If I understand you correctly, there is nothing about this example that is objectively immoral? The screams of the person in pain, the arm on the ground, the blood, the anguish of friends and family, none of this is objectively true? This, it seems, is a paragon case of immorality. One doesn't need to appeal to anything beyond the case itself. — Sam26
There's nothing
objectively immoral about it,
if we argue from a secular standpoint, because without religion there is no basis for objective morality.
What you sketch cannot be the basis of objective morality, because it would imply that people's dispositions are what determine whether or not an action is immoral. This means that if you take into account the victim and the onlookers, you must also take into account the disposition of the perpetrator and perhaps he is quite happy with what he's done. Or perhaps some of the onlookers did not like the victim and are quite content seeing him suffer. If you want to base objective morality on emotions, which sounds impossible at the onset, you cannot ignore the other side of the coin.
In virtually every case of immorality, the harm done is the reason it's referred to as immoral. And in cases where we argue over whether something is or is not immoral, usually it's because we don't see the harm, i.e., it's not clear that harm was done. — Sam26
Yet, I can think of dozens of examples where harm is done, but the act is not immoral. Thus, harm cannot be the sole factor. In a previous post you argued "harm without good reason", and I think we have established that "good reason" is entirely subjective and therefore cannot be used (logically) to argue objective morality.
The question is, why do I need to appeal to anything beyond the example to defend the idea that this act (my example) is immoral? Are you making the claim that the only way I would know this act is immoral is by appealing to something metaphysical, for example, God? — Sam26
I would argue that you're using the word 'immoral' wrong. Morality is the absolute definition of good and evil. It cannot be pliable, otherwise it loses all its meaning. You're describing your disposition towards something, namely you think it's bad to cut someone's arm off for no reason. That's a reasonable thing to say. But calling it immoral is to say it is
objectively bad, and without a force greater than man to determine what is objectively good and bad, that argument does not work. A force greater than man implies a vertical relationship, in other words, man would have a master. If there is no such force, then man has no master and thus the emotions and disposition of the perpetrator in your argument is worth just as much as the emotions and disposition as the victim, and therefore we cannot call it
objectively bad.
All I need to appeal to is the harm, nothing further. If I can make a clear case of the harm done, then I can make the claim that it's immoral, as in the example. — Sam26
Unless your willing to argue that in all cases where harm is caused, it is caused by an immoral act (including for example, self defense), this is unsatisfactory.
Who decides what's reasonable? We do. There are principles of correct reason that are applied, just as there are principles of mathematics that determine the correct and incorrect use of mathematical symbols. Moreover, I would say that these principles are discoverable. They are built into the universe, i.e., they are built into the background of reality. — Sam26
This sounds very nonsecular to me. I've heard similar theories described in lectures by Manly P. Hall and studies of Hermeticism, for example. There's nothing wrong with such views. In fact, I would largely sympathize with this approach, but to imply that there are principles built into reality that dictate how man should act is basically the same as admitting to a power greater than man, and thus to a form of God, or deity, or divine, but in a different sense than we're used to with the Abrahamic religions.