This strikes me as a pretty dishonest way of summarizing the thread. schopenhauer1 in particular is one of the most offensively proselytizing users on this forum. — Echarmion

Well, nothing I have read here suggests proselytizing, but maybe I am wrong.

What I have described is the way I look at the matter, at least.

It's weird that you make this question about you, personally. — Echarmion

How so? And why would it be weird?

My "observation" is that an anti-natalist position, ulitmately seeks to end humanity. — Echarmion

I don't think that's inherent to the position, but rather inherent to some individuals' desire to impose their views on others. That's a flaw in those individuals, and not in the position.

The fact that I cannot find sufficient justification to force individuals to exist doesn't mean it is the same for others.

What did "its" refer to again? You never answered but since everybody can read an understand sentences we already know. — Benkei

Oh. It was controversial?

And yet it continually happens in this thread and I've already pointed it out several times. The last time was here: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/480046 — Benkei

You inject half way in discussions between other people and take things out of context.

What you quoted wasn't about improving life. It was an attempt to show the absurdity of the earlier premise, by pointing out the absurdity of the implication.

It's not well-stated at all because consent cannot play a role here because this is once again personifying non-existence as if it has thought processes and a will. — Benkei

If one plans to put an individual into existence, shouldn't one take into account their well-being beforehand, regardless of whether they already exist or not? One knows that it is going to happen, so one acts accordingly. Isn't that how common sense works and how every parent operates?

Wouldn't you say that a view that ultimately seeks to create a universe devoid of subjects that can experience it is self-destructive? It seems hard to ignore this ultimate conclusion of the anti-natalist argument. — Echarmion

Views are not actors, but to follow the spirit of your comment I would say no.

I don't seek to create such a universe. I haven't seen anyone here expressing that they do.

As far as I have seen, the anti-natalist argument as shared in this thread consists of observations and questions to which there do not seem to be any good answers. Every individual can draw their own conclusions and make their own choices based on that.

But yes, if every person on earth were to conclude at once that the questions and observations of the anti-natalist argument are sufficient reason not to have children, humanity would eventually cease to exist. If that is a result of people's voluntary choice not to have children, then what business is that of mine?

I can't say I don't appreciate a little armchair psychology, but this makes little sense.

The anti-natalist viewpoint as I have seen it expressed in this thread is based on A: the idea that voluntariness and consensuality form the basis for moral conduct in regards to others, and B: that childbirth does not fit these criteria.

It has nothing to do with distrust of others, a desire to be left alone, the assertion of ego or self-destruction.

Great comment. I quite frankly don't know what there is left to say.

You just keep repeating that we're "forcing someone without consent" — Echarmion

Because it's at the core of the issue. By your use of the word "we" I'm assuming you are a parent?

but don't explain who that "someone" is supposed to be — Echarmion

The individual one is considering forcing into existence.

or how the decision-making process you envision would function. — Echarmion

Forcing others to do things without their consent needs to be avoided.

And if you make no decision, that also has consequences, right? — Echarmion

Why non-action? There are still consequences attached to this. — Echarmion

Sure.

The reason is simple; even if one intends to do good by birthing a child, the ends (odds for a happy life) do not justify the means (forcing someone without consent).

At those odds yes. You'd previously admitted you have no idea what the odds actually are in life so why would you think such a comparison relevant. — Isaac

At what odds would it be acceptable to force someone to jump from a plane?

Why is it an 'issue'. — Isaac

One would be forcing an individual to experience life, without being able to ensure whether they want to. An anti-natalist would say this is sufficient reason to refrain from doing so.

No one breathes voluntarily either. Is that a problem you feel we need to address? — Isaac

No one forces you to breathe, so I don't think this is a good comparison.

Basic risk assessment. The experience would have to be really good. And yes, people who find the experience really good do take that risk for exactly those reasons so I'm not sure what you think that example shows. — Isaac

Well, everyone is free to make such an assessment for themselves. Things get complicated when we force someone else to jump out of a plane with those odds, no?

So we go back in time or what? How do we take into account a child's will and ability to consent when both of those things only come to exist after the decision we're supposed to be taking them into account in? — Isaac

You cannot, which is exactly the issue.

In the context of our discussion those things cannot be seen seperately.

Not being able to get consent for an important decision that is made on someone else's behalf would greatly impact how I would weigh predictions and make a decision, if I choose to make a decision at all.

