with "that which is not" is the mark of a sophist (254). — Metaphysician Undercover
Stranger: It is, then, in some such region as this (where kind is distinguished from kind) that we shall find the philosopher now or later, if we should look for him. He too may be difficult to see clearly, but the difficulty in his case is not same as in the Sophist's.
Theaetetus: What is the difference?
Stranger: The Sophist takes refuge in the darkness of not-being, where he is at home and has the knack of feeling his way, and it is the darkness of the place that makes him hard to perceive.
Theaetetus: That may well be.
Stranger: Whereas the philosopher, whose thoughts constantly dwell on the nature of reality, is difficult to see because his region is so bright, for the eye of the vulgar soul cannot endure to keep its gaze upon the divine.
Theaetetus: That may well be no less true. — Sophist, 253d, translated by F.M Cornford
In the same way, the geometer does not investigate the attributes which are in a manner accidental to figures. nor the problem whether a triangle is distinct from a triangle whose angles are equal to two right angles. And this happens with good reason; for an accident is a mere name, as it were. And so Plato was not wrong when he ranked sophistry as being concerned with nonbeing. For the discussions of the sophists deal most of all with what is accidental, so to speak; for example whether the musical and the grammatical are the same or distinct.... — Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book Epsilon, 1026b, translated by H.G Apostle
And therefore the teaching they gave their pupils was ready and rough. For they used to suppose that they trained people by imparting to them not the art but its products, as though anyone professing that he would impart a form of knowledge to obviate any pain in the feet, were then not to teach a man the art of shoe-making or the sources whence he can acquire anything of the kind, but were to present him with several kinds of shoes of all sorts: for he has helped him to meet his need but has not imparted an art to him. — Aristotle, On Sophistical Refutations, 184a, translated by E.M. Edghill
It does. The Stranger is identified as a member of that circle. (216a) How do we reconcile Parmenides' denial of not-being with the Stranger's affirmation? The solution is in the dyad 'same and different'. — Fooloso4
Stranger: And if it were not about you, it is not about anything else.
Stranger: And if it were about nothing, it would not be a statement at all, for we pointed out that there could not be a statement that was a statement about nothing.
Theaetetus: Quite true.
Stranger: So what is stated about you, but so that what is different is stated as the same or what is not as what is--a combination of verbs and nouns answering to that description finally seems to be really and truly a false statement. — Sophist, 283c, translated by F.M. Cornford