If I come to the conclusion the decision is too important to be made without consent, then I have no issue with choosing non-action.

What's controversial is treating this prediction as if it was the state of affairs. To use another analogy: Let's say I developed a new flavor of ice-cream. Any given selection of ingredients will taste good to some people and bad to others. These are predictable consequences. But if I hand out my ice-cream to random customers, I cannot possibly attempt to only give my ice-cream to people that will like it. — Echarmion

You don't force people to eat your ice cream.

What kind of answer is that? You said an individual was being forced into something. Now you're saying you don't even know where they are? — Isaac

I'm just being honest. Obviously, I don't know where they are. But I can say beyond a reasonable doubt that no one is born voluntarily.

Then an assumption that they'd absolutely love it is as reasonable as an assumption that they'd hate it. Since we're in a position where we're uniquely unable to ask, what's wrong with taking a guess? — Isaac

Would you jump out of a plane knowing there's a 25% chance your parachute wouldn't work? If not, what's wrong with taking a gamble? 75% chance for a positive experience.

So your own answer to that question would be "no - it's nit that simple because the central issue is consent, not consequences"? — Isaac

No.

What I sought to point out with that comment is that the question whether a child's will, well-being and ability to consent should be taken into account prior to the decision of having children, is a matter of considering the logical consequences of childbirth, which are them coming to be as an individual with those faculties.

Where is this individual who's being forced? — Isaac

Who knows?

This whole argument arose from you claiming that issues over consent were unnecessary. — Isaac

That is not something I have claimed. Consent has been the core issue.

Consent cannot possibly be given, there's no entity capable of consent. — Isaac

Indeed. That is exactly the issue.

In all other situations where consent cannot possibly be given we make an assessment based on a weighing of the consequences. Why are you advocating a different course of action here? — Isaac

If I have to make a decision on someone else's behalf without their consent, my first question would be whether there is some dire need that would justify it. In the case of childbirth, I don't see that dire need.

Then how do we know that it will contain any meaningful degree of suffering? — Isaac

We don't. We know next to nothing about the quality of their life. It'd be nothing less than an experiment.

What I am saying is that unborn children cannot have standing as moral subjects. — Echarmion

This is not what I have argued.

What you can - indeed must - do is to predict the consequences of possible decisions. In this sense, you can also predict that the child will have a will and interests. It'd just be a mistake to treat this prediction as current fact. — Echarmion

An unborn child developing into an individual with a will and well-being is (generally speaking) a logical consequence once one makes the decision to have children, thus should be taken into account prior to this decision. I don't see why this is controversial.

Why? Since inaction can have no less of a consequence in a dynamic environment, I don't see why you'd favour it over action in the face of uncertainty. — Isaac

Not only is one forcing an individual to do something that has great consequences without their consent, but one is also incapable of estimating the outcome.

Notwithstanding that, hasn't your argument previously been exactly that we can satisfactorily predict the consequences of our actions? — Isaac

Some things can be satisfactorily predicted. Other things cannot. I think the possible quality of life of an unborn child belongs to the latter category.

I disagree. One could come to the conclusion that the consequences of their actions cannot be sufficiently understood. A good reason to refrain from such an action.

This is attributing personhood. — Benkei

It is not.

It is taking into account what will logically come about as a consequence of one's actions.

As I already said, it doesn't imply that such actions cannot be considered wrong or immoral. Only that the moral weight cannot come from the will or interest of the non-existent child. We haven't actually excluded that there is an overarching moral principle hat says to not have children when you cannot adequately support them. — Echarmion

What are such overarching moral principles based on, other than the well-being of would-be children?

You don't control the outcomes though. — Echarmion

Indeed. Isn't that a great reason to think twice before having children?

I don't have a problem with admitting that there are some things I still need to figure out regarding the moral weight of future people. But I nevertheless feel very confident that tying yourself into knots trying to somehow attribute personhood to unborn children while maintaining that they don't exist is the solution. — Echarmion

I'm not trying to attribute personhood. There's no need for it.

I'm challenging your suggestion that because a child is not yet born, one can do whatever they please in regards to its future.

Isn't it as simple as taking into account the consequences of one's actions prior to carrying them out?

It seems we're playing dumb, pretending that individuals decide to have children and when the child is born and has a will and well-being, we scratch our heads and wonder where all that came from?

Both these problems stem from looking at morality as a set of injunctions against specific outcomes, like a criminal law code listing a bunch of injuries you are not allowed to cause. And if a victim cannot be found and thus a prohibition not established, it then follows whatever you do is moral. — Echarmion

Not quite.

My premise started with an analysis of what child birth is; forcing an individual to experience life without their consent.

Your objection was that an individual that does not yet exist, has no will or well-being to take into account, thus no consent is required.

What I sought to point out is that your objection implies that actions that undermine the well-being of a future child cannot be considered wrong or immoral under your premise, which goes against all notions that I am able to conceive of what is considered "good".

The alternative view is to ask what reasons we have for doing something, and whether those reasons are "good". Should I follow these reasons in other circumstance? Shoud everyone? Creating suffering for the sake of suffering is not an acceptable motivation regardless of the outcome. It doesn't matter if I apply it by genetically engineering beings that suffer, or whether I punch my neighbor in the face for fun. — Echarmion

If you wish to shift morality from being about outcomes to being about intentions, I'll take the next step and state that "good" behavior requires both intention and outcome.

Either way I do not see how this deals with the problem I have presented.

Explain it then, instead of beating around the bush.

It's what and I were discussing before you interjected.

You noted it was "dealt with" and "not a problem".

Premise: The interests of a future child do not exist.

Implication: Actions that willfully undermine said child's non-existent interests are acceptable.

Your main problem is that you cannot compare the suffering of someone to the "suffering of nothing". Maybe that's true. But that would imply some nasty things I'll start with one. — khaled

I've noticed that these implications have been pointed out on several occasions by you, and I, and none of us have received much response.

It's not avoided at all. I specifically mention unavoidable poverty. — Benkei

So then, do you accept the implication of your premise?

I'm not sure I see this as a problem. — Echarmion

The problem is simple. If one accepts the premise that children do not have a well-being to take into account before they are born, this implies that it is perfectly acceptable to have children even when one is fully aware that they are causing them a life-time of suffering.

To me this contradicts any conceivable notion of parenting and morality.

It wasn't dealt with. It was cleverly avoided.

You're presented your premise. I've presented you with an implication of that premise. If you accept one, you accept the other.

Then we arrive at the problem already presented:

Let's say one lives in absolutely dire poverty and there is no doubt that any offspring one may bring forth will also lead a short and miserable life.

The line of reasoning you present would see no issue with birthing children in such conditions, since there's no individual whose well-being we need to take into account preceding the birth. — Tzeentch

They're not so much unimportant as they are nonexistent. — Echarmion

So are they important or not?

You seem to be beating around the bush here.

No, because the obligation of the parents is one sided. It applies regardless of the interests of the child, so there is no need to try to divine their interests before they can have any, much less ascribe some kind of will to nonexistence. — Echarmion

If not the interests of the child, from where do these obligations stem?

And if we cannot divine what the child's feelings are about being forced to live, isn't that a great reason to refrain from forcing it to?

But even if I grant that for the sake of discussion, it'd still be the case that I need to decide, for myself, whether or not an interaction is voluntary on the other side. Even if I am being told directly, that only ever constitutes a certain amount of evidence for or against an underlying will. — Echarmion

Sure.

Seems like all the more reason to be extremely careful when interacting forcefully with others, even more so when it concerns (literally) life-changing matters.

My line of reasoning would only say that the interests of the child are not the issue. — Echarmion

If the interests of the child aren't important, then whose interests are? The desires of the parents?

And doesn't your mention of obligations imply that the interests of the future child should be taken into account preceding the act of putting it into existence?

Whose discretion do you suppose I apply? I only have access to my own. — Echarmion

I'd take it a step back and argue that one should avoid forcing one's will upon others against their will altogether. Voluntary and consensual interaction seems to me the basis of moral conduct.

But this implies that the child that doesn't yet exist already has a will we are protecting. — Echarmion

What individual is being forced? You're only an individual after you have already experienced life. — Echarmion

Let's say one lives in absolutely dire poverty and there is no doubt that any offspring one may bring forth will also lead a short and miserable life.

The line of reasoning you present would see no issue with birthing children in such conditions, since there's no individual whose well-being we need to take into account preceding the birth.

You should use your power if doing so follows a maxim that you can will to be universalised. Usually, asking if you yourself would want to experience it is a good first approximation. But the details depend on the experience and the relationship we're in. — Echarmion

If it is acceptable to use one's power at one's own subjective discretion to force one's will onto others, we enter a slippery slope that inevitably leads to "might makes right."

I don't see how there could be a "violation" if there is nothing protected. — Echarmion

Protection implies more parties are involved (AKA, parent protects their would-be child from a third party). I am arguing from the viewpoint of the parent in relation to their would-be child. 'Protecting' one's future child from one's own desire of having children can be more easily understood as making the choice not to potentially violate one's would-be child's will.

But this is getting overly fuzzy, while the objection of anti-natalists is very straight forward. What justifies the act of forcing an individual to experience life without knowing whether they want to or not?

It's not a complicated matter at all.

Let's say I had the power to make you experience something that you may or may not enjoy. Why should or shouldn't I use that power without your consent?

I don't think that needs to be argued. The argument is simply that one should not purposefully put an individual in a situation that they did not (or cannot) consent to.

There's no protection of another's will. It's the prevention of violating another's will.

The question that needs answering first here is why consent is important. — Echarmion

Because without it one risks causing harm or distress against an individual's will, regardless of one's intention.

I haven't made up my mind about anti-natalism yet, but I think the most difficult question it raises is what exactly justifies the act of forcing someone to experience life.

If we can agree that forcing individuals to do things without their consent is inherently problematic, then this raises a lot of questions regarding the act of having children.

I think when we whine about American imperialism, we've just totally forgotten how devastating a real empire can be. — frank

If that is the case I blame short memories.

We want to satisfy our hunger, we want to have sex, we want to acquire things and do things that help with survival and pass on our genes. To overcome this "slavery" would involve being able to ignore the imperatives evolution sets up. It would involve not desiring food when hungry, not desiring sex when horny, it would involve not reacting to fear when scared, not reacting with angree words when offended. Monks through meditation have been able to do this to different extents so in a seance monks are overcoming there "slave to the evolutionary process" — Restitutor

If evolution isn't driving our behaviors then what is? — Restitutor

This is the key question, I believe.

I would take it one step back. The driving force behind our behavior is a desire to be happy. The evolutionary process has provided us with goals that promise happiness, which function as a carrot on a stick.

Some individuals may come to the conclusion that this situation does not provide them with the happiness they seek.

What then is the function of all the imperatives that evolution has produced for them?

It seems to me whether evolution has a purpose for the individual is therefore a subjective matter, and not particularly suited as a basis for truth or morality.

Do you not see any role for evolution at all in any human behavior? — Restitutor

It depends on the individual. I imagine it can be useful for explaining human behavior in general, but I'm not sure what the purpose of such generalizations are in the context of philosophy.

It is not a master-save relationship. — god must be atheist

A slave without a master is a slave nonetheless.

I would brush up on learning the evolutionary process if I were you and wished to understand natural processes of evolution. — god must be atheist

Cute. Not a polite way to start a conversation.

Keep your condescending diatribe to yourself.

We are a a very similar proposition, we are just the packaging for our DNA, the host that allows for there replication. It makes sence that genes wouldn't just control what our bodies look like bout would control behavior, or at least create a the framework within which we can indoctrinate each other with useful ideas. — Restitutor

Is there any reason that the individual should be content with being a slave to the evolutionary process?

And what rational analysis pertaining to this process can be expected from individuals which, as you say, are indoctrinated in a framework to enforce it?

Self-discovery assumes there's a self and that there's something to be discovered about the self and, most importantly, that it's something one would want to discover. I have no idea about the first two assumptions but, in my own case, the third assumption turns out to be false. Let's face it, we're all just one bad day away from becoming something we, ourselves, wouldn't want to meet in a dark alley. — TheMadFool

Assuming one finds a monster to be dwelling in their sub-/unconscious, wouldn't one want to understand how it works and what it is doing there?

I'd say an obsession with the acquisition of material things can be an inhibitor of enlightenment, but it is indicative of a deeper condition, namely the obsession with material existence; the latter being the real issue.

It ties in nicely with 's comment. How are the "monster" that TheMadFool describes and material existence connected?

Gloating over someone's lynching. That's absolutely disgusting.